ILLINOIS OFFICIAL REPORTS
Appellate Court
In re Vanessa K., 2011 IL App (3d) 100545
Appellate Court In re VANESSA K., Alleged to be Subject to Involuntary Medication
Caption (Vanessa K., Respondent-Appellant).
District & No. Third District
Docket No. 3-10-0545
Filed August 17, 2011
Rehearing denied September 26, 2011
Held The order for the involuntary administration of psychotropic medications
(Note: This syllabus to respondent was upheld on appeal over her contention that the State
constitutes no part of failed to comply with the statutory requirements that she be given written
the opinion of the court information about the risks and benefits of the proposed treatments.
but has been prepared
by the Reporter of
Decisions for the
convenience of the
reader.)
Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Rock Island County, No. 10-MH-13;
Review the Hon. Raymond J. Conklin, Judge, presiding.
Judgment Affirmed.
Counsel on Ann Krasuski, of Guardianship & Advocacy Commission, of Hines,
Appeal Cynthia Z. Tracy, of Guardian & Advocacy Commission, of Peoria, and
Veronique Baker, of Guardianship & Advocacy Commission, of
Chicago, for appellant.
Jeff Terronez, State’s Attorney, of Rock Island (Terry A. Mertel and
Richard T. Leonard, both of State’s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor’s
Office, of counsel), for the People.
Panel JUSTICE O’BRIEN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Presiding Justice Carter and Justice Wright concurred in the judgment
and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 The trial court granted the State’s petition to involuntarily administer psychotropic
medication to respondent Vanessa K. She appealed. We affirm.
¶2 FACTS
¶3 Respondent Vanessa K., who was 35 years old at the time the petition was filed, suffers
from schizophrenia. She voluntarily resided in a facility for persons with mental illness
before admitting herself, also voluntarily, to the Robert Young Mental Health Center for
inpatient treatment. During her hospitalization at Robert Young, she would intermittently
take her medication and other times would refuse to take it. Her treating doctor, Ernest
Galbreath, filed a petition for involuntary treatment with psychotropic medication, seeking
authority to administer the antipsychotic medication, Risperdal Consta, as a first choice, and
offering 20 other medications as treatment alternatives, including Prolixin Decanoate, also
an antipsychotic.
¶4 At a hearing on the petition to involuntarily medicate, Galbreath testified in support of
the petition. Early in Galbreath’s testimony, Vanessa’s attorney interrupted and stated for
the record that Vanessa, “during the [d]octor’s testimony has been writing very rapidly on
a number of pieces of paper and humming and making other noises and chewing her lips and
talking to herself and not appearing to be engaged with the proceedings–.” Vanessa then left
the proceedings, stating:
“I am leaving. Go ahead, discuss it without me, I will leave this for Supreme Court
Judge and half the world is watching, there is my written appeal, the Judge has the paper,
thank you and I do want to leave because you all –.”
The record includes the “written appeal” Vanessa gave the trial court before leaving the
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proceeding, which consists of illegible and illogical writing.
¶5 Galbreath resumed his testimony and stated that he was a psychiatrist and medical
director at Robert Young. He had been Vanessa’s treating psychiatrist for over three years
and diagnosed her with schizophrenia paranoia, a serious mental illness. The disorder causes
a patient to experience auditory and visual hallucinations, and to be psychotic, paranoid, and
fearful of what might be done to her. Vanessa had been brought to Robert Young after she
attacked a staff member at her residential facility when she was not given a soda. Her
treatment at Robert Young included counseling and group sessions, as well as individual
sessions with Galbreath. Her treatment plan also included medication.
¶6 Galbreath saw Vanessa daily during her inpatient treatment. Due to her mental illness,
Vanessa was exhibiting a deterioration in her ability to function. He described that Vanessa
spent entire days pacing up and down the hallway where she would previously sit and
participate in a therapy session. Her deteriorating behavior also included laughing out loud,
talking to herself, not taking her medication, and becoming angry and belligerent toward her
caretakers. She was also exhibiting or threatening disruptive behavior. Galbreath stated that
Vanessa’s behavior was continuing, and “getting worse each day.” Because of her illness,
the least restrictive treatment alternatives, to allow Vanessa to medicate herself or to
voluntarily take her medication, had not been effective in the past and would not be viable
options.
