No. 2--05--0643 filed June 30, 2006
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
JOHN CANGELOSI, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
) of Winnebago County.
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
)
v. ) No. 03--L--392
)
PATRIZIO CAPASSO, ROCKFORD )
RADIOLOGY ASSOCIATES, P.C., )
TODD D. ALEXANDER, Individually, )
TODD D. ALEXANDER, S.C., )
THOMAS DAHLBERG, and ROCKFORD )
MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, d/b/a )
Positive Reflections, NFP, )
)
Defendants ) Honorable
) Timothy R. Gill,
(Richard D. Gaines, Contemnor-Appellant). ) Judge, Presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE HUTCHINSON delivered the opinion of the court:
Attorney Richard D. Gaines appeals from an order finding him in direct civil contempt of
court and imposing a $50 fine for noncompliance with an order directing that he turn over notes
authored by Lisa Bruening, a respondent in discovery. The issue is whether Bruening's notes, which
contain her recollection of relevant events, which were authored within a day of the events, prior to
any litigation, and which were not turned over to an attorney for 22 months, are protected by either
the attorney-client privilege or the work product privilege. For the reasons that follow, we conclude
that neither privilege protects the notes. With respect to the trial court's order finding respondent in
direct civil contempt, we affirm the trial court's order and sanction, and we remand.
No. 2--05--0643
On October 14, 2003, plaintiff, John Cangelosi, filed a medical malpractice complaint against
various defendants. According to the complaint, following a skydiving accident on April 12, 2003,
plaintiff was admitted to Rockford Memorial Hospital (the Hospital) with several fractures, and he
remained there until April 23, 2003. Plaintiff alleged that, as a result of the negligence of the
Hospital and other defendants, he suffered severe, permanent damage to his spine and was
permanently disabled. On April 7, 2005, plaintiff filed an amended complaint adding Bruening as a
respondent in discovery.
On January 16, 2004, plaintiff served written interrogatories upon the Hospital, requesting
information about "statements from any witness other than yourself or, if a corporation, of anyone
other than an officer, director, managing agent, or foreman." On February 15, 2005, the Hospital
responded that it had "notes prepared by Lisa Bruening, R.N., on the evening of April 15, 2003, in
contemplation of litigation. Nurse Bruening was involved in the patient's care from approximately
7:00 p.m. on April 14 until approximately 8:00 a.m. on April 15, 2003, and her conduct is placed in
issue by Plaintiff's Complaint." However, the Hospital objected to production of the notes, based on
the attorney-client and work product privileges.
On March 24, 2005, plaintiff filed a motion to compel production of Bruening's notes. The
Hospital responded on April 29, 2005. Attached to the response was a transcript of Bruening's
court-ordered deposition and a copy of Bruening's affidavit.
In her affidavit, Bruening disclosed that on April 14 and15, 2003, she was a registered nurse
at the Hospital and attended to plaintiff. During the course of Bruening's 122-hour shift, plaintiff
experienced a change in his condition and could no longer move his extremities. Bruening was
concerned that "the change in the patient's condition, if permanent, would be a bad outcome" and
that "this is the kind of situation which may very well develop into a lawsuit." Bruening believed
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that because she was one of the persons who was attending to plaintiff when his condition changed,
her care "might be put at issue in a subsequent lawsuit." Bruening "wanted to preserve [her] own
recollections of the events of the evening of April 14-15, 2003, so that in the event of a lawsuit [she]
and/or [her] attorney would be in a better position to defend [her] conduct." Therefore, during the
evening of April 15, 2003, Bruening "made approximately 22 pages of notes about [her]
recollection of the events of the evening." Bruening did not share her notes with anyone until giving
them to Gaines when she met with him on February 9, 2005.
At her deposition, Bruening testified that her notes memorialized factual things that she saw,
factual things that she did, and factual things that she saw other people do. The notes include things
that the doctors may have said during her shift regarding plaintiff's care. After completing her notes,
Bruening placed them in a folder in her kitchen cabinet.
