ILLINOIS OFFICIAL REPORTS
Supreme Court
Powell v. Dean Foods Co., 2012 IL 111714
Caption in Supreme TRACEY POWELL, Indiv. and as Special Adm’r of the Estate of Adam
Court: McDonald, Deceased, et al., Appellants, v. DEAN FOODS COMPANY
et al., Appellees.
Docket Nos. 111714, 111717 cons.
Filed January 20, 2012
Rehearing denied March 26, 2012
Held Only the party moving to substitute a judge as a matter of right has
(Note: This syllabus standing, if that motion is erroneously denied, to seek the remedy of
constitutes no part of having all subsequent orders entered in the case declared null and void.
the opinion of the court
but has been prepared
by the Reporter of
Decisions for the
convenience of the
reader.)
Decision Under Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District; heard in that court
Review on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, the Hon. Patricia
Banks, Judge, presiding.
Judgment Appellate court judgment vacated; circuit court judgment reinstated;
cause remanded.
Counsel on Martin J. Healy, Jr., David P. Huber and Dennis M. Lynch, of The Healy
Appeal Law Firm, J. Timothy Eaton, of Shefsky & Froelich, and William J. Harte
and Joan M. Mannix, all of Chicago, and Michael T. Reagan, of Ottawa,
for appellants Tracey Powell and George Kakidas.
Michael W. Rathsack, of Chicago (Michael K. Muldoon and John J.
Muldoon III, of counsel), for appellant Alexander Chakonas.
James K. Horstman and Ronald L. Wisniewski, of Cray Huber Horstman
Heil & Vanausdal LLC, of Chicago, for appellees Alco of Wisconsin et
al.
Hugh C. Griffin and Stevie A. Starnes, of Hall Prangle & Schoonveld,
LLC, of Chicago, for appellee Dean Foods Company.
Justices JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices Freeman, Garman, Karmeier, Burke, and Theis concurred in the
judgment and opinion.
Chief Justice Kilbride took no part in the decision.
OPINION
¶1 Plaintiffs, Tracey Powell, individually and as special administrator of the estate of Adam
McDonald, deceased, George Kakidas, individually and as special administrator of the estate
of Diana Kakidas, deceased, and Alexander Chakonas, individually and as special
administrator of the estate of Christina Chakonas, deceased, filed wrongful-death actions
arising from a car accident where plaintiffs’ vehicle was hit by a tractor-trailer driven by
defendant Jamie L. Reeves. Plaintiffs filed suit against Reeves, Dean Foods Company, Alco
of Wisconsin, Inc., and Alder Group, as well as other defendants not at issue in this appeal.
Following trial, a jury in the circuit court of Cook County returned a verdict in favor of each
plaintiff, finding defendants jointly and severally liable.
¶2 Defendants appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the trial court erred in denying Alder
Group’s motion for substitution of judge as of right pursuant to section 2-1001(a)(2) of the
Code of Civil Procedure (the Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-1001(a)(2) (West 2006)). The Appellate
Court, First District, agreed with defendants that the trial court erred in denying Alder
Group’s motion for substitution of judge as a matter of right. 405 Ill. App. 3d 354.
Accordingly, the appellate court reversed the trial court’s order denying Alder Group’s
motion for substitution, and vacated all orders entered in the case subsequent to the denial
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of the motion for substitution. 405 Ill. App. 3d at 364. The appellate court remanded the
cause for a new trial before another trial judge. Id.
¶3 Plaintiffs filed petitions for leave to appeal with this court pursuant to Illinois Supreme
Court Rule 315 (Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Feb. 26, 2010)). This court denied plaintiffs’ petitions
for leave to appeal. Plaintiffs then filed motions for leave to file motions for reconsideration
of the orders denying their petitions for leave to appeal. This court allowed the motions for
reconsideration. This court then vacated its orders denying plaintiffs’ petitions for leave to
appeal, and entered orders allowing the petitions for leave to appeal, which were
consolidated.
¶4 BACKGROUND
¶5 The facts relevant to the issues on appeal are as follows. On July 6, 2002, defendant
Reeves was driving eastbound on U.S. 30 near Lincoln Street in Wanatah, Indiana. Reeves
was employed by defendant Alco of Wisconsin, Inc. The truck tractor that Reeves was
driving was owned by defendant Alder Group, Inc., and Reeves was hauling a trailer that was
owned by Dean Illinois Dairies, LLC, which was loaded with defendant Dean Foods
Company’s milk products.
