ILLINOIS OFFICIAL REPORTS
Appellate Court
Kraft Foods, Inc. v. Illinois Property Tax Appeal Board, 2013 IL App (2d) 121031
Appellate Court KRAFT FOODS, INC., Petitioner, v. ILLINOIS PROPERTY TAX
Caption APPEAL BOARD, KANE COUNTY BOARD OF REVIEW, CITY OF
AURORA, and WEST AURORA SCHOOL DISTRICT #129,
Respondents.
District & No. Second District
Docket No. 2-12-1031
Filed September 30, 2013
Held On appeal, respondent Property Tax Appeal Board’s decision that the
(Note: This syllabus industrial property leased and used as a distribution center by petitioner
constitutes no part of had an assessed value of $13.3 million was upheld over petitioner’s claim
the opinion of the court that the assessed value was $10.7 million, since weighing the evidence
but has been prepared and determining the credibility of the witnesses were matters for the
by the Reporter of Board, and under the circumstances, the Board’s decision, after
Decisions for the considering the testimony of the appraisers presented by the parties, was
convenience of the not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
reader.)
Decision Under Petition for review of order of Illinois Property Tax Appeal Board, No.
Review 07-03035.001-C-3.
Judgment Confirmed.
Counsel on Patrick C. Doody, of Law Offices of Patrick C. Doody, of Chicago, for
Appeal petitioner.
Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Michael A. Scodro,
Solicitor General, and Valerie J. Quinn, Assistant Attorney General, of
counsel), for respondent Illinois Property Tax Appeal Board.
Joshua S. Whitt and Brittany Flaherty Theis, both of Whitt Law LLC, of
Aurora, for respondents City of Aurora and West Aurora School District
#129.
Panel JUSTICE SCHOSTOK delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Presiding Justice Burke and Justice Zenoff concurred in the judgment and
opinion.
OPINION
¶1 This is an action for direct review of a final administrative decision of the Illinois
Property Tax Appeal Board (PTAB or Board). In its decision, the PTAB concluded that, for
purposes of tax year 2007, the industrial property leased and occupied by taxpayer Kraft
Foods, Inc. (Kraft), had a total assessed value of $13,312,000, reflecting a fair market value
of $40 million. Kraft, claiming an assessed value of $10,791,000 and a fair market value of
$30 million, has appealed from the PTAB’s decision. We confirm the PTAB’s decision.
¶2 BACKGROUND
¶3 The property at issue is Kraft’s industrial warehouse distribution center located at 1700
North Edgelawn Drive in Aurora Township, Kane County. The property consists of
2,160,822 square feet of land that is improved with an 860,248-square-foot, one-story,
partially air-conditioned building constructed in 2003. The building contains 19,477 square
feet of office space, with the 840,771-square-foot balance used as a warehouse distribution
center. There are 93 exterior truck docks on the east and west elevations of the building. The
land-to-building ratio is 2.51:1. The large amount of land area allows for ample parking:
there are 307 customer/employee parking spaces, and 234 truck trailer parking stalls.
¶4 The property was encumbered by a 10-year build-to-suit lease agreement that commenced
March 8, 2003. Kraft was the sole tenant and had options for two 10-year periods. The
monthly rent for the first five years of the lease was $4.35 per square foot of building area.
The lease was a triple-net lease, under which the tenant paid for utilities, taxes, insurance,
and maintenance, and the landlord paid for structural repairs only. For the second five years
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of the lease, the rent increased to $4.49 per square foot. In January 2006, in a bulk-sale
transaction, the subject property sold for $62,858,000, or $73.07 per square foot.
¶5 On March 10, 2008, the Kane County Board of Review assessed the property for tax year
2007 at $13,679,281, which reflected a market value of $41,103,609. Kraft subsequently
appealed the Board of Review’s decision to the PTAB, arguing that the Board of Review’s
assessed value was excessive. The Board of Review did not respond to Kraft’s appeal.
However, both the City of Aurora and West Aurora School District #129 (collectively
referred to as Aurora) were granted permission to intervene.
