People v. Snyder

ILLINOIS OFFICIAL REPORTS
Supreme Court

People v. Snyder, 2011 IL 111382

Caption in Supreme THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant and Cross-
Court: Appellee, v. DEANDRA SNYDER, Appellee and Cross-Appellant.

Docket No. 111382
Filed December 1, 2011

Held Where a negotiated plea of guilty to criminal damage to property did not
(Note: This syllabus encompass sentencing and a restitution order was entered even absent the
constitutes no part of required advice that this was a possibility, the defendant was not entitled
the opinion of the court to vacation of that order where plea withdrawal had never been sought
but has been prepared and was not wanted.
by the Reporter of
Decisions for the
convenience of the
reader.)

Decision Under Appeal from the Appellate Court for the Third District; heard in that
Review court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Peoria County, the Hon. Stuart
P. Borden, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Appellate court judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part; circuit
court judgment affirmed as modified.
Counsel on Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Kevin W. Lyons,
Appeal State’s Attorney, of Peoria (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, and
Michael M. Glick and Erica Seyburn, Assistant Attorneys General, of
Chicago, and Patrick Delfino, Terry A. Mertel and Dawn Duffy, of the
Office of the State’s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, of Ottawa, of
counsel), for the People.

Samuel L. Snyder, of East Peoria, for appellee.

Justices JUSTICE KARMEIER delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Chief Justice Kilbride and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Garman, Burke,
and Theis concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶1 Pursuant to a partially negotiated plea, defendant, Deandra Snyder, pled guilty to
intimidation (720 ILCS 5/12-6(a)(1) (West 2008)) and criminal damage to property (720
ILCS 5/21-1(1)(a) (West 2008)) and was sentenced to concurrent extended terms of
imprisonment of 10 and 6 years, respectively, followed by one year of mandatory supervised
release (MSR). Her sentences were to be served concurrently with each other but
consecutively to any punishment she received for violating MSR in an unrelated case. She
was also ordered to pay restitution.
¶2 On appeal, defendant argued that (1) the circuit court of Peoria County erred in imposing
extended-term sentences on both convictions; (2) her sentence was excessive; (3) the court
should not have ordered her sentences to be served consecutively to any punishment she
received for violating MSR in an unrelated case; and (4) the court failed to admonish her
about the possibility that she would be ordered to pay restitution. The appellate court vacated
the extended-term portion of her criminal damage to property sentence, reducing the sentence
for that offense to three years; found that, other than the extended-term sentencing issue, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing her; held that the trial court did not err
in ordering her sentences to be served consecutively to any punishment she received for
violating MSR in an unrelated case; and vacated the restitution order because the trial court
failed to admonish her about the possibility that she would be ordered to pay restitution. 403
Ill. App. 3d 637.
¶3 We allowed the State’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Feb. 26, 2010).
Defendant also seeks cross-relief, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in
imposing the maximum 10-year extended-term sentence for intimidation. For the following
reasons, we reverse that portion of the appellate court’s judgment vacating the restitution
order and affirm the appellate court’s judgment in all other respects.

