SIXTH DIVISION
May 12, 2006
No. 1-04-1266
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County.
)
v. ) No. 98 CR 19040
)
DWIGHT HARRISON, ) The Honorable
) Vincent M. Gaughan,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE FITZGERALD SMITH delivered the opinion of the court:
Following a bench trial, defendant Dwight Harrison (defendant) was found to
have committed acts beyond a reasonable doubt which would constitute first degree
murder. Defendant, however, was found not guilty by reason of insanity and confined to
the Department of Human Services for inpatient mental health services until June 28,
2028. On appeal, defendant contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
file a motion to suppress his confession after he was found insane. He also contends
that the State failed to "prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of first degree
murder." He asks that we reverse the "findings that he caused the death of [the victim]"
and "that the case be remanded." For the following reasons, we dismiss defendant's
appeal.
No. 1-04-1266
The State presented evidence that defendant confessed to killing the victim,
Theotrie Archie. Chicago police detectives Thomas Benoit and Jean Romic learned the
identity of defendant from the victim's roommate, Noble Foggs, who had observed
defendant "stomping" on the victim's throat. The detectives found defendant at his
sister's apartment and he agreed to accompany them to the police station for
questioning in connection with the victim's death. As they left, defendant's sister, Lita
Dixon, handed the detectives a bottle of pills, indicating that defendant needed them to
sleep and for a nervous condition. After being read his Miranda rights, defendant
initially denied involvement in the victim's death. He then agreed to submit to a
polygraph test, which was to be administered the next morning. That morning,
defendant was again read his Miranda rights, whereupon he confessed to beating and
killing the victim. After detailing the event to Assistant State's Attorney (ASA) Robert
Robertson, defendant handwrote his statement indicating the same. While in custody,
defendant was never given his medication; however, according to the detectives and
ASA Robertson, he did not have trouble understanding or communicating and did not
display any bizarre behavior.
Following defendant's not guilty plea, the trial court ordered behavioral
examinations and found that defendant was fit to stand trial with medication. On
October 1, 1999, defendant filed a motion to quash his arrest and suppress his
statement. At the subsequent suppression hearing, the trial court heard testimony from
Detectives Benoit and Romic, ASA Robertson, Lita Dixon, defendant's attorney Charles
Pinkston and psychiatrist Dr. Roni Selzberg. Dr. Selzberg was ordered by the court to
evaluate defendant and render opinions regarding his mental capacity. Dr. Selzberg
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was unable to opine whether defendant intelligently waived his Miranda rights because
she could not date her impressions back to the time of his arrest. The trial court
ultimately granted defendant's motion to suppress, and the State appealed. After
thoroughly reviewing the underlying facts of the case, the reviewing court reversed the
trial court's suppression order finding that, based on the totality of the circumstances,
defendant's confession was voluntary. See People v. Harrison, No. 1-00-2279, slip op.
at 7 (September 27, 2001) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).
Specifically, that court found:
"The ultimate question is whether the absence of
defendant's medication, when considered with the totality of
the other circumstances, rendered defendant's confession
involuntary. [Citation.]
At the time of his confession, defendant was 20 years
old and of low average to average intellectual functioning.
He was admonished of his Miranda rights on at least five
occasions, indicating that he understood them. Each time
the detectives and the ASA had contact with defendant he
appeared to understand them, responded appropriately to
their questions, and was coherent. Dr. Seltzberg testified
that defendant had no form of thought disorder and had the
intellectual capacity to understand the Miranda warnings.
Defendant's behavior did not indicate that he was in
need of medication, nor did he ever ask for medication.
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No. 1-04-1266
While in custody he displayed none of the symptoms Dr.
Seltzberg testified he would likely exhibit if he was not
medicated and was having a mental decomposition.
Defendant's sister stated that when she saw defendant at
the police station[,] he was able to answer her questions and
explain what had happened. Although defendant was in
police custody for 26 hours before he confessed, he was
only questioned once during that time. He was fed and
when given the opportunity to speak alone with the ASA[,
defendant] did not complain of mistreatment." Harrison, slip
op. at 6-7.
On January 30, 2003, defense counsel renewed his motion to suppress, and the
trial court "reopened the motion" over the State's collateral estoppel objection. On July
1, 2003, however, defendant withdrew his renewed motion to suppress.
