No. 3--09--0996
Opinion filed March 18, 2011
_________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
A.D., 2011
In re M.P., J.P., and C.P., ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
) of the 10th Judicial Circuit,
Minors ) Peoria County, Illinois,
)
(The People of the State of )
Illinois, )
)
Petitioner-Appellee, ) No. 09--JA--213, 09--JA--214
) and 09--JA--215
v. )
)
Chazteen P., ) Honorable
) Kim L. Kelley,
Respondent-Appellant). ) Judge, Presiding.
_________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE McDADE delivered the judgment of the court, with
opinion.
Presiding Justice Carter and Justice Holdridge concurred in
the judgment and opinion.
_________________________________________________________________
OPINION
Following a dispositional hearing, the court adjudicated
Chazteen P., the respondent, a fit parent, and allowed her to
retain custody of the minors, M.P., J.P., and C.P. However, the
court adjudicated the minors wards of the court and appointed the
Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) as their
guardian. The respondent appeals, contending that the court
erred when it appointed DCFS as the minors' guardian. We affirm.
FACTS
The record shows that the respondent gave birth to M.P., a
male born February 16, 2007; J.P., a male born December 28, 2007;
and C.P., a male born January 22, 2009. Thereafter, on
August 27, 2009, the State filed a juvenile petition alleging
that the minors were neglected due to an injurious environment.
The State's petition specifically alleged, among other things,
that: (1) the minors' father, J.P., Sr., came home on January 5,
2009, at 5 a.m., intoxicated and with a bottle of whiskey while
the two older minors were in the home, threatened to kick the
pregnant respondent in the stomach, and then sprayed her in the
face with detergent; (2) the respondent obtained an order of
protection against J.P., Sr., but subsequently dropped it and
later allowed him back into the home; (3) the respondent, J.P.,
Sr., and another couple were drinking alcohol at their home and a
physical altercation occurred between the two men in which J.P.,
Sr., struck the other man in the face while the other man's
children were in the room; and (4) on September 5, 2009, the
respondent and J.P., Sr., argued, and he pushed the respondent
into a wall.
The respondent filed an amended answer to the juvenile
petition on November 2, 2009, and stipulated that the State could
prove the aforementioned allegations in the petition. She also
added that J.P., Sr., was in jail at the time she dismissed the
order of protection against him. The court conducted an
adjudicatory hearing on November 30, 2009. Based on the
respondent's stipulation, the court adjudicated the minors
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neglected due to an injurious environment.
The cause immediately proceeded to a dispositional hearing.
In preparation for the dispositional hearing, Carly Gordan, a
DCFS caseworker, filed a dispositional report and testified.
Gordan's report and testimony, as well as an integrated
assessment report, indicated that the respondent had been
cooperative with DCFS since the State opened the instant juvenile
case. The respondent informed Gordan that she wanted what was
best for the minors and acknowledged that she would benefit by
participating in a parenting class.
Gordan also disclosed that the minors had remained in the
respondent's care since the State opened the instant case.
According to Gordan, the respondent's home was neat and clean,
and the respondent interacted appropriately with the minors. The
respondent was also employed and did not have substance abuse
problems. According to the integrated assessment report, the
respondent and J.P., Sr., were no longer in a romantic
relationship.
Gordan’s report corroborated the allegation in the petition
that the respondent had obtained an order of protection against
J.P., Sr., and then she dropped it and permitted him back into
her home, notwithstanding his "drinking habits." Gordan thus
recommended that the respondent participate in parenting and
domestic violence classes. Gordan also stated that since the
respondent was the minors' guardian, she was responsible for
taking them to visit J.P., Sr., who was in jail at the time of
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the hearing. However, the respondent was "not in agreement with
visits" when she and Gordan discussed it.
In closing argument, the State contended that the court
should make the minors wards of the court and appoint DCFS as
their guardian, but that the minors should remain in the
respondent's care. The State also believed that the respondent
should not supervise visits between the minors and J.P., Sr.,
because of their domestic violence issues and the need to protect
the minors from further instances of domestic violence. The
guardian ad litem agreed with the State's arguments.
J.P., Sr., also offered a closing argument, and in it he
noted that if the respondent remained the minors' guardian, she
should not be penalized for having contact with him by allowing
the minors to visit with him. The respondent argued that she
should retain guardianship of the minors, but contended that if
she did not, the minors should remain in her custody.