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¶4 I. BACKGROUND
¶5 On August 20, 2008, defendant, who had been dating Corey Simmons and was seven
months pregnant with his child, drove to his apartment complex. When she arrived, she saw
a parked car belonging to Jessica King, who had also been dating Simmons. She got a knife
from her vehicle and slashed the convertible top and all four tires of King’s car, causing
$2,891 in damage. When King and Simmons confronted her, she began yelling and swinging
the knife at them. Eventually, she got in her vehicle and left.
¶6 Defendant was charged with armed violence (720 ILCS 5/33A-2(a) (West 2008)), two
counts of attempted first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/8-4(a), 9-1 (West 2008)), unlawful
possession of a weapon by a felon (720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2008)), intimidation (720
ILCS 5/12-6(a)(1) (West 2008)), and criminal damage to property (720 ILCS 5/21-1(1)(a)
(West 2008)). She agreed to plead guilty to intimidation and criminal damage to property in
exchange for dismissal of the remaining charges. There was no agreement as to sentencing.
¶7 Before accepting defendant’s guilty plea, the trial court admonished her that she faced
a minimum of probation and a maximum of extended prison terms of 10 years for
intimidation and 6 years for criminal damage to property, followed by one year of MSR. The
court failed to admonish her as to the possibility that she would be ordered to pay restitution
or fines.
¶8 Defendant’s presentence investigation report indicates that, in June 2007, she pled guilty
to arson and obstruction of justice, stemming from an incident in which she set fire to King’s
vehicle. She was sentenced to three years in prison for arson and directed to have no contact
with King or Simmons. For obstruction, she was sentenced to 30 months of probation and
ordered to take anger management classes. In January 2008, she was released from prison
and began serving MSR on the arson conviction. At the time of the present offenses, she was
in violation of the court’s order prohibiting her from having contact with King or Simmons,
was on probation for arson, was on MSR for obstruction of justice, and had not yet begun her
anger management classes. She also had 2005 misdemeanor convictions for theft and
criminal damage to property and was on probation for those offenses when she committed
the 2007 arson.
¶9 At the sentencing hearing, the trial court stated that, in imposing sentence, it had
considered aggravating and mitigating factors. The aggravating factors included defendant’s
prior criminal history and the fact that she was on probation and MSR when she committed
the present offenses. The court also emphasized the need to deter others. In mitigation, the
court noted that defendant had a newborn child and that there was some culpability by King
and Simmons, who were involved in a “love triangle” with defendant. The court found that
defendant was a very dangerous person with serious mental and anger management issues
that needed to be addressed.
¶ 10 After considering the presentence investigation report, counsel’s arguments, evidence in
aggravation and mitigation, and defendant’s statement in allocution, the court sentenced her
to concurrent extended terms of imprisonment of 10 years for intimidation and 6 years for
criminal damage to property, followed by one year of MSR. The sentences were to be served
consecutively to any punishment she received for violating MSR in the unrelated arson case.

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 She was also ordered to pay $2,891 in restitution. She filed a motion to reconsider sentence
but did not seek leave to withdraw her guilty plea. Her motion to reconsider sentence was
denied. She filed a timely notice of appeal.
¶ 11 On appeal, defendant first argued, and the State conceded, that the trial court erred in
imposing extended-term sentences on both of her convictions. 403 Ill. App. 3d at 639. The
appellate court agreed and vacated the extended-term portion of her criminal damage to
property sentence, reducing the sentence on that offense from six to three years. Id. at 640.
¶ 12 Defendant next argued that her sentence was excessive. The appellate court disagreed,
finding that, other than the extended-term sentencing issue, which was corrected, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant. Id. at 641. The appellate court
noted that, in determining her sentence, the trial court had properly considered the
presentence investigation report, defendant’s statement in allocution, counsel’s arguments,
and the aggravating and mitigating factors. Id. at 640. The appellate court found that prison
sentences of 10 years for intimidation and 3 years for criminal damage to property were not
excessive given the significant aggravating factors in the case. Id. at 641.
¶ 13 Defendant next argued that the trial court erred in ordering her sentences to be served
consecutively to any punishment she received for violating MSR in the unrelated arson case.
The appellate court disagreed.
¶ 14 Finally, defendant argued that the trial court erred in failing to admonish her as to the
possibility that she would be ordered to pay restitution. The appellate majority agreed,
finding that the trial court’s failure to admonish her as to the possibility that she would be
ordered to pay restitution violated Illinois Supreme Court Rule 402(a)(2) (eff. July 1, 1997).
Id. at 641. Following the Fourth District’s opinion in People v. Jenkins, 141 Ill. App. 3d 602
(1986), the appellate majority held that the appropriate remedy for such an error was to
vacate the restitution order. 403 Ill. App. 3d at 642. The majority reasoned that this court had
adopted Jenkins’ approach in People v. Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d 177 (2005).
¶ 15 Justice Schmidt dissented as to the vacatur of the restitution order, noting that the Fourth
District had impliedly repudiated Jenkins’ holding that a court’s admonishments constituted
an implied promise; that Whitfield neither referred to nor relied on Jenkins; that Whitfield
was based on a negotiated plea for a specific sentence, not an open plea; and that, here,
defendant was not denied the benefit of any bargain with the State because there was no
agreement as to sentencing. 403 Ill. App. 3d at 642-44 (Schmidt, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Justice Schmidt would have followed the Second District’s approach in
People v. Seyferlich, 398 Ill. App. 3d 989 (2010), reasoning that it was not the court’s role
to bargain with defendant and that if she regretted her plea as a result of the restitution order,
the proper remedy was to allow her to withdraw her plea. 403 Ill. App. 3d at 645 (Schmidt,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Schmidt opined that there was no
indication that defendant was prejudiced or denied real justice as a result of the faulty
admonition and that vacating the restitution order defeated the legislative purpose of trying
to make victims whole.
¶ 16 This court allowed the State’s petition for leave to appeal.

