People v. Villa

ILLINOIS OFFICIAL REPORTS
Supreme Court

People v. Villa, 2011 IL 110777

Caption in Supreme THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. VICTOR
Court: VILLA, Appellant.

Docket No. 110777
Filed December 1, 2011

Held The Montgomery rule’s typical ban on use of juvenile adjudications to
(Note: This syllabus impeach a testifying defendant applied where a battery defendant, in
constitutes no part of testifying “I’ve never been in a situation like this before,” was referring
the opinion of the court to his interviews with interrogators, rather than to his criminal history–no
but has been prepared “opening of the door,” and impeachment with juvenile burglary
by the Reporter of adjudication not harmless.
Decisions for the
convenience of the
reader.)

Decision Under Appeal from the Appellate Court for the Second District; heard in that
Review court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Boone County, the Hon. J.
Todd Kennedy, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Reversed and remanded.
Counsel on Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Thomas A. Lilien, Deputy
Appeal Defender, and Paul J. Glaser, Assistant Deputy Defender, of the Office
of the State Appellate Defender, of Elgin, for appellant.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Michelle Courier,
State’s Attorney, of Belvidere (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, and
Michael M. Glick and Sheri L. Wong, Assistant Attorneys General, of
Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

Justices JUSTICE THEIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Chief Justice Kilbride and Justice Freeman concurred in the judgment
and opinion.
Justice Burke specially concurred, with opinion.
Justice Thomas dissented, with opinion, joined by Justices Garman and
Karmeier.

OPINION

¶1 Defendant Victor Villa was convicted by a Boone County jury of aggravated battery with
a firearm and aggravated discharge of a firearm under an accountability theory and was
sentenced to concurrent terms of imprisonment of 14 years and five years, respectively. The
appellate court affirmed the trial court. 403 Ill. App. 3d 309. The principal issue before this
court is whether reversible error occurred when the State was allowed to impeach defendant,
who testified at trial, with his prior juvenile adjudication for burglary.
¶2 We hold that a juvenile adjudication is typically not admissible against a testifying
defendant, defendant did not “open the door” to admission of his juvenile adjudication, and
the erroneous admission of defendant’s juvenile adjudication was not harmless. Thus, we
reverse and remand for a new trial.

¶3 BACKGROUND
¶4 In October 2007, a Boone County grand jury indicted defendant on one count of
aggravated battery with a firearm (720 ILCS 5/12-4.2(a)(1) (West 2006)), a Class X felony
(720 ILCS 5/12-4.2(b) (West 2006)), and one count of aggravated discharge of a firearm (720
ILCS 5/24-1.2(a)(2) (West 2006)), a Class 1 felony (720 ILCS 5/24-1.2(b) (West 2006)). The
charges stemmed from a drive-by shooting in Belvidere, Illinois, on August 8, 2007, during
which one person was injured.
¶5 Prior to trial, defendant moved in limine to prohibit the State from introducing evidence
regarding his August 2006 juvenile adjudication for burglary. In his written motion,

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 defendant argued that the probative value of such evidence was greatly outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice. During argument, the State indicated that it sought to use the
juvenile adjudication for impeachment should defendant testify. The following colloquy then
took place:
“THE COURT: Is there any case law that says you cannot use a juvenile
delinquency finding for impeachment?
[Assistant Public Defender] LEE: No. In fact, I believe the case law specifically
says–
THE COURT: (Interrupting) Says you can? So we’re in the normal balancing.
MR. LEE: Yes.”
¶6 The trial court determined that the burglary adjudication, which was entered less than a
year prior to the current offenses, related to defendant’s truth and veracity and that its
probative value outweighed any prejudice. The trial court thus denied defendant’s in limine
motion.
¶7 At trial, 17-year-old Adrian Cazares testified that on August 8, 2007, at 10 or 11 p.m.,
he and four friends–Hector, Capone, Poyo, and Casper–were driving around in Hector’s car
in the Belvidere neighborhood where defendant lived. Capone threw a water bottle out the
car window at Joe Follis, a friend of defendant, nearly knocking Follis off of his bicycle.
Capone exited the car and chased Follis on foot. Cazares testified that he spotted defendant
on the sidewalk and told his companions “it was just going to be me and him.” The group
exited the car and “everybody started getting rowdy.” Defendant had a “tube,” later identified
as a ceremonial knife with a sheath. Cazares and defendant “started going at it,” and Cazares
admitted kicking and hitting defendant numerous times. Cazares was adjudicated a
delinquent minor for aggravated battery in connection with this incident.
¶8 After the fight, Cazares and his companions retreated to Cazares’s house, which was two
blocks away, and remained outside in the driveway. Also present was Cazares’s uncle, Luis
Perez. Cazares and Perez both testified that they watched a vehicle slowly approach the
house, and then come to a complete stop in front of the driveway. One of the passenger
windows rolled down and multiple shots were fired from inside the vehicle toward the house.
Cazares described the vehicle as a black SUV with tinted windows.
¶9 Perez further testified that the first bullet that was fired hit the trunk of his vehicle, and
the second bullet hit the back of his arm and exited through his chest and shoulder, lodging
in his shirt. Police recovered the bullet which hit Perez, and also recovered two spent rounds
that hit Cazares’s house. All three rounds were .30/.32 caliber and were fired from the same
firearm, probably a revolver. A fourth round went into the attic of Cazares’s house and was
not recovered. The following day police located a vehicle that matched the description of the
vehicle from which the shots were fired. The vehicle was parked in the driveway at the home
of defendant’s friend, Angel Hernandez.
¶ 10 Several weeks later, on September 26, 2007, defendant learned that police were looking
for him. Defendant voluntarily went to the Belvidere public safety building, where police
arrested him. The following morning, Detectives Woody and Wallace spoke with defendant.
After being advised of his Miranda rights, defendant, who had just turned 18 three weeks

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 earlier, gave police an oral statement, which Detective Woody transcribed verbatim on a
computer. Defendant reviewed and signed the statement. In this statement, which was read
to the jury, defendant provided the following description of the events leading up to the
shooting:
“On the 8th of August like 9:30 at night I was outside talking on the phone to my girl
and I seen a dude passes by on a bike a car pass by after him. All I heard was ‘whats
up nigga’. I heard a bottle smash on the ground. I thought the dude on the bike was
my boy Joe so I went into my house to get my knife and ran out there. I got into the
street and I got surrounded. I swung my knife and at the same time I got hit in the
mouth. Some guy pulled me down and started beating the shit out of me. I had lumps
and bruises on my head and face and elbows. I couldn’t do anything and they kept
hitting and kicking me. I got up and they started running down the street toward some
white dude’s house. The car that dropped them off was in the parking lot. The car
started driving up the street toward Logan so I ran and that’s when I seen Joe. I asked
him, ‘what the fuck dude where were you?’ Joe looked at the car and put his hand
under his shirt and said, ‘should I blast them.’ I told him no. I called Angel on my
cell phone and I told him that I got my ass whooped. Angel said, ‘Alright I’ll be
through there.’ Angel drove his mom’s or sister’s black SUV and parked into the
parking lot. He got there he asked if I was alright. I showed him my arms and head.
Angel said, ‘Let’s ride around.’ We got into the car and I noticed Angel’s girlfriend
was in the front passenger seat. We drove toward Adrian’s house. It was dead silence
until we got by Adrian’s house and we started slowing down. My window rolled
down and I saw a bunch of cars and people in the front of the house. I told Joe, ‘Get
them Nigga’s’. Angel said, ‘Yeah, get them Nigga’s’. Joe was sitting behind the
driver and got close to me then pointed his hand out the window and shot multiple
times. We took off to Joe’s house and Angel dropped me and Joe there.”
¶ 11 In a subsequent question and answer session that was also transcribed, defendant clarified
that “Joe” was Joe Follis, “Angel” was Angel Hernandez, and “get them niggas” meant
“Blast them.” Defendant also clarified that he first noticed that Follis had a gun as they were
driving to Cazares’s house. Defendant described the gun as a black revolver. When asked by
police why defendant, Follis, and Hernandez went to find Cazares, defendant stated, “I was
really mad; I wanted to fuck them up.” The following questions and answers were also
transcribed as part of defendant’s statement:
“Q. Why are you telling us this today?
A. Because it’s the truth and I want the best outcome for me and my mom.
Q. Is there anything in your statement you want to add or delete from your
statement?
A. I’m sorry about this man. I wished it had never happened. I wish I would’ve
listened to my mom and stayed in my house that night.”
¶ 12 Defendant testified on his own behalf, stating that only part of the statement he gave to
police was true. According to defendant, the only reason he called Hernandez was to drive
Follis home, whom defendant believed might be in danger. Upon arriving, Hernandez told

