No. 4-07-0862 Filed 9/26/08
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
HARVEY PARK DISTRICT, ) Direct Appeal of an
Petitioner-Appellant, ) Order of the Illi-
v. ) nois Labor Relations
THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF ) Board, State Panel,
PROFESSIONALS; THE ILLINOIS LABOR ) No. S-CB-07-023
RELATIONS BOARD, STATE PANEL; JACKIE )
GALLAGHER, MICHAEL HADE, CHARLES )
HERNANDEZ, REX PIPER, and MICHAEL )
COLI, the Members of Said Board and )
Panel in Their Official Capacity Only; )
and JOHN BROSNAN, Executive Director )
of Said Board in His Official Capacity )
Only, )
Respondents-Appellees. )
_________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE McCULLOUGH delivered the opinion of the court:
Petitioner, Harvey Park District (District), appeals
the decision of respondent Illinois Labor Relations Board, State
Panel (Board), finding the refusal of respondent, American
Federation of Professionals (Union), to sign a collective-bar-
gaining agreement following a failed ratification vote was not an
unfair labor practice within the meaning of the Illinois Public
Labor Relations Act (Act) (5 ILCS 315/1 through 27 (West 2006)).
Harvey Park District v. American Federation of Professionals, 23
Pub. Employee Rep. (Ill.) par. 132, No. S-CB-07-023 (Illinois
Labor Relations Board, State Panel, September 10, 2007) (herein-
after 23 Pub. Employee Rep. (Ill.) par. 132). The District
argues that the Board erred in holding that the failed ratifica-
tion vote provided adequate grounds to resume bargaining because
the Union did not notify the District that the collective-bar-
gaining agreement required ratification and approval by the
membership. We affirm.
In July 2005, the Board certified the Union as the
exclusive representative of certain public employees of the
District and the parties began negotiating the terms of an
initial collective-bargaining agreement. The parties did not
identify ground rules for the bargaining sessions. The District
representative advised the Union representatives that he did not
have authority to make a binding agreement without the approval
of the District's board of commissioners. The Union's constitu-
tion provides that "[a] collective[-]bargaining agreement must be
ratified and approved by a majority of the members covered by
said agreement present and voting on the question by secret
ballot before the same shall be executed on behalf of the Union."
On September 20, 2006, the District representative and
Union representatives reached an accord on the terms of an
agreement. On September 21, 2006, the agreement was "officially
and publicly ratified" by the District and signed by the presi-
dent of the District's board of commissioners. Also on September
21, 2006, the Union conducted a ratification vote. The member-
ship rejected the agreement, identifying five issues: "(1) more
money, (2) part-time employees not having equality in the con-
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tract, (3) termination being at will, (4) recall rights, [and]
(5) subcontracting of the grass." On September 22, 2006, the
Union representatives advised the District representative that
its membership had rejected the agreement and requested that the
District and Union representatives resume bargaining. The
District refused, claiming the parties had an agreement on
September 20, 2006, and demanded the Union representatives sign
the document.
In October 2006, the District filed an unfair labor
practice charge with the Board, stating that on September 20,
2006, the District and the Union, by their representatives, fully
agreed to all of the provisions of a collective-bargaining
agreement and "[d]espite repeated requests, the Union has failed
to sign the [a]greement." In June 2007, the executive director
of the Board dismissed the unfair labor practice charge, stating:
"[T]he Board has not yet spoken to the issue
contained in this charge. Specifically, the
District's claim is essentially that the
Union must have specifically reserved its
right to present the tentative agreement to
the membership in order to establish a right
to continue negotiations thereafter.
***
Accordingly, one factor that leads to an
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administrative dismissal of the charge is
that it allows for direct access to the Board
via an appeal of the [d]ismissal." 23 Pub.
Employee Rep. (Ill.) par. 132, at 580 (Execu-
tive Director's dismissal order).
