NO. 4-06-0981 Filed 11/6/07
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of
v. ) Champaign County
NEISHA E. COLLIER, ) No. 05CF386
Defendant-Appellant. )
) Honorable
) Thomas J. Difanis,
) Judge Presiding.
_________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE COOK delivered the opinion of the court:
Defendant, Neisha E. Collier, pleaded guilty to ob-
structing justice (720 ILCS 5/31-4(a) (West 2006)), a Class 4
felony. The State agreed to recommend no more than two years'
imprisonment. When Collier failed to attend her sentencing
hearing, the trial court sentenced Collier to an extended term of
four years' imprisonment. Collier appeals, arguing that the
trial court did not adequately admonish Collier of the conditions
on its concurrence with the plea agreement. We vacate Collier's
sentence and remand with directions.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Underlying Offense
This case arises out of a minor vehicle collision
involving Collier's boyfriend, Allen Davis, and Nancy Seward.
Because the factual basis was exceptionally brief, we take our
facts concerning the underlying offense from the police report.
Davis was driving a Lincoln Town Car with the permis-
sion of the owner, Moesha Hilson. Collier was the only passenger
in the Lincoln Town Car. Seward had no passengers. Davis
approached a stop sign. Davis was unable to stop the car due to
snow and ice and collided with Nancy Seward's car. No one was
injured. Davis, who had a suspended license, immediately fled
the scene. Collier then called Moesha Hilson and asked Moesha to
report the Lincoln Town Car stolen.
When the police arrived, Collier lied, telling them
that she did not know the driver, but only knew his nickname to
be "Lil T." Collier stated that "Lil T." had pulled up alongside
her as she was walking to the convenience store and had agreed to
give her a ride. Collier described "Lil T." as a 16-year-old
black youth, when in fact Davis was 21. Collier told the police
she did not know who owned the Lincoln Town Car.
While still at the scene of the accident, the police
learned that Moesha Hilson had reported the Lincoln Town Car
stolen. The police began to doubt Collier's truthfulness and
told Collier that she could be sent to jail for obstructing
justice. Collier continued to tell police she only knew the
driver as "Lil T.," that she did not know Moesha Hilson, and that
she had no reason to lie.
Moesha, however, soon told the police that Collier had
asked Moesha to report the car stolen. The police decided to
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give Collier one more chance to tell the truth, but Collier
continued to deny knowing "Lil T." or Moesha. The police then
arrested and handcuffed Collier. As the police placed Collier in
the squad car, she told them Davis's true name, this time without
prompting. However, Collier continued to deny knowing Moesha.
The information charging Collier stated that Collier,
with the intent to obstruct the prosecution of Davis, knowingly
furnished false information in that she told police that she only
knew Davis as "Lil T." after Davis fled the scene of the accident
on foot, at a time when Davis's driver's license was suspended.
The information did not allege anything concerning the false
stolen-vehicle report.
B. The Plea Hearing
At the April 21, 2006, plea hearing, the trial court
first informed Collier that the charged offense, obstructing
justice, was a Class 4 felony, which typically carried a sentenc-
ing range of one to three years' imprisonment. However, due to
Collier's criminal history, Collier was eligible for an extended
sentence totaling six years' imprisonment. The following ex-
change then took place:
"THE COURT: Is your plea of guilty
today voluntary? Is this of your own free
will?
COLLIER: Yes, it is.
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THE COURT: The agreements, please.
THE STATE: Judge, this is an open plea
for later sentencing. The only agreement is
the State would cap its recommendation at two
years [in the] Department of Corrections.
THE COURT: [Defense counsel], is this
the agreement?
DEFENSE COUNSEL: That's the agreement,
Judge.
THE COURT: Miss Collier, as I under-
stand the situation, we're going to continue
this matter for a sentencing hearing, and at
that sentencing hearing your penalty range
will be anything from possibly some form of
probation up to a maximum of two years in the
Department of Corrections as opposed to some
form of probation up to six years. Your
penalty range will be confined to probation
up to two years. Is that your understanding
of where we are right now?
COLLIER: Yes, it is." (Emphasis
added.)
After the State read the factual basis for the plea, which
centered solely around Collier's denial of Davis's identity, the
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court accepted Collier's guilty plea:
"THE COURT: Miss Collier, do you now
then plead guilty to that charge of obstruct-
ing justice?
COLLIER: Yes.
THE COURT: Show the defendant pleads
guilty to that charge. That plea of guilty
is accepted by the court. Judgment is en-
tered on the plea."
