United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS May 20, 2003
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 02-11300
Summary Calendar
KENNETH LEON CRAFT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
GARY L. JOHNSON; RAYNALDO CASTRO, Senior Warden; JANIE COCKRELL,
Deputy Director of Security; CHARLES C. BELL, Assistant Warden;
JOE NUNN, Assistant Warden,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
(2:01-CV-225)
Before BARKSDALE, DeMOSS, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Kenneth Leon Craft, Texas state prisoner # 781171, appeals,
pro se, the dismissal, without prejudice, of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983
in forma pauperis (IFP) complaint for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. Craft maintains he has stated an
Eighth Amendment claim: because of bed checks by prison officials,
he is being deprived of uninterrupted sleep.
*Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
We review a dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) de novo,
applying the same standard used to review a dismissal pursuant to
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). Black v. Warren, 134 F.3d 732, 733-34
(5th Cir. 1998). We accept as true all the allegations of the
complaint, considering them in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff. Ashe v. Corley, 992 F.2d 540, 544 (5th Cir. 1993).
Craft’s allegations of intermittent sleep deprivation are not
sufficient to show that he is exposed to a risk that is so grave
that it violates contemporary standards of decency. See Helling v.
McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 36 (1993). Because Craft’s allegations fail
to state an Eighth Amendment claim, the dismissal of the complaint
was not error.
Craft also contends the district court erred in denying his
motion for a temporary restraining order and/or for a preliminary
injunction because there are remaining fact issues concerning his
entitlement to relief. We lack jurisdiction over the denial of
Craft’s motion for a temporary restraining order. See Faulder v.
Johnson, 178 F.3d 741, 742 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1018
(1999).
The denial of a preliminary injunction is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion. See Women’s Med. Ctr. v. Bell, 248 F.3d 411,
418-19 (5th Cir. 2001). To obtain a preliminary injunction, Craft
must establish, among other factors, that he has a substantial
likelihood of success on the merits of his claims. Id. As shown
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above, there is no likelihood that Craft will be successful in
proving the merits of his claims. Thus, the district court did not
abuse its discretion in denying Craft’s motion for a preliminary
injunction.
AFFIRMED
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