No. 3--05--0219
Filed February 10, 2006
_________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
A.D., 2006
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
OF ILLINOIS, ) of the 21st Judicial Circuit,
) Kankakee County, Illinois,
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
)
)
v. ) No. 04--TR--26004
)
KARLTON S. HARRIS, ) Honorable
) J. Scott Swaim,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.
_________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE O=BRIEN delivered the opinion of the court:
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Defendant, Karlton S. Harris, was convicted by the trial
court of failure to yield turning left (625 ILCS 5/11--902 (West
2004)). The trial court sentenced Harris to 12 months' court
supervision and ordered him to pay $159 in fines and court costs.
Harris appeals pro se, arguing that he did not knowingly and
intelligently waive his right to a jury trial. We reverse and
remand for further proceedings.
BACKGROUND
The evidence adduced at trial showed that on December 23,
2004, Harris was charged by uniform citation and complaint with
the offense of failure to yield turning left (625 ILCS 5/11--902
(West 2004)). Harris completed the back of the uniform citation
and complaint and mailed it to the trial court. On the back of
the citation, Harris indicated that he intended to plead not
guilty to the offense. By checking the appropriate box on the
citation, he indicated that he desired to have a bench trial.
Harris represented himself pro se at the bench trial. The
trial court found Harris guilty. The court later sentenced
Harris to 12 months' supervision and $159 in fines and court
costs.
Harris filed a motion for new trial. At the hearing on his
motion, Harris argued that before he mailed the uniform citation
and complaint to the court, he consulted a legal self-help book
on the matter. He claimed that the book stated that a jury trial
was not possible in traffic cases in Illinois. Thus, he checked
the box on the back of the citation indicating that he wanted a
bench trial. The trial court denied Harris' motion, finding that
Harris knowingly waived his right to a jury trial by checking the
box on the back of the citation marked "Trial by Judge," rather
than the box marked "Trial by Jury."
Harris appeals his conviction and sentence.
ANALYSIS
On appeal, Harris seeks remand for a new trial on the basis
that he did not understandingly waive his right to a jury trial
in open court. Specifically, he argues that the trial court
failed to admonish him as to his right to a jury trial before
proceeding with the bench trial.
Initially, the State argues that Harris waived this issue on
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appeal for failure to preserve it in the trial court. Though
Harris raised this issue in his motion for new trial, he failed
to object to the bench trial. However, a defendant's failure to
question the validity of the jury waiver in the trial court, by
both a timely objection and a posttrial motion, does not result
in a forfeiture of the issue on appeal. People v. Bracey, 213
Ill. 2d 265, 821 N.E.2d 253 (2004). A criminal defendant has a
fundamental right to a trial by jury, and the issue of whether
that right has been violated may be considered under the plain
error rule. Bracey, 213 Ill. 2d 265, 821 N.E.2d 253.
On the merits, the State acknowledges that Harris had a
statutory right to a trial by jury. 725 ILCS 5/103--6 (West
2004); People v. Flessner, 48 Ill. 2d 54, 268 N.E.2d 376 (1971);
People v. Woerly, 50 Ill. 2d 327, 278 N.E.2d 787 (1972). A
defendant validly waives his right to a jury trial only if made
(1) understandingly and (2) in open court. 725 ILCS 5/103--6
(West 2004); People v. Scott, 186 Ill. 2d 283, 710 N.E.2d 833
(1999); Woerly, 50 Ill. 2d 327, 278 N.E.2d 787 (court held that
section 103--6 applies to traffic offenses). It is the trial
court's duty to ensure that a defendant's waiver of his right to
a jury trial is made understandingly. People v. Smith, 106 Ill.
2d 327, 478 N.E.2d 357 (1985). However, the validity of a jury
waiver cannot rest on any precise formula but, rather, depends on
the facts and circumstances of each particular case. In re
R.A.B., 197 Ill. 2d 358, 757 N.E.2d 887 (2001). Where, as in the
instant case, the facts are not in dispute, the question of
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whether a defendant validly waived his right to a jury trial is
one of law subject to de novo review. R.A.B., 197 Ill. 2d 358,
757 N.E.2d 887.
In the instant case, the trial court did not question Harris
about waiving his right to a jury trial. Harris simply answered
"Yes, sir" to the question of whether he was ready for trial. At
the hearing on Harris' motion for new trial, the trial court
found that by marking the box labeled "Trial by Judge," rather
than the box labeled "Trial by Jury," Harris validly waived his
right to a jury trial. Thus, the issue before us is whether, by
selecting a bench trial on the back of the uniform citation,
Harris made an understanding waiver of his right to a jury trial
in open court. This issue appears to be one of first impression
in Illinois.
Supreme Court Rule 505 is the source of the language printed
on the back of the uniform citation and complaint. 166 Ill. 2d
R. 505. Rule 505 provides for an expeditious disposition of
charges brought by uniform citation and complaint. People v.
Nelson, 18 Ill. App. 3d 628, 310 N.E.2d 174 (1974). The Rule
promotes efficient administration of justice for the court and
convenience for the accused, who may reside some distance away,
by avoiding multiple court appearances. Nelson, 18 Ill. App. 3d
628, 310 N.E.2d 174. It also promotes efficiency for law
enforcement agencies by preserving freshness of evidence and
memory of the arresting officer. People v. Mears, 84 Ill. App.
3d 265, 405 N.E.2d 443 (1980). However, we find nothing in the
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Rule that states that a defendant's completion of the back of the
uniform citation to request a bench trial serves as a substitute
for that defendant's understanding waiver of his right to a jury
trial in open court.
We recognize that the efficient process of traffic offenses
is necessary to do justice. We also understand the State's
concern about allowing a defendant to complain about the
deprivation of his right to a jury trial after he stood by
silently and participated in a bench trial, which resulted in a
conviction. Defendants should not be allowed to gamble on the
outcome. People v. Novotny, 41 Ill. 2d 401, 244 N.E.2d 182
(1968). However, our research into statutory and case law on
this issue did not reveal any exception to the jury waiver rule
for traffic offenses. Harris did not make any statement in court
about whether he understood his right to a jury trial and chose
to waive that right. Therefore, we hold that Harris did not
understandingly waive his right to a jury trial in open court.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court of Kankakee
County and remand the cause for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.
HOLDRIDGE and MCDADE, JJ., concurring.
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