No. 3--05--0897
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Filed August 9, 2007.
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
A.D., 2007
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
OF ILLINOIS, ) of the 12th Judicial Circuit,
) Will County, Illinois,
Plaintiff-Appellant, )
)
v. ) No. 05--CF--877
)
LAVAR BRIDGEWATER, ) Honorable
) Carla Alessio-Goode,
Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge, Presiding.
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JUSTICE McDADE delivered the opinion of the court:
_________________________________________________________________
The State charged the defendant, Lavar Bridgewater, with
aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (720 ILCS 5/24--
1.6(a)(1)(a)(3)(B) (West 2004)). The trial court granted the
defendant's motion to suppress the evidence. On appeal, the
State argues that the court erred by granting the motion to
suppress. We reverse and remand.
BACKGROUND
The trial court held a hearing on the motion to suppress on
October 5, 2005. At the hearing, Officer John Morrow testified
that he was a member of the Bolingbrook police department on
May 1, 2005, when the incident in question occurred. Morrow was
on stationary patrol in his squad car on Boughton Road. When the
defendant's car passed Morrow's location, the squad car's radar
indicated that the defendant's vehicle was traveling at 59 miles
per hour in a 35-mile-per-hour zone. The officer also observed
that the defendant's automobile "had tinted windows on both the
driver's side and passenger side front windows." Morrow
activated his squad car's emergency lights and siren and pursued
the defendant's vehicle.
The defendant's car and Morrow's squad car stopped at a
traffic light. The defendant's vehicle turned right at that
intersection, traveled approximately 200 feet, and then turned
into the parking lot of a White Hen Pantry convenience store.
The defendant parked his car immediately to the right of the
front doors of the store. Morrow parked his squad car directly
behind the defendant's car.
According to Morrow, the defendant and the officer got out
of their respective vehicles simultaneously. The defendant
turned and looked at Morrow and then began to walk toward the
store. The officer said, "I initially summoned him a couple
times when he exited the vehicle to step back in the vehicle and
then to come back and talk to me. He turned around and said that
he was going to go get something to eat. I told him--I said he
needs to come back to his vehicle, and at that point he says I'm
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not in the car, turned around and walked towards the White Hen
and went inside."
At this time, Morrow called for backup. The officer then
entered the store. Morrow stated, "I went over and talked to
[the defendant], said he needs to come back outside, I stopped
him for speeding, he needs to show me driver's license and
insurance." Morrow also advised the defendant that the officer
had stopped him because of his car's tinted windows. After
Morrow asked the defendant to come outside the store three or
four times, the defendant walked out of the building, and the
officer followed. Morrow stated that normally a defendant would
not be arrested for speeding or driving a vehicle with tinted
windows.
Morrow testified that he again asked the defendant for his
driver's license and proof of insurance on the sidewalk outside
the store, directly in front of the defendant's car. The
defendant told Morrow that he did not have to give the officer
anything because he had done nothing wrong.
The officer stated that the defendant then put his hands in
his pants pockets. The officer ordered the defendant to take his
hands out of his pockets two or three times. When the defendant
did not comply, Morrow told the defendant to put his hands on the
window of the store, and the defendant refused. The officer
said, "I *** came up behind him, put my hand on his right
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shoulder and trapped his right arm in his pants and basically put
him up against the window and pulled his hands out of his pockets
to put them up on the window." Morrow arrested the defendant for
obstructing a peace officer, handcuffed the defendant, and placed
him in the squad car.
By this time, two officers had arrived in response to
Morrow's call for backup. Morrow advised the officers that he
had arrested the defendant and asked the officers to search the
defendant's vehicle. As Morrow was driving toward the exit of
the parking lot, Morrow saw one of the officers wave an
ammunition clip in his hand. Morrow then drove back toward the
defendant's car. The other officer told Morrow that he had found
the loaded ammunition clip in the console of the defendant's
vehicle. While the defendant remained handcuffed in Morrow's
squad car, Morrow joined in the search. Morrow discovered a
handgun under the front passenger seat of the defendant's car.
According to Morrow, the ammunition clip fit the handgun. Morrow
then transported the defendant to the police station. The police
towed the defendant's car to a police lot.
The defendant testified that he did not see the squad car's
emergency lights or hear its siren until he stopped at the store.
He said that when he was at the door of the building, he heard
Morrow order him to return to his car. The defendant ignored
Morrow's command. The defendant then walked into the store, and
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the officer followed. According to the defendant, Morrow did not
ask him for his driver's license and proof of insurance inside
the store. The officer asked the defendant to come outside
twice. The defendant walked out of the store, Morrow followed,
and the officer arrested him immediately. After Morrow
handcuffed the defendant, the officer asked about his driver's
license and proof of insurance. The defendant denied that he had
placed his hands in his pockets. He admitted, however, that he
had been speeding and that his car had tinted windows. The
defendant also agreed that the handgun and ammunition clip found
in his car belonged to him.
Following the hearing, the prosecutor argued that the
officers' search of the defendant's car was justified both as a
search incident to his arrest and as an inventory search prior to
towing the car. During this argument, the prosecutor did not
cite Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 158 L. Ed. 2d 905,
124 S. Ct. 2127 (2004). The court granted the motion to
suppress.
