NO. 4-05-0026 Filed 2/23/07
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
In re: OLIVIA C., a Minor, ) Appeal from
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Circuit Court of
Petitioner-Appellee, ) Champaign County
v. ) No. 04JD98
OLIVIA C., )
Respondent-Appellant. ) Honorable
) Harry E. Clem,
) Judge Presiding.
_________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the opinion of the court:
In September 2004, respondent, Olivia C., born March
23, 1989, filed a motion to dismiss the State's petition for
adjudication of wardship on double-jeopardy grounds. That same
month, the trial court denied respondent's motion. Respondent
appeals, arguing the court erred in denying her motion. We
dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
I. BACKGROUND
In May 2004, the City of Champaign (City) filed a
complaint against respondent for consuming alcohol on April 15,
2004, at Central High School in Champaign when she was 15 years
old in violation of section 5-65(a) of the Municipal Code of
Champaign (Champaign Municipal Code §5-65(a) (amended July 16,
2002)), case No. 04-OV-430. That same month, respondent entered
a guilty plea to the charge. The trial court deferred judgment
and placed respondent under supervision until May 2005.
On July 27, 2004, the City filed a motion to dismiss
instanter its complaint against respondent for which she was
under supervision (No. 04-OV-430). According to the City's
motion, respondent had failed to comply with the terms of the
court's supervision order. The City's motion stated the supreme
court's decision in City of Urbana v. Andrew N.B., 211 Ill. 2d
456, 813 N.E.2d 132 (2004), directed the City to request the
State to proceed under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile
Court Act) (705 ILCS 405/1-1 through 7-1 (West 2002)) when
confronted with a juvenile who violates the conditions of his or
her court supervision.
On July 29, 2004, the State filed a petition for
adjudication of wardship because of respondent's consumption of
alcoholic liquor while she was a minor (235 ILCS 5/6-20 (West
2002)), docketed case No. 04-JD-98. The State's charge was based
on the same conduct as the City's prior complaint.
On August 6, 2004, the trial court dismissed the City's
complaint in No. 04-OV-430 with prejudice. On September 3, 2004,
respondent filed a motion to dismiss the State's petition for
adjudication of wardship in No. 04-JD-98 on double-jeopardy
grounds. Later that month, the trial court denied respondent's
motion. In October 2004, respondent filed a motion to reconsider
her motion to dismiss. The trial court also denied this motion.
This appeal followed.
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II. ANALYSIS
The State argues this court does not have jurisdiction
to hear respondent's appeal at this time. Our supreme court has
ruled that the jurisdiction of this court is limited to appeals
from final judgments, except in limited situations established by
supreme court rule, statute, or the constitution. People v.
Miller, 35 Ill. 2d 62, 67, 219 N.E.2d 475, 478 (1966). Supreme
Court Rule 660 (134 Ill. 2d R. 660) deals with appeals in cases
arising under the Juvenile Court Act. According to Rule 660(a):
"Delinquent Minors. Appeals from final
judgments in delinquent minor proceedings,
except as otherwise specifically provided,
shall be governed by the rules applicable to
criminal cases." (Emphasis added.) 134 Ill.
2d R. 660(a).
This court has previously stated the Committee Comments to Rule
660, "taken with the provisions of the Rule providing for appeals
from final orders, indicate an intention that there be no inter-
locutory appeals in delinquency cases except when specific
provision is made." In re Hershberger, 132 Ill. App. 3d 332,
334, 477 N.E.2d 80, 82 (1985). In Herschberger, we stated the
only such specific provisions are found in Supreme Court Rule 662
(87 Ill. 2d R. 662). Hershberger, 132 Ill. App. 3d at 334, 477
N.E.2d at 82. None of the provisions found in Rule 662 apply to
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the situation in the instant case.
However, respondent attempts to rely on Supreme Court
Rule 604(f) (188 Ill. 2d R. 604(f)) in support of her argument
she should be able to appeal the trial court's denial of her
motion to dismiss for double jeopardy. Rule 604(f) states:
"Appeal by Defendant on Grounds of For-
mer Jeopardy. The defendant may appeal to
the [a]ppellate [c]ourt the denial of a mo-
tion to dismiss a criminal proceeding on
grounds of former jeopardy." 188 Ill. 2d R.
604(f).