The trial court then proceeded to take care of some technical
matters, such as ordering a Treatment Alternatives for Safer
Communities (TASC) report and setting a date for the sentencing
hearing, and the following exchange took place:
"THE COURT: All right. We will con-
tinue this matter to Thursday, June 1 at 1:30
back in this courtroom. Court services will
prepare a presentence report ***. [Defense
counsel and State], is part of the plea
agreement that the defendant appears for
sentencing?
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Yes, Your Honor, it
is.
THE STATE: Yes.
THE COURT: Miss Collier, what that
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means is, you have to appear at your sentenc-
ing hearing on June 1. *** If you don't show
up here June 1, then I will have that sen-
tencing hearing without you, and we could go
over the two[-]year cap. There is no agree-
ment if you don't show up, so it is very,
very important that you show up for your
sentencing hearing. Again, if you don't show
up, there is no agreement, and a sentencing
hearing will be held without you."
Collier did not respond to the trial court's admonishment.
Nothing further of substance was said by anyone and the plea
hearing concluded.
C. The Sentencing Hearing
Collier initially arrived to the courtroom for sentenc-
ing. However, before the trial judge entered the courtroom,
Collier left. When the judge entered the courtroom, he immedi-
ately asked where Collier was. Collier's attorney answered that
Collier had been present but left the courtroom about three
minutes prior to meet a family member who she believed would be
testifying on her behalf. The judge stated that he had warned
Collier that she needed to be present and began the hearing
without her. According to Collier's subsequent explanation of
the incident, before the judge entered the courtroom, Collier
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learned that her father provided the State with aggravating
evidence against her. Collier burst into tears and fled the
courthouse. An hour and a half later, Collier called the police
and told them she felt suicidal. Collier was hospitalized for
the next 12 hours.
Back at the sentencing hearing, the State called police
officer Rusty Wike. Wike testified that he investigated an
incident wherein Collier stole a lawnmower from her father and
sold it to a neighbor for $20. The State then called police
officer Gregory Manzana. Manzana investigated a domestic inci-
dent involving Collier and Collier's 13-year-old daughter, A.C.
A.C. told Manzana that Collier arrived at A.C.'s grandparents'
home to steal some shoes. A.C. told Collier to leave. According
to A.C., Collier then grabbed a telephone and attempted to hit
A.C. on the head with it. Collier smothered A.C. with her body
and injured A.C.'s arm in the struggle. Collier denied this.
The police did not believe they had probable cause to arrest
Collier for this incident because A.C. showed no sign of physical
injury.
The State then requested a minimum of two years'
imprisonment. The State noted that Collier's involvement with
the criminal justice system went back 18 years and that Collier
was not cooperative in the preparation of the presentence report,
missing several appointments with the Court Services Department.
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In turn, the defense counsel requested a more lenient, 18-month
term.
The trial court acknowledged that a prison sentence was
not necessary to protect the public and that Collier did not
appear to be dangerous. However, the court felt that a lengthy
sentence was necessary to further the ends of justice. Collier
had 10 criminal convictions over the last 18 years. The court
mentioned Collier's long-standing struggle with drug addiction
and stated that Collier's convictions were in line with what a
person might expect from a "junkie": property crimes, unlawful
use of a weapon, aggravated battery (1989), resisting a peace
officer, and possession with intent to deliver. The trial court
then stated:
"The court admonished the defendant that
should she fail to appear for her sentencing
hearing, the court would not concur with the
State's cap, the court could sentence her to
more than two years ***. I'm not sentencing
her to any specific number of years in the
Department of Corrections because she didn't
show up; however, she sure did blow a good
deal by not showing up." (Emphasis added.)
The trial court then sentenced Collier to four years' imprison-
ment. The trial court denied Collier's motion to reconsider.
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This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
Collier argues that the trial court improperly added a
condition to its concurrence with the plea agreement after it
accepted the plea. We agree.
Plea agreements are to some extent governed by
contract-law principles. People v. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d 320, 326,
673 N.E.2d 244, 247 (1996). Once counsel informs the trial court
of the terms of the plea agreement and before the trial court
accepts the plea, the court must (1) state its (a) concurrence
with the plea agreement or (b) conditional concurrence with the
plea agreement or (2) admonish the defendant that it is not bound
by the terms of the plea agreement and that if the defendant
persists in her plea, the disposition may be different from that
contemplated by the plea agreement. 177 Ill. 2d Rs. 402(d)(2),
(d)(3); see also People v. Rossman, 309 Ill. App. 3d 662, 668,
722 N.E.2d 1216, 1222 (2000) (regarding trial court's role in
concurring or conditionally concurring); People v. Butcher, 288
Ill. App. 3d 120, 124, 679 N.E.2d 1260, 1263 (1997) (regarding
trial court's role in admonishing the defendant that it is not
bound by the terms of the plea agreement). If the trial court
opts to conditionally concur with the terms of the plea agreement
and reserves unto itself various sentencing options, the court
must specifically state on the record those options that it
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intends to reserve and ascertain on the record that the defendant
understands the limits of the concurrence, and every sentencing
option thereby reserved, prior to the entry of the guilty plea.