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 defendant to forget about the fight. Hernandez’s girlfriend was sitting in the front passenger
seat, and defendant and Follis got into the backseat of the car. Follis was seated behind
Hernandez. Defendant testified that Follis told Hernandez to drive down the street, which
was in the direction of Cazares’s house. As they approached the house, Follis told Hernandez
to slow down. Defendant testified, “when we got right in front of the house, Joe [Follis]
rolled down the window and just pulled out a gun and started shooting.” Defendant testified
that everyone in the car was scared and surprised, defendant “didn’t expect that to happen,”
and he was “mad” at Follis. Defendant denied seeing the gun at any time before the shooting
and denied telling Follis to “get them niggas.”
¶ 13 Defendant also testified that he initially told Detectives Woody and Wallace that he did
not tell Follis to shoot anyone, but the detectives said they did not believe him. According
to defendant, he was scared and “started throwing some things in” to make his story more
believable. When asked on direct examination why he would sign a statement that contained
false information, defendant answered:
“I don’t know. You know, I honestly didn’t know what to say. I was scared. You
know, I just–all I can say is I was scared. I’ve never been in a situation like this
before. You know. I gave–I gave them that statement because, you know, they were
saying that I was looking at prison time and stuff like that. I’ve never been in prison
or nothing like that.”
¶ 14 On cross-examination, the State challenged defendant’s testimony that he had “never
been in a situation like this before.” Defendant admitted that on January 19, 2006, he had
been interviewed by the same detectives at the Belvidere police department on another case
and had given a typewritten statement in that case. Defendant insisted that the two situations
were “nowhere near the same,” and on redirect explained that in 2006 he was 16 years old
and was questioned as a juvenile. In contrast, when he was questioned by police in 2007, he
had already turned himself in to police, and he had been arrested and charged as an adult with
aggravated battery with a firearm.
¶ 15 In rebuttal, the State published a certified copy of defendant’s juvenile adjudication for
burglary, entered on August 28, 2006. The State referred to the juvenile adjudication twice
during its closing argument and twice more during rebuttal argument, generally asserting that
the burglary adjudication was a basis for concluding that defendant’s trial testimony was not
truthful.
¶ 16 The jury was instructed on the legal theory of accountability and returned a verdict
finding defendant guilty of both charged offenses–aggravated battery with a firearm and
aggravated discharge of a firearm. In his motion for a new trial, defendant argued, inter alia,
that the trial court erred “in allowing the State to present to the jury evidence of defendant’s
juvenile adjudication.” Defendant did not elaborate further in his written motion. During
argument on the motion, defense counsel did not assert, as he did in the motion in limine,
that the prejudice to defendant of admitting his juvenile adjudication outweighed its
probative value. Rather, defense counsel argued for the first time that under People v.
Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d 510 (1971), a juvenile adjudication is not admissible against a
testifying defendant. The trial court agreed with the State that this was a new argument, but

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 that defendant’s juvenile adjudication was admissible pursuant to statute–an apparent
reference to section 5-150(1)(c) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/5-
150(1)(c) (West 2006)). The trial court denied defendant’s motion and subsequently
sentenced him to concurrent terms of 14 years’ imprisonment for the aggravated battery with
a firearm and 5 years’ imprisonment for the aggravated discharge of a firearm. The trial court
also ordered defendant to pay Luis Perez $20,083 in restitution.
¶ 17 Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by allowing the State to impeach
him with his juvenile adjudication or, in the alternative, that trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance by failing to proffer a proper objection to that evidence. The appellate court
rejected defendant’s arguments and affirmed his conviction and sentence. 403 Ill. App. 3d
309. The appellate court held that, pursuant to section 5-150(1)(c) of the Juvenile Court Act
of 1987, a juvenile adjudication may be admitted against a testifying defendant for
impeachment purposes, subject to the balancing test set forth in Montgomery, and that
defendant’s juvenile adjudication was properly admitted. Id. at 317. The appellate court
further held that defendant’s juvenile adjudication was admissible for the independent reason
that defendant opened the door to its use. Id. at 318. Finally, the appellate court held that trial
counsel’s arguments concerning the juvenile adjudication cannot form the basis of an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim because defendant’s own testimony provided a basis
for admission of the juvenile adjudication. Id. at 321.
¶ 18 We allowed defendant’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Feb. 26,
2010).

¶ 19 ANALYSIS
¶ 20 I
¶ 21 Defendant argues that, pursuant to the holding in Montgomery, a juvenile adjudication
is not admissible against a testifying defendant, and he was denied a fair trial when the State
was permitted to impeach him with his juvenile adjudication. Though defendant first raised
this issue posttrial, the State does not argue that defendant has forfeited review or acquiesced
in the admission of his juvenile adjudication. Thus, the State has forfeited these arguments.
See People v. Lucas, 231 Ill. 2d 169, 175 (2008) (“State may forfeit an argument that the
defendant forfeited an issue”). In addition, defendant renews his appellate argument that trial
counsel was ineffective by failing to appreciate the “full implication of Montgomery” and
wrongly conceding prior to trial that case law supported the admission of defendant’s
juvenile adjudication. Thus, the impeachment issue is squarely before us.
¶ 22 Resolution of this issue requires us to consider the relationship between this court’s
decision in Montgomery and section 5-150(1)(c) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987, both of
which speak to the admissibility of juvenile adjudications in criminal proceedings. We
review this legal issue, which devolves into an issue of statutory construction, de novo.
People v. Alcozer, 241 Ill. 2d 248, 254 (2011).

