No. 3--95--0673
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IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
A.D., 1996
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
OF ILLINOIS, ) of the 12th Judicial Circuit,
) Will County, Illinois
Plaintiff-Appellant, )
)
v. ) No. 95--DT--32553
)
DAVID EDWARDS, ) Honorable
) Gilbert Niznik
Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge, Presiding
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JUSTICE LYTTON delivered the opinion of the court:
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The defendant, David Edwards, was charged with driving without
a seat belt (625 ILCS 5/12--603.1 (West 1994)), driving under the
influence of alcohol (625 ILCS 5/11--501(a)(2) (West 1994)),
driving with a blood-alcohol concentration of .10 or more (625 ILCS
5/11--501(a)(1) (West 1994), and operation of an uninsured motor
vehicle (625 ILCS 5/3--707 (West 1994)). Following a hearing, the
trial court granted the defendant's combined motion to suppress
evidence, quash arrest, and rescind his statutory summary suspen-
sion. The State appeals. We reverse and remand for further pro-
ceedings.
The bystander's report indicates that the defendant's
automobile was stopped at a planned, staged, safety-check roadblock
administered by the Romeoville police department. The roadblock
channelled every tenth vehicle through the roadside safety check.
That car would then be checked for safety violations. If the
vehicle had no equipment violations or other obvious problems, it
was allowed to proceed. However, if any equipment or other
violations were observed, a police officer would direct the vehicle
to another staging area where the vehicle would be inspected more
closely.
Romeoville police officer Michael Ramaglia testified that on
May 26, 1995, at approximately 8 p.m., the defendant's vehicle was
stopped because it was the tenth vehicle traveling through the
roadblock. Another officer noticed that the defendant was not
wearing a seat belt. Based on this violation, the defendant was
directed to the second staging area. Ramaglia stated that at this
area, the defendant was asked for proof of a valid driver's license
and insurance. While in the second area, Ramaglia obtained evi-
dence that the defendant was driving under the influence of
alcohol. The defendant was then arrested for that offense.
The trial court granted the defendant's combined motion. It
later denied the State's motion to reconsider and found that the
defendant was detained because of his failure to wear a seat belt,
in violation of Illinois law. 625 ILCS 5/12--603.1 (West 1994).
On appeal, the State argues that the trial court erred in
granting the defendant's motion. Specifically, it contends that
the defendant was initially stopped at a constitutionally proper
roadblock and therefore was not stopped solely on the basis of a
violation of the seat belt law. We agree.
In Illinois, the seat belt law provides that:
"No motor vehicle, or driver or passenger
of such vehicle, shall be stopped or searched
*** solely on the basis of a violation or sus-
pected violation of this Section." 625 ILCS
5/12--603.1 (West 1992).
It is well settled that a fourth amendment "seizure" occurs
when an automobile is stopped at a roadblock or checkpoint. United
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1116, 96 S.
Ct. 3074 (1976). Nevertheless, a roadblock stop of vehicles is
permissible under the fourth amendment because the State's interest
in highway safety outweighs the minimal privacy intrusion on
motorists. Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S.
444, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412, 110 S. Ct. 2481 (1990). We have followed
this reasoning in upholding stops to check for safety violations.
People v. Wells, 241 Ill. App. 3d 141, 608 N.E.2d 578 (1993).
Here, the defendant was "seized" when his vehicle was stopped
at the initial checkpoint. At that point, the police were stopping
every tenth vehicle on the roadway regardless of whether the driver
had violated any statutes. The defendant was stopped pursuant to
a proper roadblock rather than the seat belt violation. The
defendant's dispatch to the second staging area because of the seat
belt violation was an extension of the original seizure. The
defendant was not stopped "solely on the basis of a violation" of
the seat belt law (see 625 ILCS 5/12--603.1(e) (West 1994). Thus,
he was properly detained.
Additionally, we note that our interpretation is consistent
with the legislative history of section 603.1(e). The legislative
debates on this statute indicate that the primary purpose of adding
section 603.1(e) was to curtail what legislators saw as officers
harassing motorists for not wearing a seat belt, particularly when
trying to generate additional revenue for the community. 85th Ill.
Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, June 24, 1987, at 230, 231
(statements of Representatives Weaver and Rea). The amendment was
not intended to prevent a police officer from further detaining a
motorist who was not wearing a seat belt after an otherwise lawful
stop.
The judgment of the circuit court of Will County is reversed,
and the cause is remanded for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.
MICHELA, J., concurs.
HOLDRIDGE, P.J., dissents.
PRESIDING JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE, dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. The issue in this cause is not
whether sending the defendant to the second staging area was part
of a valid fourth amendment "seizure," as the majority holds.
Rather, the issue is whether sending the defendant to the second
staging area solely because he was not wearing his seat belt
violated Section 603.1 of the Illinois Vehicle Equipment Law (the
Statute). 625 ILCS 5/12--603.1 (West 1992). I believe that by
doing so the police violated the clear and unambiguous intent of
the Statute, and I would affirm the trial court on that basis.
While I agree with the majority's conclusion that the
defendant was stopped pursuant to a proper road block rather than
a seat belt violation, and that therefore he was not
stopped "solely on the basis of a violation of the seat belt law,"
the analysis cannot end there. The Statute provides in relevant
part that:
"No motor vehicle, or driver or passenger of such
vehicle, shall be stopped or searched *** solely
on the basis of a violation or suspected violation
of this Section." (Emphasis added.) 625 ILCS
5/12--603.1 (West 1992).
The statute does not permit an individual to be "stopped or
searched" based upon a violation of this statute, thus clearly
using the verbs in the disjunctive. While disjunctive words (such
as "or") and conjunctive words (such as "and") are sometimes
misused by legislators, "the literal meaning of these terms should
be followed unless it renders the statute inoperable or the meaning
becomes questionable." Sutherland Statutory Construction § 21.14,
at 9 (Supp. 1995); Advincula v. United Blood Services, 274 Ill.
App. 3d 573, 581 (1995).
Section 603.1 does not become inoperable nor of questionable
meaning by interpreting it literally to mean that an individual
cannot be stopped or searched based upon the failure to wear a seat
belt. In this matter, it is uncontroverted that the defendant was
dispatched to the second staging area and searched because of the
seat belt violation. Thus, although he was not stopped based upon
his failure to wear his seat belt, he was certainly searched based
upon that violation.
Because I would find that the defendant was searched based
upon his failure to wear his seat belt, a search which was in
violation of Section 603.1 of the Statute, I would affirm the trial
court.
For the reasons discussed, I respectfully dissent.