This provision does not apply to delinquency proceedings under
the Juvenile Court Act as they are not in the nature of criminal
proceedings. See People v. Taylor, 221 Ill. 2d 157, 166-67, 850
N.E.2d 134, 139 (2006).
Respondent next argues this court should apply the
collateral-order doctrine pronounced by the United States Supreme
Court in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541,
93 L. Ed. 1528, 69 S. Ct. 1221 (1949). According to the Court,
the collateral-order doctrine was designed to address a small
class of orders that do not dispose of all the issues in a case
but "which finally determine claims of right separable from, and
collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be
denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require
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that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is
adjudicated." Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546, 93 L. Ed. at 1536, 69 S.
Ct. at 1225-26.
Respondent interprets the Court's decision in Abney v.
United States, 431 U.S. 651, 659, 52 L. Ed. 2d 651, 659-60, 97 S.
Ct. 2034, 2040 (1977), to stand for the proposition an order
denying a motion to dismiss a case on double-jeopardy grounds
falls within the small class of orders that should be considered
under the collateral-order rule. However, our state supreme
court in interpreting Abney has held it is constitutionally
permissible to disallow interlocutory appeals of court orders
denying a defendant's motion to dismiss on double-jeopardy
grounds. People ex rel. Mosley v. Carey, 74 Ill. 2d 527, 538,
387 N.E.2d 325, 330 (1979). According to our supreme court:
"We do not interpret Abney as holding
its result to be constitutionally required by
either the [f]ederal double[-]jeopardy provi-
sions or due[-]process principles. As the
[C]ourt in Abney explicitly recognized, 'it
is well settled that there is no constitu-
tional right to an appeal' [citation], and
'[t]he right of appeal, as we presently know
it in criminal cases, is purely a creature of
statute; in order to exercise that statutory
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right of appeal one must come within the
terms of the applicable statute ***' [cita-
tion]. Abney and the other United States
Supreme Court cases relied on by defendant,
including the post-Abney case of United
States v. MacDonald (1978), 435 U.S. 850, 56
L. Ed. 2d 18, 98 S. Ct. 1547, interpreted a
[f]ederal statute which has no direct paral-
lel in Illinois." Carey, 74 Ill. 2d at 538-
39, 387 N.E.2d at 330.
As a result, the Court's decision in Abney offers little support
for respondent's position.
After our supreme court's ruling in Carey, the court
adopted Supreme Court Rule 604(f) (188 Ill. 2d R. 604(f)), which,
as stated earlier, allows a defendant to appeal to the "[a]ppel-
late [c]ourt the denial of a motion to dismiss a criminal pro-
ceeding on grounds of former jeopardy." However, as recently as
2006, our supreme court in Taylor stated a delinquency proceeding
under the Juvenile Court Act is not "criminal in nature."
Taylor, 221 Ill. 2d at 166-67, 850 N.E.2d at 139. The court has
not adopted a rule similar to Rule 604(f) to apply to proceedings
that are not "criminal in nature." Further, in the 50-plus years
since the United States Supreme Court set forth the collateral-
order doctrine, the Supreme Court of Illinois has yet to adopt
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it. Respondent asks this court to do so. We decline this
request as it is beyond this court's authority to do so, i.e., to
expand its jurisdiction. As we stated earlier, our supreme court
has stated our jurisdiction is limited to appeals from final
judgments except in limited situations created by a supreme court
rule, statute, or constitution. Miller, 35 Ill. 2d at 67, 219
N.E.2d at 478.
Defendant also argues "the fact that a similarly
situated adult could file an interlocutory appeal, yet a juvenile
is essentially barred from doing so violates equal protection."
We disagree. Both the Illinois and United States Constitutions
require the government to "treat similarly situated individuals
in a similar manner" (People v. R.L., 158 Ill. 2d 432, 437, 634
N.E.2d 733, 736 (1994)); however, juveniles subject to a petition
for adjudication of wardship--a proceeding not "criminal in
nature"--are not similarly situated to a defendant in a criminal
proceeding. As a result, the State does not violate respondent's
equal-protection rights by allowing a criminal defendant an
interlocutory appeal of the denial of a motion to dismiss on
double-jeopardy grounds and denying respondent the same in a
noncriminal matter.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we dismiss this appeal for lack
of jurisdiction.
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Appeal dismissed.
COOK and TURNER, JJ., concur.
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