The State filed a motion to reconsider in which it cited
Thornton. At the hearing on the motion to reconsider, the
prosecutor argued that the holding of Thornton applied to this
case regarding a search incident to arrest. The prosecutor again
contended that the search was valid as an inventory search.
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Defense counsel argued that Thornton was distinguishable
from the present case because the defendant in this case was
initially stopped for petty offenses whereas the defendant in
Thornton was not initially stopped for a petty offense. The
defendant's attorney submitted that the defendant could not have
been arrested for the petty offenses and that the offense for
which he was arrested was too remote in time to justify searching
the defendant's car incident to that arrest.
The trial court agreed with the defendant that Thornton was
distinguishable from the instant case. The court found that the
arrest was too remote in time from Morrow's original purpose for
stopping the defendant. The court stated that there was no nexus
between the defendant's arrest and the officers' search of his
car. The court, therefore, denied the State's motion to
reconsider. The State appealed.
ARGUMENT
The State contends that the trial court erred in denying its
motion to reconsider. Specifically, the State argues that the
holding of Thornton, 541 U.S. 615, 158 L. Ed. 2d 905, 124 S. Ct.
2127, is applicable to this case. We note that the State argued
to the trial court that the search was also justified as an
inventory search. The State, however, does not renew the
inventory search argument on appeal.
6
The defendant submits that Thornton is distinguishable from
the present case. Specifically, the defendant contends that he
could not have been arrested for the traffic offenses for which
he was originally stopped, whereas the defendant in Thornton
could have been arrested for the traffic offense that he
committed. The instant defendant also submits that, unlike the
defendant in Thornton, he was arrested for conduct that occurred
outside his vehicle.
An appellate court reviews de novo the trial court's
ultimate ruling concerning whether suppression of the evidence
was warranted. People v. Luedemann, 222 Ill. 2d 530, 857 N.E.2d
187 (2006).
In Thornton, 541 U.S. 615, 158 L. Ed. 2d 905, 124 S. Ct.
2127, an officer in an unmarked squad car noticed that the
license plate on the defendant's car did not match the car.
Before the officer could initiate a traffic stop, the defendant
parked his car and exited the vehicle. The officer then parked
his squad car near the defendant's car. When the officer
questioned the defendant outside his car, the defendant exhibited
suspicious behavior. The officer then conducted a pat-down
search of the defendant. During the frisk, the officer
discovered illegal drugs on the defendant's person. The officer
arrested the defendant, handcuffed him, and placed him in the
squad car. The officer then conducted a search of the
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defendant's car incident to the arrest. During the search, the
officer discovered a handgun. The trial court denied the
defendant's motion to suppress the handgun, and ultimately the
United States Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision.
The defendant in Thornton argued to the Supreme Court that
the search incident to his arrest was not justified because the
officer did not initiate contact with him while he was in his
car. The majority opinion in Thornton reviewed the holdings of
previous Supreme Court cases concerning searches incident to
arrest. In Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 23 L. Ed. 2d 685,
89 S. Ct. 2034 (1969), the Court held that officers were
justified in conducting a search incident to arrest only to
search for weapons the defendant might use or evidence that he
might conceal or destroy. The Chimel Court limited such searches
to the area within a defendant's immediate control, defined as
the area within which a defendant might be able to reach a weapon
or a piece of evidence.
In New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 69 L. Ed. 2d 768, 101
S. Ct. 2860 (1981), the Court extended the rule of Chimel to
traffic stops. The Belton holding permitted officers to search a
vehicle's passenger compartment, and closed containers within the
compartment, incident to the arrest of either occupants or recent
occupants of a car.
8
In Thornton, the Court noted that its ruling in Belton did
not depend upon whether the officer initiated contact with the
defendant while the defendant was in his car, or while he was out
of his car. The Court, therefore, rejected the defendant's
argument in Thornton and affirmed the trial court's ruling.
The lead opinion in Thornton was written by Justice
Rehnquist and was joined by a majority of the justices except for
footnote 4, which criticized Justice Scalia's concurrence (which
we discuss below). Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Breyer joined
the opinion in full. Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Ginsburg,
concurred in the judgment. In his concurring opinion, Scalia
stated that the majority had stretched the doctrine of search
incident to arrest "beyond its breaking point." Thornton, 541
U.S. at 625, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 916, 124 S. Ct. at 2133, (Scalia,
J., concurring, joined by Ginsburg, J.). Scalia noted that in
Thornton, the defendant was handcuffed and in the squad car at
the time of the search. Therefore, the original rationale of
Chimel did not apply because the possibility that the defendant
might reach a weapon or evidence in his vehicle was remote in the
extreme. Scalia stated, however, that he would affirm in
Thornton on the basis of a search for evidence of the defendant's
crime, i.e., possession of illegal drugs, without regard to
whether the defendant might be able to reach a weapon or
evidence.