¶7 Galbreath discussed his treatment plan of prescribing Prolixin Decanoate, the
antipsychotic medication with a generic name of fluphenazine decanoate. The drug is
administered in an injectable dose of 2.5 and 50 milligrams every two weeks. No testing or
procedures were required to monitor the medication, although he would observe Vanessa’s
progress on the drug. Galbreath pointed to the ability for Vanessa to go two weeks between
doses as a reason he prescribed the drug. He also pointed to Vanessa’s refusal to take
medication on her own, noting that when medicating herself, Vanessa “refuses at random,
[is] very paranoid, that’s part of her illness.” He had administered Prolixin Decanoate to
Vanessa previously and found it to be an effective treatment for her. Her prior use of the
drug resulted in continued auditory and visual hallucinations, but curbed her physical
aggression. When taking the drug previously, Vanessa remained free of hospitalization for
her illness for over a year. He rejected less restrictive treatment or medication because of
Vanessa’s unpredictability and unreliability about maintaining her medication. He stated that
Vanessa “will not address the psychotic activity.” In his opinion, she lacked the capacity to
make a reasoned decision regarding the administration of medication. He believed the drug
was necessary as a safety measure to manage Vanessa so she would not attack people, which
first occurred after she stopped taking her medication. He also observed that, when not on
her medication, Vanessa was “not really rational to take care of herself.”
¶8 Galbreath acknowledged that when he submitted the petition, his first preference for
medication was Risperdal Consta, a newer antipsychotic drug than Prolixin Decanoate,
which had not been available in an injectable form when Vanessa previously took the drug.
He explained that he substituted the medication because at the time he filed the petition, he
did not know that Vanessa had taken previously taken Prolixin. He testified regarding the
side effects of Risperdal Consta and compared them to the side effects of Prolixin
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Decanoate. Galbreath stated that he had advised Vanessa orally about the risks, benefits, and
side effects of medication, including Risperdal Consta and Prolixin Decanoate, on a daily
basis during her hospitalization at Robert Young, although she would often become
disruptive and leave during the explanation. On her arrival at Robert Young, Vanessa was
provided a standard form, written explanation concerning the side effects of different
medications generally given to his patients. Galbreath acknowledged that he never gave
Vanessa written information specifically concerning Prolixin Decanoate.
¶9 The trial court questioned Galbreath, ensuring that the doctor wanted the trial court to
grant him authority to give Vanessa Prolixin Decanoate, 2.5 to 50 milligrams intravenously,
every two weeks, rather than Risperdal Consta, as stated in the petition. As a result of
discussion with Vanessa’s attorney, the trial court narrowed the petition to substitute Prolixin
Decanoate as the primary medication, over Vanessa’s objection. The State also objected,
noting that the statutory written notice requirements were to be strictly construed and that
Vanessa was not given written information about Prolixin Decanoate. According to the State,
because Vanessa was provided written information regarding Risperdal Consta, it should
remain the primary medication per the petition in order to comply with the statutory
requirements. The trial court admonished the parties to decide whether to amend the petition
and adjourned for 10 minutes. When the hearing reconvened, Galbreath testified that he gave
Vanessa an oral explanation and written information on Prolixin Decanoate. The written
information states that the drug treats schizophrenia and includes the following headings:
“When This Medicine Should Not Be Used,” “How to Use This Medicine,” Drugs and Foods
to Avoid,” “Warnings While Using This Medicine,” and “Possible Side Effects.” A copy of
the written information provided Vanessa was admitted into evidence.
¶ 10 Following the close of testimony, the trial court granted the petition in its entirety. It
made the following findings. Vanessa had a serious mental illness, suffered from a
deterioration of her ability to function, and had engaged in threatening behavior. The
benefits of involuntarily administration of Prolixin Decanoate outweighed its harm. Vanessa
was informed orally and in writing about the drug’s side effects. Vanessa lacked the capacity
to make a reasoned decision about taking medication. Less restrictive alternatives were
explored and determined to be inappropriate. The trial court noted Vanessa’s in-court
behavior as support that a least restrictive environment would not work. No testing was
required for the safe administration of the drug. Afer making its findings, the trial court gave
a copy of Vanessa’s appeal rights to her attorney and told him to give it to her, which
counsel agreed to do.
¶ 11 ANALYSIS
¶ 12 Vanessa raises three issues: whether the State failed to comply with section 2-102 of the
Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (Code) (405 ILCS 5/2-102(a-5) (West
2010)); whether the order allowing the involuntary administration of medication was
supported by clear and convincing evidence (405 ILCS 5/2-107.1(a-5) (West 2010)); and
whether the issues raised on appeal are moot.