¶6 At the hearing before the PTAB, Kraft presented the testimony of appraiser Terrance
McCormick. He estimated that the value of the subject property was $30 million. Aurora
presented the testimony of appraiser James Gibbons. Gibbons estimated that the value of the
subject property was $43.3 million. Below, we set forth only those facts necessary to an
understanding of the issues in this appeal.
¶7 Kraft’s Appraisal
¶8 McCormick, a real estate appraiser with 32 years’ experience, testified that he applied
the three traditional approaches to value in order to arrive at an estimate of the market value
of the property. Under the cost approach, he arrived at an estimated value of $31 million.
Under the income approach, he arrived at an estimated value of $29.3 million. However, he
placed the most weight on the sales comparison approach. In conjunction with that approach,
he considered five comparable sales.
¶9 Comparable Sale 1 was in Aurora, Naperville Township, Du Page County. It was a one-
story, concrete-panel-constructed, multiple-tenant warehouse distribution industrial building
containing 315,799 square feet and situated on a 739,213-square-foot parcel of land. The
building was constructed in 2000 and had 1.8% office space, 32-foot clear ceiling heights,
37 exterior truck-height docks, 3 drive-in truck doors, and a sprinkler system. The building
was in average physical condition for its age. The building was last sold in December 2007
for $12.8 million. The unit price was $40.53 per square foot of building area, including land.
¶ 10 Comparable Sale 2 was in Aurora, Aurora Township, Kane County. It was a one-story,
concrete-panel-constructed, multiple-tenant warehouse distribution industrial building
containing 383,948 square feet and situated on a 780,595-square-foot parcel of land. The
building was constructed in 2002 and had 1% office space, 30-foot clear ceiling heights, 41
exterior truck-height docks, 2 drive-in truck doors, and a sprinkler system. The building was
in average physical condition for its age. The building was last sold in April 2007 for $18.1
million. The unit price was $47.14 per square foot of building area, including land.
¶ 11 Comparable Sale 3 was in Romeoville, Will County. It was a one-story, concrete-panel-
constructed, multiple-tenant warehouse distribution industrial building containing 471,453
square feet and situated on a 1,000,573-square-foot parcel of land. The building was
constructed in 2004 and had 2% office space, 30-foot clear ceiling heights, 48 exterior truck-
height docks, 3 drive-in truck doors, and a sprinkler system. The building was in average
physical condition for its age. The building was last sold in June 2006 for $16,502,500. The
unit price was $35 per square foot of building area, including land.
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¶ 12 Comparable Sale 4 was in Joliet, Will County. It was a one-story, steel-framed, concrete-
panel-constructed, multiple-tenant warehouse distribution industrial building containing
474,432 square feet and situated on a 1,446,323-square-foot parcel of land. The building was
constructed in 2006 and had 2% office space, 30-foot clear ceiling heights, 140 exterior
truck-height docks, 4 drive-in truck doors, and a sprinkler system. The building was in
average physical condition for its age. The building was last sold in February 2007 for $18.25
million. The unit price was $38.47 per square foot of building area, including land.
¶ 13 Comparable Sale 5 was in Romeoville. It was a one-story, steel-framed, concrete-panel-
constructed, multiple-tenant warehouse distribution industrial building containing 652,056
square feet and situated on a 1,151,421-square-foot parcel of land. The building was
constructed in 2007 and had 2% office space, 30-foot clear ceiling heights, 76 exterior truck-
height docks, 3 drive-in truck doors, and a sprinkler system. The building was in average
physical condition for its age. The building was last sold in December 2007 for $12.8
million. The unit price was $40.53 per square foot of building area, including land.
¶ 14 McCormick testified that under the sales comparison approach the subject property had
a value of $35 per square foot of building area, including land, or $30.1 million. In
reconciling the three approaches to valuation, he concluded that the subject property had a
value of $30 million.
¶ 15 In giving his opinion, McCormick acknowledged that the comparable sale and rental
properties were significantly smaller than the subject property. He stated that, in general, the
larger the building, the lower the rent per square foot. He also stated that a large building
with a single tenant carries a higher degree of risk. He acknowledged, however, that there is
very little risk associated with a build-to-suit lease for a triple-A-rated tenant. He further
testified that it was appropriate to consider properties 30 miles away from the subject
property because, if a purchaser were seeking to “buy or lease a large building like the
subject property, their market would be the entire Chicago region.”