At trial, the parties stipulated to the testimony of Detective Benoit, Detective
Romic and ASA Robertson, and also stipulated to defendant's handwritten statement.
Noble Foggs testified that, on June 9, 1998, he was in his apartment when he heard
"some struggling sounds" in the hall. Foggs opened his door and saw defendant
stomping on the victim's throat as he lay motionless on the ground. Foggs said "don't
kill him" and returned to his apartment. Foggs admitted that he had been drinking and
using drugs that night and that he initially refused to speak to police officers during their
investigation.
The parties further stipulated that the victim's cause of death was due to multiple
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injuries and blunt force trauma. Both parties presented stipulated testimony relating to
defendant's mental capacity. Dr. Seltzberg opined that, within a reasonable degree of
psychiatric certainty, defendant was legally insane at the time of the offense. Dr.
Markos opined that, within a reasonable degree of psychiatric certainty, defendant
suffered from paranoid-type schizophrenia, which caused him to lack the "substantial
capacity to appreciate the criminality of his act or to conform his behavior with the
requirements of the law." Dr. Carl Wahlstrom, Jr., concluded that neither he nor any
other medical professional could render an opinion as to defendant's sanity because
defendant could not recall the events of the crime.
The trial court found that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that
defendant committed acts which would constitute first degree murder. However, it also
found that the defense proved by clear and convincing evidence that defendant was
insane at the time of the offense and, therefore, was not guilty by reason of insanity.
The trial court subsequently ordered his evaluation. At a hearing on March 19, 2004,
the court found that he was in need of mental health services on an inpatient basis.
Moreover, it stated that "[t]he maximum sentence the defendant would be required to
serve is 60 years from June 22, 1998, the date originally taken into custody, credit for
2,097 days." The court ordered defendant to the Department of Human Services for
treatment until June 28, 2028, "unless the acquitee is released early pursuant to 730
ILCS 5/5-2-4(d) or (l)." This timely appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
As a threshold matter, the State maintains that defendant's contentions on
appeal are moot and that we lack jurisdiction over this cause. See In re Andrea F., 208
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Ill. 2d 148, 156 (2003) (finding that reviewing courts generally do not decide moot
questions, which are those that present no actual controversy or existing issues and
relief cannot be granted). More specifically, the State contends that, because defendant
was found not guilty by reason of insanity, he was effectively acquitted and we cannot
grant the relief which he seeks here, which is reversal and remand of the verdict. As a
result, the State asserts, if we granted the relief requested, defendant would be exposed
to another trial in violation of double jeopardy. See People ex rel. Daley v. Crilly, 108 Ill.
2d 301, 312-13 (1985). In response, defendant argues that our court has jurisdiction
and double jeopardy is not involved because his not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI)
verdict does not amount to an acquittal, especially since he was not "set free." He
contends that, by virtue of the trial court's finding that the State met its burden beyond a
reasonable doubt, he was necessarily found guilty and he has a liberty interest that can
be cured by our reversal of this cause or remand to review his counsel's actions and the
sufficiency of the evidence presented. We agree with the State and conclude that we
cannot address defendant's appeal.
Simply put, under our system of law, an NGRI verdict is, in all form and
substance, an acquittal. An "acquittal" is defined as the " 'release, absolution or
discharge from an obligation, liability, or engagement.' " (Emphasis added.) People v.
Thon, 319 Ill. App. 3d 855, 863 (2001), quoting Black's Law Dictionary 25 (6th ed.
1990). Throughout our legal history, our nation's courts, as well as those of our own
state, have made clear that we cannot punish or hold accountable one upon whom we
cannot impose blame. See, e.g., United States v. Lyons, 739 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1984)
(Rubin, J., dissenting); Hopps v. People, 31 Ill. 385 (1863); People v. Teran, 353 Ill.
