NO. 3-96-0682
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
A.D., 1997
JANA WYCKOFF-DIKE, legal ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
guardian and next friend of ) of the 10th Judicial Circuit,
TRISTAN J.B. WYCKOFF, a ) Peoria County, Illinois
minor, )
)
Plaintiff-Appellant )
)
v. ) No. 96-MR-72
)
PEORIA POLICE PENSION FUND )
BOARD OF TRUSTEES, ) Honorable
) Richard Grawey
Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE BRESLIN delivered the opinion of the court:
Plaintiff Jana Wyckoff-Dike appeals a trial court's denial of
her motion to quash subpoenas issued by the defendant, Peoria
Police Pension Fund Board (Board). The subpoenas were issued after
Jana requested that the Board designate her son, Tristan, as a
beneficiary of a deceased officer's pension because Tristan had
been adjudicated by the Circuit Court of Peoria County to be the
officer's child. At issue is whether the Illinois Pension Code
(Code), (40 ILCS 5/1-101 et seq. (West 1994)), precludes the Board
from adjudicating the issue of paternity after paternity is
established in the circuit court. We hold that it does not. Thus,
we affirm.
FACTS
Jana allegedly had a relationship with a police officer
named Jerome Short. She claims that as a result of the
relationship she became pregnant and gave birth to Tristan. While
alive, Jerome did not acknowledge paternity. However, after his
death, Jana contacted the Board to request that Tristan receive
benefits as a surviving child under the Police Pension Act. The
Board denied the request because there was insufficient evidence of
paternity.
Thereafter, Jana filed a paternity action under the Parentage
Act of 1984 (750 ILCS 45/1 et seq. (West 1994)). This action was
uncontested and resulted in a finding that Tristan was Jerome's
son. The action, however, was against Jerome's estate and did not
name the Board as a defendant. Following the entry of the order,
Jana's attorney, Christopher Ryan, contacted the Board to inform it
of the circuit court's finding and to request that the Board
determine what benefits Tristan should receive. The Board
responded that a formal hearing was required where Jana could
introduce evidence on the issue of paternity.
After allegedly discussing with the Board the use of DNA
testing as a method of proving paternity, Ryan began the process of
acquiring tissue samples and forwarded them to a laboratory for
testing. He indicated that Tristan would submit a blood sample
once it was determined that Jerome's tissue could be tested.
However, before the test results returned, Ryan withdrew as Jana's
attorney. Jana's new attorney indicated that Jana did not want to
proceed with the testing. In preparation for the formal hearing on
the case, the Board then issued subpoenas to acquire the records
relating to the DNA testing from Ryan, and to compel Tristan to
submit to a blood test.
Jana moved to quash the subpoenas in the circuit court. The
trial court denied this motion and ruled that: (1) under the
Pension Code, the Board has exclusive authority to manage the
Pension Fund; (2) the question of whether Jerome was the father was
a question of fact properly before the Board; (3) the Board was
not bound by the previous court action because the Board was not in
privity with Jerome's estate; and (4) the subpoenas issued by the
Board were within its authority under 40 ILCS 5/3-136 (West 1994)
and sought reasonable and relevant information. Jana appeals.
ANALYSIS
Resolution of this dispute depends on an interpretation of
section 1-104.2 of the Illinois Pension Code. 40 ILCS 5/1-104.2
(West 1994). The relevant portion of section 1-104.2 provides:
[C]hildren not conceived in lawful wedlock shall be
entitled to the same benefits as other children,
and no child's or survivor's benefit shall be
disallowed because of the illegitimacy of the
child; however, in cases where the father is the
employee parent, paternity must first be
established. Paternity may be established by any
one of the following means: (1) acknowledgment by
the father, or (2) adjudication before or after the
death of the father, or (3) any other means
acceptable to the board of trustees of the pension
fund or retirement system.
40 ILCS 5/1-104.2 (West 1994).
The primary rule of statutory interpretation is that the court
should ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature.
