United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS May 5, 2003
Charles R. Fulbruge III
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Clerk
No. 02-30832
Summary Calendar
LORRAINE M. JUPITER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
JOHN E. POTTER, Postmaster General,
United States Postal Service,
Defendant-Appellee.
______________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana, New Orleans
01-CV-358-S
______________________________________________
Before BARKSDALE, DeMOSS, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Lorraine M. Jupiter, appellant, appeals from a summary
judgment dismissing her claims against the Postmaster General of
the United States Postal Service. Appellant brought suit alleging
racial harassment and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. While she alleged
several instances, each of which she asserted were violations of
the Civil Rights Act, she abandons all of her claims on appeal save
two: the “break schedule” incident of November 4, 1998, and the
“constant harassment” of EEO charge #5 (sic).
With respect to the “break schedule” claim, the district court
found that appellant had failed to show that appellee’s conduct
with respect to the lunch break schedule and the implementation of
the schedule was based on race. Appellant does not set forth any
argument to show how or why the district court erred in its
conclusion. In any event, our own review of the record convinces
us that appellant failed to establish a prima facie case or raise
a fact issue with respect to any illegal animus for appellee’s
conduct. Appellee asserts and we find that appellant has failed to
show that any of the postal activities were motivated by race,
gender, or protected activity.
With respect to her “constant harassment” claim, we assume
that appellant is referring to what she later describes in her
brief as a claim for “retaliatory harassment.” Her brief fails to
set forth any legal authority in support of her argument. To the
extent she might be arguing her treatment after she filed an EEOC
complaint constituted retaliation for her protected activity, our
finding above disposes of this argument.
Finally, appellant raises for the first time on appeal a
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cursory and conclusory argument that she was constructively
discharged (apparently to show an adverse employment action). This
argument was not alleged or presented below and we do not address
it here. We affirm essentially for the reasons set forth by the
district court.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
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