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¶ 23 II
¶ 24 The Juvenile Court Act, as adopted in 1965, prohibited the admission of a juvenile
adjudication against the minor “for any purpose whatever in any civil, criminal or other cause
or proceeding except in subsequent proceedings under this Act concerning the same minor.”
1965 Ill. Laws 2585, 2590 (§ 2-9); Ill. Rev. Stat. 1965, ch. 37, ¶ 702-9(1). This statutory
provision was still in effect in 1971 when this court decided the Montgomery case.
¶ 25 In Montgomery, this court adopted then-proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 609. Under
this rule, the credibility of a witness may be attacked with evidence of a prior conviction
where the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year, or involved
dishonesty or a false statement, regardless of the punishment. In either instance, however,
such evidence is inadmissible where the trial judge determines that the probative value of the
evidence of the crime is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice or,
generally speaking, the prior conviction is more than 10 years old. Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d
at 516.
¶ 26 Relevant to this appeal, proposed Rule 609 also addressed the admissibility of juvenile
adjudications, stating:
“ ‘Evidence of juvenile adjudications is generally not admissible under this rule. The
judge may, however, allow evidence of a juvenile adjudication of a witness other
than the accused if conviction of the offense would be admissible to attack the
credibility of an adult and the judge is satisfied that admission in evidence is
necessary for a fair determination of the issue of guilt or innocence.’ ” (Emphasis
added.) Id. at 517 (quoting 51 F.R.D. 391).
Although the Montgomery case did not involve a juvenile adjudication, this court intended
that all provisions of proposed Rule 609 should be followed in future cases. People v. Ray,
54 Ill. 2d 377, 383 (1973).
¶ 27 In 1982, the legislature amended the Juvenile Court Act and rewrote the provision
concerning the admissibility of juvenile adjudications in other proceedings. The amended
statute provided, in pertinent part, that juvenile adjudications “shall be admissible *** in
criminal proceedings in which anyone who has been adjudicated delinquent *** is to be a
witness, and then only for purposes of impeachment and pursuant to the rules of evidence
for criminal trials.” Pub. Act 82-973 (eff. Sept. 8, 1982); Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 37, ¶ 702-
10(1)(c).
¶ 28 In People v. Massie, 137 Ill. App. 3d 723 (1985), our appellate court discussed the
interplay between this provision and the Montgomery decision. The appellate court held that
a plain reading of the statute indicates that juvenile adjudications are only admissible where
the person “is to be a witness,” and that the statute contains no language indicating that the
provision applies where a defendant testifies on his own behalf. The appellate court noted
that a contrary interpretation would conflict with Montgomery. Massie, 137 Ill. App. 3d at
731. The appellate court also held that because the statute provides that a juvenile
adjudication is only admissible “pursuant to the rules of evidence for criminal trials,”
admissibility must be in accordance with Montgomery, which adopted the rule of evidence
governing the use of juvenile adjudications in criminal proceedings. Id. See also People v.

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 Bunch, 159 Ill. App. 3d 494, 513 (1987) (acknowledging that under Montgomery and Massie
juvenile adjudications are not admissible for impeachment against a testifying defendant);
People v. Allen, 151 Ill. App. 3d 391, 394 (1986) (stating that under Montgomery and Massie
defense counsel’s advice to defendant not to testify because the State would impeach him
with his juvenile adjudications was incorrect).
¶ 29 When the legislature adopted the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act), the provision
restricting the admission of juvenile adjudications remained the same. Pub. Act 85-601 (eff.
Jan. 1, 1988); Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 37, ¶ 801-10(1)(c). Accordingly, our appellate court
continued to construe the statutory prohibition on the admission of juvenile adjudications in
concert with Montgomery, as the appellate court had done in the Massie opinion. People v.
Kerns, 229 Ill. App. 3d 938, 941 (1992) (following Massie); see also People v. Sneed, 274
Ill. App. 3d 287, 295 (1995) (stating that the court has no discretion to admit a juvenile
adjudication against a testifying defendant, citing proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 609(d),
as adopted in Montgomery, and Kerns).
¶ 30 The statute was next amended as part of the Juvenile Justice Reform Provisions of 1998.
Pub. Act 90-590 (eff. Jan. 1, 1999). The amended provision is identical to the prior
provision, with one addition. The amended provision states that juvenile adjudications “shall
be admissible *** in criminal proceedings in which anyone who has been adjudicated
delinquent *** is to be a witness including the minor or defendant if he or she testifies, and
then only for purposes of impeachment and pursuant to the rules of evidence for criminal
trials.” (Emphasis added.) Pub. Act 90-590 (§ 2001-10) (eff. Jan. 1, 1999). This statute was
in effect at the time of defendant’s trial in this case and has not been amended further. See
705 ILCS 405/5-150(1)(c) (West 2010).
¶ 31 A split of authority has occurred in the appellate court as to whether juvenile
adjudications are admissible for impeachment against a testifying defendant, as section 5-
150(1)(c) seems to suggest, or inadmissible, as Montgomery instructs. In People v. Coleman,
399 Ill. App. 3d 1150 (2010), the Fourth District reconciled section 5-150(1)(c) of the Act
with Montgomery and held that juvenile adjudications are normally not admissible against
a testifying defendant. Coleman, 399 Ill. App. 3d at 1155-56. In the present case, the Second
District parted company with Coleman and essentially held that the statute trumps
Montgomery. 403 Ill. App. 3d at 316-18. The Fourth District has had an opportunity to
consider the appellate opinion under review and has adhered to its earlier decision in
Coleman. See People v. Bond, 405 Ill. App. 3d 499, 506-12 (2010), petition for leave to
appeal pending, No. 111504.
¶ 32 Before addressing this conflict in the case law, we make two preliminary observations.
We observe first that the holding of Montgomery relating to juvenile adjudications has now
been codified as Rule 609(d) of the Illinois Rules of Evidence (Ill. R. Evid. 609(d) (eff. Jan.
1, 2011)). We need not consider the effect, if any, of this codification because it postdates
defendant’s trial by over two years. Moreover, the comment to Rule 609 expressly states that
the codification of the Montgomery holding was not intended to resolve any conflict between
Montgomery and section 5-150(1)(c) of the Act. Ill. R. Evid. 609, cmt. (eff. Jan. 1, 2011);
see also Ill. R. Evid. Committee Commentary (eff. Jan. 1, 2011) (recognizing a possible
conflict between Rule 609(d) and section 5-150(1)(c) of the Act and stating that codification

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 “is not intended to resolve the issue concerning the effect of the statute”).
¶ 33 We observe also that defendant does not dispute the State’s contention that the General
Assembly had the authority, when it amended the Act in 1998, to enact a new rule of
evidence governing the admissibility of juvenile adjudications. We need not consider the
legislature’s authority in this area because, as discussed below, section 5-150(1)(c) is not in
conflict with the rule of evidence adopted in Montgomery.
¶ 34 Defendant argues that if the legislature intended to break from the Montgomery rule, it
would have removed or modified the statutory language, “pursuant to the rules of evidence
for criminal trials,” which Illinois courts have interpreted as a nod to Montgomery. The State
counters that the legislature, by adding the language “including the minor or defendant if he
or she testifies,” meant to remove the prohibition, adopted in Montgomery, against admission
of juvenile adjudications to impeach a testifying defendant and to expressly permit this
practice.
¶ 35 Our primary objective in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent
of the legislature. People v. Smith, 236 Ill. 2d 162, 167 (2010); People v. Williams, 235 Ill.
2d 286, 290 (2009). “We determine intent by reading the statute as a whole and considering
all relevant parts.” R.D. Masonry, Inc. v. Industrial Comm’n, 215 Ill. 2d 397, 403 (2005).
Words and phrases should not be considered in isolation. People v. Santiago, 236 Ill. 2d 417,
428 (2010). Accordingly, in construing section 5-150(1)(c) of the Act, we cannot focus
exclusively on the limiting language on which defendant relies, nor on the amendatory
language on which the State relies. To the extent these portions of section 5-150(1)(c) appear
to conflict, we must, if possible, construe them in harmony. See In re Possession & Control
of the Commissioner of Banks & Real Estate of Independent Trust Corp., 327 Ill. App. 3d
441, 499 (2001). Although an amendment to a statute may give rise to a presumption that the
legislature intended to change the law (Williams v. Staples, 208 Ill. 2d 480, 496 (2004)), such
presumption is not conclusive and may be overcome by other circumstances and
considerations (Varelis v. Northwestern Memorial Hospital, 167 Ill. 2d 449, 461 (1995); 1A
Norman J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction § 22:30, at
360-61 (7th ed. 2009)).
¶ 36 Notably, when section 5-150(1)(c) was amended in 1998, Illinois courts had already
examined the statutory phrase “pursuant to the rules of evidence for criminal trials.” Massie
and subsequent cases interpreted this phrase to mean: pursuant to the Montgomery decision,
which adopted the rule of evidence applicable to juvenile adjudications. Massie, 137 Ill. App.
3d at 731; Allen, 151 Ill. App. 3d at 394; Bunch, 159 Ill. App. 3d at 512; Kerns, 229 Ill. App.
3d at 941; Sneed, 274 Ill. App. 3d at 295. The legislature chose to retain this language,
without modification, when it amended section 5-150(1)(c). Where, as here, statutory
language has acquired a settled meaning through judicial construction and that language is
retained in a subsequent amendment of the statute, such language is to be understood and
interpreted in the same way unless a contrary legislative intent is clearly shown. In re
Marriage of O’Neill, 138 Ill. 2d 487, 495 (1990); People v. Agnew, 105 Ill. 2d 275, 280
(1985). This is so because the judicial construction of the statute becomes a part of the law,
and the legislature is presumed to act with full knowledge of the prevailing case law and the
judicial construction of the words in the prior enactment. R.D. Masonry, 215 Ill. 2d at 404;

