No. 3--96--0471
_________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
A.D., 1997
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
OF ILLINOIS, ) of the 14th Judicial Circuit,
) Rock Island County, Illinois
Plaintiff, )
)
v. )
)
DANIEL E. SCHMIDT, ) No. 96--DT--128
)
Defendant-Appellee )
)
(GEORGE H. RYAN, )
Illinois Secretary of State, ) Honorable
) Ronald C. Taber,
Appellant). ) Judge Presiding
_________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE McCUSKEY delivered the opinion of the court:
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The defendant, Daniel E. Schmidt, was charged with driving
under the influence of alcohol (625 ILCS 5/11--501 (West 1994)) and
improper lane usage (625 ILCS 5/11--709 (West 1994)). His driver's
license was subsequently suspended on two grounds: (1) for driving
with a blood-alcohol concentration of .10 or more (statutory
summary suspension) (625 ILCS 5/11--501.1 (West 1994)); and (2) for
driving with alcohol in his system while he was under the age of 21
("zero tolerance" suspension) (625 ILCS 5/11--501.8 (West 1994)).
The trial court ordered the Secretary of State (Secretary) to
issue the defendant a judicial driving permit (JDP). On appeal,
the Secretary claims the trial court's order was erroneous. After
carefully reviewing the record, we agree with the Secretary and
reverse.
We initially note that the defendant has not filed an
appellee's brief. However, since the record is simple and we can
easily decide the issue raised without the aid of an appellee's
brief, we shall decide the merits of the appeal. First Capitol
Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128, 133,
345 N.E.2d 493, 495 (1976).
FACTS
The record reflects that around 3 a.m. on February 17, 1996.
the 20-year-old defendant was injured when he drove his parents'
vehicle off a roadway and into a utility pole. The police report
indicates the defendant's eyes were bloodshot, his speech was
slurred, and he admitted that he had been drinking alcohol. The
defendant was taken to a hospital where he submitted a blood sample
for blood-alcohol testing. The test results showed a blood-alcohol
level of .165. The defendant was given a notice which stated that
his license would be suspended on April 3, 1996.
On March 28, 1996, the trial court ordered the Secretary to
issue the defendant a JDP. On April 3, 1996, the Secretary
informed the trial court that the defendant was ineligible for a
JDP because the defendant had received a suspension pursuant to the
"zero tolerance" law. See 625 ILCS 5/11--501.8 (West 1994).
Consequently, the Secretary requested that the trial court
reconsider its issuance of the JDP. On April 19, 1996, the trial
court declined the Secretary's request and re-issued the original
order granting the JDP.
ANALYSIS
On appeal, the Secretary argues that the trial court erred in
granting the defendant a JDP. The Secretary claims the trial court
lacked the authority to issue a JDP because one of the bases for
the defendant's suspension was the violation of the "zero
tolerance" law. We agree with the Secretary's contention.
Under the "zero tolerance" law, if a driver who is less than
21 years of age submits to a test which reveals a blood-alcohol
concentration of more than 0.00, the Secretary shall suspend his
driving privileges. 625 ILCS 5/11--501.8(d) (West 1994). The
"zero tolerance" provision does not provide for issuance of a JDP.
625 ILCS 5/11--501.8 (West 1994). However, it does permit a driver
to receive a restricted driving permit at the Secretary's
discretion. 625 ILCS 5/11--501.8(e)(7) (West 1994).
A statutory summary suspension is issued when a defendant has
refused a breath test or he takes the test and it shows an alcohol
level of .10 or more. 625 ILCS 5/11--501.1 (West 1994). To
relieve such a suspension, the trial court may order the Secretary
to issue a JDP to qualifying individuals. 625 ILCS 5/6--206.1
(West 1994). Thus, while the statutory summary suspension statute
provides for the issuance of a JDP, the "zero tolerance" statute
does not.
In the instant case, the defendant's license was suspended
pursuant to the "zero tolerance" law and the statutory summary
suspension law. As a first offender, the defendant would normally
have been eligible to receive a JDP to relieve the statutory
summary suspension. See 625 ILCS 5/11--501.1 (West 1994).
However, in the case at hand, the JDP the defendant received was
invalid because it could not relieve the effect of the "zero
tolerance" suspension. See People v. Boyd, 211 Ill. App. 3d 99,
101, 570 N.E.2d 8, 9 (1991).
In Boyd, the court noted that a JDP is "only effective for
statutory summary suspensions." Boyd, 211 Ill. App. 3d at 101, 570
N.E.2d at 9. The court observed that a JDP has no impact on other
revocations or suspensions authorized by the vehicle code, stating
"if a driver's underlying driving privileges are lost for another
reason and he also has received a statutory summary suspension, the
court cannot issue a JDP." (Emphasis added.) Boyd, 211 Ill. App.
3d at 101, 570 N.E.2d at 9.
Here, the defendant lost his driving privileges pursuant to
the "zero tolerance" statute and the statutory summary suspension
statute. Accordingly, pursuant to Boyd, the trial court had no
authority to issue the defendant a JDP.
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the circuit court of
Rock Island County is reversed.
Reversed.
BRESLIN and HOMER, JJ., concur.