¶ 13 We begin with the mootness issue, as it affects the viability of the appeal. Vanessa argues
that this court should recognize her appeal under the recognized exceptions to the mootness
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doctrine. She contends all three of the exceptions apply. Whether an exception to the
mootness doctrine applies is a question of law, which we review de novo. In re Alfred H.H.,
233 Ill. 2d 345, 350 (2009).
¶ 14 Courts will generally not decide moot questions, render advisory opinions, or consider
issues where the results will not be affected regardless of how the court decides the issues.
Alfred H.H., 233 Ill. 2d at 351. There are three exceptions to the mootness doctrine. In re
Daryll C., 401 Ill. App. 3d 748, 752 (2010). The public interest exception applies where (1)
the question is one of a public nature; (2) there is a need for an authoritative determination
for future guidance of public officers; and (3) there is a likelihood that the question would
recur. In re Robin C., 395 Ill. App. 3d 958, 963 (2009). The “capable of repetition yet
evading review” exception requires the complaining party to show that (1) the challenged
action is too short in its duration to be fully litigated prior to its cessation and (2) there is a
reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to the same
action again. In re Barbara H., 183 Ill. 2d 482, 491 (1998). The collateral consequences
exception applies where a party has suffered or is threatened with an actual injury traceable
to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial determination. Daryll C.,
401 Ill. App. 3d at 752.
¶ 15 Because the July 14, 2010, order authorizing the administration of psychotropic
medication was limited by statute to 90 days, it had expired by the time of this appeal,
making the issues raised here moot. 405 ILCS 5/2-107.1(a-5) (West 2010). However, we
find that the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine applies and permits this court
to reach the merits of Vanessa’s first issue. Vanessa seeks an interpretation of the written
notification requirements of section 2-102 of the Code, a matter of public concern. A
determination of that issue by this court will guide other public officers seeking and deciding
petitions to involuntarily medicate a respondent. There is a substantial likelihood that this
issue will arise again because petitions are limited to 90-day periods for involuntary
administration.
¶ 16 The public interest exception does not apply to Vanessa’s second issue, where she raises
a sufficiency of the evidence argument, because the facts of this case are particular to it and
not matters of public concern. We determine that the second exception to the mootness
doctrine, capable of repetition yet evading review, applies to the second appeal issue. The
90-day statutory limit for the involuntary administration establishes that an action
challenging the grant of a petition cannot be fully litigated before it expires. As supported
by the testimony below, Vanessa’s history of noncompliance with maintaining her
medication, and her inability to reason rationally because of her illness, it is reasonable to
expect that she would be subject to another petition for involuntary administration of
psychotropic medication in the future. Because these exceptions apply, we need not address
the collateral consequences exception.
¶ 17 Having concluded that exceptions to the mootness doctrine apply, we address the
substantive issues. We first consider whether the State failed to comply with section 2-102
of the Code. 405 ILCS 5/2-102(a-5) (West 2010). Vanessa contends that the State failed to
establish that it provided the required written information to her about the medications that
were options for her treatment. She also complains that the State failed to comply with the
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three-day notice requirement as set forth in section 2-107.1(a-5)(1) of the Code. 405 ILCS
5/2-107.1(a-5)(1) (West 2010).
¶ 18 The primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the
legislature’s intent. In re Mary Ann P., 202 Ill. 2d 393, 405 (2002). The best indicator of the
intent of the legislature is the statute’s language, which should be given its plain and
ordinary meaning. Mary Ann P., 202 Ill. 2d at 405. We review issues of statutory
construction de novo. In re Michelle J., 209 Ill. 2d 428, 434 (2004).
¶ 19 Section 2-102(a-5) states:
“If the services include the administration of *** psychotropic medication, the physician
or the physician’s designee shall advise the recipient, in writing, of the side effects, risks,
and benefits of the treatment, as well as alternatives to the proposed treatment, to the
extent such advice is consistent with the recipient’s ability to understand the information
communicated. The physician shall determine and state in writing whether the recipient
has the capacity to make a reasoned decision about the treatment. *** If the recipient
lacks the capacity to make a reasoned decision about the treatment, the treatment may
be administered only (i) pursuant to the provisions of Section 2-107 or 2-107.1 [405
ILCS 5/2-107 or 405 ILCS 5/2-107.1] ***.” 405 ILCS 5/2-102(a-5) (West 2010).