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 People v. De La Paz, 204 Ill. 2d 426, 433 (2003). We conclude, therefore, that when the
legislature amended section 5-150(1)(c) in 1998, it intended the phrase “pursuant to the rules
of evidence for criminal trials” to continue to have the same meaning it had for well over a
decade.
¶ 37 The State argues that interpreting this portion of section 5-150(1)(c) in this way renders
meaningless the very language added to the statute by the 1998 amendment. We are mindful
of our duty to construe this statute so that each clause is given effect (see DeSmet v. County
of Rock Island, 219 Ill. 2d 497, 509-10 (2006)) and reject the State’s argument. The previous
versions of the statute had been interpreted as barring the use of juvenile adjudications for
impeachment of a testifying defendant. See, e.g., Massie, 137 Ill. App. 3d at 731; Kerns, 229
Ill. App. 3d at 941. The pertinent language added by the 1998 amendment simply removed
that statutory bar. Compare Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 37, ¶ 801-10(1)(c), with 705 ILCS 405/5-
150(1)(c) (West 2010). “In other words, the legislature has said a defendant who chooses to
testify may be impeached with a juvenile adjudication but has conditioned the use of such
impeachment on the rules of evidence for criminal trials.” Coleman, 399 Ill. App. 3d at 1155.
¶ 38 The fact that the legislation simultaneously permits juvenile adjudications to be used
against a testifying defendant, but also restricts such use pursuant to the rules of evidence as
adopted in Montgomery, does not render the new language meaningless. At the time the
amendment was adopted, case law had already recognized an exception to Montgomery
permitting introduction of a defendant’s otherwise inadmissible criminal record where the
defendant “opens the door.” Bunch, 159 Ill. App. 3d at 513; People v. Brown, 61 Ill. App.
3d 180, 184 (1978). Accord People v. Harris, 231 Ill. 2d 582, 590-91 (2008) (holding that
defendant opened the door to admission of his juvenile adjudication). The amendatory
language simply recognizes that circumstances may exist where a juvenile adjudication is
admissible against a testifying defendant, notwithstanding the general prohibition against the
admission of such evidence under Montgomery.
¶ 39 The State also argues that the legislature intended to put juvenile adjudications on the
same footing as criminal convictions for impeachment purposes. The State cites the Juvenile
Justice Reform Provisions of 1998 as a whole, noting that this court has recognized a “shift
from ‘the singular goal of rehabilitation to include the overriding concerns of protecting the
public and holding juvenile offenders accountable for violations of the law.’ ” People v.
Taylor, 221 Ill. 2d 157, 172 (2006) (quoting In re A.G., 195 Ill. 2d 313, 317 (2001)). The
State maintains that allowing juvenile adjudications to impeach a testifying defendant is
consistent with this shift in purpose.
¶ 40 Although juvenile proceedings and criminal trials share a number of common features,
significant differences still exist between the two. Taylor, 221 Ill. 2d at 170. Further, the shift
in goal set forth in the Juvenile Justice Reform Provisions of 1998 has not negated the
concept that rehabilitation is a more important consideration in juvenile proceedings than in
criminal trials. Id. This court, therefore, has been reluctant to equate a juvenile proceeding
under the Act with a criminal trial. In re Rodney H., 223 Ill. 2d 510, 520 (2006). As we stated
in Taylor, “ ‘the ideal of separate treatment of children is still worth pursuing.’ ” Taylor, 221
Ill. 2d at 170 (quoting McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 546 n.6 (1971) (plurality
op.)). Thus, we reject the State’s argument that juvenile adjudications should be put on an

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 equal footing with criminal convictions for impeachment purposes.
¶ 41 For the foregoing reasons, we hold that section 5-150(1)(c) of the Act allows the
admission of juvenile adjudications against a testifying defendant for impeachment only in
accordance with Montgomery and its progeny. We therefore overrule the appellate decision
under review to the extent it holds that section 5-150(1)(c) changed the rule adopted in
Montgomery.

¶ 42 III
¶ 43 Our holding above does not absolutely resolve whether defendant’s juvenile adjudication
should have been admitted. The appellate court concluded that, irrespective of its
interpretation of section 5-150(1)(c), defendant’s juvenile adjudication was admissible
because defendant opened the door to its use when he testified that he had “never been in a
situation like this before” and had “never been in prison or nothing like that.” See 403 Ill.
App. 3d at 313. Defendant urges reversal of the appellate court.
¶ 44 Although evidentiary rulings are typically left to the sound discretion of the trial court
(People v. Jackson, 232 Ill. 2d 246, 265 (2009)), the issue here is whether the appellate court
correctly held, as a matter of law, that defendant opened the door to the admission of his
juvenile adjudication. On this purely legal issue our review proceeds de novo. See People v.
Smith, 233 Ill. 2d 1, 15 (2009).
¶ 45 In ruling that defendant had opened the door to admission of his juvenile adjudication,
the appellate court relied on this court’s opinion in People v. Harris, 231 Ill. 2d 582 (2008).
In Harris, the defendant, when asked on direct examination whether he had committed the
crimes in question, testified:
“ ‘No sir. There is no possible way that I could have committed this crime. I mean
people who commit robberies, things like that, have a motive, have a reason for
doing things like that. But I am a professional man. I work. I go to college. I went to
Robert Morris, ICC, Midstate. I mean, it’s no reason–I mean I live a productive life.
I live just like any of the 12 jurors, like you live. I don’t commit crimes.’ ” (Emphasis
added.) Harris, 231 Ill. 2d at 584-85.
The trial court allowed the State to impeach defendant with evidence of his two most recent
juvenile adjudications. In judging whether the trial court had abused its discretion, we
determined that the “pivotal question” on review was whether the defendant was attempting
to mislead the jury about his criminal background when he testified, “I don’t commit
crimes.” Id. at 590. “If he was, then he ‘opened the door’ and the trial court was well within
its discretion to allow the admission of defendant’s prior adjudications for purposes of
impeachment. If he was not, then defendant’s testimony was not a proper basis for the
admission of that evidence.” Id.
¶ 46 The defendant in Harris maintained that his answer was merely a present tense statement
of how he conducts his life and was not meant to misstate or falsify his juvenile record. We
concluded that even if true, “it is just as reasonable to construe defendant’s answer as a
comprehensive denial of ever having engaged in criminal activity, which amounts to an
outright lie.” (Emphasis in original.) Id. at 591. Thus, we found the trial court did not abuse