9
In Thornton, Justice O'Connor concurred in part, but
dissented with regard to footnote 4. O'Connor acknowledged that
the majority's opinion followed logically from the holding of
Belton. However, she found Belton's holding to rest on a "shaky
foundation." Thornton, 541 U.S. at 624, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 915,
124 S. Ct. at 2133, (O'Connor, J., concurring in part). She
expressed dissatisfaction with the state of the law concerning
search of a vehicle incident to arrest. She found Scalia's
arguments to be persuasive, but would not join Scalia's
concurrence because the issues Scalia raised had not been briefed
by the parties. Justices Stevens and Souter dissented.
Although we agree with the opinions of Justices O'Connor,
Scalia, Ginsburg, Stevens, and Souter in Thornton, with regard to
Chimel's original rationale for a search incident to an arrest,
we must follow the majority opinions in Thornton and Belton. The
defendant in this case was a recent occupant of his car when he
was arrested. The defendant's arrest was remote in time only
because of his failure to comply with a police officer's orders
during a lawful traffic stop for violations the defendant
admitted that he had committed. Under the holdings of Thornton
and Belton, the officers were justified in conducting a search of
the defendant's vehicle incident to that arrest.
The defendant is incorrect to assert that he could not have
been arrested for the traffic violations for which he was
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originally stopped. In Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S.
318, 149 L. Ed. 2d 549, 121 S. Ct. 1536 (2001), the Supreme Court
ruled that a defendant may be arrested for a traffic violation
punishable only by a fine, such as failure to wear seat belts.
Therefore, we disagree with the defendant that Thornton is
distinguishable from the present case based on whether he could
have been arrested for his traffic violations.
In his petition for rehearing, the defendant contends that
the holding of Atwater is inapplicable to the present case
because no court in Illinois has explicitly followed its ruling.
We note that in People v. Caballes, 221 Ill. 2d 282, 851 N.E.2d
26 (2006), the Illinois Supreme Court stated that its search and
seizure jurisprudence was in limited lockstep with the rulings of
the United States Supreme Court. In Caballes, the court reviewed
the limitations to the lockstep principle based on differences
between the Illinois Constitution and the United States
Constitution. The Caballes court did not cite Atwater or
Illinois cases related to Atwater in its discussion of
limitations on the lockstep doctrine. Therefore, except for the
limitations noted in Caballes, Illinois courts are bound to
follow the United States Supreme Court's holdings in lockstep
with regard to search and seizure cases, including the holding of
Atwater.
11
Even assuming, arguendo, that the holding of Atwater is
inapplicable to the present case, we reject the defendant's
argument that Thornton is inapposite because the defendant could
not have been arrested for his traffic offense. Thornton is not
distinguishable on this basis. The holding of Thornton did not
depend on whether the defendant could have been arrested for his
traffic offense. The defendant in Thornton was arrested as a
result of a pat-down search that was unrelated to his traffic
offense. Under the instant defendant's rationale, he was
arrested for resisting a peace officer, which he claims was also
unrelated to his traffic offense. Thus, the defendant is
incorrect that the ruling of Thornton is inapposite to the
present case.
Furthermore, we note that this defendant's arrest for
resisting a peace officer was related to the traffic offense for
which the officer initiated the traffic stop. The defendant
attempted to evade the consequences of a lawful traffic stop by
parking his car, ignoring the officer's commands to stay by his
vehicle, and walking into a business establishment. He was
arrested because he resisted multiple attempts by the officer to
effect a lawful traffic stop. Therefore, the facts of this case
are even more closely related to the holding of Belton, upon
which Thornton relied, than the facts in Thornton because the
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defendant was arrested for conduct that was related to his
vehicle.
We also disagree with the defendant that Thornton is
distinguishable because, unlike the defendant in that case, the
instant defendant was arrested for conduct that occurred outside
his vehicle. In Thornton, the defendant was arrested because he
possessed illegal drugs that were found on his person outside the
vehicle. The defendant in Thornton, like the defendant in the
present case, was arrested for conduct that occurred outside his
vehicle. Thus, we also do not find Thornton to be
distinguishable on this basis.
Although we have found no Illinois Supreme Court case which
has discussed Thornton, the court has adopted the holding of
Belton. People v. Bailey, 159 Ill. 2d 498, 639 N.E.2d 1278
(1994). As we stated above, with limitations not pertinent to
this case, on search and seizure issues our supreme court has
followed the approach taken by the United States Supreme Court.
See Caballes, 221 Ill. 2d 282, 851 N.E.2d 26. We, therefore,
believe the Illinois Supreme Court would adopt the holding of
Thornton as well.
In summary, although we disagree with the rationale of
Thornton, 541 U.S. 615, 158 L. Ed. 2d 905, 124 S. Ct. 2127, we
are bound by its ruling. Under the holdings of Thornton and
Belton, the officers in this case were justified in conducting a
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search of the defendant's vehicle incident to his arrest. We
rule, therefore, that the trial court erred as a matter of law by
denying the State's motion to reconsider and granting the
defendant's motion to suppress the evidence.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the
Will County circuit court and remand the matter for further
proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.
LYTTON, P.J., and CARTER, J., concur.
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