¶6 Around 10:25 p.m., Christina Chakonas was driving with Adam McDonald and Diana
Kakidas. Christina approached U.S. 30 on Lincoln Street, which was a secondary road with
a stop sign for U.S. 30. After stopping, Christina began to turn left attempting to cross Route
30. Reeves struck Christina’s vehicle as it crossed the eastbound lanes of U.S. 30. As a result
of the accident, Christina, Adam and Diana were killed.
¶7 On December 2, 2003, plaintiff Chakonas filed his complaint against Reeves, Alco, Inc.,
Alco of Wisconsin, Inc., d/b/a Robert Alder & Sons, and Dean Foods Company. In July
2004, Chakonas filed an amended complaint naming Reeves, Alco, Inc., Alco of Wisconsin,
Dean Foods Company, and Dean Illinois Dairies, LLC, as defendants.
¶8 On December 31, 2003, Powell and Kakidas filed their complaint naming Reeves and
Dean Foods Company as defendants. In July 2004, Powell and Kakidas filed an amended
complaint naming Dean Illinois Dairies, LLC, Reeves, Alco of Wisconsin, and Alder Group
as defendants. In August 2004, Chakonas filed a motion to consolidate his action with that
of Powell and Kakidas. That motion was granted and the cases were consolidated.
¶9 Plaintiffs alleged that the corporate defendants were vicariously liable for Reeves’
negligent driving. Further, plaintiffs alleged that Reeves was speeding, was in excess of his
federal hours of service requirements, and did not brake until four seconds after the collision.
¶ 10 Following discovery, the case was set for trial on October 11, 2007. The defendants were
all represented by one law firm. At the time of trial, the following defendants had been
named in one or both of plaintiffs’ complaints: Reeves; Alco, Inc.; Alco of Wisconsin, Inc.;
Alder Group, Inc.; Dean Foods Company; and Dean Illinois Dairies, LLC. On October 11,
2007, four defendants moved ex parte for a change of judge as of right pursuant to section
2-1001(a)(2)(i) of the Code. Defendant Dean Illinois Dairies, LLC, took a change of judge
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as of right from Judge William J. Haddad.1 Defendant Alco of Wisconsin took a change as
of right from Judge Susan Zwick. Defendant Dean Foods Company took a change as of right
from Judge James M. Varga, and defendant Alco, Inc., took a change as of right from Judge
Patricia Banks.
¶ 11 When plaintiffs learned of Alco, Inc.’s motion for substitution as of right from Judge
Banks, plaintiffs filed a motion with the assignment judge to send the case back to Judge
Banks to reconsider Alco, Inc.’s motion. After the case was sent back to Judge Banks,
plaintiffs filed a motion seeking reconsideration of Judge Banks’ order granting Alco, Inc.’s
motion for substitution of judge. Plaintiffs alleged that Alco of Wisconsin, Inc., and Alco,
Inc., were alternative names for the same entity, and that Alco, Inc., was the former name of
Alco of Wisconsin, Inc. Although plaintiff Chakonas had named Alco, Inc., as a defendant,
plaintiffs argued that defendants’ amended appearance purposely excluded an appearance by
Alco, Inc., and in response to plaintiff Chakonas’ complaint, defendants referenced Alco of
Wisconsin when answering Chakonas’ allegations against Alco, Inc. Plaintiffs argued that
the same party was using two different names to get two substitutions as of right, when they
were only entitled to one substitution as of right.
¶ 12 Defendants agreed with plaintiffs that the motion on behalf of Alco, Inc., had been filed
inadvertently. Defense counsel stated, “what I would respectfully ask is that your order be
rescinded or whatever you have to do; but I would present a motion now on behalf of Alder
Group, Inc., for substitution of judge and we move on from there.” Judge Banks then granted
plaintiffs’ motion to reconsider.
¶ 13 Defendant Alder Group, Inc., then presented its motion for substitution of judge as of
right from Judge Banks. Plaintiffs responded that the trial court had ruled on a substantial
issue in the case within the meaning of section 2-1001(a)(2)(ii), when it reconsidered and
vacated the order granting Alco, Inc.’s motion for substitution of judge, so that Alder Group,
Inc., had no right to a substitution of judge. Judge Banks ordered further briefing on the
issue. Following briefing, Judge Banks denied Alder Group, Inc.’s motion for substitution
of judge on the ground that the court had made a substantial ruling on a substantive issue
when it determined Alco, Inc.’s status, and when the court vacated the order of substitution.