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 its discretion when it permitted the State to impeach the defendant with two prior juvenile
adjudications. Id.
¶ 47 Defendant argues that Harris is distinguishable from the present case. Defendant notes
that in Harris the State did not seek to introduce the defendant’s juvenile adjudications until
after he had testified. In the instant case, however, the decision to allow the use of
defendant’s juvenile adjudication for impeachment was made prior to the start of trial when
the court denied defendant’s motion in limine. Defendant thus contends that the “the door
was already opened” when he took the stand. We disagree.
¶ 48 The trial court’s pretrial ruling, permitting the State to introduce evidence of defendant’s
juvenile adjudication, is not tantamount to the independent act of a defendant opening the
door to admission of such evidence. To be sure, defendant’s juvenile adjudication was going
to be revealed to the jury regardless of the substance of his testimony. But the issue is
whether defendant’s testimony provided an alternative basis for admission of the
adjudication on which we may sustain the trial court’s ruling. See 2A Ill. L. & Prac. Appeal
& Error § 403 (2002) (“The reasons a court gives for admitting or excluding evidence are
not material, for purposes of appellate review, if there is a proper basis appearing in the
record or law that will sustain the ruling.”); People v. Johnson, 208 Ill. 2d 118, 128-29
(2003) (discussing the fundamental principle of appellate law that permits affirmance of a
lower court’s order on an alternative ground).
¶ 49 We note that this is not a case where the defendant touched on his criminal background
on direct examination in response to an adverse in limine ruling in order to “ ‘blunt the
impact’ of the State’s anticipated evidence.” People v. Hanson, 238 Ill. 2d 74, 100 (2010)
(quoting People v. Brown, 172 Ill. 2d 1, 48 (1996)). In such a case, the defendant cannot be
said to have opened the door to admission of a juvenile adjudication. Here, the relevant
portion of defendant’s testimony was given in response to questions seeking an explanation
as to why defendant would sign an inculpatory statement that contained false information.
On that issue, defendant testified on direct examination:
“I don’t know. You know, I honestly didn’t know what to say. I was scared. You
know, I just–all I can say is I was scared. I’ve never been in a situation like this
before. You know. I gave–I gave them that statement because, you know, they were
saying that I was looking at prison time and stuff like that. I’ve never been in prison
or nothing like that.” (Emphases added.)
The pivotal question is whether defendant was attempting to mislead the jury about his
criminal background. See Harris, 231 Ill. 2d at 590.
¶ 50 The State argues that defendant’s testimony falsely implied that he had no experience
with the criminal justice system, thus opening the door to admission of his juvenile
adjudication. We do not find the State’s broad construction of defendant’s testimony to be
a reasonable one. When read in context, defendant’s testimony that he had “never been in a
situation like this before” plainly refers to his interrogation by Detectives Wallace and
Woody. This testimony, at most, implied that defendant had never before been questioned
by police. Police questioning may occur in numerous circumstances and is not necessarily
indicative of a criminal background. Thus, defendant’s testimony simply opened the door to

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 cross-examination by the State regarding instances of prior police questioning; it did not
open the door to defendant’s prior criminal history.
¶ 51 We note that the State did attempt to impeach defendant by cross-examining him about
his interrogation by the same detectives in connection with another case 18 months earlier;
defendant denied that the two police encounters were similar. On redirect examination,
defendant explained why the two police encounters were different. Notably, defendant never
strayed from the narrow subject of police interrogation and, accordingly, did not open the
door to admission of this juvenile adjudication.
¶ 52 The result does not change when we consider defendant’s additional testimony that he
had “never been in prison or nothing like that.” The State concedes that defendant had never
been imprisoned. Thus, this portion of defendant’s testimony was truthful. The additional
phrase, “or nothing like that,” cannot be reasonably construed as opening the door beyond
the narrow subject of prior police interrogations.
¶ 53 We note, also, that defendant’s testimony here stands in stark contrast to the defendant’s
testimony in Harris that “I don’t commit crimes.” Although a defendant’s testimony need
not be as direct as the testimony in Harris in order to open the door to admission of a prior
juvenile adjudication, something more is needed than a reference to prior police questioning,
as occurred in this case. We emphasize that permitting the State to introduce a juvenile
adjudication where the defendant opens the door is an exception to the rule set forth in
Montgomery prohibiting the admission of juvenile adjudications against a testifying
defendant. Courts must exercise caution when applying this exception and determining the
extent to which a defendant has opened the door.
¶ 54 We hold that defendant’s testimony does not provide an alternative basis for affirming
the trial court’s ruling allowing the State to introduce into evidence defendant’s prior juvenile
adjudication for burglary. The admission of this evidence was error.
¶ 55 The State argues that even if defendant had not been impeached with his juvenile
adjudication, no reasonable probability exists that he would have been acquitted of the
charged offenses. We disagree.
¶ 56 The only evidence in this case implicating defendant in the drive-by shooting was his
statement to police. Although Adrian Cezaras testified regarding the earlier assault on
defendant, thus supplying a motive for the shooting, no other witness testified as to
defendant’s involvement. No witness placed defendant in the vehicle from which the shots
were fired, and no witness testified that defendant gave the order to shoot. The State’s case
rested on defendant’s statement, and the prosecutor’s ability to persuade the jury that
defendant was not credible when, at trial, he testified that the inculpatory portions of his
statement were false. Thus, defendant’s credibility figured prominently in the State’s case.
¶ 57 Significantly, during the State’s relatively short closing argument, the prosecutor twice
referenced defendant’s prior juvenile adjudication. The prosecutor first stated that the jury
should take into account his “burglary adjudication *** in determining his truthfulness.” The
prosecutor then added: “And I submit to you he is less truthful because of his burglary
adjudication.” A short time later, the prosecutor again referenced defendant’s juvenile
adjudication, stating: “[I]f he gets over the bias for being on trial and the fact that he’s got

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 a burglary adjudication, then you would have to believe that the defendant somehow made
*** some of these things up.” In the State’s rebuttal argument, the prosecutor again argued
that the jury “can certainly determine that because [defendant] has a juvenile adjudication
for burglary that he’s not telling the truth.” The State reiterated this point when the
prosecutor argued that the jury should “factor in the juvenile burglary adjudication with all
the other evidence, and that’s just another thing that tells you when this defendant testified
today he was not telling you the truth.”
¶ 58 Based on the lack of evidence implicating defendant in the drive-by shooting other than
his own statement which he recanted, in part, at trial; the role the jury’s credibility
determination necessarily played in defendant’s conviction; and the State’s repeated
argument that defendant’s juvenile adjudication was a basis to find his in-court testimony
untruthful, we conclude that the evidentiary error in this case was not harmless. Accordingly,
we reverse and remand for a new trial.
¶ 59 In light of our disposition, we need not consider defendant’s additional argument that
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to lodge the appropriate objection to the admission
of defendant’s juvenile adjudication.

