NOTICE: Under Supreme Court Rule 367 a party has 21 days after the filing of the opinion
to request a rehearing. Also, opinions are subject to modification, correction or withdrawal at
anytime prior to issuance of the mandate by the Clerk of the Court. Therefore, because the
following slip opinion is being made available prior to the Court's final action in this matter,
it cannot be considered the final decision of the Court. The official copy of the following
opinion will be published by the Supreme Court's Reporter of Decisions in the Official
Reports advance sheets following final action by the Court.
Docket No. 80540--Agenda 8--November 1996.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. KIM TRUITT,
Appellee.
Opinion filed January 30, 1997.
JUSTICE HARRISON delivered the opinion of the court:
Defendant, Kim Truitt, is being prosecuted in the circuit
court of Rock Island County for unlawful delivery of a controlled
substance (720 ILCS 570/401 (West 1994)). The case has not yet gone
to trial. The matter is before our court because the State
disagrees with a pretrial ruling by the circuit court regarding how
it will be required to prove that the subject material is a
controlled substance. For the reasons that follow, we have
concluded that this court has no jurisdiction to hear the State's
appeal. The appeal is therefore dismissed.
In establishing its case against defendant at trial, the State
hoped to avail itself of section 115--15 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/115--15 (West 1994)). That statute
does not alter what the State is required to prove. It merely
simplifies how the State may present its evidence by creating a
limited exception to the normal hearsay rules.
Section 115--15(a) provides that laboratory reports from the
Department of State Police, Division of Forensic Services and
Identification, are admissible as prima facie evidence of the
contents, identity and weight of the subject material in
prosecutions for violation of either the Cannabis Control Act (720
ILCS 550/1 et seq. (West 1994)) or the Illinois Controlled
Substances Act (720 ILCS 570/100 et seq. (West 1994)). The need to
adduce testimony from the person who actually performed the
analysis is eliminated, provided that certain conditions are met.
Except in the case of preliminary or grand jury hearings,
utilization of section 115--15's provisions requires the State to
serve a copy of the laboratory report on the defendant's attorney
(or on the defendant himself if he is unrepresented). 725 ILCS
5/115--15(b) (West 1994). The defendant or his attorney then has
seven days from the date of receipt to demand that the State
present the testimony of the person who signed the report. 725 ILCS
5/115--5(c) (West 1994). If no such demand is made, the report is
admissible for the purpose of establishing the contents, identity
and weight of the substance without the need for any additional
foundation or testimony.
In the case before us, the State's Attorney duly served
defense counsel with a copy of the laboratory report. When no
demand for live testimony was made by the defendant or his
attorney, the State's Attorney advised the court and defense
counsel that he intended to rely on the laboratory report at trial
without calling the chemist who prepared it, as section 115--15
permitted. On the motion of defendant's attorney, the circuit court
then entered a pretrial order declaring that section 115--15 was
unconstitutional and could not be invoked by the State to avoid
presenting testimony from the person who analyzed the substance in
question and prepared the report on it.
The State now seeks to appeal the circuit court's
interlocutory order directly to our court. Defendant has challenged
this court's jurisdiction to hear the case, and although we
vacillated on the question before the case was taken under
advisement, we have ultimately concluded that defendant's
jurisdictional challenge is meritorious.
Initially, the State claimed that we had jurisdiction pursuant
to our Rule 302(a) (134 Ill. 2d R. 302(a)). That rule, however,
does not apply to criminal appeals. 134 Ill. 2d R. 612. Once it
realized this, the State next invoked Rule 603 (134 Ill. 2d R.
603), which provides:
"Appeals in criminal cases in which a statute of the
United States or of this State has been held invalid and
appeals by defendants from judgments of the circuit
courts imposing a sentence of death shall lie directly to
the Supreme Court as a matter of right. All other appeals
in criminal cases shall be taken to the Appellate Court."
The problem with reliance on this rule is that it was not
intended to create an independent basis for appellate review. It
merely specifies which court should hear a case that is otherwise
appealable. Where, as here, the State takes issue with a nonfinal
order entered by the circuit court in a criminal case, the
threshold question of whether that order is appealable by the State
is determined exclusively by Rule 604(a)(1) (145 Ill. 2d R.
604(a)(1)). See People v. Young, 82 Ill. 2d 234, 239 (1980).
Rule 604(a)(1) restricts the State's right to appeal in
criminal cases to four situations. Under the rule, the State may
appeal only from an order or judgment which has the substantive
effect of (1) dismissing a charge for any of the grounds enumerated
in section 114--1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (725 ILCS 5/114--1
(West 1994)); (2) arresting judgment because of a defective
indictment, information or complaint; (3) quashing an arrest or
search warrant; or (4) suppressing evidence.
In this case, the State has finally understood the controlling
effect of Rule 604(a)(1). It now claims that the circuit court's
interlocutory order is appealable on the grounds that it falls
within in the fourth category covered by the rule, suppression of
evidence.
Before the State may obtain review of a pretrial suppression
order under Rule 604, the prosecutor must certify to the trial
court that the suppression substantially impairs his ability to
prosecute the case. Young, 82 Ill. 2d at 247. Such a certification
was made here, and the State contends that this certification
forecloses any further assessment of the order by this court and
renders the order automatically appealable. We disagree.
In Young, 82 Ill. 2d at 247, this court did hold that it would
not secondguess a prosecutor's good-faith evaluation of the effect
of a suppression order on his case. People v. Keith, 148 Ill. 2d
32, 39-40 (1992). Before that principle even comes into play,
however, the order must, in fact, be one that suppresses evidence.
In making the threshold determination as to whether a pretrial
evidentiary ruling constitutes a suppression order within the
meaning of Rule 604(a)(1), this court does not defer to the parties
or the trial court. As in all matters affecting our jurisdiction,
we make our own assessment, looking at the substantive effect of
the order rather than its form. See People v. Phipps, 83 Ill. 2d
87, 90-91 (1980).
In this case the circuit court's order does not have the
effect of suppressing evidence. The order will not prevent any
facts or opinions from being presented to the jury. From the record
before us, it appears that its sole impact will be on the manner in
which those facts and opinions are presented. Instead of being able
to rely on a piece of paper, the State will have to present
testimony from an actual witness. There is no way this can
reasonably be viewed as a suppression. To the contrary, because the
witness will be subject to cross-examination, the jury will almost
certainly end up receiving a much more thorough explanation of the
pertinent facts than the document alone could ever provide. In this
sense, the circuit court's ruling may actually have the opposite
effect of a suppression order.
Because the interlocutory order here does not suppress
evidence and because it is not claimed to fall within any of the
other provisions of our Rule 604(a)(1), the State has no right to
appeal the order to this or any court of review. The State's appeal
is therefore dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Appeal dismissed.