Filed 6/26/08 NO. 4-07-0976
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
CLEMENT JANDESKA, ) Appeal from
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Circuit Court of
v. ) Champaign County
PRAIRIE INTERNATIONAL TRUCKS, INC., ) No. 06L50
Defendant-Appellee, )
and )
KEVIN LYONS and CHARLES FLICKNER, ) Honorable
Respondents in Discovery. ) Michael Q. Jones,
) Judge Presiding.
_________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE McCULLOUGH delivered the opinion of the court:
In May 2006, plaintiff, Clement Jandeska, filed an
amended complaint based on a theory of retaliatory discharge
against defendant, Prairie International Trucks, Inc. (Prairie).
In November 2007, the trial court granted defendant's motion for
summary judgment. Jandeska appeals. We affirm.
As the parties are well aware of the facts of this
case, we address only those facts necessary to our disposition.
On October 4, 2005, Robbin Kurtsinger, a Prairie
client, brought a diesel truck to Prairie to have repairs done to
the vehicle. When she got the vehicle back, Kurtsinger concluded
either the repairs were not done correctly or something else was
wrong with the vehicle so she took the truck back to Prairie on
October 10. Jandeska told Kurtsinger the repairs Kurtsinger had
requested on October 4 were made but something had happened while
the repairs were being made that caused the problem Kurtsinger
was now experiencing. Between October 10 and 14, 2005, Prairie's
mechanics worked on the vehicle and fixed the problem. Prairie
charged Kurtsinger its normal rate for these repairs. Jandeska
allegedly told Kurtsinger the vehicle should be fixed at no cost
because the problem was caused by Prairie leaving the glow plug
in the engine in the first place. Kurtsinger relayed the infor-
mation Jandeska had given her to Kevin Lyons, whom Kurtsinger
believed to be Prairie's general manager. Around October 22,
Kurtsinger complained to Charlie Flickner (general manager of
Prairie's Champaign location) about the repairs. She told him
one of the technicians told her a glow plug was left in her
engine but she would not say who told her. At some point, Lyons
became involved in the conversation. According to Kurtsinger,
Lyons first denied Prairie had done anything to damage
Kurtsinger's vehicle when it was in for repairs the first time,
but he finally agreed it had been damaged and that it would be
repaired at no cost to Kurtsinger.
Kevin Mitchaner owned his own trucking business and
used Prairie whenever one of his vehicles needed repairs. In
October 2005, Mitchaner needed a part for one of his vehicles, so
he went to Prairie and dealt with Jandeska. Jandeska retrieved
the part and began to "ring it into the computer" when the
computer malfunctioned and would not print out an invoice with
the correct part number and cost. Because Mitchaner was in a
hurry and needed to take the part and leave as quickly as possi-
ble, Jandeska told him he would fill out an invoice by hand, get
the part number and dollar amount later, and Mitchaner could pay
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the next time he stopped at Prairie. On October 22, 2005,
Mitchaner was back at Prairie. Jandeska was not there so
Mitchaner spoke to Lyons about paying for the part. According to
Mitchaner, Lyons got Jandeska's handwritten invoice, entered the
information into the computer, and Mitchaner then paid for the
part along with additional work he was having done at that time.
On October 25, 2005, Prairie fired Jandeska.
In May 2006, Jandeska filed an amended complaint
against Prairie based on a theory of retaliatory discharge. In
June 2006, Prairie filed a motion to dismiss claiming the Automo-
tive Repair Act (815 ILCS 306/1 through 85 (West 2004)) did not
expressly or impliedly provide a cause of action in favor of
Jandeska. Jandeska responded, stating he did not allege the
Automotive Repair Act provided him with a private right of
action. Instead, he cited the Automotive Repair Act to support
his assertion false billing and improper car repairs are in
violation of public policy. In July 2006, the trial court denied
Prairie's motion following a hearing. Prairie filed a motion for
interlocutory appeal and the court denied it. In October 2007,
Prairie filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial
court granted in November 2007. This appeal followed.
Jandeska alleges Prairie discharged him for telling
Kurtsinger she should not have had to pay for repairs to her
truck because the repairs were only necessary because of a
mistake by Prairie. Illinois adheres to the employment-at-will
doctrine, where a noncontractual employee serves at the em-
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ployer's discretion and can be discharged for any reason or no
reason. Sherman v. Kraft General Foods, Inc., 272 Ill. App. 3d
833, 836, 651 N.E.2d 708, 710 (1995). Our supreme court created
a limited exception to this rule when it recognized the tort of
retaliatory discharge in Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d
172, 181-82, 384 N.E.2d 353, 357 (1978). "A plaintiff states a
valid claim for retaliatory discharge only if [he] alleges that
[he] was (1) discharged; (2) in retaliation for [his] activities;
and (3) that the discharge violates a clear mandate of public
policy." Hinthorn v. Roland's of Bloomington, Inc., 119 Ill. 2d
526, 529, 519 N.E.2d 909, 911 (1988).
We conclude Jandeska has not stated a claim for retal-
iatory discharge because he cannot meet the third prong of the
cause of action since Prairie's termination of Jandeska's employ-
ment did not violate a clear mandate of public policy. In doing
so, we recognize the trial court denied Prairie's motion to
dismiss based on this argument but ultimately granted Prairie
summary judgment on other grounds. However, an appellate court
may affirm the trial court's decision on any basis appearing in
the record. American Service Insurance Co. v. Pasalka, 363 Ill.