¶ 60 CONCLUSION
¶ 61 For the reasons stated, we hold that the admission into evidence of defendant’s juvenile
adjudication was error, and such error was not harmless. We reverse the judgments of the
circuit and appellate courts and remand to the circuit court for a new trial.

¶ 62 Reversed and remanded.

¶ 63 JUSTICE BURKE, specially concurring:
¶ 64 I fully concur and join in the majority opinion in this case. I write separately only to
explain why I believe Justice Thomas is incorrect in his interpretation of section 5-150(1)(c)
of the Juvenile Court Act.
¶ 65 Justice Thomas interprets section 5-150(1)(c) as authorizing the admission of a testifying
defendant’s prior juvenile adjudications for impeachment purposes. Such an interpretation,
however, is in direct conflict with the long-standing rule adopted by this court in People v.
Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d 510, 517 (1971). As we recently and unanimously stated in Illinois
Rule of Evidence 101, which is a codification of our common law, when a statute conflicts
with a rule or decision of this court, the Illinois Supreme Court has the last word under
separation of powers principles. See Ill. R. Evid. 101 (eff. January 1, 2011) (“[A] statutory
rule of evidence is effective unless in conflict with a rule or decision of the Illinois Supreme
Court.”). Thus, Justice Thomas’ interpretation would render the statute unconstitutional in
violation of separation of powers. See Ill. Const. 1970, art. II, § 1 (the legislative, executive,
and judicial branches of government are separate and “[n]o branch shall exercise powers
properly belonging to another”); People v. Bond, 405 Ill. App. 3d 499, 507-08 (2010).
¶ 66 Unconstitutional interpretations should be avoided. In People v. Williams, 143 Ill. 2d 477,

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 482-83 (1991), we held that although a judicial rule will prevail over a statute that directly
and irreconcilably conflicts with that rule on a matter within the court’s authority, this court
will attempt “to reconcile most conflicts between rules of the judiciary and legislative
enactments.” See, e.g., People v. Harris, 231 Ill. 2d 582, 591 (2008) (wherein we declined
to interpret section 5-150(1)(c) but, instead, created an exception to our Montgomery rule,
allowing impeachment of a testifying defendant with his prior juvenile adjudications where
the defendant “opened the door” by providing misleading testimony concerning his prior
criminal history). Here, the majority offers an interpretation of section 5-150(1)(c) that
avoids the constitutional problem by reconciling any perceived conflict. Moreover, the
majority’s interpretation upholds our long-standing Montgomery rule, which not only has
been applied by our trial courts for decades, but also is now incorporated in our newly
adopted rules of evidence. Accordingly, I join with the majority.

¶ 67 JUSTICE THOMAS, dissenting:
¶ 68 In the first half of its decision, the majority concludes that section 5-150(1)(c) does not
permit the use of prior juvenile adjudications as impeachment evidence against a testifying
defendant. In the second half of its decision, the majority concludes that defendant’s
testimony in this case did not open the door to the admission of his prior adjudications for
purposes of impeachment. Because I disagree with both of these conclusions, I must
respectfully dissent.

¶ 69 Section 5-150(1)(c)
¶ 70 Although the majority fully and accurately recounts the history of section 5-150(1)(c),
it is worth taking the time to review that history again. When originally adopted in 1965, the
Juvenile Court Act prohibited the admission of a prior adjudication “for any purpose
whatever in any *** proceeding.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1965, ch. 37, ¶ 702-9(1). Six years later, in
Montgomery, this court adopted then-proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 609, which
addressed the use of prior criminal convictions for purposes of impeachment. As a general
rule, Montgomery provides that a witness’s prior conviction is admissible for impeachment
purposes only where (1) the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment of more than
one year, or the crime involved dishonesty or a false statement; (2) the conviction is less than
10 years old; and (3) the trial judge determines that the probative value of the evidence is not
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d at 516.
Montgomery then explained that, while evidence of a prior adjudication is generally not
admissible for impeachment purposes, a trial judge may allow such evidence in relation to
a witness other than the accused, and only where (1) such evidence would be admissible to
attack the credibility of an adult and (2) the judge is satisfied that the admission of such
evidence is necessary for a fair determination of guilt or innocence. Id. at 517.
¶ 71 In 1982, the legislature amended the Juvenile Court Act, which, Montgomery
notwithstanding, had continued to prohibit the admission of prior adjudications “for any
purpose whatever in any *** proceeding.” See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 37, ¶ 702-9(1). Once
amended, the Act authorized the admission of prior adjudications “in criminal proceedings

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 in which anyone who has been adjudicated delinquent *** is to be a witness, and then only
for purposes of impeachment and pursuant to the rules of evidence.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch.
37, ¶ 702-10(1)(c). The uniform understanding of this provision was that (1) while prior
adjudications were now admissible for purposes of impeaching a “witness,” they remained
inadmissible in relation to a testifying defendant; and (2) to be admissible against a witness,
prior adjudications had to satisfy the admissibility standards set forth in Montgomery. See,
e.g., Massie, 137 Ill. App. 3d at 731; Bunch, 159 Ill. App. 3d at 513; Allen, 151 Ill. App. 3d
at 394.
¶ 72 And so things remained until 1998, when the legislature “radically altered” the Juvenile
Court Act “to provide more accountability for the criminal acts of juveniles and *** to make
the juvenile delinquency adjudicatory process look more criminal in nature.” People v.
Taylor, 221 Ill. 2d 157, 165 (2006) (describing Public Act 90-590). Among the many radical
alterations contained in Public Act 90-590 was an amendment to the provision governing the
use of prior adjudications for impeachment. Again, since Montgomery was decided in 1971,
the clear state of the law in Illinois had been that, while prior adjudications could be used to
impeach the credibility of a witness, they could not be used to impeach the credibility of a
testifying defendant. But now, as a result of the legislature’s 1998 overhaul of the Juvenile
Court Act, prior adjudications became admissible in criminal proceedings against “anyone
*** including the minor or defendant if he or she testifies,” and then “only for purposes of
impeachment and pursuant to the rules of evidence.” (Emphasis added.) 705 ILCS 405/5-
150(1)(c) (West 2000).
¶ 73 This brief historical review reveals a clear progression in the legislature’s handling of
prior adjudications in relation to impeachment. From 1965 until 1982, the Juvenile Court Act
categorically prohibited the admission of prior adjudications “for any purpose whatever in
any *** proceeding.” From 1982 until 1999, the Juvenile Court Act authorized the admission
of prior adjudications for purposes of impeaching a “witness.” And now finally, from 1999
until the present, the Juvenile Court Act authorizes the admission of prior adjudications for
purposes of impeaching “anyone *** including the minor or defendant if he or she testifies.”
¶ 74 Given this clear legislative progression, one wonders why there is even a question as to
whether defendant’s prior adjudication was admissible in this case. The fundamental rule of
statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s intent (Michigan
Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 503-04 (2000)), and the best
indication of legislative intent is the statutory language, given its plain and ordinary meaning.
Illinois Graphics Co. v. Nickum, 159 Ill. 2d 469, 479 (1994). Here, the statutory language
could not be more plain. Section 5-150(1)(c) expressly states that prior adjudications “shall
be admissible” in relation to “anyone who has been adjudicated delinquent *** including the
minor or defendant if he or she testifies, and then only for purposes of impeachment and
pursuant to the rules of evidence for criminal trials.” 705 ILCS 405/5-150(1)(c) (West 2000).
Where is the ambiguity or confusion? Defendant here “ha[d] been adjudicated delinquent,”
and the State sought to admit that adjudication “only for purposes of impeachment.” After
considering the Montgomery standard for admissibility (i.e., the nature and recency of the
crime and whether the probative value outweighed the prejudicial impact), the trial court
ruled that the adjudication would be “allowed to be admitted for purposes of impeachment”