¶ 16 Aurora’s Appraisal
¶ 17 Gibbons, a real estate appraiser with approximately 30 years’ experience, testified that
he applied the three traditional approaches to value in order to arrive at an estimate of the
market value of the property. Under the cost approach, he arrived at an estimated value of
$46,585,000. Under the income approach, he arrived at an estimated value of $43.7 million.
However, he placed the most weight on the sales comparison approach. In conjunction with
that approach, he considered six comparable sales.
¶ 18 Comparable Sale 1 was the subject property.
¶ 19 Comparable Sale 2 was in Aurora. It was a one-story, precast-concrete-constructed,
multiple-tenant warehouse distribution industrial building containing 607,752 square feet and
situated on a 1,306,800-square-foot (30 acre) parcel of land. The building was constructed
in 2005 and had 1.3% office space, 32-foot clear ceiling heights, 80 exterior truck-height
docks, 4 drive-in truck doors, 380 parking spaces, and a sprinkler system. The building was
last sold in April 2006 for $29.6 million. The unit price was $48.70 per square foot of
building area.
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¶ 20 Comparable Sale 3 was the same as McCormick’s Comparable Sale 2.
¶ 21 Comparable Sale 4 was the same as McCormick’s Comparable Sale 1.
¶ 22 Comparable Sale 5 was in Aurora. It was a one-story, concrete-panel-constructed, single-
tenant industrial warehouse containing approximately 694,367 square feet and situated on
a 1,485,880-square-foot parcel of land. The building was constructed in 1999 and had 3%
office space, 30- to 40-foot clear ceiling heights, 74 exterior truck-height docks, 2 drive-in
truck doors, 167 car parking spaces, trailer spaces, and a sprinkler system. The building was
last sold in January 2005 for $32.25 million. The unit price was $46.45 per square foot of
building area.
¶ 23 Comparable Sale 6 was in Aurora. It was a one-story, precast-concrete-constructed,
single-tenant industrial warehouse building containing approximately 530,937 square feet
and situated on a 1,659,349-square-foot parcel of land. The building was constructed in 1997
and had 3.1% office space, 30-foot clear ceiling heights, 88 exterior truck-height docks, and
2 drive-in truck doors. The building had 52,000 square feet of air-conditioned warehouse
space. The building was last sold in March 2007 for $28,064,000. The unit price was $52.85
per square foot of building area. Comparable Sale 6 was a property leased by Kraft that was
previously sold in the same bulk-sale transaction as Comparable Sale 1. As to that
transaction, Gibbons did not allocate a value to each parcel, and he did not know how that
could be done.
¶ 24 Based upon the sales comparison approach, Gibbons estimated the value of the subject
property at $43.3 million. In reconciling the three approaches to valuation, he concluded that
the subject property had a value of $43.3 million.
¶ 25 Kraft’s Rebuttal
¶ 26 Anthony Uzemack testified that he had been retained for the purpose of conducting a
desk review of Gibbons’ appraisal. He did not review McCormick’s appraisal. Uzemack
stated that it was very difficult to determine market value for property such as the subject
property. Such properties are not fee-simple “transactions” but investment schemes and
should be treated as leased-fee sales. He noted that the subject property’s contract rent was
high, even characterizing it as “on the moon.” He testified that there were few large
warehouses in existence, which made the market narrow and limited.
¶ 27 Uzemack considered Gibbons’ sales comparison approach to be weak. He stated that
Comparable Sales 1 and 6 were leased-fee bulk-sale transactions involving the subject
property and another property. He asserted that Comparable Sales 2, 3, and 5 had been put
together as leased-fee transactions by Liberty Property LLC, one of the largest real estate
investment trust (REIT) firms in the country for corporate warehouse distribution facilities.
He believed that those sales should be eliminated. That left Comparable Sale 4, a property
smaller than the subject property, the size of which put it in a different market.
