No. 3--96-0230
_________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
A.D., 1997
MICHAEL and KARLA WENG ) Appeal from the Circuit
) Court of the 14th
Plaintiffs-Appellants, ) Judicial Circuit, Rock
) Island County, Illinois
)
v. ) No. 95--SC--32771
)
) Honorable
THOMAS ALLISON ) Dennis DePorter
Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge, Presiding
_________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE delivered the Opinion of the Court:
The plaintiffs, Michael and Karla Weng (buyers), bought a car
from the defendant, Thomas Allison (seller). When the car failed
to perform as they expected, the buyers sued the seller, claiming
breach of express and implied warranties. The trial court entered
judgment in favor of the seller. We reverse and remand.
At trial, the buyers testified that the seller told them that
the car in question was: "mechanically sound," "in good condition,"
"a good, reliable car," "a good car," and had "no problems." The
car was 10 years old and had been driven approximately 96,000
miles. Without test driving the car, the buyers agreed to purchase
it for $800.
When the buyers attempted to drive the car home, they noticed
that the car did not seem to operate properly. They took the car
to an automobile dealership for an inspection and learned that the
car needed extensive repairs (costing approximately $1,500) and
that it was not safe to drive. Subsequently, they brought suit
against the seller.
After hearing the evidence, the trial judge found that the
seller's statements indicated to the buyers that he never had any
problems with the car. The court found that in order for the
statements of the seller to become express warranties, they would
have to constitute the "basis of the bargain" between the parties.
The trial judge found that the statements made by the seller to the
buyer could not become the basis of the bargain unless the buyer
reasonably relied upon them. Finally, the trial judge found that
no one could have reasonably relied upon statements to the effect
that a 10-year-old car, driven 96,000 miles and being sold for
$800, had "no problems" and was "mechanically sound." The trial
court ruled that because the statements did not constitute the
basis of the bargain, they were not express warranties, and entered
judgment in favor of the seller.
Initially, we note that the seller has not filed a brief on
appeal. However, the record is simple and the issues are such that
the court can easily resolve them without the aid of an appellee's
brief. Therefore, we turn to the merits of the case. See First
Capitol Mortgage Corp. V. Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d
128 (1976).
The buyers argue on appeal that the trial court erred in
finding that the seller had not breached express warranties. A
reviewing court may not reverse the judgment of a trial court
concerning the existence of an express or implied warranty unless
it is clearly contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.
Adolphson v. Gardner-Denver Co., 196 Ill. App. 3d 396, 400-01
(1990). For a judgment to be against the manifest weight of the
evidence, it must appear that a conclusion opposite to that reached
by the trier of fact is clearly evident. First Security Bank v.
Bawoll, 120 Ill. App. 3d 787, 794 (1983). We find that the trial
court's judgment was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Express warranties are enforceable if the statements at issue
are: (1) affirmations of fact or promise which relate to the goods
and become part of the basis of the bargain; or (2) descriptions of
the goods which are made part of the basis of the bargain. (810
ILCS 5/2-313 (Michie 1994)), see, Redmac, Inc. v. Computerland of
Peoria, 140 Ill. App. 3d 741 (1986). If the goods fail to conform
to the affirmations or promises, the seller may be held accountable
for breach of warranty.
In this matter, the seller's statements to the buyers that the
car was "mechanically sound," "in good condition," and had "no
problems" were affirmations of fact and descriptions of the car
that created an express warranty. Capital Equipment Enterprises v.
North Pier Terminal Company, 117 Ill. App. 2d 264, 266 (1969)
(representation by seller that crane was "in good condition"
created express warranty); Sass v. Spradlin, 66 Ill. App. 3d 976,
981 (1978) (seller's statement that truck was in "undamaged
condition" when it in fact had a defective transmission was breach
of express warranty).
We find the trial court's ruling that the statements of the
seller could not have been part of the basis of the bargain simply
because no reasonable persons could have relied upon those
statements was erroneous. The trial court misconstrued the role of
reliance in determining whether an affirmation of fact or
description is part of the basis of the bargain. Affirmations of
fact made during the bargain are presumed to be part of the basis
of t