¶ 14 The case then proceeded to trial and the jury found in favor of all three plaintiffs and
against all defendants. The jury awarded $7 million to the estate of Christina Chakonas,
which was reduced to $4.2 million because the jury found that Christina was 40% at fault.
The jury also awarded $8 million to the estate of Diana Kakidas and $8 million to the estate
of Adam McDonald. The jury answered special interrogatories finding that Christina’s
contributory negligence was not more than 50% of the combined fault, and that Reeves was
an agent of Dean Foods.
¶ 15 Thereafter, the trial court denied defendants’ posttrial motions. Relevant to the instant
appeal, the trial court reaffirmed its denial of Alder Group’s motion for substitution, holding
that the denial of the motion was not so overly prejudicial that it deprived defendants of a fair
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Defendant Dean Illinois Dairies, LLC, was dismissed from the case at the close of all the
evidence.
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trial.
¶ 16 On appeal, the defendants argued, inter alia, that the trial court erred in denying Alder
Group’s motion for substitution of judge as a matter of right. Defendants further argued that
all subsequent orders entered in the case after the trial court erroneously denied the motion
for substitution of judge were void.
¶ 17 A majority of the appellate court agreed with defendants. The majority first found that
the trial court’s order granting the motion to reconsider the substitution of judge did not
constitute a “substantial issue” within the meaning of section 2-1001(a)(2)(ii) of the Code.
405 Ill. App. 3d at 360. The majority held that the ruling on the motion to reconsider did not
involve a matter pertaining to the merits of the case, but instead concerned a procedural
matter. Id. Therefore, the trial court erred in denying Alder Group’s motion for substitution
of judge as a matter of right. Id.
¶ 18 The majority next held that all defendants had standing to challenge the denial of Alder
Group’s motion for substitution of judge as a matter of right. 405 Ill. App. 3d at 364. The
majority noted that Illinois case law holds that any and all orders entered after the improper
denial of a motion to substitute judge are null and void. Id. It followed, then, that such orders
are void as to all parties in the action. Id. The majority therefore held that “all defendants in
the case at bar have standing to challenge the denial of Alder Group’s motion for substitution
of judge as a matter of right and all subsequent orders following the improper denial of Alder
Group’s motion for substitution of judge are void as to all parties.” Id.
¶ 19 In so holding, the appellate court majority rejected the decision in Aussieker v. City of
Bloomington, 355 Ill. App. 3d 498 (2005). There, a divided panel of the appellate court held
that each individual plaintiff in a multiplaintiff civil action was deemed to be a separate
party, each entitled to one motion for substitution of judge as a matter of right. Id. at 503.
Aussieker also held that the other plaintiffs in the case lacked standing to claim that the trial
court erred in denying another plaintiff’s motion for substitution of judge as a matter of right.
Id.
¶ 20 In rejecting the decision in Aussieker, the appellate court majority in the instant case
instead agreed with the holding of the court in In re Austin D., 358 Ill. App. 3d 794, 799
(2005), decided less than six months after Aussieker, which found that Aussieker’s holding
was “simply wrong.” 405 Ill. App. 3d at 364. The dissenting justice in Aussieker wrote the
unanimous opinion in Austin D. The Austin D. court held that any and all orders entered after
the improper denial of a motion to substitute judge are null and void as to all parties in the
action. Austin D., 358 Ill. App. 3d at 799.
¶ 21 The appellate court majority in this case therefore vacated all orders as to all defendants
entered subsequent to the trial court’s improper denial of Alder Group’s motion to substitute,
and remanded the cause to the presiding judge of the law division of the circuit court of Cook
County for reassignment to another trial judge for a new trial.
¶ 22 The dissenting justice agreed with the majority that the trial court erred in denying Alder
Group’s motion for substitution of judge as a matter of right, and that the trial court’s order
denying Alder Group’s motion must be reversed, as well as the order entered for judgment
on the jury’s verdict against Alder Group. 405 Ill. App. 3d at 364-65 (Gordon, J., dissenting).
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However, the dissenting judge would hold that the defendants other than Alder Group lacked
standing to claim that the trial court erred by denying Alder Group’s motion for substitution
of judge. Id. at 365.
