No. 2--96--0282
________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT
________________________________________________________________
LA SOCIETE ANONYME GORO and ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
TITAN FASTENERS, INC., ) of Du Page County.
)
Petitioners-Appellants, )
) No. 94--MR--0690
v. )
)
CONVEYOR ACCESSORIES, INC., ) Honorable
) Bonnie M. Wheaton,
Respondent-Appellee. ) Judge, Presiding.
________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE HUTCHINSON delivered the opinion of the court:
Petitioners, La Societe Anonyme Goro and Titan Fasteners,
Inc., appeal the trial court's judgment denying their petition to
register a judgment in Du Page County against respondent, Conveyor
Accessories, Inc. The Tribunal de Commerce de Paris, in Paris,
France, initially entered the judgment, and the Cour D'Appel de
Paris, also in Paris, France, modified, but otherwise confirmed,
the judgment. The issues on appeal are: (1) whether the trial
court erred in determining that the petition is barred by the five-
year statute of limitations applicable to actions for which a
specific limitations period is not provided; (2) whether, if the
underlying action is barred, petitioners' claim for interest
payments due during the five years preceding the filing of the
petition is valid; and (3) whether the appeal was taken for an
improper purpose and petitioners should, therefore, be sanctioned
pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 375 (155 Ill. 2d R. 375). We
reverse and remand.
On May 13, 1987, the Tribunal de Commerce de Paris entered a
judgment for petitioners. On June 6, 1989, the Cour D'Appel de
Paris modified, but otherwise confirmed, the judgment.
On October 26, 1994, petitioners filed a petition in the
circuit court of Du Page County to register the foreign judgment.
Respondent objected, contending, inter alia, that the action was
barred under section 13--205 of the Code of Civil Procedure (the
Code) (735 ILCS 5/13--205 (West 1994)), which provides that all
civil actions not otherwise provided for shall be commenced within
five years after the cause of action accrued. See 735 ILCS 5/13--
205 (West 1994). Petitioners asserted that, because of certain
statutory amendments, petitions to register a foreign-country
judgment are now governed by the seven-year statute of limitations
applicable to the enforcement of Illinois judgments.
Alternatively, petitioners argued that their action for the
interest on the judgment was not time barred.
On September 27, 1995, the trial court held that the petition
was barred by the five-year statute of limitations governed under
section 13--205 of the Code. On February 8, 1996, the trial court
denied petitioners' motion to reconsider. The memorandum opinion
and order of the trial court did not specifically address the issue
regarding the collection of interest on the judgment. However, the
transcript of the proceedings indicates that the trial court
determined that, because the judgment could not be registered,
petitioners could not, therefore, collect the interest.
Petitioners filed a timely notice of appeal.
Petitioners' first argument on appeal is that the trial court
erred in determining that the petition to register the foreign-
country judgment is time barred. We agree.
The enforcement of non-Illinois judgments is governed under
two uniform statutes. The Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
Act (the Foreign Judgments Act) (735 ILCS 5/12--650 through 12--657
(West 1994)) governs the enrollment and enforcement of judgments of
courts of the United States and any other courts, the judgments of
which are entitled to full faith and credit in Illinois. See 735
ILCS 5/12--651 (West 1994). The Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments
Recognition Act (the Recognition Act) (735 ILCS 5/12--618 through
12--626 (West 1994)) governs the recognition of judgments of any
governmental unit other than the United States. The Recognition
Act also provides that a foreign judgment that is final,
conclusive, and enforceable where rendered is conclusive between
the parties. 735 ILCS 5/12--619, 12--620 (West 1994). Further, a
foreign judgment is enforceable in the same manner as the judgment
of a sister state that is entitled to full faith and credit. 735
ILCS 5/12--620 (West 1994); see also Pinnacle Arabians, Inc. v.
Schmidt, 274 Ill. App. 3d 504, 507 (1995).
Neither of these statutory acts specifically provides a
limitations period for the enforcement of non-Illinois judgments.
Prior to 1991, the registration and enforcement of sister-state
judgments was governed by sections 12--601 through 12--617 of the
Code, which also contained no specific limitations period.
Therefore, prior to 1991, an action to register a foreign judgment,
whether from another state or another country, was considered civil
in nature. Because no specific limitations period was provided,
Illinois courts applied the five-year statute of limitations to
such actions. In re Marriage of Kramer, 253 Ill. App. 3d 923, 926-
27 (1993).
However, effective September 9, 1991, the Illinois legislature
repealed sections 12--601 through 12--617 of the Code and adopted
the Foreign Judgments Act to implement the full faith and credit
clause of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., art. IV, §1)
and to facilitate the interstate enforcement of judgments. See
Practice Management Associates, Inc. v. Thurston, 225 Ill. App. 3d
470, 473 (1992). Section 12--652 of the Foreign Judgments Act
states:
"A copy of any foreign judgment authenticated in
accordance with the acts of Congress or the statutes of this
State may be filed in the office of the circuit clerk for any
county of this State. The clerk shall treat the foreign
judgment in the same manner as a judgment of the circuit court
for any county of this State. A judgment so filed has the
same effect and is subject to the same procedures, defenses
and proceedings for reopening, vacating, or staying as a
judgment of a circuit court for any county of this State and
may be enforced or satisfied in like manner." 735 ILCS 5/12--
652 (West 1994).
