No. 2--95--0208
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
OF ILLINOIS, ) of Lake County.
)
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) No. 93--CF--1592
)
v. )
)
LAURA BASCOM, ) Honorable
) Charles F. Scott,
Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge, Presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE COLWELL delivered the opinion of the court:
The State appeals the circuit court's order quashing the
arrest of the defendant, Laura Bascom, and suppressing evidence
obtained as a result. The State contends that the court
erroneously found that the arresting officer lacked probable cause
for the arrest although another officer with whom he was working in
concert knew facts that provided probable cause. We reverse and
remand.
The record shows that Wauconda police detective Ronald Geary
responded to a 9-1-1 call from the defendant's husband, Lance
Epoch. Geary found Epoch at his home appearing "heavily soiled,
kind of full of mud, and wet." Epoch had an abrasion on his chin
and showed other signs of physical contact.
Epoch told Geary that he had arrived home at about 9:30 p.m.
and the defendant arrived soon after. An argument ensued. In the
course of the argument, the defendant retrieved a 9-millimeter
handgun from the bedroom. The defendant held the gun to her head
and pulled the trigger, but the gun did not fire. She then pointed
the gun at Epoch and pulled the trigger, with the same result.
Epoch tried to call 9-1-1, but the defendant disconnected the
phone. The defendant struck him in the face several times during
the confrontation.
Epoch provided Geary with a description of the defendant. He
said she might have been headed to one of two bars in Fox Lake or
to Good Samaritan Hospital. Geary then issued an ISPERN dispatch
to area police units. The dispatch noted that the defendant was a
suicide risk and was wanted for domestic battery. Sometime that
night, Geary issued a nontraffic citation against the defendant for
domestic battery.
At 11:45 p.m. during roll call, Officer Joseph Neary of the
Fox Lake police department was advised of the ISPERN dispatch and
that the defendant was wanted for domestic battery. A Fox Lake
police dispatcher informed Neary that the defendant might be found
at the Old Style Inn or the Aquarium Tavern in Fox Lake.
At the hearing, Neary testified that he received additional
information regarding the defendant some time that evening.
Specifically, Neary stated that he learned that a firearm was
involved in the alleged domestic battery. Neary testified,
however, that he could not remember whether he received this
information before or after he arrested the defendant.
Neary found the defendant, who matched the description in the
dispatch, at the Old Style Inn. Neary arrested the defendant
pursuant to Wauconda's domestic battery request. The defendant
said that a nearby purse was hers. Neary took the defendant and her
purse to the Fox Lake police station. An inventory of the
defendant's purse disclosed a folded paper that Neary recognized as
something commonly used to transport cocaine. Neary felt the paper
and detected a soft material inside. He then opened the paper. A
laboratory test later confirmed that the powder in the folded paper
was cocaine. Defendant denied knowledge of the cocaine.
The defendant filed a motion to quash her arrest and suppress
the cocaine. The court granted the motion, stating that Detective
Geary had "statutory reasonable grounds" and "constitutional
probable cause" to arrest the defendant, but that Officer Neary did
not. The court denied the State's motion to reconsider and the
State perfected this appeal.
The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court correctly
found that Officer Neary lacked probable cause to arrest the
defendant. Indeed, for purposes of this appeal, the defendant does
not dispute that Detective Geary had probable cause to arrest her.
She also does not contest the propriety of the search of her purse.
The defendant argues, however, that Geary's knowledge cannot be
imputed to Neary, the arresting officer. She emphasizes that the
precise contents of the ISPERN dispatch are unclear (although
admitted into evidence, the dispatch does not appear in the record
on appeal), and that Neary made no independent observations of the
defendant which would have provided grounds to arrest her.
Generally, a ruling on a motion to suppress will not be
disturbed unless it is manifestly erroneous. People v. Frazier,
248 Ill. App. 3d 6, 12 (1993). However, suppression motions are
best characterized as raising mixed questions of fact and law, and
if all factual disputes in a case have been resolved, only a
question of law remains. People v. Foskey, 136 Ill. 2d 66, 76
(1990). Consequently, it is important to note the difference
between a ruling rendered by applying law to stipulated or
undisputed facts and the process of evaluating the credibility of
testimony and weighing evidence. Frazier, 248 Ill. App. 3d at 12.