App. 3d 385, 389-90, 842 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (2006).
In his amended complaint, Jandeska claimed it is the
public policy of Illinois that (1) automotive repair facilities
have a duty to properly repair vehicles and be honest with
customers as to the necessity of repairs and the cause of damage
to the vehicle, and (2) customers are not fraudulently charged in
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connection with mechanical repairs and other work performed on
their vehicles. Jandeska cited section 80(6) of the Automotive
Repair Act (815 ILCS 306/80(6) (West 2004)) as support for this
claim. That section makes it unlawful for a motor vehicle repair
facility to charge a customer for unnecessary repairs.
"'[U]nnecessary repairs' means those repairs
for which there is no reasonable basis for
performing the service. A reasonable basis
includes: (i) that the repair service is
consistent with specifications established by
law or the manufacturer of the motor vehicle,
component, or part; (ii) that the repair is
in accordance with usual and customary prac-
tices; (iii) that the repair was performed at
the specific request of the consumer after
the technician disclosed to the consumer the
basis for recommending the repair when the
recommendation is not in accordance with
manufacturer specifications or accepted trade
practices; or (iv) that the repair is at the
consumer's request." 815 ILCS 306/80(6)
(West 2004).
Our supreme court "has consistently sought to restrict
the common[-]law tort of retaliatory discharge." Metzger v.
DaRosa, 209 Ill. 2d 30, 44, 805 N.E.2d 1165, 1173 (2004).
Retaliatory discharge cases have been allowed under two circum-
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stances: (1) when an employee has been fired for filing a claim
for worker's compensation; or (2) when the employee is discharged
for reporting an employer's illegal or improper conduct, other-
wise known as "whistle blowing." Jacobson v. Knepper & Moga,
P.C., 185 Ill. 2d 372, 376, 706 N.E.2d 491, 493 (1998).
Jandeska's claim falls under the latter of these two categories.
As stated, Prairie's termination of Jandeska's employ-
ment did not violate a clear mandate of public policy. Our
supreme court has stated the following about what constitutes a
mandated public policy:
"There is no precise definition of the
term. In general, it can be said that public
policy concerns what is right and just and
what affects the citizens of the State col-
lectively. It is to be found in the State's
constitution and statutes and, when they are
silent, in its judicial decisions. [Cita-
tion.] Although there is no precise line of
demarcation dividing matters that are the
subject of public policies from matters
purely personal, a survey of cases in other
[s]tates involving retaliatory discharges
shows that a matter must strike at the heart
of a citizen's social rights, duties, and
responsibilities before the tort will be
allowed." Palmateer v. International Har-
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vester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 130, 421 N.E.2d
876, 878-79 (1981).
"While the supreme court has not tried to spell out all circum-
stances that meet this threshold, it is clear from the words the
court has chosen that the threshold is high and the circumstances
limited." Chicago Commons Ass'n v. Hancock, 346 Ill. App. 3d
326, 329, 804 N.E.2d 703, 705 (2004).
Here, given "whistle blowing" is an extraordinary
exception to the employment-at-will doctrine, we cannot say that
this matter strikes at Jandeska's "social rights, duties, and
responsibilities." Indeed, Jandeska simply told a client that he
believed Prairie had failed to properly repair his vehicle. Such
action falls substantially short of the supreme court's public-
policy threshold stated in Palmateer.
Although Jandeska claims he does not allege the Automo-
tive Repair Act gives him a private right of action, we must
address the statute because Jandeska relies on it as support for
his claim there is a public policy Prairie violated when it
terminated him. It is undisputed the Automotive Repair Act does
not explicitly give a private right of action to automotive
repair facility employees who are wrongfully terminated from
their employment. In certain cases, it is appropriate to imply a
private right of action for retaliatory discharge. However, our
supreme court has noted: "Given this court's reluctance to expand
the common law in this area, we must also hesitate to imply such
actions under a statute without explicit legislative authority."
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Fisher v. Lexington Health Care, Inc., 188 Ill. 2d 455, 468, 722
N.E.2d 1115, 1121 (1999). The Automotive Repair Act does not
confer a private right of action.
The Fisher court noted four factors are to be consid-
ered when determining whether a private right of action may be
implied from a statute. It is appropriate to imply a private
right of action if (1) the plaintiff is a member of the class the
statute was enacted to benefit; (2) the plaintiff's injury is one
the statute was designed to prevent; (3) a private right of
action is consistent with the underlying purpose of the statute;
and (4) implying a private right of action is necessary to
provide an adequate remedy for violations of the statute.
This statute was meant to protect the customers, not
employees of automotive repair facilities. Moreover, Jandeska's
injury, i.e., the loss of his job, is not the type of injury the
statute was designed to prevent. Thus, a private right of action
cannot be implied from the statute. Finally, providing a private
right of action is not necessary to provide an adequate remedy
for violation of the statute as section 85 of the Automotive
Repair Act provides penalties for violations of the Act. See 815
ILCS 306/85 (West 2004).
For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's
judgment.
Affirmed.
KNECHT and STEIGMANN, JJ., concur.
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