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 and “only if defendant should testify.” Defendant testified, and the State impeached him with
the adjudication. This was textbook compliance with the express statutory language, and the
trial court’s ruling ought to be affirmed.
¶ 75 Of course, my colleagues in the majority see things differently. To them, despite the
insertion of language expressly stating that prior adjudications are admissible for purposes
of impeaching “[the] defendant if he or she testifies,” section 5-150(1)(c) means exactly the
same thing after the 1998 amendment as it did before the amendment, when prior
adjudications were not admissible to impeach a testifying defendant. Supra ¶¶ 37-38. In
support of this result, the majority begins by explaining that, although a legislative
amendment ordinarily gives rise to a presumption that the legislature intended to change the
law, that presumption is not conclusive and may be overcome by other circumstances and
considerations. Supra ¶ 35. Overcoming that presumption here, the majority maintains, is the
fact that, for “well over a decade” preceding the 1998 amendment, the courts of this state had
consistently construed the statutory phrase “pursuant to the rules of evidence for criminal
trials” to mean “pursuant to the Montgomery decision.” Supra ¶ 36. Thus, by retaining this
phrase in the 1998 amendment “without modification” (supra ¶ 36), the legislature must have
intended that phrase to mean the same thing after the amendment as it did before the
amendment, viz., “subject to the Montgomery decision.” And because Montgomery states that
prior adjudications are not admissible against a testifying defendant, the majority concludes
that, whatever the legislature meant by amending section 5-150(1)(c), it did not mean that
prior adjudications would now be admissible for purposes of impeaching a testifying
defendant. Instead, the majority suggests, the legislature was merely recognizing the reality
that Illinois courts had already crafted an exception to Montgomery for testifying defendants
who “open the door” to the admission of otherwise inadmissible prior adjudications and that
in such cases, and only in such cases, prior adjudications would be admissible. Supra ¶¶ 37-
38.
¶ 76 I respectfully submit that the foregoing analysis is flawed in several respects. First, and
most significantly, the majority fails to construe, on its face, the plain language of section 5-
150(1)(c). Though it correctly acknowledges that this court’s “primary objective in
construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature” (supra
¶ 35), the majority conspicuously omits the inevitable and subsequent corollary to that
principle, namely, that “the best indication of legislative intent is the statutory language,
given its plain and ordinary meaning.” See Illinois Graphics Co., 159 Ill. 2d at 479. This
bedrock principle appears nowhere in the majority’s discussion. The consequence is that,
instead of first giving the statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning, the majority
skips immediately to a presumption concerning the effect of legislative amendments and to
asking whether “other circumstances and considerations” exist in this case to overcome that
presumption. Supra ¶ 35. Why is the court invoking presumptions, however, if section 5-
150(1)(c) is clear and unambiguous on its face? Conversely, if, on its face, section 5-
150(1)(c) is anything other than clear and unambiguous, the majority is compelled to explain
why. Indeed, even in the case that the majority cites for the presumption concerning the
effect of statutory amendments, this court invoked the presumption only after concluding
that, on its face, the statute at issue “[could] be construed in several ways.” Williams, 208 Ill.

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 2d at 489. What are the “several ways” that, on its face, section 5-150(1)(c) can be
construed? Absent a clear answer to that question, the majority should not be invoking
interpretive presumptions, exceptions to interpretive presumptions, or any other external aids
to construction. Instead, it should be applying the plain language of section 5-150(1)(c) as
written, just as the circuit and appellate courts did below.
¶ 77 That said, even assuming that the majority’s invocation of the interpretive presumption
was proper in this case, its application of that presumption was not. Again, the majority
begins with a familiar and unassailable principle, namely, that “[w]hile *** a material change
in a statute made by an amendatory act is presumed to change the original statute, the
circumstances surrounding the enactment of an amendment must be considered.” See
Williams, 208 Ill. 2d at 496. What the majority neglects to explain, however, is what this
court means by “circumstances surrounding the enactment.” Williams is very clear on this
point:
“ ‘An amendment of an unambiguous statute indicates a purpose to change the law,
while no such purpose is indicated by the mere fact of an amendment of an
ambiguous provision.’ ” Id. (quoting O’Connor v. A&P Enterprises, 81 Ill. 2d 260,
271 (1980)).
More recently, this court explained that, in determining whether a statutory amendment is
merely a clarification of rather than a substantive change in the law, courts should consider
whether (1) the enacting body declared that it was clarifying a prior enactment; (2) a conflict
or ambiguity existed prior to the amendment; and (3) the amendment is consistent with a
reasonable interpretation of the prior enactment and its legislative history. K. Miller
Construction Co. v. McGinnis, 238 Ill. 2d 284, 299 (2010). If the answer to each of these
questions is “no,” then a change in the law was intended.
¶ 78 The foregoing principles are nowhere discussed or applied in the majority’s opinion. This
is regrettable, as application of the foregoing principles leads to the inescapable conclusion
that the 1998 amendment to section 5-150(1)(c) changed the law governing the admissibility
of prior adjudications for purposes of impeaching the accused. To begin with, the legislature
in no way declared that the 1998 amendment was meant only to clarify the prior version of
the statute. On the contrary, the legislation that included the 1998 amendment “radically
altered” the Juvenile Court Act. Taylor, 221 Ill. 2d at 165. As importantly, no one can
possibly dispute that, prior to the 1998 amendment, the meaning of section 5-150(1)(c) was
clear and unambiguous. The majority itself emphasizes that, for well over a decade, the
courts of this state uniformly and consistently construed that statute as permitting the
admission of prior adjudications for purposes of impeaching any witness but the accused.
Thus, under Williams, any amendment to the statute at that point would “indicate[ ] a purpose
to change the law.” And finally, not only is the 1998 amendment not “consistent with a
reasonable interpretation of the prior enactment,” it is directly contrary to every interpretation
of the prior enactment that had been rendered up until that point. Again, prior to 1998, the
courts of this state uniformly held that, under the Juvenile Court Act, prior adjudications
could not be used to impeach the accused. The 1998 amendment says precisely the
opposite–that prior adjudications “shall be admissible” for purposes of impeaching “anyone
*** including the minor or defendant if he or she testifies.” Thus, under every applicable