¶ 28 On cross-examination, Uzemack acknowledged that he did not know which other
properties in the market were similar to Kraft’s in terms of size, nor did he know which ones
were single-tenant properties. He did not know whether Kraft’s lease was a publicly available
record. He did not know the terms of the subject property’s sale.
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¶ 29 Uzemack testified that the sizes of the properties compared in Gibbons’ appraisal were
a “large component” of his conclusion that the properties were not really comparable to the
subject property. He acknowledged that the subject property was “big,” but he did not believe
that it was “unique.” He also acknowledged that Gibbons’ descriptions of the compared
properties were accurate; Gibbons’ appraisal contained no mathematical errors; and Gibbons
had extracted capitalization rates from actual sales as well as from surveys.
¶ 30 Uzemack additionally testified that it was proper to use as a comparable sale a property
that was leased at the time of its sale as long as its rent was at market level. He also noted
that the property did not have to be vacant at the time it was sold in order to be considered
as a comparable sale property.
¶ 31 The PTAB’s Decision
¶ 32 The PTAB concluded that a reduction in the assessment of the property as established
by the Board of Review was warranted. It found the property’s estimated fair market value,
as of January 1, 2007, to be $40 million.
¶ 33 In arriving at its conclusion, the PTAB noted various points of agreement between the
two appraisers. Both McCormick and Gibbons agreed about the description of the
improvements to the property, both had applied the three traditional approaches to value, and
both had ranked those in the same order, attributing the greatest weight to the sales
comparison approach, with the income approach ranking second. Both appraisers valued the
land at $2 per square foot, and both were in near-agreement on the cost of replacing the
improvements. The PTAB agreed with both appraisers that the $62 million sale price of the
property did not reflect its fair market value.
¶ 34 In considering the replacement cost approach, the PTAB determined that the subject
property had a value of $45,257,813. In considering the income approach, the PTAB
determined that the subject property had a value of $40.9 million.
¶ 35 In considering the sales comparison method, the PTAB noted that Gibbons’ Comparable
Sale 3 was the same as McCormick’s Comparable Sale 2. (The record also reveals that
Gibbons’ Comparable Sale 4 was the same as McCormick’s Comparable Sale 1.) The PTAB
considered all of the five sales McCormick had offered, which were located in Aurora,
Romeoville, and Joliet. They were improved with multitenant warehouse buildings ranging
from 315,799 to 652,056 square feet, and sold between June 2006 and December 2007 for
prices ranging from $35 to $47.14 per square foot including land. The PTAB assigned less
weight to the sales farthest away from the subject property, which sold for the lowest unit
prices.
¶ 36 The PTAB considered the six sales that Gibbons had used. It gave no weight to
Comparable Sales 1 and 6, because those sales were of the subject property and another
property in a bulk-sale transaction. The four remaining properties were improved with one-
story industrial warehouse buildings that ranged in size from 320,047 to 694,367 square feet
and were built between 1999 and 2005. Three were multitenant buildings and one was a
single-tenant property.
¶ 37 The PTAB found that the most probative sales were, like the subject property, located
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in Aurora and had unit prices ranging from $39 to $48.70 per square foot of building area,
including land. Taking into consideration the size and multitenant configuration of some of
the properties, the PTAB found that downward adjustments of price would be justified for
comparison’s sake. Further, the Board found that Gibbons’ Comparable Sale 5 was the most
comparable to the subject property. It was a single-tenant building with 694,367 square feet
of building area that was leased for $3.75 per square foot at the time it sold and had a unit
value of $46.45 per square foot of building area, including land. The subject property’s
assessment reflected a unit value of $47.48 per square foot of building area, including land.
Based on comparable sales, the Board found that Kraft’s property had a unit value of $46 per
square foot of building area, including land, which was the equivalent of $39.6 million
rounded.
¶ 38 After considering the testimony, and the different approaches to value, giving most
emphasis to the evidence of the sales in the record, the PTAB found that the property had a
market value of $40 million on January 1, 2007.
¶ 39 Kraft filed a timely notice of appeal.