On May 13, 2005, the trial court ruled that Bruening's notes were not protected by the
attorney-client or work product privilege and ordered Gaines to turn over the notes. On June 9,
2005, Gaines advised the trial court that he would not be turning over the notes, and the trial court
found Gaines in direct civil contempt of court. Gaines indicated that he intended to appeal the trial
court's order but asked that the order contain a provision allowing the contempt to be purged by
turning over the notes. The trial court's June 9 order reflected the imposition of a $50 fine and
provided that Gaines could purge himself of contempt by producing a copy of the notes to all parties.
Gaines timely appeals.
When an individual appeals a finding of direct civil contempt arising from noncompliance
with a discovery order, we must necessarily review the propriety of the discovery order. In re
Marriage of Bonneau, 294 Ill. App. 3d 720, 723 (1998). If the discovery order is improper, the
finding of contempt must be reversed. Bonneau, 294 Ill. App. 3d at 723. Generally, discovery
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rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion, but the applicability of a privilege is reviewed de novo.
Sterling Finance Management, L.P. v. UBS PaineWebber, Inc., 336 Ill. App. 3d 442, 446 (2002).
Supreme Court Rule 201(b)(2) provides, in pertinent part:
"All matters that are privileged against disclosure on the trial, including privileged
communications between a party or his agent and the attorney for the party, are privileged
against disclosure through any discovery procedure. Material prepared by or for a party in
preparation for trial is subject to discovery only if it does not contain or disclose the theories,
mental impressions, or litigation plans of the party's attorney." 166 Ill. 2d R. 201(b)(2).
To be entitled to the protection of the attorney-client privilege, a claimant must show that (1) a
statement originated in confidence that it would not be disclosed; (2) it was made to an attorney
acting in his legal capacity for the purpose of securing legal advice or services; and (3) it remained
confidential. Rounds v. Jackson Park Hospital & Medical Center, 319 Ill. App. 3d 280, 285-86
(2001). "The work product doctrine provides a broader protection than the attorney-client privilege
and is designed to protect the right of an attorney to thoroughly prepare his case and to preclude a
less diligent adversary attorney from taking undue advantage of the former's efforts." Fischel &
Kahn, Ltd. v. Van Straaten Gallery, Inc., 189 Ill. 2d 579, 591 (2000), citing Hickman v. Taylor, 329
U.S. 495, 510-11, 91 L. Ed. 451, 462, 67 S. Ct. 385, 393-94 (1947).
Gaines argues that "[t]he evidence unequivocally demonstrates that Bruening drafted the
[n]otes to assist her attorney in defending possible future litigation, and further that she held the
[n]otes in strict confidence until she provided them to her attorney. Thus, they are protected by the
attorney-client privilege." Gaines also argues that, "because the [n]otes also reflect Bruening's own
writings made in reasonable anticipation of future litigation, they are also protected by the work
product privilege." We conclude that neither privilege applies.
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Turning first to the claim of attorney-client privilege, the critical issue is whether Bruening's
notes were a communication made to an attorney for the purpose of securing legal advice. Rounds is
instructive on this issue. In Rounds, a medical malpractice action, the plaintiff sought to discover a
nurse's written statement and other nurses' incident reports, which detailed the sequence of events
that transpired at the hospital. The nurse who prepared the statement provided an affidavit in which
she averred that she prepared it because she " 'believed that this matter would likely result in
litigation' " and she wanted to " 'be able to provide [the] document as a communication to those
attorneys assigned to represent [her].' " Rounds, 319 Ill. App. 3d at 286. The hospital asserted that
the documents were made in anticipation of litigation and claimed the attorney-client privilege.
After the hospital refused to turn over the documents, the trial court found the hospital in contempt
of court, and the hospital appealed.
On appeal, the First District determined that the attorney-client privilege did not apply.
Rounds, 319 Ill. App. 3d at 284-88. The reviewing court first ruled that, despite the affidavit, the
hospital "has not presented any facts that would indicate to this court that the [nurse's statement] was
anything more than the result of a mere prediction by [the] nurse." Rounds, 319 Ill. App. 3d at 286.
