NOTICE: Under Supreme Court Rule 367 a party has 21 days after
the filing of the opinion to request a rehearing. Also, opinions
are subject to modification, correction or withdrawal at anytime
prior to issuance of the mandate by the Clerk of the Court.
Therefore, because the following slip opinion is being made
available prior to the Court's final action in this matter, it
cannot be considered the final decision of the Court. The
official copy of the following opinion will be published by the
Supreme Court's Reporter of Decisions in the Official Reports
advance sheets following final action by the Court.
Docket No. 81621--Agenda 16--January 1997.
JENNIFER PANKY BURRELL, Appellee, v. SOUTHERN TRUSS et al. (Wood
River Township Hospital et al., Appellants).
Opinion filed April 24, 1997.
JUSTICE MILLER delivered the opinion of the court:
Wood River Township Hospital (Wood River), Medical
Radiological Services, Inc. (Medical Radiological), and Dr. Anthony
Marrese filed separate liens in the circuit court of Saline County
against proceeds received by plaintiff, Jennifer Panky Burrell, in
a settlement with defendants, Joel Kingston and Southern Truss.
Wood River filed its claim under the Hospital Lien Act (770 ILCS
35/0.01 et seq. (West 1992)), and Medical Radiological and Dr.
Marrese filed their separate claims under the Physicians Lien Act
(770 ILCS 80/0.01 et seq. (West 1992)). The total of these three
liens exceeded one-third of plaintiff's settlement. The circuit
court aggregated the lien claims, limited total recovery on the
liens to one-third of the settlement, and prorated the amounts to
be dispensed to the lienholders so that the total paid to the
lienholders did not exceed one-third of plaintiff's recovery. On
appeal, the appellate court affirmed the distribution to the
lienholders. 281 Ill. App. 3d 553. We granted leave to appeal (155
Ill. 2d R. 315) and now reverse the judgments of the appellate and
circuit courts.
Plaintiff filed a complaint based on the negligent or wrongful
acts of Kingston in the course of his employment with Southern
Truss. Plaintiff later settled her claims against the defendants
for a total of $8,500. Plaintiff then filed a petition to
adjudicate certain outstanding liens, arguing that the total amount
of the liens exceeded one-third of the settlement. Three of the
plaintiff's creditors entered appearances in the proceedings. Wood
River asserted a lien in the amount of $913.65 under the Hospital
Lien Act. Medical Radiological and Dr. Marrese asserted liens in
the amount of $473 and $1,529, respectively, under the Physicians
Lien Act. The Hospital Lien Act provides that "the total amount of
all liens hereunder shall not exceed one-third of the sum paid or
due to said injured person on said claim or right of action ***."
770 ILCS 35/1 (West 1992). The Physicians Lien Act contains
identical limiting language. 770 ILCS 80/1 (West 1992). Although
the liens together exceeded one-third of plaintiff's settlement,
the total amounts claimed under each of the two lien acts did not
exceed one-third of the settlement.
The circuit judge read the Hospital Lien Act and the
Physicians Lien Act together and limited total recovery by the
lienholders to one-third of plaintiff's settlement. The judge then
prorated each lien at 97.17% of its total--an amount that would
reduce the total of the liens so that they would not exceed one-
third of the settlement. Thus, Wood River's lien was reduced by
$25.86, Medical Radiological's lien was reduced by $13.39, and Dr.
Marrese's lien was reduced by $43.28.
Wood River and Medical Radiological appealed, arguing that the
Hospital Lien Act and Physicians Lien Act each create distinct
liens and that there exists a separate right under each act to a
maximum of one-third of plaintiff's settlement. The appellate court
disagreed and affirmed the decision of the circuit court. 281 Ill.
App. 3d at 558. The appellate court noted the similarity of the
language in the different lien acts and believed that the intent of
the legislature and the practical application of the statutes were
furthered by reading the statutes together. 281 Ill. App. 3d at
556-57. Like the circuit court, the appellate court limited
recovery on the total of all liens under the hospital and
physicians lien acts to a maximum of one-third of the plaintiff's
recovery.
In construing a statute, courts are required to ascertain and
give effect to the intent of the legislature. Varelis v.
