ILLINOIS OFFICIAL REPORTS
Appellate Court
People v. Satisfield, 2012 IL App (2d) 110297
Appellate Court THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
Caption LASHAWN SATISFIELD, Defendant-Appellant.
District & No. Second District
Docket No. 2-11-0297
Filed October 1, 2012
Held The demand for a speedy trial filed by defendant while he was
(Note: This syllabus incarcerated in a Department of Corrections’ facility was ineffective due
constitutes no part of to his failure to comply with section 3-8-10 of the Unified Code of
the opinion of the court Corrections requiring that he send a copy of the demand to the chief
but has been prepared administrative officer of the facility where he was incarcerated.
by the Reporter of
Decisions for the
convenience of the
reader.)
Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Lake County, No. 09-DT-3362; the
Review Hon. George D. Strickland, Judge, presiding.
Judgment Affirmed.
Counsel on Thomas A. Lilien and R. Christopher White, both of State Appellate
Appeal Defender’s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.
Michael J. Waller, State’s Attorney, of Waukegan, (Lawrence M. Bauer,
of State’s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), and
David Neal, of Coal City, for the People.
Panel JUSTICE BIRKETT delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices McLaren and Hutchinson concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Following a stipulated bench trial, defendant, Lashawn Satisfield, was found guilty of
driving under the influence of alcohol (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a) (West 2008)). On appeal,
defendant contends that the trial court erred in striking his speedy-trial demand. For the
reasons that follow, we affirm.
¶2 BACKGROUND
¶3 Defendant was charged with two counts of driving under the influence of alcohol (625
ILCS 5/11-501(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 2008)). On January 7, 2010, he filed a speedy-trial
demand, but failed to appear in court on February 10, 2010. As a result, the trial court entered
a bond forfeiture warrant for defendant’s arrest and ordered him to appear in court on March
17, 2010.
¶4 On March 2, 2010, defendant filed a second speedy-trial demand, this time while
incarcerated in the Department of Corrections’ Lawrence Correctional Center on a separate
offense. At the March 17, 2010, hearing, the State moved to strike defendant’s second
demand on the basis that defendant failed to send a copy of the demand to the chief
administrative officer of Lawrence Correctional Center, as required by section 3-8-10 of the
Unified Code of Corrections (Code) (730 ILCS 5/3-8-10 (West 2010)). Defendant did not
appear on that date.
¶5 Following a subsequent hearing on the matter, the trial court granted the State’s motion
and struck defendant’s second demand. The oral motion to reconsider made by defendant
shortly thereafter was denied.
¶6 On May 26, 2010, the trial court entered judgment on the bond forfeiture.
¶7 Defendant filed a third speedy-trial demand on August 10, 2010, and the case proceeded
to a stipulated bench trial on November 29, 2010, after which the trial court found defendant
guilty and sentenced him to one year of court supervision. Following an unsuccessful motion
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for a new trial, defendant brought this timely appeal.
¶8 ANALYSIS
¶9 On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred in granting the State’s motion to
strike his second speedy-trial demand. According to defendant, because the State was aware
of his incarceration at Lawrence Correctional Center, his failure to send a copy of his second
speedy-trial demand to the chief administrative officer was not fatal to his demand. We
disagree.
¶ 10 Section 3-8-10 of the Code provides that the speedy-trial rights afforded defendants under
sections 103-5(b), (c), and (e) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/103-
5(b), (c), (e) (West 2010)) shall apply to people committed to the Department of Corrections.
730 ILCS 5/3-8-10 (West 2010). Section 3-8-10 requires, however, that a defendant file a
demand that includes the following:
“a statement of the place of present commitment, the term, and length of the remaining
term, the charges pending against him or her to be tried and the county of the charges,
and the demand shall be addressed to the state’s attorney of the county where he or she
is charged with a copy to the clerk of that court and a copy to the chief administrative
officer of the Department of Corrections institution or facility to which he or she is
committed.” 730 ILCS 5/3-8-10 (West 2010).