¶ 40 ANALYSIS
¶ 41 Standard of Review
¶ 42 The findings of an administrative agency are prima facie correct in a case such as this,
and the court should not intervene in a case where property has been assessed higher or lower
than it should have been through a mere error of judgment by the administrative agency.
Chrysler Corp. v. Illinois Property Tax Appeal Board, 69 Ill. App. 3d 207, 210 (1979).
However, where the court is faced with potential use of an improper method of valuation,
rather than with a mere difference of opinion as to the market value of a particular parcel,
courts have intervened. Chrysler, 69 Ill. App. 3d at 210-11.
¶ 43 Illinois law requires that all real property be valued at its fair cash value, estimated at the
price it would bring at a fair voluntary sale where the owner is ready, willing, and able to sell
but is not compelled to do so, and the buyer is likewise ready, willing, and able to buy but
is not forced to do so. Chrysler, 69 Ill. App. 3d at 211. “Fair cash value” is synonymous with
fair market value, and an arm’s-length sales transaction is the best evidence thereof. Walsh
v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 181 Ill. 2d 228, 230 (1998). There are three basic methods
of evaluating real property: (1) the sales comparison approach; (2) the income approach; and
(3) the reproduction cost approach. Chrysler, 69 Ill. App. 3d at 211. In the absence of market
value established by a contemporaneous arm’s-length sale, the sales comparison approach
is the preferred method and should be used when market data are available. Cook County
Board of Review v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 384 Ill. App. 3d 472, 480-81 (2008) (Omni).
The sales comparison approach relies on sales of comparable properties in the open market
to reach a determination of the subject property’s fair cash value. Omni, 384 Ill. App. 3d at
481. The existence of market data to determine fair cash value is central to the sales
comparison (also called market) approach. Omni, 384 Ill. App. 3d at 481. The income
method is based on the property’s income-producing potential and divides the property’s net
income by a capitalization rate, which is a return on and of capital, as determined by market
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data. Department of Transportation v. Drury Displays, Inc., 327 Ill. App. 3d 881, 885
(2002). Generally, the reproduction cost approach should be emphasized only in the context
of some special-purpose property, which is defined as property of such a nature and applied
to such a special use that it cannot have a market value. Chrysler, 69 Ill. App. 3d at 212.
¶ 44 Kraft’s first argument on appeal is that the PTAB erred as a matter of law in relying on
leased-fee bulk-sale transactions, not listed on the open market, to find the market value for
the subject property. Kraft frames this issue as whether the PTAB considered appraisals that
applied the proper methodology for the valuation of the subject property. This is a legal
question that we would review de novo. Board of Education of Meridian Community Unit
School District No. 223 v. Illinois Property Tax Appeal Board, 2011 IL App (2d) 100068,
¶ 35 (Onyx). In response, the PTAB asserts that there is really no issue as to whether the
proper valuation method was employed. The PTAB points out that Kraft does not dispute
that it was appropriate for the appraisers and the PTAB to consider all three methods to value
the property, nor was it improper for everyone, including the PTAB, to give the sales
comparison approach the most weight. The PTAB argues that Kraft’s real contention is that
the PTAB erred in placing greater weight on Gibbons’ testimony than it did on McCormick’s
and Uzemack’s. As such, the appropriate standard of review of the PTAB’s decision should
be whether that decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 45 In its reply brief, Kraft insists that the PTAB is mischaracterizing its argument. Kraft
argues that the problem with the PTAB’s approach to determining the value of the property
was twofold. First, Kraft contends that the PTAB erred in considering comparables “that did
not reflect the fair market value of the fee simple absolute.” Second, Kraft argues that the
PTAB erred in “mixing and matching the comparable properties from two appraisals” and
in essence creating its own appraisal. Kraft maintains that the PTAB “is to weigh the
evidence and then decide which party has presented the more compelling evidence; it does
not permit the PTAB to create its own evidence and substitute it for those offered by trained
experts.” Kraft therefore concludes that the PTAB’s purported errors should be reviewed
de novo.