¶ 23 ANALYSIS
¶ 24 Plaintiffs now appeal the appellate court’s decision vacating the jury’s verdicts against
all defendants and remanding for a new trial. Plaintiffs Powell and Kakidas argue that: (1)
the defendants other than Alder Group lack standing to appeal from the denial of Alder
Group’s motion to substitute; (2) the trial court properly denied Alder Group’s motion to
substitute because Alco of Wisconsin and Alder Group were the same party, and Alco of
Wisconsin had already been granted a substitution; (3) the trial court properly denied Alder
Group’s motion to substitute because the trial court’s ruling on the substitution motion was
substantial; and (4) any relief in this case should be prospective only.
¶ 25 Plaintiff Chakonas argues that even if Alder Group’s motion was wrongly denied, all
subsequent orders were merely voidable and not void. Chakonas also argues that even if the
trial court wrongly denied Alder Group’s motion for substitution of judge, only Alder Group
had standing to contest that ruling on appeal, and the verdicts against the remaining three
defendants should be affirmed.
¶ 26 Motion to Dismiss
¶ 27 Before we address the merits of plaintiffs’ appeal, we first must address plaintiffs’ joint
motion to dismiss Alder Group with prejudice. Plaintiffs filed their joint motion to dismiss
Alder Group with prejudice during the briefing of the case. We ordered the motion taken
with the case.
¶ 28 Plaintiffs’ joint motion notes that in their briefs to the appellate court, they stated that if
the verdict as to the other defendants was affirmed, they would not pursue Alder Group
separately on any retrial. Plaintiffs repeated that assertion during oral argument in the
appellate court. Plaintiffs Powell and Kakidas state that they again confirmed that they would
not seek retrial solely as to Alder Group in their brief to this court. Plaintiffs’ joint motion
states that, in order to avoid any confusion concerning their intentions, they now were
moving to dismiss Alder Group from the case, with prejudice.
¶ 29 In response to plaintiffs’ joint motion to dismiss, Alder Group stated that it had no
objection to having its potential liability and obligations in this case fully and finally
extinguished. Alder Group noted that the trial court had stayed execution of the judgment
against it, but had imposed certain obligations on Alder Group in the operation of its business
during the pendency of the appeal. Alder Group acknowledged that the appellate court had
vacated the judgment entered against it, but stated that it was still potentially liable for the
judgment should this court reverse the appellate court. Alder Group asserted that it was not
clear from plaintiffs’ motion whether plaintiffs intended to fully and finally release Alder
Group from the judgments below, from Alder Group’s obligations under the stay order, and
from all potential liability. Alder Group stated that absent a full and final release, it would
object to dismissal. However, if plaintiffs were proposing to dismiss Alder Group from the
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case with prejudice and to fully and finally release Alder Group from the trial court
judgments entered against it, from Alder Group’s obligations under the stay order, and from
all potential liability in the case, Alder Group would have no objection to its dismissal on
that basis.
¶ 30 The remaining defendants filed a response arguing that this court should deem plaintiffs’
motion to be a concession that the trial court committed error when it denied Alder Group’s
motion for substitution of judge. The remaining defendants also argued that plaintiffs’
motion should cause this court to reconsider the granting of plaintiffs’ petition for leave to
appeal.
¶ 31 At oral argument, this court asked plaintiffs’ counsel to clarify whether its dismissal of
Alder Group was with prejudice. Plaintiffs’ counsel confirmed that the dismissal was with
prejudice. Plaintiffs’ counsel noted that the judgment against Alder Group had been vacated,
and plaintiffs now were dismissing Alder Group with prejudice, therefore Alder Group was
released from the judgments entered against it, as well as from all obligations and potential
liability. Given plaintiffs’ affirmation that its dismissal of Alder Group with prejudice is a
total release, along with Alder Group’s statement that it would have no objection to a
dismissal on that basis, we hereby grant plaintiffs’ joint motion to dismiss Alder Group with
prejudice.
¶ 32 Substitution of Judge as of Right
¶ 33 We now turn to the merits of this case. Section 2-1001 of the Code provides, in pertinent
part:
“(a) A substitution of judge in any civil action may be had in the following
situations:
***
(2) Substitution as of right. When a party timely exercises his or her right to
a substitution without cause as provided in this paragraph (2).
(i) Each party shall be entitled to one substitution of judge without cause
as a matter of right.