As to all the documents, the reviewing court noted that there was "no indication from the record that
the documents were created subsequent to the lawsuit or at the direction of an attorney. *** There
had not been an attorney-client relationship created prior to the creation of the reports." Rounds,
319 Ill. App. 3d at 287. The reviewing court rejected the hospital's argument that the documents had
" 'the intent of attorney-client communications,' " noting that "[t]he documents contain primarily
factual statements relating to [the plaintiff's] medical condition *** and the events surrounding her
treatment while at [the hospital]." Rounds, 319 Ill. App. 3d at 288; see also Chicago Trust Co. v.
Cook County Hospital, 298 Ill. App. 3d 396, 408-09 (1998) (finding the attorney-client privilege
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inapplicable because the documents at issue were not addressed to the attorney and did not seek
legal advice); Sakosko v. Memorial Hospital, 167 Ill. App. 3d 842, 847 (1988) (finding the attorney-
client privilege inapplicable because the documents at issue were not addressed to the client's
attorney and "contain[ed] primarily factual statements relating to plaintiffs' medical conditions and
prognoses").
Here, like the nurse in Rounds, Bruening authored the notes because she believed "this is the
kind of situation which may very well develop into a lawsuit." Bruening wrote the notes upon her
return home after her shift and, at that time, no lawsuit had been filed. Bruening testified that the
primary focus of the notes was to memorialize what had happened during her shift. Like the
documents in Rounds, Bruening's notes contain primarily factual statements relating to what she had
observed and heard. And, as in Rounds, Bruening did not have an attorney when she authored the
notes, nor were the notes directed to an attorney. All of the above factors taken together lead us to
conclude that Bruening's notes were not a communication with an attorney for the purpose of
securing legal advice. Turning the notes over to an attorney 22 months later did not change the
nature of the notes.
Gaines argues that "the 'essence' of the privilege is the confidentiality of the communication."
That may be so; however, that presumes the existence of a communication. As already stated,
Bruening's notes simply do not constitute a communication with an attorney. Gaines also argues that
the absence of an attorney-client relationship when the notes were authored is of no moment. He
asserts that "a communication has been held to be protected even when made well before the
attorney-client relationship is formed if the communication is created in the context of obtaining
legal representation." Again, this assertion presumes the notes were a communication with an
attorney. Had Bruening met with Gaines on the evening of April 15, 2003, and told him what had
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happened during her shift at the hospital, that communication might have been privileged even
though Gaines had not been retained at the time. However, that is not the factual scenario with
which we are presented.
Turning next to the issue of whether Bruening's notes were protected by the work product
doctrine, it is clear that they are subject to discovery because they do not "contain or disclose the
theories, mental impressions, or litigation plans of the party's attorney." 166 Ill. 2d R. 201(b)(2);
Shapo v. Tires 'N Tracks, Inc., 336 Ill. App. 3d 387, 393 (2002) (noting that Rule 201(b)(2) "sets the
parameters for the scope of discovery of work-product materials"). As noted, Bruening's notes
contained her own factual recollection of events.
Because Bruening's notes were not protected by either the attorney-client privilege or the
work product privilege, the trial court properly ordered Gaines to turn over the notes. Hence, we
must consider the trial court's order finding Gaines in direct civil contempt. Where a party's refusal
to comply with a trial court's order constitutes a good-faith effort to secure an interpretation of the
two privileges in question, it is appropriate to vacate a contempt citation on appeal. Sakosko, 167
Ill. App. 3d at 848. In this case, the record indicates that Gaines asked to be held in contempt
because he planned to seek appellate review of the trial court's order compelling him to turn over
Bruening's notes. However, in his appellate brief, Gaines "wishes to make clear that he does not
seek [to have the contempt citation vacated], as it may cause the issue to become moot for purposes
of seeking further review." In light of this request, we affirm the trial court's order finding Gaines in
direct civil contempt.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the circuit court of Winnebago County, and
we remand this case for further proceedings.
Affirmed and remanded.
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GROMETER, P.J., and BYRNE, J., concur.
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