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App. 3d 720 (2004). This is the essence of the insanity defense: our collective
conscience has deemed it unjust to punish an individual who, because he is mentally ill,
does not understand the nature or quality of his conduct. See Lyons, 739 F.2d at 995
(we cannot punish where we cannot impose blame); Teran, 353 Ill. App. 3d at 730 (our
legislature has long recognized that those who lack substantial capacity to appreciate
criminality of their conduct should not be prosecuted in same manner as those who
have this capacity); see, e.g., Hopps, 31 Ill. 385 (person affected by "insanity" is not fit
for punishment). In direct contrast to this, a verdict of guilty is dependent upon the
concept of responsibility. See Lyons, 739 F.2d at 995; see, e.g., Hopps, 31 Ill. 385 (a
crime consists of the union of an act and a purposeful intention; it is this combination
which constitutes guilt). It focuses on the punishment of an individual for his "vicious
will"--his free choice to do wrong. See Lyons, 739 F.2d at 995. It is this choice that we
punish, more so than the resulting criminal act. See Lyons, 739 F.2d at 994 (guilt
involves more than a factual determination that the defendant did the act; he must also
be blameworthy); see, e.g., Hopps, 31 Ill. 385 (crime cannot be established without
sound mind). Ultimately, then, a successful insanity defense and a guilty verdict are
mutually exclusive: a defendant found to be insane at the time of the crime's
commission cannot be "guilty" because, pursuant to his mental condition, he cannot
make an effective choice regarding his behavior. See Lyons, 739 F.2d at 995; see, e.g.,
Hopps, 31 Ill. 385 (sanity is guilt and insanity is innocence). Therefore, without culpable
responsibility, guilt cannot attach and the result is an acquittal. See Lyons, 739 F.2d at
995 ("[a]n acquittal by reason of insanity is a judgment that the defendant is not guilty"
(emphasis omitted)); Teran, 353 Ill. App. 3d at 730 (a defendant who succeeds on the
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affirmative defense of insanity "escape[s] criminal responsibility"); see, e.g., Hopps, 31
Ill. 385 (any doubt regarding a defendant's sanity must result in acquittal); see also
People v. Marshall, 273 Ill. App. 3d 969, 975 (1995) (defendants found not guilty by
reason of insanity "have not been convicted of any crime"); People v. Adams, 35 Ill.
App. 3d 810, 814 (1976) ("[a] verdict of not guilty due to insanity constitutes a full
acquittal").
An NGRI verdict, then, is equivalent to an acquittal. It is strictly a finding that the
defendant is not guilty, in the same manner as any other acquittal which renders a
defendant discharged from any liability as, for example, when a defendant receives a
directed verdict, when a mistrial is declared and the defendant is not prosecuted again,
or when a jury for whatever reason determines that the defendant should be absolved
from any obligation related to the alleged crime. Merely because the reason behind a
defendant's release from responsibility is a successful claim of insanity should not
produce a different outcome; after all, the effect is the same since the defendant has
avoided liability. See, e.g., Adams, 35 Ill. App. 3d at 814 (a defendant acquitted due to
insanity "is entitled to all the protection and constitutional rights as if acquitted on any
other ground"). As such, it is imperative to note perhaps the most basic tenant of our
federal and state constitutions: a defendant who has been acquitted and declared not
guilty may not be retried on the same offense and his verdict cannot be reviewed. See
Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 64, 57 L. Ed. 2d 43, 54, 98 S. Ct. 2170, 2179
(1978) ( this is true even if the legal rulings underlying the acquittal were in error);
United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571, 51 L. Ed. 2d 642, 651, 97
S. Ct. 1349, 1355 (1977), relying on United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 41 L. Ed. 300,
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16 S. Ct. 1192 (1896); accord Crilly, 108 Ill. 2d at 312-13 (discussing and applying these
federal cases to our state); see also Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, ' 6 (no appeal may be
taken from judgment of acquittal). Therefore, because an NGRI verdict is an acquittal,
we cannot review defendant's cause here.
Further support for our conclusion can be found in the language our state
legislature chose to employ in the statutes it enacted surrounding NGRI verdicts and in
the effects that these statutes have in the treatment of defendants who obtain such
verdicts. In dealing with mental disorders, our legislature carved out a special place for
insanity verdicts based precisely on the notion of criminal responsibility. That is, a
person who, at the time of his conduct, lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the
criminality of it "is not criminally responsible." 720 ILCS 5/6-2(a) (West 2002). This is
entirely distinct from a person who, at the time of his conduct, "was not insane but was
suffering from a mental illness"; this person "is not relieved of criminal responsibility"
and "may be found guilty." 720 ILCS 5/6-2(c) (West 2002). While the latter, then, is "no
less guilty than one who is guilty and not mentally ill" and must serve the same
sentence as one found guilty, the former is entitled to be released from any sort of
custody the very moment he has recovered his sanity and is no longer dangerous to
society; he is, for all intents and purposes, a free man who does not have to serve any
sentence whatsoever. Compare People v. Crews, 122 Ill. 2d 266, 277-78 (1988) (a
defendant found "guilty but mentally ill" is forever held to be criminally responsible for
his conduct just as one found guilty), with People v. Hampton, 121 Ill. App. 3d 273, 277
(1983) (an NGRI defendant is an acquittee who has not been convicted and therefore
should not be punished).