The court adjudicated the respondent a fit parent and
allowed her to retain custody of the minors, but made the minors
wards of the court and appointed DCFS as their guardian. The
court opined that DCFS needed to be the minors' guardian "to make
sure that after [J.P., Sr., was] released, and even before then,
that [the respondent was] able to make sure that there [was] a
proper environment for these children [which had not] occurred in
the past" due to the domestic violence between the respondent and
J.P., Sr. The court also believed that the respondent placed her
own needs above those of the minors and that she needed to learn
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the necessary skills to protect the minors. The court thus
ordered her to undergo counseling and to complete domestic
violence and parenting classes. The court also found that J.P.,
Sr., was an unfit parent, but ordered that he may have visits
with the minors. The respondent appealed.
ANALYSIS
On appeal, the respondent contends that the court erred when
it appointed DCFS as the minors' guardian. The respondent
specifically argues that the court exceeded its authority by
appointing a guardian when the respondent had been found fit and
the minors had been placed in her home. The respondent further
argues that the State's evidence was insufficient to support the
appointment of DCFS as the minors' guardian.
Once a trial court adjudicates a minor to be neglected, the
court shall hold a dispositional hearing. 705 ILCS 405/2--21(2)
(West 2008). If the minor is made a ward of the court at the
dispositional hearing, the court shall determine the proper
disposition. 705 ILCS 405/2--22(1) (West 2008). In fashioning a
dispositional order, the court’s overriding concern is the best
interest of the child. In re Beatriz S., 267 Ill. App. 3d 496
(1994). On review, a trial court's dispositional determination
will be reversed only if the court abused its discretion by
selecting an inappropriate dispositional order. In re K.S., 365
Ill. App. 3d 566 (2006). A trial court abuses its discretion
when no reasonable person would agree with its decision. Dawdy
v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 207 Ill. 2d 167 (2003).
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We first conclude that the court did not exceed its
authority in appointing DCFS as guardian for the minors. Section
2--23 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (the Act) states:
"(1) The following kinds of orders of disposition
may be made in respect of wards of the court:
(a) A minor under 18 years of age found
to be neglected *** may be (1) continued in
the custody of his or her parents ***." 705
ILCS 405/2--23(1)(a)(1) (West 2008).
The court also may award guardianship of a child to DCFS. 705
ILCS 405/2--23(1)(c) (West 2008).
Section 1--3(8)(c) of the Act states that " '[g]uardianship
of the person' of a minor" includes "the rights and
responsibilities of legal custody except where legal custody has
been vested in another person or agency." 705 ILCS 405/1--
3(8)(c) (West 2008). Thus, section 1--3 of the Act contemplates
that a trial court may divide guardianship and custody of a
minor. Furthermore, this court has previously recognized the
propriety of such a division. See In re E.L., 353 Ill. App. 3d
894 (2004). Therefore, we disagree with the respondent's
contention that the court exceeded its authority when it
appointed DCFS as guardian of the minors. We next consider the
issue of whether the court abused its discretion.
After our careful review of the record, we conclude that the
court did not err when it granted DCFS guardianship of the
minors, while retaining them in the custody of the fit
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respondent. At the outset, we agree with the court's finding
that the respondent was a fit parent, as the record indicates
that she was employed, had a clean home, interacted appropriately
with the minors, and did not have problems with substance abuse.
However, we note that the record shows a history of domestic
violence between the respondent and J.P., Sr., and that these
instances of domestic violence occurred while the children were
present in the home. Furthermore, the respondent stipulated that
she dismissed an order of protection against J.P., Sr., at a time
when he was in jail, and later allowed him back into her home.
We do not believe that such an action fostered a safe environment
for the minors.
We agree that the respondent needed to learn the skills
necessary to protect herself and the minors from experiencing
domestic violence in the future, so that she may provide a safe
and nurturing home environment for all involved. Therefore,
although this court may not have fashioned a dispositional order
identical to the one fashioned by the trial court in this case,
we cannot say that no reasonable person would agree with the
court's decision to grant DCFS guardianship of the minors. Thus,
we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion by
granting guardianship of the minors to DCFS while retaining
custody with the respondent.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County is
affirmed.
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Affirmed.
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