People v. Culp, 127 Ill. App. 3d 916, 926-27, 468 N.E.2d 1328,
1335 (1984); Rossman, 309 Ill. App. 3d at 669, 722 N.E.2d at
1222. If the defendant enters a plea of guilty following the
trial court's concurrence or conditional concurrence, and the
trial court subsequently withdraws its concurrence or conditional
concurrence, it must advise the defendant of this and allow the
defendant the opportunity to withdraw her guilty plea. 177 Ill.
2d R. 402(d)(2); Rossman, 309 Ill. App. 3d at 668, 722 N.E.2d at
1222. If the defendant chooses to withdraw her guilty plea, the
case is then transferred to a new judge. 177 Ill. 2d R.
402(d)(2); People v. Bouie, 327 Ill. App. 3d 243, 247, 763 N.E.2d
858, 861 (2002).
The requirement that Collier appear for sentencing did
not constitute a properly communicated condition on the trial
court's concurrence with the plea agreement. As stated above,
the court must specifically state the terms of its conditional
concurrence and the sentencing options that it intends to reserve
for itself, and ascertain on the record that the defendant
understands the limits of the concurrence and every sentencing
option thereby reserved, prior to the entry of the guilty plea.
Culp, 127 Ill. App. 3d at 926-27, 468 N.E.2d at 1335; Rossman,
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309 Ill. App. 3d at 669, 722 N.E.2d at 1222. Here, the trial
court concurred with the terms of the plea agreement when, upon
hearing the terms of the plea agreement, it told Collier: "Your
penalty will be confined to probation up to two years." The
trial court then ascertained that Collier understood these to be
the terms of the agreement and accepted her guilty plea. The
trial court did not tell Collier that its concurrence with the
State's recommended two-year cap depended on Collier's attendance
at the sentencing hearing until after it had already accepted her
plea. Further, the court did not ascertain whether Collier
understood the conditions of the court's concurrence.
We note that the trial court in the instant case had
every right to withdraw its concurrence when Collier did not
appear for sentencing. However, under Rule 402(d)(2), the trial
court was obligated to notify Collier that it was going to
withdraw its concurrence and allow Collier the opportunity to
withdraw her guilty plea. 177 Ill. 2d R. 402(d)(2); Rossman, 309
Ill. App. 3d at 668, 722 N.E.2d at 1222; see also Bouie, 327 Ill.
App. 3d at 247, 763 N.E.2d at 861. Hence, when Collier did not
appear at sentencing, the trial court could either have sentenced
Collier to a term within the range contemplated by the plea
agreement or it could have continued the hearing to allow Collier
to affirm or withdraw her guilty plea. Rossman, 309 Ill. App. 3d
at 668, 722 N.E.2d at 1222. Though the trial court was not
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authorized to sentence Collier to a lengthier sentence than that
contemplated by the plea agreement with which it had concurred,
the trial court was not without additional recourse. As we
stated in Rossman, the trial court could order Collier's plea
vacated, sending the parties back to the drawing board; order a
bail-bond violation (720 ILCS 5/32-10(a) (West 2006)); and/or
order Collier to be in contempt of court (720 ILCS 5/1-3 (West
2006)). Rossman, 309 Ill. App. 3d at 668, 722 N.E.2d at 1222.
Though our ruling on the conditional-concurrence issue is
dispositive, we nevertheless consider two of the State's remain-
ing arguments.
The State argues that we should not have considered
whether the trial court adequately communicated its conditional
concurrence because the requirement that Collier attend her
sentencing hearing was not a condition on the trial court's
concurrence at all, but rather the requirement was part of the
plea agreement itself. The State's argument is without merit. A
plea agreement is between the State and the defendant. People v.
Hayes, 159 Ill. App. 3d 1048, 1053, 513 N.E.2d 68, 71 (1987),
citing People v. Robinson, 66 Ill. App. 3d 601, 604, 384 N.E.2d
420, 423 (1978). The trial court is not a party to the plea
agreement; its only role is to indicate, at the time the agree-
ment is stated, whether it will concur or conditionally concur
with the plea agreement. 177 Ill. 2d R. 402(d); Rossman, 309
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Ill. App. 3d at 668, 722 N.E.2d at 1222. In some instances, the
conditions stated by the trial court may become part of the plea
agreement, but that is not the case here. See Bouie, 327 Ill.