Northwestern Memorial Hospital, 167 Ill. 2d 449, 454 (1995). Courts
should first look to the language of the statute to determine the
intent of the drafters. Nottage v. Jeka, 172 Ill. 2d 386, 392
(1996). When the statutory language is clear, no resort is
necessary to other aids of construction. Henry v. St. John's
Hospital, 138 Ill. 2d 533, 541 (1990). We must determine in this
case whether the hospital and physicians lien acts limit the
recovery of all lienholders under these acts to a combined one-
third of plaintiff's recovery, or whether the statutes simply limit
recovery under each individual lien act to one-third of plaintiff's
recovery.
As we have noted, the Hospital Lien Act provides that "the
total amount of all liens hereunder shall not exceed one-third of
the sum paid or due to said injured person on said claim or right
of action ***." 770 ILCS 35/1 (West 1992). The Physicians Lien Act
contains the same language. 770 ILCS 80/1 (West 1992). Unlike the
courts below, we believe that the plain language of these statutes
limits application of the one-third maximum to each individual act
and requires aggregation of only those liens filed under that
particular act. We agree with the lienholders that the phrase "all
liens hereunder," in limiting the amount of liens that may be
asserted against a single recovery, refers only to liens filed
under each act, and does not include liens that are asserted under
separate provisions. To hold otherwise, as plaintiff suggests,
would require us to read into the statutes an additional limitation
that the legislature did not include.
This interpretation of the statutory language conforms to the
long standing construction the appellate court has given this
language. Wheaton v. Department of Public Aid, 92 Ill. App. 3d 1084
(1981), dealt with a fact pattern almost identical with the present
case. In Wheaton, one claimant filed a lien under the Hospital Lien
Act and two other claimants filed liens under the Physicians Lien
Act. Wheaton, 92 Ill. App. 3d at 1085. The amount claimed under
each act was less than one-third of plaintiff's settlement, but the
total amount asserted under the two acts, together, exceeded one-
third of the settlement. Wheaton, 92 Ill. App. 3d at 1086-87. The
appellate court held that the amounts of the hospital's and
physicians' liens could not be reduced as long as the total amount
of the liens filed under each separate act did not exceed one-third
of plaintiff's recovery. Wheaton, 92 Ill. App. 3d at 1086.
The same rationale has been followed by every court deciding
the issue until the present case. See, e.g., Illini Hospital v.
Bates, 135 Ill. App. 3d 732, 734 (1985) (language of the statute is
clear and the allowance of liens under the Hospital Lien Act is
mandatory provided it does not exceed one-third of the total
recovery); In re Estate of McMillan, 115 Ill. App. 3d 1022, 1026
(1983) (in light of the plain language of section 1 of the Hospital
Lien Act, reduction of hospital's lien appropriate only if lien
exceeds one-third of settlement); O'Donnell v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 71 Ill. App. 3d 1, 13 (1979) (under the Hospital Lien Act, the
court is charged with the responsibility of adjudicating and
enforcing hospital liens pursuant to a mechanical "one-third of
proceeds" formula).
Although we rest our decision on the plain language of the
statutes at issue here, we note that our interpretation is
consistent with the legislative history of related provisions.
There are five other separate acts providing for liens in favor of
health-care providers in Illinois. These additional lien acts
govern dentists (770 ILCS 20/0.01 et seq. (West 1992)), physical
therapists (770 ILCS 75/1 et seq. (West 1992)), home health care
agencies (770 ILCS 25/1 et seq. (West 1992)), clinical
psychologists (770 ILCS 10/0.01 et seq. (West 1992)), and emergency
medical services personnel (770 ILCS 22/1 et seq. (West 1992)). All
the acts except the one applicable to dentists were enacted after
the Wheaton decision. "Where statutes are enacted after judicial
opinions are published, it must be presumed that the legislature
acted with knowledge of the prevailing case law." People v.
Hickman, 163 Ill. 2d 250, 262 (1994). We may thus assume that the
legislature was aware of, and approved, Wheaton's construction when
it enacted the other lien statutes and continued to use the phrase
"all liens hereunder" or an equivalent expression, "all liens under
this Act," in limiting the amount that may be received under each
act to one-third of the plaintiff's recovery.
Further support for our holding may be found in the
legislative history of one of the post-Wheaton statutes, the Home
Health Agency Lien Act. Like the provisions applicable to
physicians and hospitals, at issue here, the Home Health Agency
Lien Act uses the phrase "all liens hereunder" in limiting the
amount that may be asserted under that statute against a single
recovery. During debate on the act, there was discussion regarding
the distribution of a recovery when the liens of different types of
health-care providers exceed the money available. 84th Ill. Gen.