Further, the executive director opined that "a dis-
missal is appropriate on the merits," stating:
"The [District's] position on this matter is
that the Union is required to specifically
put an employer on notice of its intent to
have a membership ratification vote in order
to establish a right to further negotiations
in the event that the membership rejects the
agreement. This position might have more
merit were it not that contract ratification
votes are a nearly universal component of the
bargaining process.
***
In sum, I find that a failed contract
ratification vote is sufficient basis for the
Union's demand to continue negotiations, and
that the [Union] did not waive its right to
such a vote if it failed to specifically
notify the [c]harging [p]arty of its intent
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to do so. *** Clearly, party representa-
tives present at negotiations are bound to
support tentative agreements or advise their
counterpart in advance that they will not do
so, and party representatives are required to
keep their proposals and representations in
line with the parameters set by the princi-
pals. The District does not assert that the
Union's representatives acted in blatant
disregard of the negotiation process by
bringing the tentative agreement to the mem-
bership. There is no evidence or assertion
that the Unions's negotiation team actively
encouraged the membership to reject the
agreement." 23 Pub. Employee Rep. (Ill.)
par. 132, at 580 (Executive Director's dis-
missal order).
In August 2007, the Board upheld the executive direc-
tor's dismissal. This appeal followed.
Judicial review of an agency's decisions is governed by
the Administrative Review Law (Review Law) (735 ILCS 5/3-101
through 113 (West 2004)). 5 ILCS 315/9(i) (West 2004); City of
Belvidere v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 181 Ill. 2d
191, 204, 692 N.E.2d 295, 301-02 (1998). The Review Law speci-
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fies that judicial review of a final administrative decision
extends to all questions of law and fact presented in the record.
735 ILCS 5/3-110 (West 2004).
The Board's findings of fact are held prima facie true
and correct and will only be reversed on appeal if they are
against the manifest weight of the evidence. Illinois Fraternal
Order of Police Labor Council v. Illinois Local Labor Relations
Board, 319 Ill. App. 3d 729, 736, 745 N.E.2d 647, 653 (2001). A
decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if
the opposite conclusion is clearly evident. City of Tuscola v.
Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 314 Ill. App. 3d 731,
733-34, 732 N.E.2d 784, 786 (2000). Where the issue before the
reviewing court involves the Board's conclusions of law, however,
the court's review is de novo. Illinois Fraternal Order of
Police, 319 Ill. App. 3d at 736, 745 N.E.2d at 653.
The District alleges the Union violated sections 7 and
10(b)(4) of the Act. Section 7 of the Act provides that a public
employer and the labor organization have the authority and duty
to bargain collectively with regard to matters directly affecting
wages, hours, and conditions of employment. 5 ILCS 315/7 (West
2004). Section 10(b)(4) of the Act provides that a labor organi-
zation commits an unfair labor practice if the labor organization
or its agents refuse to bargain collectively in good faith with a
public employer. 5 ILCS 315/10(b)(4) (West 2004).
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The Act does not itself require ratification and
approval of a collective-bargaining agreement by a majority of
the members. In this case, however, the Union's own constitution
mandates that collective-bargaining agreements be ratified and
approved by a majority of the members "before the same shall be
executed on behalf of the Union." The Labor Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act of 1959 (Disclosure Act) requires a union to
file its constitution and bylaws with the Secretary of Labor (29
U.S.C. §431(a) (2000)), and the contents are public information
(29 U.S.C. §435(a) (2000)). The Disclosure Act was the product
of congressional concern with widespread abuses of power by union
leadership. Finnegan v. Leu, 456 U.S. 431, 435, 72 L. Ed. 2d
239, 243, 102 S. Ct. 1867, 1870 (1982). The Disclosure Act's
primary aim was to ensure that labor organizations were governed
democratically and were responsive to the will of their
rank-and-file members. Finnegan, 456 U.S. at 435-36, 72 L. Ed.
2d at 244, 102 S. Ct. at 1870.
