NO. 4-07-0063 Filed 8/13/07
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF ) Appeal from
DANVILLE, ILLINOIS, ) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Vermilion County
v. ) No. 06LM781
BECKY LOVE, )
Defendant-Appellant. ) Honorable
) Joseph P. Skowronski,
) Judge Presiding.
____________________________________________________________
JUSTICE APPLETON delivered the opinion of the court:
Defendant, Becky Love, is a tenant of plaintiff, the Danville Housing
Authority. In an action for forcible entry and detainer, the trial court awarded posses-
sion to plaintiff. Defendant appeals, arguing that plaintiff failed to provide her the
grievance procedure required by federal statutory law. We agree and, therefore, reverse
the trial court's judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
The lease agreement provides as follows:
"III. Informal settlement of a grievance
Any grievance must be personally presented, either
orally or in writing, to the [public housing authority's] cen-
tral office or the management office of the development in
which the complainant resides[,] within [10] days after the
grievable event.
***
*** [T]he complainant will be contacted to arrange a
mutually convenient time within [10] working days to meet
so the grievance may be discussed informally and settled
without a hearing. ***
Within five working days following the informal dis-
cussion, the [public housing authority] shall prepare and
either hand-deliver or mail to [the] [t]enant a summary of
the discussion ***. ***
IV. Formal Grievance Hearing
If the complainant is dissatisfied with the settlement
arrived at in the informal hearing, the complainant must
submit a written request for a hearing to the management
office of the development where [the] [t]enant resides[,] no
later than five working days after the summary of the infor-
mal hearing is received." (Emphases in original.)
On September 13, 2006, plaintiff served upon defendant a 30-day notice of
termination of the lease. The grounds for termination were twofold: (1) defendant
failed to keep the apartment clean and free of trash; and (2) the apartment was infested
with mice, in violation of the prohibition against harboring animals.
On September 27, 2006, defendant hand-delivered a grievance to plaintiff,
contesting the termination of the lease. Plaintiff never responded because it considered
the grievance to be untimely. Under the lease, the deadline for submitting a grievance
was September 23, 2006 (10 days after the "grievable event," i.e., the service of the
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notice of termination on September 13, 2006).
Plaintiff filed a complaint for forcible entry and detainer, and the trial
court held a bench trial. At the conclusion of plaintiff's case, defendant moved for a
directed finding pursuant to section 2-1110 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-
1110 (West 2006)) on the ground that plaintiff had failed to provide her the grievance
procedure required by federal law. Defendant argued that under the applicable federal
statute, her grievance was timely because she submitted it within the 30-day period in
the notice of termination. See 42 U.S.C. §§1437d(k)(2), (l)(4)(C) (2000). The court
disagreed with defendant's interpretation of the statute and held the grievance to be
untimely because defendant had failed to submit it within 10 days, the deadline to which
the parties agreed in the lease.
Defendant testified that her mother had a heart attack in February 2006,
making it necessary for defendant to spend much of her time at her parents' house,
taking care of them, with the result that her own housekeeping suffered. Defendant and
her father testified that the deficiencies in housekeeping had been remedied, as shown in
recent photographs. The trial court found that plaintiff had proved the alleged viola-
tions of the lease. Accordingly, it entered judgment in plaintiff's favor for possession of
the premises.
This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
The parties agree that defendant had the right to submit a grievance over
the termination of the lease. They agree that a public-housing tenancy cannot be
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terminated until the time for submitting a grievance has expired, and if the tenant
submits a timely grievance, the tenancy cannot be terminated until the grievance
procedure is completed. 24 C.F.R. §966.4(l)(3)(iv) (2007). They also apparently agree
that the 10-day deadline in their lease is unenforceable if it conflicts with federal law. In
its brief, plaintiff says: "[I]f the 10[-]day notice period is not in violation of federal law, it
must be upheld under general contract principles." (Emphasis added.) The corollary
would seem to be that if the 10-day period violates federal law, it should not be upheld.
The sole issue in this appeal is whether the contractual 10-day period for
submitting a grievance is consistent with federal statutory law. We interpret statutes de
novo. In re Marriage of Elenewski, 357 Ill. App. 3d 504, 506, 828 N.E.2d 895, 897
(2005). The relevant federal statute provides as follows:
"(k) ***
The Secretary shall[,] by regulation[,] require each
public housing agency receiving assistance under this chap-
ter [the United States Housing Act of 1937 (42 U.S.C. §§1437-
1440 (2000))] to establish and implement an administrative
grievance procedure under which tenants will--
***
(2) have an opportunity for a hearing
before an impartial party upon timely request
within any period applicable under subsection
(l) ***.