Assem., House Proceedings, June 20, 1985, at 323-24. Representative
Johnson, explaining that he wished to establish legislative intent,
offered an example in which, after the attorney's lien had been
deducted, $60,000 remained of an initial $100,000 recovery and
separate sums of $30,000 were claimed under the hospital,
physicians, and home health care lien acts. 84th Ill. Gen. Assem.,
House Proceedings, June 20, 1985, at 323-24 (statements of
Representative Johnson). In response to questions from
Representative Johnson, Representative Levin affirmed that all the
liens should be treated "on the same footing," to use
Representative Johnson's phrase, and reduced on a prorated basis so
that each of the three lien categories would be entitled to $20,000
of the $60,000 remaining from the recovery. 84th Ill. Gen. Assem.,
House Proceedings, June 20, 1985, at 324 (statements of
Representatives Johnson and Levin). As these remarks demonstrate,
the amount claimed under each lien act in the example is for less
than one-third of the settlement. After adjudication, however, the
lienholders' total recovery would equal an amount that represents
60% of the total settlement, exceeding one-third of the settlement.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the Hospital Lien
Act and the Physicians Lien Act provide for separate liens, with
the total amounts that may be claimed under each act limited to
one-third of plaintiff's settlement. We therefore reverse the
judgments of the appellate and circuit courts and remand the cause
to the circuit court of Saline County for entry of judgment
consistent with this opinion.
Appellate court judgment reversed;
circuit court judgment reversed;
cause remanded.
JUSTICE HARRISON, dissenting:
I was against granting the petition for leave to appeal in
this case, and I still think review by this court was
inappropriate. The court's decision today does not award Wood
River, Medical Radiological, or Dr. Marrese a single penny more
than they were otherwise entitled to. It merely makes it easier for
them to collect the amount plaintiff already owes by increasing
their statutory lien rights against her settlement proceeds. The
increase for all three health care providers totals all of $82.53.
Eighty-two dollars and fifty-three cents in additional lien
rights for three providers for four years of litigation. That is
all this case is or was ever about. What this shows to me is that
there is no amount too trivial to warrant the court's intervention
if my colleagues believe they can make the litigation process more
difficult for plaintiffs.
Wholly aside from these considerations, I believe that the
majority's opinion is misguided. The appellate court correctly
noted that if the various liens could be aggregated, as the
majority here holds, the total lien amount could easily consume the
plaintiff's entire recovery. The plaintiff would have hired an
attorney and endured the rigors of litigation and achieved success
and be left with nothing. I share the appellate court's view that
the legislature could not have intended such an absurd and unjust
result.
A second flaw in the majority's analysis is that it can yield
inequitable and absurd results even among the lien holders
themselves. Because the majority treats each of the lien statutes
as being independent of the others, the size of a particular health
care provider's lien may depend on the fortuity of whether the
other lien holders are governed by the same lien statute or by a
different one.
The anomalies that can result are readily illustrated. Assume,
for example, that a plaintiff receives a $9,000 recovery and has
agreed to pay his attorney a one-third contingency fee. If the
plaintiff had a physical therapy bill of $3,000 and a bill from his
doctor for $3,000, the majority's approach would mean that the
therapist and the doctor could each assert liens for the full
amount they were owed, a total of $6,000. If, however, the
providers submitting the $3,000 bills were both doctors rather than
a doctor and a physical therapist, their combined lien rights would
be limited to $3,000, half as much. Similarly, if there were two
doctors who both had bills of $3,000 in addition to the physical
therapist with the $3,000 bill, each of the doctors would have to
accept liens for a reduced amount, while the physical therapist
would be entitled to a lien for the full $3,000.
I can see no rational basis for such disparate results. The
appellate court's approach avoids these problems completely. The
majority's analysis simply ignores them. In so doing, it sets the
stage for inequities that the legislature could not have intended
and failed to recognize when it debated and enacted the law.
Where the passage of a series of legislative acts results in
confusion and consequences that the General Assembly may not have
contemplated, the courts must construe the acts in such a way as to
reflect the obvious intent of the legislature and permit practical
application of the law. People ex rel. Community High School
District No. 231 v. Hupe, 2 Ill. 2d 434, 448 (1954). The appellate
court did that here. Its judgement should therefore be affirmed.
Accordingly, I dissent.