¶ 20 Section 2-102(a-5) requires written notification of the proposed treatment’s side effects,
risks, benefits, and alternative treatments. In re Dorothy J.N., 373 Ill. App. 3d 332, 336
(2007). A person cannot make an informed decision regarding the administration of
medication unless the risks and benefits are explained to him or her. In re Cathy M., 326 Ill.
App. 3d 335, 341 (2001). Even when a respondent is verbally advised about the benefits and
risks of a medication, and refuses to take it, he or she is entitled to written information. In
re Richard C., 329 Ill. App. 3d 1090, 1095 (2002). The State must present clear and
convincing evidence that it complied with the notification requirements in section 2-102(a-
5). In re Louis S., 361 Ill. App. 3d 774, 779-80 (2005).
¶ 21 Vanessa argues that trial court’s order must be reversed because she was not provided
written information about all the medication approved for administration by the court, noting
the lengthy list of alternative medications attached to the order. She relies on In re John R.,
339 Ill. App. 3d 778 (2003), and In re Laura H., 404 Ill. App. 3d 286 (2010), which
interpreted the statute as necessitating that written information be provided on all the
alternative medications. Both cases are distinguished on the facts. In John R., two of the
respondents did not receive any written information on the medications to be involuntarily
administered and the third respondent only received information on one of the drugs
authorized in the trial court’s order. John R., 339 Ill. App. 3d at 784. In Laura H., the
respondent was given a stack of drug handouts that failed to notify her about the risks,
benefits, and alternatives to the proposed treatment. Laura H., 404 Ill. App. 3d at 290.
¶ 22 The involuntary administration of psychotropic medication implicates a respondent’s
liberty interests, which include a right to refuse medication. In In re C.E., 161 Ill. 2d 200,
214 (1994), the court recognized a mentally ill person’s constitutionally protected liberty
interest to refuse the administration of psychotropic medication. The court discussed two
guiding fundamental concerns about an involuntary treatment recipient’s due process rights,
including the “substantially invasive nature of psychotropic substances and their significant
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side effects” and “recognition that psychotropic substances may be misused by medical
personnel” for patient control rather than treatment. C.E., 161 Ill. 2d at 214-15. Because it
implicates a respondent’s liberty interests, the statute must be strictly construed. In re Alaka
W., 379 Ill. App. 3d 251, 275 (2008).
¶ 23 Here, the petition originally requested the administration of Risperdal Consta. Galbreath
gave Vanessa written information on that drug and attempted to verbally explain its risks,
benefits and side effects. He also verbally informed her of the risks, benefits, and side effects
of Prolixin Decanoate. Although he spoke to Vanessa on a daily basis regarding medication,
she would not participate in the discussion. In his opinion, Vanessa was “not really rational
to take care of herself,” and due to her illness, had a limited ability to understand the
information regarding the medication. After the petition was filed, Galbreath determined that
Prolixin Decanoate, an older form of schizophrenia medication, had worked well for Vanessa
in the past and would be a better medication for her. The order entered by the trial court was
limited to the administration of Prolixin Decanoate. The trial court expressly asked
Galbreath what medication he wanted to administer to Vanessa. Galbreath explained why
Prolixin Decanoate was a better choice for Vanessa, based on her prior experience using the
medication. No other medications were discussed and the order specified only Prolixin
Decanoate. In re Gail F., 365 Ill. App. 3d 439, 447 (2006) (finding trial court can approve
fewer medications than listed in the petition pursuant to treating doctor’s request). Galbreath
did not specify any alternative medications as he did not consider them to be viable options
for Vanessa. Accordingly, there was no need to provide information on all the medications
listed as alternatives in the attachment to the trial court’s order. At the hearing, Galbreath
admitted that written information on Prolixin Decanoate was not provided to Vanessa. The
hearing recessed for Galbreath to give Vanessa written information on the drug. When the
hearing reconvened, Galbreath testified that he provided Vanessa a document describing
Prolixin Decanoate and its use, benefits, risks and side effects as required by the statute.