***
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(l) ***
Each public housing agency shall utilize leases
which--
***
(4) require the public housing agency to
give adequate written notice of termination of
the lease which shall not be less than--
(A) a reasonable period of
time, but not to exceed 30 days--
(i) if the
health or safety of
other tenants, pub-
lic housing agency
employees, or per-
sons residing in the
immediate vicinity
of the premises is
threatened; or
(ii) in the
event of any drug-
related or violent
criminal activity or
any felony convic-
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tion;
(B) 14 days in the case of
nonpayment of rent; and
(C) 30 days in any other
case, except that if a State or local
law provides for a shorter period
of time, such shorter period shall
apply[.]" 42 U.S.C.
§§1437d(k)(2), (l)(4) (2000).
In accordance with section 1437d(k)(2), the Secretary of Housing and
Urban Development has promulgated subpart B, part 26, chapter IX, subtitle B of Title
24 of the Code of Federal Regulations. Subpart B, entitled "Grievance Procedures and
Requirements," is comprised of sections 966.50 through 966.57 (24 C.F.R. §§966.50
through 966.57 (2007)) and contemplates a two-stage grievance procedure--as does the
lease in this case. In the first stage, the tenant will "personally present[]" the grievance,
"either orally or in writing," to the public housing authority "so that the grievance may
be discussed informally and settled without a hearing." 24 C.F.R. §966.54 (2007).
"[W]ithin a reasonable time" after the informal discussion, the public housing authority
will write a summary of the discussion and give a copy of it to the tenant. 24 C.F.R.
§966.54 (2007). "The summary shall specify the names of the participants, dates of
meeting, the nature of the proposed disposition of the complaint[,] and the specific
reasons therefor, and shall specify the procedures by which a hearing under [section]
966.55 may be obtained if the complainant is not satisfied." 24 C.F.R. §966.54 (2007).
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Section 966.55 provides: "The complainant shall submit a written request for a hearing
to the [public housing authority] within a reasonable time after receipt of the summary
of the discussion pursuant to [section] 966.54." 24 C.F.R. §966.55(a) (2007).
Subpart B does not specify a deadline for initially submitting the grievance
(that is, before the informal discussion). According to defendant, sections 1437d(k)(2)
and (l)(4)(C) gave her up to 30 days to do so. The lease imposes a deadline of "[10] days
after the grievable event." The issue is whether defendant's interpretation of the federal
statute is correct. If her interpretation is correct, the lease conflicts with the statute, and
in that event (as the parties agree), the statute should prevail.
Under section 1437d(k)(2), the tenant will "have an opportunity for a
hearing before an impartial party upon timely request within any period applicable
under subsection (l)." 42 U.S.C. §1437d(k)(2) (2000). Subsection (l)(4) prescribes the
periods of notice for terminating a lease (different circumstances call for different
amounts of notice). 42 U.S.C. §1437d(l)(4) (2000). The parties agree that the only
applicable period in subsection (l)(4) is the 30-day period in subsection (l)(4)(C) (42
U.S.C. §1437d(l)(4)(C) (2000)). Thus, defendant was to "have an opportunity for a
hearing before an impartial party upon timely request within any period applicable
under subsection (l)" (42 U.S.C. §1437d(k)(2) (2000))--that period being, in the present
case, 30 days (see 42 U.S.C. §1437d(l)(4)(C) (2000)). We understand the adverbial
phrase "within any period applicable under subsection (l)" to modify the noun immedi-
ately preceding it: "request."
Plaintiff reasons that "if a tenant receives a 30[-]day eviction notice, the
time to request a grievance must be within that period, meaning 30 days or less." (First
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emphasis added, second one omitted.) Plaintiff further reasons that because plaintiff
"provid[ed] in its lease for all grievance requests to be made within 10 days or less, it
meets *** the requirements of [sections 1437d(k) and (l)], because 10 days is within the
30[-]day notice of termination." (Emphasis in original.) This reasoning would be more
persuasive if the statute read as follows: "Tenants will *** have an opportunity for a
hearing before an impartial party upon timely request within any period the lease
prescribes, which shall be within the applicable period in subsection (l)." That is not
what the statute says. Instead, it reads as follows: Tenants will "have an opportunity for
a hearing before an impartial party upon timely request within any period applicable
under subsection (l)." 42 U.S.C. §1437d(k)(2) (2000). Defendant submitted her
grievance within 30 days. Therefore, it was timely, and the trial court erred in entertain-
ing this action for forcible entry and detainer while the grievance procedure was still
pending.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court's judgment.
Reversed.
MYERSCOUGH and TURNER, JJ., concur.
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