¶ 46 We find Kraft’s argument to be without merit. First, in arguing that the PTAB erred in
relying on improper comparable-sale appraisals, Kraft’s contention is premised on the notion
that the PTAB should not have relied on five of Gibbons’ comparable-sale appraisals,
because Uzemack testified that those appraisals had not been done in a way to reflect actual
market value. However, Gibbons specifically testified that his comparable-sale appraisals did
reflect actual market value. Thus, as Kraft is essentially arguing that the PTAB should have
placed greater weight on Uzemack’s testimony than on Gibbons’, we will not disturb the
PTAB’s decision unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. See Kankakee
County Board of Review v. Illinois Property Tax Appeal Board, 337 Ill. App. 3d 1070, 1074
(2003) (United Coatings).
¶ 47 Second, we reject Kraft’s contention that the PTAB erred in choosing to accept some
evidence and rejecting or discounting other evidence. Despite Kraft’s protests to the contrary,
it was not inherently improper for the PTAB to credit some of the evidence that both parties
presented. Kraft cites no authority for the proposition that the PTAB must accept evidence
from only one of the parties in a valuation dispute. Indeed, such an argument is contrary to
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existing precedent. See, e.g., Kankakee County Board of Review v. Property Tax Appeal
Board, 2012 IL App (3d) 110045, ¶¶ 6, 8, 10 (Armstrong) (taxpayer’s appraiser testified that
subject property was worth between $2.9 million and $3.15 million; county’s appraiser
testified that property was worth between $8.6 million and $10.4 million; PTAB determined
that property was worth $3.96 million); Onyx, 2011 IL App (2d) 100068, ¶¶ 4, 31 (taxpayer’s
appraisers testified that subject property was worth either $10.66 million or $9.6 million;
appraiser for school district testified that property was worth $25.9 million; PTAB
determined that property was worth $10 million); Kendall County Board of Review v.
Property Tax Appeal Board, 337 Ill. App. 3d 735, 739 (2003) (AT&T) (PTAB found that
each of the appraisals submitted was more valid than the other one as to certain points;
PTAB determined that subject property was worth different amount than either of the
appraisers had concluded).
¶ 48 We note that none of the aforementioned cases explain why the PTAB may consider
conflicting appraisals and conclude that the property is worth a different amount than what
any of the experts testified to. We believe that the reasoning of those cases is implicitly based
on the weight-of-the-evidence concept, which requires the trier of fact to find whether the
greater amount of credible evidence presented sustains the issue that is to be established.
Black’s Law Dictionary 1594 (6th ed. 1990). In making such a determination, the trier of fact
may find that both parties presented credible evidence as to a certain issue. That the trier of
fact ultimately determines that one party presented more credible evidence than the other
does not require it to discount all the evidence that the other party presented. Thus, the
PTAB’s conclusion that the property was worth a different amount than any of the appraisers
determined does not require us to employ a de novo standard of review. See AT&T, 337 Ill.
App. 3d at 739. Accordingly, as stated above, we will not disturb the PTAB’s decision unless
it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. United Coatings, 337 Ill. App. 3d at 1074.
¶ 49 Whether the PTAB’s Findings Are Against
the Manifest Weight of the Evidence
¶ 50 Kraft next argues that, even if the de novo standard of review is not applied, the PTAB’s
decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Specifically, Kraft argues that the
PTAB erred in (1) placing any weight on Gibbons’ Comparable Sales 2, 3, and 5, because
those comparables were based on leased-fee bulk-sale transactions; and (2) excluding from
consideration McCormick’s Comparable Sales 3, 4, and 5, just because those comparables
were based on properties outside of Aurora.
¶ 51 As stated above, the PTAB’s finding regarding the property’s fair market value will not
be reversed unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence, which occurs only where
“all reasonable and unbiased persons would agree that the decision is erroneous and that an
opposite conclusion is clearly evident.” United Coatings, 337 Ill. App. 3d at 1074. Moreover,
weighing evidence and determining the credibility of witnesses are jobs of the PTAB and are
uniquely in its province. AT&T, 337 Ill. App. 3d at 737. Thus, on administrative review, this
court does not reweigh the evidence, reassess the credibility of the witnesses, substitute its
judgment for that of the PTAB, or make an independent determination of the facts. AT&T,
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337 Ill. App. 3d at 737. This court will not disturb the PTAB’s findings where there exists
simply a difference of opinion regarding the actual value of the property. County of Du Page
v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 303 Ill. App. 3d 538, 541 (1999).