App. 3d at 246, 763 N.E.2d at 860, citing Hayes, 159 Ill. App. 3d
at 1053, 513 N.E.2d at 72.
For example, in Hayes, prior to the trial court's
acceptance of the defendant's guilty plea, the State requested
that the court admonish the defendant that if he failed to appear
at his sentencing hearing, he would be eligible for a more severe
sentence. Defense counsel then told the court that he had
informed the defendant of the consequences should the defendant
fail to appear at sentencing. The court then admonished the
defendant in open court that if he failed to appear at sentencing
he could be sentenced in excess of the sentence contemplated by
the plea agreement. The court asked the defendant if he under-
stood these terms, and the defendant answered, "Yes, I do." The
court then accepted the defendant's guilty plea and set the date
for the sentencing hearing. Hayes, 159 Ill. 2d at 1050, 513
N.E.2d at 70. The appellate court held that the requirement that
the defendant attend his sentencing hearing became an integral
part of the plea agreement where the requirement was clearly
communicated to and understood by the defendant at the time of
the plea and came about by agreement of the attorneys. Hayes,
159 Ill. App. 3d at 1054, 513 N.E.2d at 72.
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Here, unlike in Hayes, there was no clear communication
to the defendant regarding the change in the plea agreement. As
stated above, the trial court concurred with the plea agreement
when it told Collier that her sentence would not exceed two
years. Collier entered her guilty plea based on the assurance of
receiving a sentence under that cap. After the trial court
accepted Collier's plea, it asked the parties whether it was
"part of" the plea agreement that Collier appear for sentencing.
Counsel for both parties answered "yes." However, merely label-
ing a requirement part of the plea agreement does not make it so.
The requirement was not brought about by the attorneys, but
rather by the trial court. Most critically, the court first
brought the requirement to the parties' attention after the court
had already accepted Collier's guilty plea and the court never
ascertained whether Collier understood the requirement.
The instant case is similar to Bouie, where the appel-
late court also rejected the State's argument that the require-
ment that the defendant appear at his sentencing hearing was
"part of" the plea agreement. Bouie, 327 Ill. App. 3d at 247,
763 N.E.2d at 861. In Bouie, after the trial court acknowledged
the parties' plea agreement, the court stated that it would leave
its "options open" as to punishment in the event that the defen-
dant did not appear at his sentencing hearing. The trial court
then asked if that created "a problem for anyone." Both the
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State and defense counsel answered that it did not. The defen-
dant did not comment. The court then accepted the defendant's
guilty plea. After accepting the plea, the court admonished the
defendant that if he did not appear for sentencing, the court
would sentence the defendant in excess of the sentence contem-
plated by the plea agreement. The defendant acknowledged the
requirement. Bouie, 327 Ill. App. 3d at 245, 763 N.E.2d at 859.
The appellate court held that nothing in the series of communica-
tions exchanged at the plea hearing "show[ed] unequivocally that
the defendant was advised that appearing at the sentencing
hearing was part of his plea agreement." Bouie, 327 Ill. App. 3d
at 247, 763 N.E.2d at 861.
Here, the argument against the State on appeal is even
stronger than in Bouie because the trial court in the instant
case made no mention of the requirement that Collier appear at
sentencing before it accepted the guilty plea. Also, unlike the
defendant in Bouie, Collier never personally acknowledged the
trial court's admonishment of the requirement, even after the
guilty plea was accepted.
Finally, the State argues that we should not have
reached the merits of Collier's claim because the trial court was
never bound by the State's recommended two-year cap, thus nulli-
fying the issue of whether the court improperly added a condition
to its concurrence with the plea agreement. This argument is not
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persuasive. If a trial court chooses not to concur with a plea
agreement, it must admonish the defendant in open court that it
is not bound by the terms of the plea agreement and it must tell
the defendant that if she persists in her plea, she may be
sentenced in excess of the sentence contemplated by the plea
agreement. 177 Ill. 2d R. 402(d)(3). Here, the trial court made
no such admonishment. To the contrary, upon hearing the terms of
the plea agreement, the court expressly told Collier: "Your
penalty will be confined to probation up to two years."
Accordingly, we vacate Collier's sentence and remand
this case to the trial court to either impose a sentence contem-
plated by the plea agreement or to proceed in keeping with the
requirements of Rule 402(d)(2).
III. CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, we vacate Collier's
sentence and remand with directions consistent with this opinion.
Vacated and remanded with directions.
APPLETON and KNECHT, JJ., concur.
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