(ii) An application for substitution of judge as of right shall be made by
motion and shall be granted if it is presented before trial or hearing begins
and before the judge to whom it is presented has ruled on any substantial
issue in the case, or if it is presented by consent of the parties.
(iii) If any party has not entered an appearance in the case and has not
been found in default, rulings in the case by the judge on any substantial issue
before the party’s appearance shall not be grounds for denying an otherwise
timely application for substitution of judge as of right by the party.” 735 ILCS
5/2-1001(a)(2) (West 2006).
¶ 34 As noted, the appellate court found that all defendants have standing to challenge the trial
court’s erroneous denial of Alder Group’s motion for substitution of judge as of right. We
disagree. For the reasons set forth below, we find that the remaining defendants do not have
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standing to challenge the trial court’s denial of Alder Group’s motion for substitution.
¶ 35 The issue of standing presents a question of law that this court reviews de novo. Wexler
v. Wirtz Corp., 211 Ill. 2d 18, 23 (2004). The doctrine of standing ensures that issues are
raised only by parties having a real interest in the outcome of the controversy. Village of
Chatham v. County of Sangamon, 216 Ill. 2d 402, 419 (2005). Standing is shown by
demonstrating some injury to a legally cognizable interest. Id.
¶ 36 The essence of the inquiry concerning standing is whether the litigant, either in an
individual capacity or in a representative capacity, is entitled to have the court decide the
merits of a dispute or a particular issue. In re Estate of Wellman, 174 Ill. 2d 335, 345 (1996).
The purpose of the standing doctrine is to ensure that courts are deciding actual, specific
controversies and are not deciding abstract questions or moot issues. Estate of Wellman, 174
Ill. 2d at 344. Thus, as a general rule, a party cannot complain of an error that does not
prejudicially affect that party. Geer v. Kadera, 173 Ill. 2d 398, 413 (1996). A party must
assert its own legal rights and interests, rather than assert a claim for relief based upon the
rights of third parties. See Commercial Credit Loans, Inc. v. Espinoza, 293 Ill. App. 3d 923,
929 (1997). Moreover, one who has obtained by judgment all that has been asked for in the
trial court cannot appeal from the judgment. Geer, 173 Ill. 2d at 413-14.
¶ 37 The remaining defendants argue that they have standing to challenge the order denying
Alder Group’s motion for substitution as of right. Defendants contend that the primary focus
in determining standing is whether the party seeking adjudication has a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy. Further, defendants note that even nonparties have standing to
urge a trial error on appeal if the nonparty can demonstrate a “direct, immediate and
substantial interest in the subject matter, which would be prejudiced by the judgment or
benefitted by its reversal,” citing Buntrock v. Terra, 348 Ill. App. 3d 875 (2004), and
Citicorp Savings of Illinois v. First Chicago Trust Co. of Illinois, 269 Ill. App. 3d 293
(1995).
¶ 38 Defendants argue that they are each a party to the action and that they each have a
personal stake and a direct, immediate and substantial interest in the outcome. Moreover,
each defendant clearly has been prejudiced by the liability judgments entered against them
after the trial court’s erroneous ruling, so that they have standing to challenge the trial court’s
order denying Alder Group’s motion for substitution as of right.
¶ 39 Aside from the general claim that they have been prejudiced by the judgments entered
against them, and that they have a personal stake and a direct, immediate and substantial
interest in the outcome, defendants fail to demonstrate how they were prejudiced by the trial
court’s ruling. The fact that the jury entered verdicts against defendants does not establish
prejudice. Otherwise, as plaintiffs observe, a losing party could claim nearly any error,
against any party, as a basis for reversal without a showing of prejudice.
¶ 40 In fact, Dean Foods Company and Alco of Wisconsin, Inc., each filed a motion for
substitution of judge as a matter of right, which the trial court granted. Consequently, those
defendants obtained all that was asked for, and everything to which they were entitled, in the
trial court. Defendant Reeves did not file a motion for substitution of judge as of right.
Therefore, Reeves cannot now complain that he was erroneously denied his right to
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substitution of judge.