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 consideration, the legislature’s intent to change the law could not be clearer, and the
majority’s conclusion to the contrary is simply untenable.
¶ 79 Next, I question the majority’s conclusion that, in enacting the 1998 amendment, the
legislature retained “without modification” the phrase “pursuant to the rules of evidence for
criminal trials.” Supra ¶ 36. As the majority correctly explains, “for well over a decade” prior
to the 1998 amendment, the courts of this state understood the statutory phrase “pursuant to
the rules of evidence for criminal trials” to mean “pursuant to the Montgomery decision.”
Supra ¶ 36. And everyone equally understood that, under the rule announced in Montgomery,
prior adjudications are not admissible for purposes of impeaching the accused. According
to the majority’s own analysis, then, prior to the 1998 amendment, the phrase “pursuant to
the rules of evidence for criminal trials” meant, inter alia, “pursuant to the rule that prior
juvenile adjudications are not admissible for purposes of impeaching the accused.” The 1998
amendment, however, changed that very rule by expressly making prior adjudications
admissible for purposes of impeaching “anyone *** including the minor or defendant if he
or she testifies.” In other words, far from retaining “without modification” the phrase
“pursuant to the rules of evidence for criminal trials,” the 1998 amendment itself modified
“the rules of evidence for criminal trials,” thereby rendering any previous judicial
construction of that phrase obsolete.
¶ 80 Finally, I would note that, when assessing the legislature’s purpose in enacting a statutory
amendment, this court ordinarily concludes that the legislature did in fact have a purpose.
Sometimes that purpose will be to change settled law, and other times it will be to clarify
unsettled law. But in every case, there will be an actual purpose. Here, by contrast, the
majority effectively concludes that the 1998 amendment to section 5-150(1)(c) served no
purpose whatsoever. Again, prior to 1998, section 5-150(1)(c) was universally understood
to permit the admission of prior adjudications for purposes of impeaching any witness but
the defendant. At the same time, the courts of this state had carved out an exception for
defendants whose testimony “opens the door” to the admission of prior adjudications that
would otherwise be inadmissible. See, e.g., Bunch, 159 Ill. App. 3d at 513. And according
to the majority, the sole purpose of the 1998 amendment was to recognize that reality. Supra
¶ 38 (“[T]he amendatory language simply recognizes that circumstances may exist where a
juvenile adjudication is admissible against a testifying defendant, notwithstanding the general
prohibition against the admission of such evidence under Montgomery.”). In other words,
according to the majority, the legislature’s purpose in amending section 5-150(1)(c) was to
declare that prior juvenile adjudications are admissible whenever they are admissible. This
purpose is unlikely at best, and it is certainly not the one compelled by our ordinary analytical
standards.
¶ 81 Before concluding, I wish to address briefly the special concurrence’s suggestion that the
foregoing analysis is “incorrect” in light of this court’s recent adoption of Illinois Rule of
Evidence 101, which provides that statutory rules of evidence that conflict with decisions or
rules of this court are unenforceable. See Ill. R. Evid. 101 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011). This would be
an interesting point were it not for the fact that defendant was tried and convicted in June
2008, more than two years before the adoption and subsequent enactment of the Illinois
Rules of Evidence, of which Rule 101 is a part. Indeed, the majority opinion in this case, in

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 which the special concurrence “fully concur[s] and join[s]” (supra ¶ 64 (Burke, J., specially
concurring)), expressly states that the Illinois Rules of Evidence do not apply retroactively
to defendant’s case. Supra ¶ 32 (explaining that, because Rule of Evidence 609(d) “postdates
defendant’s trial by over two years,” the court “need not consider the effect, if any,” it would
have in this case). This is undeniably correct. The opening commentary to the Rules of
Evidence states that:
“the Illinois Rules of Evidence are not intended to abrogate or supersede any current
statutory rules of evidence. The Committee sought to avoid in all instances affecting
the validity of any existing statutes promulgated by the Illinois legislature. The
Illinois Rules of Evidence are not intended to preclude the Illinois legislature from
acting in the future with respect to the law of evidence in a manner that will not be
in conflict with the Illinois Rules of Evidence, as reflected in Rule 101.” (Emphases
added.) Ill. R. Evid., Committee Commentary.
This commentary clearly demonstrates that the Rules of Evidence were meant to apply
prospectively only and were never meant to reach back and govern proceedings that
commenced well before their implementation. Likewise, although this court adopted the
Rules of Evidence on September 27, 2010, the Rules did not become effective until more
than three months later on January 1, 2011, another clear indication that the Rules were never
meant to apply retroactively. See General Motors Corp. v. Pappas, 242 Ill. 2d 163, 187
(2011) (delayed implementation is clear evidence that provision in question is meant to apply
prospectively only). Thus, while there may be an argument to be made that, for defendants
prosecuted after January 1, 2011, the Rules of Evidence trump section 5-150(1)(c), that
argument has no place in this case.1
¶ 82 What also has no place in this case is any consideration of how and/or whether our
interpretation of section 5-150(1)(c) in this case would survive the enactment of our Rules
of Evidence. The legislature enacted section 5-150(1)(c) effective January 1, 1999, some 12
years before this court enacted the Rules of Evidence. As importantly, at that time, this court
expressly recognized that the legislature had the authority “to prescribe new rules of evidence
and alter existing ones” and that “[s]uch action does not offend the separation-of-powers
clause of our constitution.” First National Bank of Chicago v. King, 165 Ill. 2d 533, 542
(1995); see also People v. Orange, 121 Ill. 2d 364, 381 (1988) (holding that this court’s
previous refusal to allow the substantive use of prior inconsistent statements “did not
preclude the legislature from doing so”). Thus, given that this case is governed not by the
Illinois Rules of Evidence but by section 5-150(1)(c), the only relevant question in this case
is: what was the legislature’s intent when it lawfully enacted section 5-150(1)(c) in 1999?
If its intent was to override Montgomery, as I am convinced it was, it is of no present concern
that that intent might conceivably render section 5-150(1)(c) unenforceable in proceedings
commenced after January 1, 2011. I therefore resist the special concurrence’s suggestion that
this court’s adoption of the Illinois Rules of Evidence in 2011 must inform and guide our

1
In recognizing that this argument exists, I express no opinion as to its merit, one way or the
other.

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 assessment of the legislature’s intent circa 1999. The statute means what the statute means,
and our job is to enforce it as written.
¶ 83 For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s interpretation of section 5-
150(1)(c).

¶ 84 Opening the Door
¶ 85 I likewise disagree with the majority’s conclusion that defendant’s testimony in this case
did not open the door to the admission of his prior adjudications for purposes of
impeachment.
¶ 86 Although defendant argues that his testimony is not akin to the defendant’s testimony in
Harris, where the defendant falsely stated that he had led a crime-free life, a defendant’s
testimony need not be as emphatic as “I don’t commit crimes” in order to mislead the jury
about his or her criminal background. If the testimony, taken as a whole, is capable of a
reasonable construction that would mislead the jury, that is sufficient to “open the door” to
admission of a juvenile adjudication. Here, defendant’s testimony that he had “never been
in a situation like that before” reasonably can be construed as an attempt to mislead the jury
by portraying defendant as inexperienced with the criminal justice system and thus
“overwhelmed and prone to making a false statement” to police. 403 Ill. App. 3d at 319. As
brought out on cross-examination, defendant, in fact, had been in a similar situation just 18
months earlier when he was questioned by the same detectives in connection with another
case. The questioning in that case, like the questioning in the present case, resulted in the
preparation of a typewritten statement.
¶ 87 Defendant’s testimony that he had “never been in prison” may have been accurate; but
his full statement that he had never been in prison “or nothing like that” reasonably can be
construed as an attempt to mislead the jury by again portraying defendant as inexperienced
or “unseasoned.” 403 Ill. App. 3d at 319. That defendant may have meant something else is
not dispositive. See Harris, 231 Ill. 2d at 591. Accordingly, I agree with the appellate court
that defendant’s testimony opened the door to the admission of his juvenile adjudication.

¶ 88 Conclusion
¶ 89 For both of the reasons set forth above,2 I respectfully dissent.

¶ 90 JUSTICES GARMAN and KARMEIER join in this dissent.

2
My conclusion that defendant’s prior adjudication was properly admitted likewise disposes
of defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel argument, as counsel is not ineffective for failing
to keep out perfectly admissible evidence.

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