Indeed, where both the facts and the credibility of the witnesses
are uncontroverted the question presented becomes a legal one,
subject to de novo review. Frazier, 248 Ill. App. 3d at 12-13.
In this case, the defendant contends that several facts are
disputed and states that a manifestly erroneous standard of review
is required. Specifically, the defendant argues that Neary's
testimony shows that he did not know when he learned that a firearm
was involved in the alleged battery and that it could have been
after he arrested the defendant. Further, the defendant states
that the record is not clear that Officer Neary knew about the
alleged domestic battery when he arrested the defendant.
At the hearing, the court found that Officer Neary lacked
probable cause to arrest the defendant. The trial court based this
conclusion on the premise that Neary was unaware of the specific
facts surrounding the domestic battery and that Neary did not
observe the defendant do anything suspicious before he arrested
her. The court also noted that it believed that the record showed
that Neary knew of the domestic battery before he arrested the
defendant.
First, we find that the determination of whether Neary knew
about the firearm before he arrested the defendant is not relevant
to the outcome of the issue before this court because it is not
necessary for an officer to know how a crime has been committed
before making a warrantless arrest. See 725 ILCS 5/107--2(c) (West
1992). Second, we find nothing in the record that shows that the
trial court's believing Neary that he knew about the domestic
battery before he arrested the defendant was unreasonable.
Accordingly, we only need determine if, as a matter of law,
Detective Geary's and Officer Neary's testimony satisfies the legal
requirements for Neary's making a warrantless arrest. See People
v. Clark, 92 Ill. 2d 96, 99 (1982) (if a trial court's ruling on a
motion to suppress was based on a witness' testimony that it
accepted as credible, and there is no ground upon which the trial
court's credibility determination can be rejected as "clearly
unreasonable," then a reviewing court need only determine, as a
matter of law, whether the witness' testimony satisfies the
applicable legal requirements).
When officers are working in concert, probable cause can be
established from all the information collectively received by the
officers even if that information is not specifically known to the
officer who makes the arrest. People v. Fenner, 191 Ill. App. 3d
801, 806 (1989). Certainly, arresting officers may rely upon
dispatches to make arrests even if they are unaware of the
specific facts that established probable cause to make the arrest.
People v. Crowell, 94 Ill. App. 3d 48, 50 (1981). In such a case,
however, the State must demonstrate that the officer who directed
the dispatch to be issued possessed facts sufficient to establish
probable cause to make the arrest. People v. Crane, 244 Ill. App.
3d 721, 725 (1993).
In this case, the parties agree that Detective Geary had
probable cause for the defendant's arrest and that Geary phoned
dispatch seeking help from neighboring police departments in
apprehending her. Accordingly, because probable cause already was
established, it is irrelevant whether Neary observed any suspicious
behavior by the defendant before arresting her. Additionally,
Illinois law does not require Neary, as the arresting officer, to
have known the specific details surrounding the alleged domestic
battery before making the arrest. Instead, Neary may reasonably
rely on a dispatch to make the arrest. See Crane, 244 Ill. App. 3d
at 724-25.
The defendant's reliance on People v. Crane and People v.
Crowell to show that Detective Geary's knowledge cannot be imputed
to Officer Neary is misplaced. In Crane, a detective had knowledge
of the defendant's involvement in the crime under investigation.
However, no evidence existed that he was working in concert with
the arresting officers or had commanded them to make the arrest.
In fact, there was no evidence that the detective had communicated
his knowledge to anyone else. Crane, 244 Ill. App. 3d at 724-25.
In Crowell, a dispatch instructed patrol officers to "attempt
to locate" a certain van. No order was given to arrest the van's
occupants. Moreover, there was no evidence that the officers who
issued the dispatch had probable cause to arrest defendant.
Crowell, 94 Ill. App. 3d at 50.
Unlike the officers in Crane and Crowell, here Officer Neary
and Detective Geary worked in concert to apprehend the defendant.
Further, in this case it is also undisputed that the officer that
issued the dispatch, Detective Geary, had probable cause to arrest
the defendant. Thus, this case is factually distinguishable from
Crane and Crowell.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court
is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.
McLAREN and DOYLE, JJ., concur.