No. 3--07--0138
_________________________________________________________________
Filed March 20, 2008
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
A.D., 2008
STANDARD MUTUAL INSURANCE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
COMPANY, ) of the 12th Judicial Circuit,
) Will County, Illinois,
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
)
) No. 06--MR--623
v. )
)
JIMMIE ROGERS, ) Honorable
) Barbara Petrungaro,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.
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PRESIDING JUSTICE McDADE delivered the opinion of the court:
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The plaintiff, Standard Mutual Insurance Company, filed a
declaratory judgment action, alleging that it had no duty to
provide uninsured motorist benefits to the defendant, Jimmie
Rogers. Both parties moved for summary judgment, and the circuit
court found in favor of the plaintiff. On appeal, the defendant
argues that the circuit court erred when it found that he was not
entitled to uninsured motorist benefits under his insurance
policy with the plaintiff. We affirm.
On September 28, 2005, the defendant was driving his son to
preschool. While stopped at an intersection, an individual on a
bicycle rode into the defendant's vehicle, causing the front
passenger-side window to shatter. The defendant sustained an
injury to his right eye from the broken glass. The individual on
the bicycle was not covered by an insurance policy.
On October 24, 2005, the defendant filed an insurance claim
with the plaintiff, alleging that he was entitled to compensation
for his injuries under the uninsured motorist provision of his
policy. In response, the plaintiff filed this declaratory
judgment action.
Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. On January
26, 2007, the circuit court found that the plaintiff had no duty
or obligation to provide uninsured motorist benefits to the
defendant because a bicycle did not constitute a motor vehicle,
such that the individual on the bicycle was not considered an
uninsured motorist. On February 27, 2007, the defendant filed a
notice of appeal with the circuit court.
Initially, we note that the plaintiff suggests that the
defendant failed to file a timely notice of appeal and that this
court must dismiss the defendant's appeal for lack of
jurisdiction.
In relevant part, Supreme Court Rule 303(a)(1) (210 Ill. 2d
R. 303(a)(1)) provides that, "the notice of appeal must be filed
with the clerk of the circuit court within 30 days after the
entry of the final judgment appealed from." Supreme Court Rule
373 (155 Ill. 2d R. 373) provides that, if a notice of appeal is
received after the due date, the time of mailing will be the time
of filing. In this case, the defendant filed his notice of
appeal on February 27, 2007, which was not within 30 days of the
court's final judgment on January 26, 2007. However, the
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defendant's notice of filing indicates that it was mailed on
February 21, 2007. This court has inquired with the circuit
court of Will County, which confirmed that the defendant mailed
the notice of appeal to the circuit court on February 21, 2007.
Accordingly, the defendant timely filed his notice of appeal (155
Ill. 2d R. 373), and we have jurisdiction to consider the merits
of the defendant's argument.
The defendant argues that the circuit court erred when it
found that he was not entitled to uninsured motorist benefits
under his insurance policy with the plaintiff. Specifically, the
defendant contends that the public policy considerations behind
the uninsured motorist coverage statute weigh in favor of
extending coverage in this case, including the general rule that
coverage should be construed liberally in favor of the
policyholder.
We review matters of statutory construction and summary
judgment de novo. Hudson v. YMCA of Metropolitan Chicago,LLC,
377 Ill. App. 3d 631, 878 N.E.2d 821 (2007).
Statutory construction requires the reviewing court to
determine and give effect to the legislature's intent. DeLuna v.
Burciaga, 223 Ill. 2d 49, 857 N.E.2d 229 (2006). The primary
indicator of legislative intent is the statute's plain language.
DeLuna, 223 Ill. 2d 49, 857 N.E.2d 229. If the statute's
language is clear and unambiguous, there is no need to resort to
other methods of statutory construction. DeLuna, 223 Ill. 2d 49,
857 N.E.2d 229. However, if the statute's plain language is
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ambiguous, we will employ other tools of statutory construction,
including the consideration of similar and related enactments.
DeLuna, 223 Ill. 2d 49, 857 N.E.2d 229.
Section 143a(1) of the Illinois Insurance Code provides:
"No policy insuring against loss resulting from
liability imposed by law for bodily injury or death suffered
by any person arising out of the ownership, maintenance or
use of a motor vehicle that is designed for use on public
highways and that is either required to be registered in
this State or is principally garaged in this State shall be
renewed, delivered, or issued for delivery in this State
unless coverage is provided therein or supplemental thereto,
in limits for bodily injury or death set forth in Section 7-
203 of the Illinois Vehicle Code for the protection of
persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to
recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor
vehicles and hit-and-run motor vehicles because of bodily
injury, sickness or disease, including death, resulting
therefrom." (Emphasis added.) 215 ILCS 5/143a(1) (West
2004).
"Motor vehicle" is not defined in the Illinois Insurance Code.
However, "motor vehicle" is defined in the Illinois Vehicle Code
(Vehicle Code) (625 ILCS 5/1--100 et seq. (West 2004)), a code
that is referenced in the Illinois Insurance Code. Thus, we look
to the Vehicle Code for assistance in defining "motor vehicle."
DeLuna, 223 Ill. 2d 49, 857 N.E.2d 229.
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Section 1--146 of the Vehicle Code defines "motor vehicle"
as "[e]very vehicle which is self-propelled and every vehicle
which is propelled by electric power obtained from overhead
trolley wires, but not operated upon rails, except for vehicles
moved solely by human power and motorized wheelchairs."
(Emphasis added.) 625 ILCS 5/1--146 (West 2004). Section 1--217
of the Vehicle Code defines "vehicle" as "[e]very device, in,
upon or by which any person or property is or may be transported
or drawn upon a highway or requiring a certificate of title under
Section 3--101(d) of this Code, except devices moved by human
power, devices used exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks
and snowmobiles as defined in the Snowmobile Registration and
Safety Act." (Emphasis added.) 625 ILCS 5/1--217 (West 2004).
Furthermore, section 1--106 of the Vehicle Code defines "bicycle"
as "[e]very device propelled by human power upon which any person
may ride, having two tandem wheels except scooters and similar
devices." 625 ILCS 5/1--106 (West 2004). Given these
legislative distinctions, it is clear that a "bicycle" cannot be
considered a "motor vehicle" for the purposes of uninsured motor
vehicle coverage. We are unpersuaded by the defendant's public-
policy-based argument, and hold that the circuit court did not
err when it granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff.
The judgment of the circuit court of Will County is
affirmed.
Affirmed.
SCHMIDT and CARTER, JJ., concur.
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