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Our Code of Criminal Procedure confirms this:
"If the defendant is found not guilty by reason of insanity, the court
shall enter a judgment of acquittal * * *." (Emphasis added.) 725 ILCS
5/104-25 (c) (West 2002).
That section then mandates that we turn to section 5-2-4 of the Unified Code of
Corrections, which deals with proceedings after "Acquittal by Reason of Insanity." See
730 ILCS 5/5-2-4 (West 2002). Once the acquittal is entered, the trial court orders an
evaluation by the Department of Human Services and, based upon this evaluation, may
very well find the not-guilty defendant "a person not in need of mental health services."
730 ILCS 5/5-2-4(a) (West 2002). If it does, then, in keeping with the conclusion that an
acquitted person has no criminal responsibility, the court must order the defendant
"discharged from custody." 730 ILCS 5/5-2-4(a) (West 2002); see also 730 ILCS 5/5-2-
4(h) (West 2002) ("[i]f the Court finds that the defendant is no longer in need of mental
health services it shall order the facility director to discharge the defendant").
Consequently, even though a defendant with an NGRI verdict may be detained for
involuntary commitment, he is not serving a "sentence" for a crime and could
conceivably spend virtually no time in custody if he is immediately found not to be in
need of mental health services. Those defendants found guilty or guilty but mentally ill
do not have this option, since they can never escape the declaration of their guilt. See,
e.g., 720 ILCS 5/6-2 (West 2002).
Ultimately, a defendant who has obtained an NGRI verdict is free. Although he
may be detained for an evaluation or even for a stay in a mental health facility, it is just
a matter of time before he is released and discharged forever from custody, as any
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acquitted defendant. See People v. Shelton, 281 Ill. App. 3d 1027, 1036 (1996)
(insanity acquittee can be held only as long as he is mentally ill). The confinement he
may experience does not change the fact that he was found "not guilty" and has been
acquitted from all liability; any confinement in this regard is not "punishment" but, rather,
treatment and protection. See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 368-69, 77 L. Ed.
2d 694, 708, 103 S. Ct. 3043, 3051-52 (1983) ("purpose of commitment following an
insanity acquittal" is to treat individual's mental illness and protect him and society; we
cannot excuse liability and at the same time punish, for, "[a]s he was not convicted, he
may not be punished"); Shelton, 281 Ill. App. 3d at 1035-36 ("[b]ecause [insanity
acquittees] have not been convicted of a crime, they may not be punished"); Foucha v.
Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80, 118 L. Ed. 2d 437, 448, 112 S. Ct. 1780, 1785 (1992)
(same); see also Marshall, 273 Ill. App. 3d at 975.
This is not to say that a defendant who has obtained an NGRI verdict has
absolutely no appellate rights following his trial. We do not imply this at all with our
holding here. Rather, we recognize several cases where our courts have heard claims
from such acquittees. See, e.g., Williams v. Staples, 208 Ill. 2d 480 (2004) (appeal from
denial of habeas petition after NGRI verdict); People v. Jurisec, 199 Ill. 2d 108 (2002)
(review of trial court's commitment determination and calculation of Theim date); People
v. Pastewski, 164 Ill. 2d 189 (1995) (review of use of "extended term sentencing" in
determining insanity acquittee's commitment time); People v. Markwart, 327 Ill. App. 3d
80 (2001) (appeal from trial court's approval of treatment plan); People v. Owens, 269
Ill. App. 3d 152 (1994) (appeal from denial of motion to modify treatment after NGRI
finding); People v. White, 165 Ill. App. 3d 249 (1988) (appeal of involuntary commitment
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order following NGRI verdict). It must be noted, however, that these cases involved
challenges based on the postacquittal process involved in our statutory scheme and not
on the review of the propriety of the substantive NGRI determinations. Thus, while an
NGRI defendant may state a claim regarding the location of his commitment, how long
he is committed for, standards of proof for commitment, the determination of his
dangerousness, the details of his treatment process, or the procedures surrounding his
discharge, he is foreclosed, by virtue of his acquittal, from challenging the underlying
NGRI finding.