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¶ 17 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 18 A. The State’s Appeal
¶ 19 Rule 402 requires that the trial court give a defendant certain admonishments before
accepting a guilty plea, including “the minimum and maximum sentence prescribed by law.”
Ill. S. Ct. R. 402 (eff. July 1, 1997).
¶ 20 In the present case, it is undisputed that the trial court failed to substantially comply with
Rule 402(a)(2) in that it failed to admonish defendant as to the possibility that she would be
ordered to pay restitution. The issue on appeal is whether the proper remedy for failing to
admonish defendant, who entered a partially negotiated guilty plea, as to the possibility that
she would be ordered to pay restitution is to vacate the restitution order or give her the
opportunity to withdraw her plea. Here, defendant did not move to withdraw her guilty plea,
and, at oral argument before this court, defense counsel made it clear that defendant does not
want to withdraw her plea.
¶ 21 Because this issue concerns the interpretation of a supreme court rule, a question of law,
our review is de novo. Robidoux v. Oliphant, 201 Ill. 2d 324, 332 (2002).
¶ 22 In vacating the restitution order in the present case, the appellate majority relied heavily
on Jenkins, 141 Ill. App. 3d 602. In Jenkins, the defendant entered an open guilty plea. Id.
at 604. The trial court admonished him pursuant to Rule 402 before he entered his plea but
did not mention restitution. The trial court ordered him to pay restitution as part of his
sentences. On appeal, he argued that his guilty plea must be vacated because he was not
admonished that his sentences might include restitution. Id. at 608. The Fourth District
concluded that “the restitution order exceeded the ‘maximum sentence’ of which the
defendant had been admonished upon entry of his guilty plea.” Id. at 609. Although the
defendant sought to vacate his plea, the Jenkins court concluded that the appropriate remedy
was to vacate the restitution order, noting that as long as the restitution order was vacated,
the sentences imposed were within the limits stated to the defendant before he entered his
plea.
¶ 23 In his dissent from the appellate majority’s vacatur of the restitution order in the present
case, Justice Schmidt relied on Seyferlich, 398 Ill. App. 3d 989. In Seyferlich, the defendant,
who entered an open plea, was admonished that her sentence could include a fine of up to
$25,000 but not that she could be ordered to pay restitution. Id. at 990. She was ordered to
pay $46,311 in restitution. On appeal, she argued that the trial court erred in failing to
admonish her of the possibility of restitution. Citing Jenkins, she argued that the amount of
restitution must be reduced to $25,000–the maximum financial penalty she was told she
faced as a result of her guilty plea.
¶ 24 In rejecting her argument, the Second District in Seyferlich explained that the Fourth
District’s remedy in Jenkins–vacatur of the restitution order–was inappropriate. Id. at 991.
The Seyferlich court noted that the cases upon which the Jenkins court relied characterized
the trial court’s admonishments as “implied promises” and viewed the admonishments as
part of a bargaining process between the court and the defendant. The Seyferlich court
rejected this view, noting that the admonishments, which are required by Rule 402, are
designed to ensure that the defendant’s guilty plea is intelligently and understandingly made,