¶ 52 Here, the PTAB placed the most weight on the comparable sales method, which was
appropriate. Omni, 384 Ill. App. 3d at 480-81. In doing so, it also placed the most weight on
the comparable sales that were in Aurora (four of Gibbons’ and two of McCormick’s). The
PTAB found that those sales had varying degrees of similarity to Kraft’s property, with the
primary differences being in size and multitenant configuration. The PTAB found that, in
particular, Gibbons’ Comparable Sale 5 was the most similar to the subject property because
it was a large distribution warehouse nearly equal to Kraft’s in size and was leased to a single
tenant at market rent. It placed less weight on McCormick’s three comparables that were not
in Aurora, not only because they were 25 to 30 miles away from the subject property, but
because they were smaller than the subject property. As all of the PTAB’s findings are
supported by the record, we cannot say that its decision is against the manifest weight of the
evidence.
¶ 53 In so ruling, we reject Kraft’s contention that the PTAB erred in considering Gibbons’
Comparable Sale 3. We observe that Gibbons’ Comparable Sale 3 was the same as
McCormick’s Comparable Sale 2, something that Kraft specifically asked the PTAB to
consider. Kraft, thus, cannot now complain that the PTAB erred in considering McCormick’s
Comparable Sale 2. See Byer Clinic & Chiropractic, Ltd. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.,
2013 IL App (1st) 113038, ¶ 20 (party is judicially estopped from assuming a position in a
legal proceeding contrary to a position it held in a prior legal proceeding).
¶ 54 We also reject Kraft’s contention that the PTAB erred in placing any weight on Gibbons’
Comparable Sales 2 and 5 (as well as Comparable Sale 3) because those were leased-fee
bulk-sale transactions. Such transactions occur when a property is sold to real estate investors
in order to collect rental income. The transactions do not necessarily reflect market value.
Kraft’s argument as to this point is essentially that the PTAB should have placed more
weight on Uzemack’s testimony than on Gibbons’ and McCormick’s. Uzemack testified that
the leases as to Gibbons’ Comparable Sales 2, 3, and 5 were not at market rate when they
sold. Gibbons testified that they were. McCormick’s testimony also indicated that Gibbons’
Comparable Sale 3 was at market rate. As it was within the PTAB’s discretion to place more
weight on Gibbons’ and McCormick’s testimony than on Uzemack’s, we will not disturb the
PTAB’s ruling as to this point. See AT&T, 337 Ill. App. 3d at 737.
¶ 55 We further reject Kraft’s argument that the PTAB’s decision was internally inconsistent.
Kraft argues that Gibbons’ Comparable Sales 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 were all leased-fee bulk-sale
transactions. As the PTAB specifically refused to give any weight to Comparable Sales 1 and
6, Kraft argues that the PTAB’s decision was inconsistent when it nonetheless considered
Comparable Sales 2, 3, and 5. We do not find the PTAB’s decision to be internally
inconsistent. The PTAB refused to give any weight to Comparable Sales 1 and 6 because
those sales involved the subject property and a property that was involved with it in the same
sales transaction. The PTAB’s refusal to consider those properties was unrelated to its
consideration of any of the other properties that Gibbons and McCormick submitted as
comparables.
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¶ 56 We next consider Kraft’s argument that the PTAB erred in “excluding” three of
McCormick’s comparables only because they were outside of Aurora. Kraft insists that
because McCormick testified that an entity wanting to use a large warehouse would consider
the entire Chicago area as the market for such a warehouse, and because that testimony was
unrebutted, the PTAB was obligated to place significant weight on those comparables.
¶ 57 We first observe that Kraft mischaracterizes the PTAB’s findings. The PTAB did not
indicate that it was excluding those three comparables. Rather, it just indicated that it was
placing less weight on those properties because they were not close to the subject property.