¶ 24 Vanessa also argues that the statute requires the written information be provided to a
respondent three days prior to the hearing on a petition for involuntary administration. She
points to section 2-107.1(a-5)(1), which requires that a respondent be delivered a copy of the
petition three days before the hearing and contends that section 2-102 must be read in
conjunction with that requirement. 405 ILCS 5/2-107.1(a-5)(1), 2-102(a-5) (West 2010). We
find nothing in the Code requiring a three-day notice for the dissemination of written
materials. While section 2-102 references section 2-107.1, it does not incorporate that
section’s three-day notice requirement. We agree with Vanessa that a respondent may not
be able to make an informed decision without written information on the proposed treatment,
and that the better practice is to provide the information prior to the hearing. However, we
will not read into the statute conditions not expressed by the legislature. Michelle J., 209 Ill.
2d at 437. We find that Vanessa was timely provided the necessary written information on
Prolixin Decanoate as required in section 2-102 of the Code. In addition, the statutory
requirements pertain to the extent the respondent is able to understand. Here, Galbreath’s
testimony and Vanessa’s conduct at the hearing demonstrate her limited ability to
understand.
¶ 25 Our final issue is whether the order allowing the involuntary administration of
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medication was supported by clear and convincing evidence. Vanessa claims that the State
failed to establish that she lacked capacity, that the benefits of medications outweighed their
harm, and that the testing and procedures included in the order were necessary.
¶ 26 Section 2-107.1 allows a party to petition the court for an order authorizing the
involuntary administration of psychotropic medication. 405 ILCS 5/2-107.1(a-5)(1) (West
2010). The petition and notice of the hearing on it must be delivered to the respondent, his
or her attorney and guardian no later than three days before the hearing date. 405 ILCS 5/2-
107.1(a-5)(1) (West 2010). The petition may also ask the court to authorize any testing and
procedures necessary for the safe and effective administration of the medication and must
set forth the specific testing and procedures. 405 ILCS 5/2-107.1(a-5)(1) (West 2010).
Sections 2-107.1(a-5)(4)(A) through (a-5)(4)(G) state:
“(4) Psychotropic medication *** may be administered to the recipient if and only
if it has been determined by clear and convincing evidence that all of the following
factors are present. In determining whether a person meets the criteria specified in the
following paragraphs (A) through (G), the court may consider evidence of the person’s
history of serious violence, repeated past pattern of specific behavior, actions related to
the person’s illness, or past outcomes of various treatment options.
(A) That the recipient has a serious mental illness ***.
(B) That because of said mental illness ***, the recipient currently exhibits any
one of the following: (i) deterioration of his or her ability to function, as compared
to the recipient’s ability to function prior to the current onset of symptoms of the
mental illness *** for which treatment is presently sought, (ii) suffering, or (iii)
threatening behavior.
(C) That the illness *** has existed for a period marked by the continuing
presence of the symptoms set forth in item (B) of this subdivision (4) or the repeated
episodic occurrence of these symptoms.
(D) That the benefits of the treatment outweigh the harm.
(E) That the recipient lacks the capacity to make a reasoned decision about the
treatment.
(F) That other less restrictive services have been explored and found
inappropriate.
(G) If the petition seeks authorization for testing and other procedures, that such
testing and procedures are essential for the safe and effective administration of the
treatment.” 405 ILCS 5/2-107.1(a-5)(4)(A) through (a-5)(4)(G) (West 2010).
¶ 27 The State must present expert testimony regarding the above factors to sustain its burden.
In re Joseph M., 398 Ill. App. 3d 1086, 1090 (2010). Expert medical testimony is considered
clear and convincing when the expert identifies direct observation of the respondent on
several occasions as the basis for his or her diagnosis. In re Schaap, 274 Ill. App. 3d 497,
502 (1995) (citing In re Tuman, 268 Ill. App. 3d 106, 111 (1994)). An expert may also rely
on unsubstantiated evidence ordinarily considered as hearsay in order to explain the basis
of her opinion, if the evidence is the type reasonably relied on by experts in the field.
Schaap, 274 Ill. App. 3d at 502.
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¶ 28 An order authorizing administration of medication is limited to no more than 90 days.
405 ILCS 5/2-107.1(a-5)(5) (West 2010). The order must designate the persons authorized
to administer the treatment and specify the medications and anticipated range of dosages,
and “may include a list of any alternative medications and range of dosages deemed
necessary.” 405 ILCS 5/2-107.1(a-5)(6) (West 2010). This court will not reverse a trial
court’s order permitting the involuntary administration of psychotropic medication unless
it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Joseph M., 398 Ill. App. 3d at 1089. An
order is against the manifest weight of the evidence only when an opposite conclusion is
apparent or when the findings appear to be unreasonable, arbitrary and not based on the
evidence. Joseph M., 398 Ill. App. 3d at 1089.