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 as required by Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). The Seyferlich court noted that it is
not the trial court’s role to bargain with a defendant to obtain his or her guilty plea.
¶ 25 The Seyferlich court also recognized that the Fourth District’s opinion in People v.
Harris, 359 Ill. App. 3d 931 (2005), called into doubt the continued viability of its prior
opinion in Jenkins. Seyferlich, 398 Ill. App. 3d at 991-92. In Harris, the court held that if the
trial court’s failure to properly admonish a defendant results in the denial of “real justice” or
in prejudice to the defendant, the reviewing court should vacate the guilty plea. Harris, 359
Ill. App. 3d at 936. The Harris court noted that the defendant did not seek to vacate his guilty
plea but, instead, sought the wrong remedy–to amend the sentencing order. Id. at 937.
¶ 26 The Seyferlich court concluded that “[i]f defendant would not have pleaded guilty but for
the incomplete admonition, her remedy was to seek leave to withdraw her plea.” Seyferlich,
398 Ill. App. 3d at 992. The court found that Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d 177, did not dictate a
different result. Seyferlich, 398 Ill. App. 3d at 992. We agree.
¶ 27 In Whitfield, the defendant entered a negotiated plea to first degree murder in exchange
for a 25-year prison term. Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d at 179. The court failed to admonish him that
he would have to serve three years of MSR in addition to the negotiated prison term. Id. at
180. He argued that the MSR was not part of the negotiated sentence and that he was entitled
to enforce his bargain with the State. Id. at 186-87. Recognizing that the MSR could not
legally be stricken, he argued that, to best approximate his bargain with the State, his prison
term should be reduced by three years. Id. at 187.
¶ 28 As we noted in Whitfield, the “benefit of the bargain” theory espoused by defendant was
rooted in Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971). Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d at 184-85. In
Santobello, the Court held that “when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or
agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or
consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.” Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262. In Whitfield, we
restated that holding as follows: “if a defendant shows that his plea of guilty was entered in
reliance on a plea agreement, he may have a due process right to enforce the terms of the
agreement.” Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d at 189. In Whitfield, we agreed with the defendant’s
argument that “his constitutional right to due process and fundamental fairness was violated
because he pled guilty in exchange for a specific sentence, but received a different, more
onerous sentence.” Id. at 188-89. In granting his request to reduce his prison term, we
concluded that “adding the statutorily required three-year MSR term to defendant’s
negotiated 25-year sentence amounts to a unilateral modification and breach of the plea
agreement by the State, inconsistent with constitutional concerns of fundamental fairness.”
Id. at 190.
¶ 29 In vacating the restitution order in the present case, the appellate majority, citing
Whitfield, stated that “[t]he Jenkins approach has been adopted by our supreme court.” 403
Ill. App. 3d at 642. Despite the appellate majority’s statement to the contrary, we did not rely
on or adopt Jenkins’ reasoning in Whitfield. Instead, our holding in Whitfield was premised
on the “benefit of the bargain” analysis, which was appropriate because of Whitfield’s fully
negotiated plea.
¶ 30 The significant difference between Whitfield and the present case is that Whitfield fully

