Filed 9/11/09 NO. 4-08-0809
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
CHAMPAIGN-URBANA PUBLIC HEALTH ) Appeal from
DISTRICT, ) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Champaign County
v. ) No. 08MR121
THE BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE DEPARTMENT )
OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY OF THE STATE )
OF ILLINOIS; JAMES P. SLEDGE, as )
Director of the Department of )
Employment Security of the State of )
Illinois; THE DEPARTMENT OF )
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY OF THE STATE OF ) Honorable
ILLINOIS; and SHELLEY J. SCOTT, ) Thomas J. Difanis,
Defendants-Appellees. ) Judge Presiding.
_________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the opinion of the court:
In January 2006, plaintiff, Champaign-Urbana Public
Health District (the District), hired codefendant Shelley J.
Scott as its finance director. In May 4, 2007, Scott submitted
her unsolicited letter of resignation to the chairperson of the
District's board. Thereafter, Scott applied for unemployment
benefits, which the Department of Employment Security granted.
The District contested the Department's grant in this regard,
citing section 601(A) of the Unemployment Insurance Act (Act)
(820 ILCS 405/601(A) (West 2006)) and arguing that because Scott
had resigned, she was not eligible for unemployment benefits.
Following an administrative hearing, the Board of Review found
that Scott had not resigned but had been discharged.
In February 2008, the District filed a complaint for
administrative review seeking reversal of the Board's decision.
In October 2008, the circuit court affirmed the Board of Review's
decision.
The District appeals, arguing that Scott voluntarily
resigned, rendering her ineligible for unemployment benefits
under the Act. We agree, reverse the circuit court's judgment,
and remand with directions.
I. BACKGROUND
In May 2007, Scott anonymously reported to the Dis-
trict's board that her supervisor had engaged in financial
impropriety with District funds. Thereafter, the District's
board investigated these allegations.
On May 4, 2007, Scott removed all personal items from
her office and submitted an unsolicited letter of resignation to
the chairperson of the District's board, Carol Elliott. Scott's
letter cited difficulty with her supervisor as the reason for her
departure, which she noted was "effective immediately." After
receiving the letter of resignation, Elliott asked Scott if she
would be willing to stay at her job if her supervisor was no
longer employed by the District. Scott responded that she would
stay. That same day, the District's board suspended Scott's
supervisor pending the results of its investigation. Elliott
later testified that her question to Scott was merely hypotheti-
cal. However, Scott testified that she interpreted Elliott's
question as an offer of continued employment, which she accepted.
Scott returned to her empty office on Monday, May 7,
2007. Scott's acting supervisor, Julie Pryde, knowing that Scott
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submitted her resignation on Friday, May 4, 2007, asked the
District's counsel for clarification on Scott’s employment
status. Counsel responded that he required time to research the
issue. In the interim, Pryde treated Scott as if she were still
an employee and left Scott to work on the District's budget. (A
failure to complete the budget by the end of the week would have
resulted in the District's losing its funding.)
Scott never completed the budget. Instead, Scott went
home sick on Tuesday, May 8, 2007, and on Wednesday, May 9, 2007,
sent a letter to Elliott, attempting to negotiate a severance
package. Scott went home sick on Thursday, May 10, 2007, as
well. On Friday, May 11, 2007, the District's counsel informed
Pryde that Scott’s resignation became final at the time her
resignation letter was submitted to Elliott on May 4, 2007.
Pryde immediately informed Scott in writing that her resignation
had been effective on that date. Thereafter, Scott filed for
unemployment benefits, which she was granted. The Board of
Review upheld this benefit determination, and the circuit court
affirmed. (We note the Board of Review's decision referred to
the referee's section 602(A) finding (820 ILCS 405/602(A) (West
2006)) and correctly ignored it as irrelevant. That section
deals with employee misconduct, which no one raised as an issue
in this case.)
This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
The District argues that Scott’s May 4, 2007, letter of
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resignation was effective upon delivery and was not subject to
rescission. Scott responds that she rescinded her resignation
when Elliott asked Scott if she would consider staying. As
evidence that she rescinded her resignation, Scott points to the
fact that she worked on the budget the following week. Scott
posits that she was later discharged when she received Pryde's
letter acknowledging her May 4, 2007, resignation. We agree with
the District that Scott's resignation was effective May 4, 2007.
A. Undisputed Facts and the Standard of Review
The following facts are undisputed: (1) Scott hand-
delivered a resignation letter to Elliott on May 4, 2007; (2) the
letter stated that Scott’s resignation was "effective immedi-
ately"; and (3) Scott was a public employee.
The legal effect of undisputed facts is a question of
law, which we review de novo. Fitzpatrick v. Human Rights
Comm’n, 267 Ill. App. 3d 386, 392, 642 N.E.2d 486, 491 (1994).
B. Scott's Resignation Was Final and Irrevocable
When a public officer tenders a letter of resignation,
"the resignation is an unalterable fact and the officer cannot
withdraw the resignation and cannot negate it by continuing to
perform the job." (Emphasis added.) Rohrback v. Department of
Employment Security, 361 Ill. App. 3d 298, 305, 835 N.E.2d 955,
962 (2005). This has long been the law in Illinois because
"public policy requires that there be certainty as to who are and
who are not public officers." People ex rel. Adamowski v.
Kerner, 19 Ill. 2d 506, 512, 167 N.E.2d 555, 558 (1960). This
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same standard applies to public employees as well. Stearns v.
Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 59 Ill. App. 3d 569, 572,
375 N.E.2d 877, 880 (1978).
In this case, the record reveals, and the parties do
not dispute, that on May 4, 2007, Scott, a public employee,
tendered her resignation "effective immediately." In doing so,
Scott’s resignation became a fait accompli. Nevertheless, citing
Kerner, 19 Ill. 2d at 512, 167 N.E.2d at 558, Scott asserts that
Elliott took affirmative action to preclude her resignation for
the public convenience--that is, the budget issue was so signifi-
cant that Elliott was forced to disregard Scott's May 4, 2007,
resignation--and that Scott agreed to do so. However, given the
facts of this case, whatever conversation Scott and Elliott had
after the resignation letter was tendered is irrelevant. As this
court explained in Rohrback, 361 Ill. App. 3d at 305-06, 835
N.E.2d at 962, Scott’s return to the office the following week
and subsequent work on the budget have no bearing on her employ-
ment status. Further, contrary to Scott's assertion, Pryde's May
11, 2007, correspondence to Scott was nothing more than an
official acknowledgment that Scott’s resignation became effective
on May 4, 2007.
Because we conclude that Scott resigned on May 4, 2007,
she is ineligible for unemployment benefits unless she is other-
wise qualified for such benefits pursuant to the terms of section
601 of the Act (820 ILCS 405/601 (West 2006)). Accordingly, we
remand this matter for a determination as to whether Scott is
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otherwise eligible for benefits under section 601 of the Act (820
ILCS 405/601 (West 2006)).
In closing, we note that when determining whether Scott
is eligible for unemployment benefits, the Board of Review shall
not consider anything done or said to Scott after she delivered
her resignation letter to Elliott on May 4, 2007.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we reverse the circuit court’s
judgment and remand with directions.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
TURNER and APPLETON, JJ., concur.
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