The PTAB also found that those properties had lower values than the properties in Aurora
that both McCormick and Gibbons had considered as comparables. We also note that the
record indicates that the subject property was close to an interstate highway, something that
Gibbons indicated increased the value of the property. Although McCormick testified that
his Comparable Sale 3 in Romeoville was close to I-55, he indicated that his Comparable
Sale 4 in Joliet was in an inferior location to the subject property. McCormick did not
indicate how close the property in Comparable Sale 5 was to an interstate. As we cannot say
that all reasonable people would take a different position than the PTAB did in placing less
weight on the properties outside of Aurora, the PTAB’s decision on this point is not against
the manifest weight of the evidence. See United Coatings, 337 Ill. App. 3d at 1074.
¶ 58 As to Kraft’s argument that the PTAB was obligated to place greater weight on the three
properties outside of Aurora because no one rebutted McCormick’s testimony that the entire
Chicago area was the market for someone looking for a large warehouse (and therefore the
properties outside of Aurora were indeed comparable), we note that Kraft cites no authority
for the proposition that a trier of fact must accept certain testimony just because it is
unrebutted. Indeed, if Kraft’s argument were valid, it would remove some of the discretion
from the trier of fact as to how much weight should be afforded various evidence. That we
decline to do. Cf. People v. McCoy, 140 Ill. App. 3d 868, 873 (1986) (jury was free to reject
any or all of defendant’s testimony even though it was not directly contradicted by other
eyewitnesses).
¶ 59 Finally, we find Kraft’s reliance on Armstrong, 2012 IL App (3d) 110045, to be
misplaced. In that case, the reviewing court noted that the subject property was old, as one
of the appraisers had described it as having a “40-year weighted age.” Armstrong, 2012 IL
App (3d) 110045, ¶¶ 3, 6. Further, it had been owned and occupied by Armstrong since
construction, and it was “unique,” having been built to manufacture floor tiles in a “fairly
uncommon vertical manufacturing” process. Armstrong, 2012 IL App (3d) 110045, ¶ 3. That
process required a “very tall facility, which would not be useful for many potential industrial
users.” Armstrong, 2012 IL App (3d) 110045, ¶ 3. The subject property’s unique
characteristics of age, size, multiple stories, and vertical “rack warehouse system”
complicated the task of finding suitable comparable sales. Armstrong, 2012 IL App (3d)
110045, ¶¶ 6-7. Based on the unique nature of the subject property, the taxpayer submitted
comparable sales that were farther away from the subject property. Armstrong, 2012 IL App
(3d) 110045, ¶ 7. The board of review submitted comparables that were closer but had
multitenant configurations. The PTAB ruled in favor of the taxpayer, finding that the
multitenant properties that the board of review had submitted were not comparable to
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Armstrong’s owner-occupied single-user vertical-manufacturing facility. The PTAB also
specifically explained that the board of review’s expert had provided no information
regarding the lease terms, their lengths, or any other details for those multitenant comparable
sales. Armstrong, 2012 IL App (3d) 110045, ¶ 9. The reviewing court confirmed the PTAB’s
decision, noting that “ ‘[i]f there is any evidence which fairly supports the agency’s findings,
the decision must be sustained on review.’ ” Armstrong, 2012 IL App (3d) 110045, ¶ 17
(quoting Illini Country Club v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 263 Ill. App. 3d 410, 417
(1994)).
¶ 60 Here, Kraft argues that the PTAB should have considered comparable sales that were
farther away from the subject property, just as it did in Armstrong. However, in this case,
unlike in Armstrong, one of the taxpayer’s own experts testified that the subject property was
not unique. Indeed, both McCormick and Gibbons submitted several comparable properties
that were located in Aurora. Further, unlike in Armstrong, the expert here opposing the
taxpayer (Gibbons) provided sufficient information regarding the lease terms of the
comparable properties. Finally, we note that in Armstrong, based on the substantial deference
to which the PTAB’s decisions are entitled, the reviewing court confirmed the PTAB’s
decision. Applying that same standard of review to the case herein, and for the reasons set
forth above, we also find that the PTAB’s decision should be confirmed.
¶ 61 CONCLUSION
¶ 62 For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the PTAB is confirmed.
¶ 63 Confirmed.
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