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 negotiated for a specific prison term, whereas, here, defendant pled guilty with no promise
as to sentencing. She pled guilty in exchange for the State’s agreement to drop the remaining
charges against her, which the State has done. Therefore, she has received the full “benefit”
of her bargain. The remedy in Whitfield was fashioned to give Whitfield the “benefit of the
bargain” he made with the State. In Whitfield, we concluded that we should give weight to
Whitfield’s preference, rather than simply giving him an opportunity to withdraw his plea.
Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d at 202-03, 205. However, nothing in Whitfield indicates that this
specific enforcement remedy is available where, as here, a defendant enters a partially
negotiated plea. Contrary to the appellate court’s holding, Whitfield’s remedy–based on a
“benefit of the bargain” analysis–is inapplicable to defendant’s partially negotiated plea
because she received the benefit of the bargain she made with the State.
¶ 31 We agree with and adopt the Second District’s reasoning and conclusion in Seyferlich
and hold that the appropriate remedy for the trial court’s failure to admonish defendant, who
entered a partially negotiated guilty plea, as to the possibility that she would be ordered to
pay restitution is to allow her the opportunity to withdraw her plea. In so holding, we
expressly overrule the Fourth District’s holding in Jenkins–that the appropriate remedy for
failing to admonish a defendant who entered a partially negotiated plea as to the possibility
of restitution is to vacate the restitution order instead of allowing him the opportunity to
withdraw his plea.
¶ 32 Therefore, as in Seyferlich, if defendant in this case would not have pleaded guilty but
for the incomplete admonishment, she should have sought leave to withdraw her guilty plea.
See Seyferlich, 398 Ill. App. 3d at 992. Allowing a defendant a fresh opportunity to decide
whether to plead guilty, with full knowledge of the possible consequences, adequately
protects her rights and avoids awarding a windfall due to the trial court’s error. It also
provides both the parties and the trial court an incentive to ensure adequate admonishments,
while taking into consideration victims’ rights to obtain restitution.
¶ 33 However, in the present case, we need not determine whether the incomplete
admonishment requires vacatur of defendant’s guilty plea because, at oral argument, defense
counsel made it clear that defendant does not want to withdraw her plea. Instead, she seeks
a remedy to which she is not entitled–vacatur of the restitution order. Accordingly, we
reverse that portion of the appellate court’s judgment vacating the restitution order.

¶ 34 B. Defendant’s Request for Cross-Relief
¶ 35 In her request for cross-relief, defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion
in imposing the maximum 10-year extended-term sentence for intimidation. We disagree.
¶ 36 A reviewing court gives substantial deference to the trial court’s sentencing decision
because the trial judge, having observed the defendant and the proceedings, is in a much
better position to consider factors such as the defendant’s credibility, demeanor, moral
character, mentality, environment, habits, and age. People v. Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d 205, 212-
13 (2010). Therefore, a reviewing court may not modify a defendant’s sentence absent an
abuse of discretion. Id. at 212. An abuse of discretion will be found where “the sentence is
‘greatly at variance with the spirit and purpose of the law[ ] or manifestly disproportionate

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 to the nature of the offense.’ ” Id. (quoting People v. Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d 203, 210 (2000)).
¶ 37 After reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in sentencing defendant to the maximum 10-year extended-term sentence for intimidation.
The record demonstrates that the court properly considered the presentence investigation
report, defendant’s statement in allocution, counsel’s arguments, and the aggravating and
mitigating factors. The aggravating factors included defendant’s prior criminal history and
the fact that she was on probation and MSR when she committed the present offenses. The
court also emphasized the need to deter others. In mitigation, the court noted that defendant
had a newborn child and that there was some culpability by King and Simmons. The court
further found that defendant was a very dangerous person with serious mental and anger
management issues that needed to be addressed. Given the significant aggravating factors in
this case, we cannot say that the sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment for intimidation “is
‘greatly at variance with the spirit and purpose of the law[ ] or manifestly disproportionate
to the nature of the offense.’ ” See Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d at 212.

¶ 38 CONCLUSION
¶ 39 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse that portion of the appellate court’s judgment
vacating the restitution order and affirm the appellate court’s judgment in all other respects.

¶ 40 Appellate court judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part;
¶ 41 circuit court judgment affirmed as modified.

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