United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
March 17, 2003
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 02-41060
Summary Calendar
CURTIS SHABAZZ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
GARY L. JOHNSON, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION, RODNEY COOPER, HEAD WARDEN,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
USDC No. 5:01-CV-70
March 17, 2003
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, SMITH, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Curtis Shabazz, Texas state prisoner # 522178, appeals the
district court’s dismissal as frivolous of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983
complaint based on its being time-barred. He argues that the
statute of limitations was tolled while his federal habeas petition
was pending and that it was also tolled by a continuing violation
of his right to access to the courts. The basis for Shabazz’s suit
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
is his claim that he was prejudiced by the prison officials’
failure to advise him of the enactment of the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) or of its statute of
limitations until after the grace period for filing a habeas
petition had run.
The district court erroneously dismissed Shabazz’s complaint
as time-barred. A cause of action for denial of access to the
courts does not accrue until the claimant sustains a “relevant
actual injury.” Shabazz did not sustain such an injury until the
U.S. Supreme Court refused to review this court’s determination
that Shabazz’s habeas petition was untimely filed.1 Shabazz filed
his § 1983 complaint within two years of that determination;
therefore it was timely filed.2
The appellees suggest that the complaint should have been
dismissed pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey.3 However, Heck is
inapplicable to the present suit because Shabazz does not seek
damages “for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment,
or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render
1
See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996) (listing as an
example of actual injury a court’s dismissal of an inmate’s suit
“for failure to satisfy some technical requirement which, because
of deficiencies in the prison's legal assistance facilities, he
could not have known.”).
2
See Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 576 (5th
Cir. 2001).
3
512 U.S. 477, 486 (1974).
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a conviction or sentence invalid.”4
Shabazz argues that he was denied access to the courts because
appellees failed to inform him of the AEDPA statute of
limitations.5 By implication, Shabazz’s claim that he was denied
access to the court as a result of receiving the untimely notice of
the AEDPA statute of limitations is foreclosed by this court’s
precedent. This court’s prior determination that equitable tolling
was inapplicable despite Shabazz’s lack of notice of the filing
deadline until after termination of the limitation period indicates
that the failure to timely provide the information did not
constitute a constitutional violation.6 Because his complaint does
not support an arguable constitutional violation, Shabazz’s § 1983
suit was properly dismissed as frivolous although on different
grounds than those relied upon by the district court.
The district court’s dismissal of Shabazz’s complaint is
AFFIRMED. We also find that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Shabazz’s motion to amend. Shabazz’s motion
4
Id.
5
He alleged that the defendants had “a legal duty to ensure
that all new laws relating to criminal jurisprudence are
promulgated timely to all inmates, including those such as me
confined to Administrative Segregation and denied direct access to
[the] law library and legal assista[n]ce from persons trained in
the Law.”
6
See Shabazz v. Johnson, 99-10609 (Dec. 19, 2000)
(unpublished) (holding that Shabazz’s ignorance of the law, even
though occasioned by TDCJ’s failure to notify him of the
limitations period, did not constitute a “rare and exceptional”
circumstance meriting equitable tolling).
-3-
to file a supplemental brief is DENIED.
AFFIRMED.
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