In Johnson v. Johnson, 267 Ill. App. 3d 253, 255 (1994), we
held that, since the adoption of the Foreign Judgments Act, the
seven-year limitations period for enforcing an Illinois judgment
applies to the enrollment and enforcement of a sister-state
judgment, rather than the five-year period for other actions.
Petitioners argue that the seven-year limitations period
should also apply to the registration and enforcement of a foreign-
country judgment. In support of their argument, petitioners cite
section 12--620 of the Recognition Act, which states:
"Except as provided in Section 12--621 of this Act, a
foreign judgment meeting the requirements of Section 12--619
of this Act is conclusive between the parties to the extent
that it grants or denies recovery of a sum of money. The
foreign judgment is enforceable in the same manner as the
judgment of a sister state which is entitled to full faith and
credit." 735 ILCS 5/12--620 (West 1994).
Because the enrollment and enforcement of a sister-state
judgment is now governed by the seven-year limitations period and
because a foreign-country judgment "is enforceable in the same
manner as the judgment of a sister state," petitioners argue that
the registration and enforcement of a foreign-country judgment is
now also governed by the seven-year limitations period. We agree
with petitioners that the seven-year limitations period should
apply.
Respondent argues that, because the amendment to the Code only
discusses judgments of sister states and because the Recognition
Act was not amended, this court should apply the same limitations
period to a foreign-country judgment as we did prior to the
amendment. We disagree. Although the Recognition Act has not been
amended, what it has always stated was that foreign-country
judgments are enforceable in the same manner as the judgment of a
sister state that is entitled to full faith and credit. See 735
ILCS 5/12--620 (West 1994). Before the 1991 amendment, the period
for registration and enforcement of both sister-state and foreign-
country judgments was five years. After the amendment, the period
is seven years.
The trial court's order denying the petition to register the
foreign-country judgment stated as part of the reason for its
denial the fact that sister-state judgments may now simply be filed
in the trial court to be immediately treated as an Illinois
judgment, whereas foreign-country judgments must meet certain
requirements to be final and conclusive between the parties. We
see no reason that this extra statutory procedure should render the
registration and enforcement of a foreign-country judgment governed
by a different limitations period. Moreover, the trial court's
order expressly found that the judgment was final and conclusive
between the parties.
The trial court's order also states that, in Johnson, we
declined to rule whether the seven-year limitations period applies
to the enforcement of sister-state judgments. This is incorrect.
In Johnson, we explicitly held that the seven-year limitations
period applies to the enrollment and the enforcement of sister-
state judgments. What we declined to determine was whether that
limitations period began to run from the date of the rendition of
the judgment or from the date it was registered. Johnson, 267 Ill.
App. 3d at 255. Moreover, we fail to see how the limitation the
trial court attempted to place on our holding supports the denial
of the petition here since, like the petitioner in Johnson,
petitioners in the present case are attempting to register the
judgment.
The trial court's order in the present case relies for its
reasoning on an Idaho case, Attorney General of Canada on Behalf of
Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada v. Tysowski, 118 Idaho
737, 800 P.2d 133 (Idaho App. 1990), in which the plaintiff filed
an action in Idaho to enforce a five-year-old judgment previously
entered in Canada. The court held that the "catch-all" statute of
limitations, similar to our section 13--205 of the Code, was
applicable because no limitations period was specifically provided
for that type of action. Tysowski, 118 Idaho at ___, 800 P.2d at
135-36. However, the Tysowski court recognized that the
Recognition Act provides for the recognition and enforcement of
foreign-country judgments in the same manner as sister-state
judgments, but held that the Recognition Act was inapplicable
because the cause of action was filed prior to its enactment.
Tysowski, 118 Idaho at ___ n.2, 800 P.2d at 135 n.2.
We agree with the reasoning of the cases that have held that
the Foreign Judgments Act and the Recognition Act are to be
interpreted to complement each other rather than to be mutually
exclusive and that they are to be enforceable in the same manner.
See Guinness PLC v. Ward, 955 F.2d 875, 891-92 (4th Cir. 1992); Don
Docksteader Motors, Ltd. v. Patal Enterprises, Ltd., 794 S.W.2d
760, 761 (Tex. 1990). We hold that the 1991 amendment to the Code
adopting the Foreign Judgments Act rendered the seven-year
limitations period for an Illinois judgment applicable to the
registration and enforcement of foreign-country judgments as well
as sister-state judgments. Our resolution of the first issue
obviates the need to address petitioners' second issue on appeal.
Finally, respondent contends that petitioners' appeal was
improperly taken, constituting a frivolous appeal. Respondent
moved for sanctions pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 375 (155 Ill. 2d
R. 375). From our determination of the first issue, it should be
apparent this court does not consider this a frivolous appeal. We,
therefore, deny respondent's motion for sanctions.
We reverse the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County
denying the petition to register the foreign-country judgment and
remand this cause for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
McLAREN and DOYLE, JJ., concur.