¶ 41 Reeves argues that he did not file a motion for substitution as of right following the
denial of Alder Group’s motion because to do so would have been futile, as the trial court
already had stated that it had ruled on a substantial matter. Nonetheless, Reeves could have
filed a motion for substitution of right in order to preserve the issue for appeal. Or, had
Reeves believed Judge Banks was prejudiced and that he could not receive a fair trial before
her, Reeves could have filed a petition for substitution of judge for cause pursuant to section
2-1001(a)(3) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-1001(a)(3) (West 2006)). Having done neither,
Reeves cannot now complain that he was denied a substitution of judge as of right, or that
the trial court erred in denying Alder Group’s motion. See Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.
v. O’Malley, 163 Ill. 2d 130, 140 (1994) (defendant forfeited his right to claim there was no
effective waiver of trial judge’s disqualification, by failing to pursue the matter until an
unfavorable judgment was entered against him); Douglas Theater Corp. v. Gold Standard
Enterprises, Inc., 188 Ill. App. 3d 573, 580 (1989) (court may not consider relief not
requested in the trial court).
¶ 42 It is clear that defendants Dean Foods Company, Alco of Wisconsin, Inc., and Reeves are
asserting a claim for relief based upon the rights of Alder Group, rather than asserting their
own claims. As plaintiffs point out, in order to show prejudice, defendants would have to
show that they had a right to substitution from Judge Banks. As discussed, Alco of
Wisconsin and Dean Foods Company did not have such a right, because they already had
sought and obtained a substitution of judge from Judge Susan Zwick and Judge James M.
Varga, respectively. Reeves cannot claim that he was denied a right to substitution from
Judge Banks when he did not seek a substitution of judge, either as of right or for cause.
Consequently, defendants do not have standing to challenge the trial court’s order denying
Alder Group’s motion for substitution of judge as of right.
¶ 43 In so holding, we find that the appellate court in Aussieker correctly found that the other
16 plaintiffs in that case had no standing to challenge the trial court’s order erroneously
denying another plaintiff’s motion for substitution of judge. Aussieker, 355 Ill. App. 3d at
503. Aussieker was correct that the trial court’s ruling denying one plaintiff’s motion for
substitution of judge did not affect the remaining plaintiffs, each of whom was a separate
party who could separately assert his or her own right to a substitution of judge. Id.
¶ 44 In addition, having found that the appellate court in Aussieker was correct concerning
standing, we overrule the decision in Austin D., 358 Ill. App. 3d 794, which found the
decision in Aussieker to be “simply wrong.”
¶ 45 Defendants also argue that because the express language of section 2-1001(a) provides
that the substitution of judge provisions pertain to the moving party’s right to a substitution
of judge “in any civil action,” a timely filed motion for substitution of judge requires that a
different judge hear the entire “action.” Therefore, the granting of a substitution of judge
motion requires that the “entire case” be assigned to a different judge. Defendants apparently
are arguing that because the appellate court found that Alder Group’s motion for substitution
should have been granted, it follows that if Alder Group was entitled to a new trial because
of the erroneous denial of its motion, all defendants who were parties to the “entire case” are
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entitled to a new trial.
¶ 46 We need not consider whether the “entire case” includes all defendants or just Alder
Group, as Alder Group now has been dismissed from the case. Given the dismissal of Alder
Group, the case need not be remanded to the trial court for a new trial before a different
judge.
¶ 47 Accordingly, because the remaining defendants lack standing to challenge the trial
court’s order denying Alder Group’s motion for substitution of judge as of right, we vacate
the appellate court’s order, which vacated the judgments against defendants Alco of
Wisconsin, Dean Foods Company, and Reeves, and which remanded the cause for a new trial
as to those defendants. We reinstate the judgments entered in the trial court in favor of
plaintiffs and against Alco of Wisconsin, Dean Foods Company, and Reeves.
¶ 48 We also note that given its disposition of the case, the appellate court did not address the
remaining issues raised by defendants on appeal. Accordingly, we remand the cause to the
appellate court for consideration and resolution of the remaining issues. Carter v. SSC Odin
Operating Co., 237 Ill. 2d 30, 51 (2010).
¶ 49 CONCLUSION
¶ 50 For all of the foregoing reasons, we vacate the appellate court’s decision with regard to
defendants Alco of Wisconsin, Dean Foods Company, and Reeves, reinstate the judgment
of the trial court concerning those defendants, and remand the cause to the appellate court
to address the remaining issues raised by those defendants on appeal.
¶ 51 Appellate court judgment vacated;
¶ 52 circuit court judgment reinstated;
¶ 53 cause remanded.
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