¶ 11 In People v. Staten, 159 Ill. 2d 419, 426, 429-30 (1994), our supreme court held that the
defendant’s failure to include in his speedy-trial demand a reference to section 3-8-10 of the
Code or the details of his incarceration, time served, and time remaining on his sentence
rendered his demand ineffective. The defendant argued, as defendant does in the present
case, that because the State knew where he was incarcerated, his failure to strictly comply
with the requirements of section 3-8-10 should be excused, as the purpose of the statute was
served. Staten, 159 Ill. 2d at 427-28. The supreme court rejected that argument, noting that
the requirements of section 3-8-10 are neither technical nor meaningless and that the
legislature chose to place the burden of making an affirmative speedy-trial demand according
to section 3-8-10 on incarcerated defendants. Staten, 159 Ill. 2d at 428. In addition, the Staten
court noted that courts of this state had already held that the State’s knowledge of a
defendant’s whereabouts did not relieve the defendant of the burden of complying with
section 3-8-10. Staten, 159 Ill. 2d at 428; see also People v. Wentlent, 109 Ill. App. 3d 291
(1982); People v. Davis, 92 Ill. App. 3d 869 (1981).
¶ 12 Defendant attempts to distinguish Staten on the ground that the defendant’s violations
of section 3-8-10 in Staten were more flagrant than the violation in the present case, where
defendant simply failed to deliver a copy of the demand to the chief administrative officer
of Lawrence Correctional Center. This contention is unavailing, as the language used by the
supreme court in Staten indicates that the supreme court intended to mandate strict
compliance with the requirements of section 3-8-10. Noting several decisions that required
compliance with section 3-8-10 as a precondition of the running of the speedy-trial period,
the supreme court stated the following:
“The above authorities recognize that a defendant who claims a violation of a speedy-
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trial right cannot prevail if the demand for trial fails to comply with the terms of the
governing speedy-trial provision. To treat the informational requirements of section 3-8-
10 as surplusage would be to infringe on the legislative prerogative to set reasonable
conditions on an incarcerated defendant’s right to receive a trial within 160 days of the
demand. As reflected by the statutes examined in the instant case, the legislature has seen
fit to provide different time periods and demand requirements for offenders who are
differently situated.” Staten, 159 Ill. 2d at 429-30.
Nowhere in this passage or in the cases cited by Staten is there support for defendant’s
position that whether omissions in a speedy-trial demand made pursuant to section 3-8-10
are fatal is dependent upon the number and severity of the omissions. Rather, Staten suggests
that a defendant must fully comply with all of the requirements of section 3-8-10 in order to
set the 160-day period running. Although the defendant in Staten failed to comply with more
requirements than defendant in the present case, in each case the claimed purpose of section
3-8-10 (to make the State aware of the defendant’s whereabouts) was satisfied. Nevertheless,
the supreme court in Staten held that the defendant’s demand was insufficient. Accordingly,
we see no reason to excuse defendant from full compliance with the requirements of section
3-8-10 simply because he satisfied a few more requirements than the defendant in Staten.
¶ 13 During oral arguments on this matter, counsel for defendant argued strenuously that the
record did not contain any evidence that defendant, in fact, failed to send a copy of the
demand to the chief administrative officer of Lawrence Correctional Center. He also argued
that any deficiency in putting the chief administrative officer on notice could have been
remedied by the State’s writting defendant into court upon receiving his demand. With
respect to defendant’s claim that the record does not indicate whether defendant sent a copy
to the chief administrative officer, we note that defendant had at least two opportunities to
demonstrate to the trial court that he had complied with all of the requirements of section 3-
8-10: at the hearing on the State’s motion to strike his demand and at the hearing on
defendant’s posttrial motion. At both hearings, defendant’s compliance with section 3-8-10
was squarely at issue, yet defendant took neither opportunity to demonstrate that he had sent
a copy of his demand to the chief administrative officer. Moreover, the burden to comply
with the requirements of section 3-8-10 was on defendant. People v. Sandoval, 236 Ill. 2d
57, 66 (2010) (“the legislature intended to place the burden of compliance [with the
requirements of section 3-8-10] on the demanding defendant”). The State was under no
obligation to remedy defendant’s failure to comply with section 3-8-10, and defendant’s
attempt to shift that burden is unavailing.
¶ 14 Because we conclude that defendant was required to comply with all of the requirements
of section 3-8-10–including sending a copy of his demand to the chief administrative
officer–and because defendant has offered nothing tending to show that he complied with all
of those requirements, the trial court did not err in striking defendant’s second speedy-trial
demand. Given our conclusion that defendant’s failure to demonstrate compliance with the
requirements of section 3-8-10 is fatal to his demand, we need not determine what, if any,
effect his failure to appear in the trial court on February 10, 2010, and March 17, 2010, had
on any of his demands.
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¶ 15 CONCLUSION
¶ 16 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Lake County is affirmed.
¶ 17 Affirmed.
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