¶ 29 Vanessa contends that the State did not prove she lacked capacity, that the treatment’s
benefits outweighed its harm, and that testing and procedures were necessary. She does not
dispute that the State established she has a serious mental illness; that because of her illness
she exhibits a deterioration of her ability to function as compared to her ability before the
current onset of symptoms, suffering, and threatening behavior; and that her illness has
existed for a period showing continued symptoms. 405 ILCS 5/2-107.1(a-5)(4)(A), (a-
5)(4)(B), (a-5)(4)(C) (West 2010).
¶ 30 To determine whether “the recipient lacks the capacity to make a reasoned decision about
the treatment” (405 ILCS 5/2-107.1(a-5)(4)(E) (West 2010)), a trial court considers the
following factors:
“(1) The person’s knowledge that he has a choice to make;
(2) The person’s ability to understand the available options, their advantages and
disadvantages;
(3) Whether the commitment is voluntary or involuntary;
(4) Whether the person has previously received the type of medication or treatment
at issue;
(5) If the person has received similar treatment in the past, whether he can describe
what happened as a result and how the effects were beneficial or harmful; and
(6) The absence of any interfering pathologic perceptions or beliefs or interfering
emotional states which might prevent an understanding of legitimate risks and benefits.”
In re Israel, 278 Ill. App. 3d 24, 37 (1996).
¶ 31 The record establishes the first factor, knowledge that she has a choice, weighs against
involuntary administration. Galbreath testified that Vanessa would take her medication when
she wanted to take it and would refuse it other times. Her refusal to take her medication
prompted the filing of the petition to involuntarily medicate. Although Vanessa’s reasoning
in making a choice regarding her medication is suspect due to her mental illness, it appears
that she was aware that she had a choice regarding medication. The second factor, ability to
understand the available options, favors involuntary administration. Galbreath testified that
he verbally informed Vanessa about the medication options on a daily basis but as a result
of her illness, she would become disruptive and leave the room. He also characterized
Vanessa as “not really rational to take care of herself” when she was not properly medicated,
as demonstrated by her courtroom behavior.
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¶ 32 The third factor, that the commitment is voluntary, favors Vanessa. However, this factor
is tempered by Galbreath’s testimony that Vanessa was “getting worse every day” due to her
refusal to consistently take her medication. The fourth factor, Vanessa’s previous use of
Prolixin Decanoate, favors involuntary administration. Galbreath explained that Vanessa has
reacted favorably to the drug in the past, that it curbed her aggression and that it allowed her
to avoid hospitalization for over a year. The fifth factor, Vanessa’s testimony regarding prior
use of the medication, also favors involuntary administration. As reflected in the record,
Vanessa was disruptive during the hearing and left without testifying. She presented the trial
court with a purported “written appeal” that consisted of illogical writings. The final factor,
the absence of any interfering pathologic perceptions, beliefs, or emotional states preventing
an understanding of risks and benefits, also favors involuntary administration. Galbreath
explained that because of her illness, Vanessa refused to consistently take her medication
and to address her psychotic activity. Based on our application of the Israel factors to the
instant facts, we find that the State established that Vanessa lacked the ability to make a
reasoned decision regarding her medication.
¶ 33 We next consider whether the State established that the benefits of administering Prolixin
Decanoate outweighed its harm. Galbreath compared the side effects of Risperdal Consta to
those of Prolixin Decanoate. He noted that Vanessa previously used Prolixin Decanoate with
successful results and apparently without adverse reaction. Without the medication, Vanessa
was not rational to care for herself as evidenced by her worsening condition. He also
believed that the involuntary administration of psychotropic medication was necessary for
safety concerns, as supported by Vanessa’s aggressive and threatening behavior toward her
caretakers. Another benefit Galbreath mentioned was Vanessa’s ability to stay out of the
hospital for a year when previously using Prolixin Decanoate. Finally, contrary to Vanessa’s
claim, Galbreath testified, and the trial court reiterated, that no testing or procedures were
needed to monitor Vanessa’s use of Prolixin Decanoate. Galbreath said that he would
monitor Vanessa with observation and that no other action was necessary. We find that the
State proved by clear and convincing evidence the statutory factors necessary to sustain its
petition. The trial court’s grant of the petition to involuntarily administer psychotropic
medication was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 34 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Rock Island County is
affirmed.
¶ 35 Affirmed.
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