Bonaguro v. County Officers Electoral Board, 158 Ill. 2d 391, 634
N.E.2d 712 (1994). While the court is not bound by an agency's
interpretation of a statute which the agency is charged with
enforcing, the interpretation is entitled to deference. Granite
City Community Unit School District #9 v. Illinois Educational
Labor Relations Board, 279 Ill. App. 3d 439, 664 N.E.2d 1060
(1996). Rules covering fire and police pensions are to be
liberally construed to favor pension beneficiaries. Swiatek v.
Bensenville Police Pension Board, 205 Ill. App. 3d 85, 562 N.E.2d
1270 (1990).
The court's review of an issuance of administrative subpoenas
is limited to a consideration of: (1) the constitutionality of a
statute; (2) whether the contemplated agency proceedings are
included within the statutory authority; (3) the reasonableness of
the demand; and (4) the relevance of the information sought.
Illinois Department of Public Aid v. Kessler, 72 Ill. App. 3d 802,
391 N.E.2d 160 (1979).
Jana argues that the subpoenas issued by the Board should be
quashed because they are irrelevant. She asserts that since the
statute permits proof of paternity by adjudication after the
father's death, and the circuit court had the authority to rule on
the issue of paternity under the Parentage Act, (750 ILCS 45/9(a)-
(b) (West 1994)), the issue of paternity was conclusively
established and there is nothing left for the Board to determine.
Although paternity was established in a court of law, we
cannot agree with Jana's contention that the Board should be
precluded from holding its own independent hearing. The Board is
entrusted with the duty of protecting the police pension fund from
disbursements made to individuals who are not entitled to payments.
People ex rel. Loftus v. Keller, 332 Ill. App. 389, 75 N.E.2d 408
(1947); see also Bowden v. Flannery, 18 Ill. App. 2d 299, 152
N.E.2d 188 (1958) (whether party was entitled to receive pension
benefits was a question of fact to be determined by the Board). To
fulfill this duty, we hold that the Board must be allowed to
question paternity, even when paternity has been addressed in a
separate action.
However, this does not mean, as the Board urges, that prior
paternity determinations may be ignored by the Board. Section 1-
104.2 does not specifically state that the Board must accept a
prior adjudication, but the statute clearly contemplates that an
adjudication will play some role in a hearing before the Board.
Although a review of the legislative history provides no
guidance, we believe that the statute seeks to strike a balance
between the rights of a beneficiary, the need for judicial economy
and the Board's role of reviewing an applicant's status to
determine whether the circumstances entitle the individual to
pension benefits. Therefore, as in the case when an individual
seeks to prove heirship by introducing a prior court order, (see
755 ILCS 5/5-3(c) (West 1994)), we hold that proof of paternity by
a prior adjudication under 1-104.2 is prima facie evidence of
paternity. When a plaintiff presents the prior adjudication as
evidence of paternity, a rebuttable presumption arises and the
burden of persuasion shifts to the Board. The Board must then
present sufficient evidence to support a finding that the court
adjudicated father is not the biological father. See Franciscan
Sisters Health Care Corp. v. Dean, 95 Ill. 2d 452, 448 N.E.2d 872
(1983) (discussing rebuttable presumptions and burdens of parties).
The Board's final decision will be based upon the evidence
introduced at the hearing, and that decision will be reviewable
under the Administrative Review Act. See 40 ILCS 5/3-148 (West
1994). Were we to hold otherwise, a potential beneficiary could
petition the circuit court and essentially have the court place him
on the pension rolls. Such a result is not contemplated by the
Code as it would lead to the circumvention of the Board which is
the body entrusted with designating the beneficiaries of the fund.
40 ILCS 5/3-128 (West 1994).
Accordingly, we hold that the Board was not precluded from
adjudicating the issue of paternity despite the fact that paternity
was established in a prior action against the deceased's estate.
Therefore, the trial court properly denied Jana's motion to quash
because the Board's subpoenas sought information which was relevant
to the issue of paternity.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court
of Peoria County is affirmed.
Affirmed.
HOMER and McCUSKEY, JJ., concurring.