Although the District contends that "negotiators are
presumed to have authority, or at the least apparent authority to
negotiate and agree to a collective-bargaining agreement unless
clearly, unequivocally, and expressly preserved at the bargaining
table," in the present case (1) there is no past history which
indicates that ratification is not necessary, (2) the parties did
not identify ground rules for the bargaining sessions, (3) the
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constitution requires ratification by the membership, (4) no
Union representative stated that it was not bound by majority
ratification, and (5) the District representative did not act in
a way to clarify the Union representatives' authority. This
court has not been presented with any evidence showing that the
Union representatives had authority to conclude agreements
without membership ratification.
The District's insistence that the contract not be
ratified and approved by a majority of the employees attempts to
bargain, not with respect to matters directly affecting wages,
hours, and conditions of employment, but with respect to a matter
which was exclusively within the internal domain of the Union.
Members of a union have the right to determine the extent of
authority delegated to their bargaining unit. It is within their
province to determine whether or not their bargaining unit may
enter into a binding contract with or without membership ratifi-
cation. It is not an issue which the District can insist upon
without mutual agreement by the Union, any more than the Union
can insist that the contract be submitted to a governing body of
the District. Although the Union, as the exclusive representa-
tive of certain public employees of the District, could negotiate
an agreement on behalf of the employees it represented, its
constitution requires a collective-bargaining agreement be
ratified and approved by a majority of the members before it is
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executed on behalf of the Union.
The cases upon which the District relies do not support
its claims because they (1) do not mandate that a union must
provide notice to an employer that the collective-bargaining
agreement requires ratification and approval by the membership,
(2) do not reference a constitutional requirement of ratification
by the members, (3) refer to ground rules for the bargaining
sessions not found in the instant case, (4) reference a signed
collective-bargaining agreement not found in the present case,
and (5) rely on a bargaining history or pattern not found in this
case to establish authority to conclude a contract in current
negotiations. See Board of Education v. Sered, 366 Ill. App. 3d
330, 337, 850 N.E.2d 821, 828 (2006) (negotiation ground rules
required that each party attending the negotiations have the
authority to enter into a binding agreement); Truck Drivers, Oil
Drivers, Filling Stations & Platform Workers Union Local 705,
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Village of Maywood, 10
Pub. Employee Rep. (Ill.) par. 2018, No. S-CA-92-147, at X-102
(Illinois State Labor Relations Board, April 26, 1994) (in prior
negotiations, village manager had served as village’s sole
bargaining representative and had signed parties previous bar-
gaining agreement on behalf of village); American Federation of
State, County & Municipal Employees, Council 31 v. City of
Burbank, 4 Pub. Employee Rep. (Ill.) par. 2048, No. S-CA-88-19,
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at 339 (Illinois State Labor Relations Board, November 7, 1988)
("members of the City negotiating team never indicated that they
had sufficient authority to bind the City. In addition, the
ground rules provided that no agreement would become final until
ratified by the respective principals").
In the instant case, the executive director found there
were no explicit discussions between the District and the Union
during the negotiations in which the parties agreed that member-
ship ratification was not needed to establish a contract, noting
"contract ratification votes are indeed a nearly universal
component of the bargaining process." 23 Pub. Employee Rep.
(Ill.) par. 132, at 579 (Executive Director's dismissal order).
In fact, the Union's constitution provides that "[a]
collective[-]bargaining agreement must be ratified and approved
by a majority of the members covered by said agreement present
and voting on the question by secret ballot before the same shall
be executed on behalf of the Union." The Board upheld the
dismissal of the executive director. Because (1) the parties did
not explicitly agree that any agreement between the negotiators
did not require ratification by the employees, (2) the Union's
constitution required membership ratification as a prerequisite
to entering a binding agreement, (3) no Union representative
indicated he had authority to enter into a binding agreement
without membership ratification, and (4) there was no established
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history of entering into bargaining agreements without such
ratification, it was within the authority of the Board, on this
record, to dismiss the charge.
For the reasons stated, we affirm the Board's decision.
Affirmed.
APPLETON, P.J., and MYERSCOUGH, J., concur.
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Harvey Park District v. American Federation of Professionals
Combined Opinion