A recent and correlative case to the instant one is State v. Baxley, 102 Haw. 130,
73 P.3d 668 (2003). There, the defendant had been charged with attempted assault,
terroristic threatening and kidnaping and was acquitted on all charges by reason of
insanity after a bench trial. He appealed, contending, in part, that the trial court erred by
acquitting him of kidnaping on the ground of insanity because there was insufficient
evidence against him on this charge. Upon review, the state supreme court concluded
that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the cause. The Baxley court noted that appellate
jurisdiction in a criminal case requires that the defendant be "aggrieved": that his
substantive rights be affected or prejudiced. See Baxley, 102 Haw. at 133-34, 73 P.3d
at 671-72. It reasoned that, because the defendant had not been convicted but, rather,
had been found insane, he was effectively acquitted, his rights had not been adversely
impacted, and, therefore, he was not aggrieved. See Baxley, 102 Haw. at 133-34, 73
P.3d at 671-72. Since the defendant failed to demonstrate that he had been prejudiced
by the acquittal, the Baxley court determined that it did not have jurisdiction to address
the substance of his contention on appeal regarding sufficiency of the evidence. See
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Baxley, 102 Haw. at 134, 73 P.3d at 672.
Just as the defendant in Baxley, defendant here has not been aggrieved; to the
contrary, he has been acquitted by the NGRI verdict and faces no criminal
responsibility. Though he may be confined, he is not so because of guilt but, rather, for
his and society's safety, pending a conclusion issued by the trial court that he is no
longer in need of mental health services. Once that occurs, his literal freedom will
accompany his already-guaranteed legal freedom. Defendant raised the issue of
insanity at trial--it was he who proposed it and presented supportive evidence--and he
won his acquittal from the crime charged on that ground. He cannot be heard to return
before our courts, for there is no greater substantive relief we can impart upon him than
the freedom from any guilt which he has already received. Accordingly, we have no
jurisdiction over him or his cause.
Even were this not so, and even were we to instead review defendant's claims on
appeal, we would still conclude that they have no substantive merit and cannot stand in
light of the record before us.
Defendant first contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a
motion to suppress his statement after the trial court determined he was insane. To
successfully allege ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must prove that his
counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and
prejudiced the defense of his case. See People v. Moore, 356 Ill. App. 3d 117, 121
(2005), citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693, 104
S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984).
Here, defense counsel filed a pretrial motion to suppress defendant's statement.
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Although the motion to suppress was initially granted by the trial court, the reviewing
court reversed the trial court's suppression order because it found that, based on the
totality of the circumstances, defendant's confession was voluntary. See Harrison, slip
op. at 7.
While a confession by an insane person must be suppressed because it could
not be made intentionally, a court may, after considering all of the evidence, determine
that a defendant was sane at the time he confessed and that the confession was
voluntary. See People v. Lamerson, 190 Ill. App. 3d 52 (1989) (rejecting psychologist's
opinion that the defendant was insane at the time of statement and finding that, based
on the testimony of two police officers, he understood Miranda warnings and voluntarily
made statement).
In the instant case, on appeal from the trial court's suppression order, the
reviewing court thoroughly analyzed the circumstances surrounding defendant's
confession and determined that it was voluntary. See Harrison, slip op. at 7. Unlike the
psychiatrist in Lamerson, Dr. Seltzberg was unable to render an opinion regarding
whether defendant intelligently waived his Miranda rights at the time of his confession.
Moreover, Dr. Selzberg's testimony, coupled with that of the detectives and ASA
Robertson, demonstrated that defendant's confession was voluntary. Defendant
maintains that the trial court's insanity finding contradicts the reviewing court's
assessment of his intellectual functioning as "low average to average." However,
defendant fails to cite any authority to support his contention. We are not persuaded by
his argument, especially since the reviewing court clearly considered numerous factors
in making its determination, none of which was dispositive on its own. See People v.
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Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d 484, 500 (1996). Accordingly, defendant has not demonstrated the
necessary prejudice to support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Defendant next contends that the State failed to prove he committed acts
constituting first degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt. When reviewing the
sufficiency of the evidence, it is necessary to determine "whether, after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." (Emphasis
in original.) Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560, 573, 99 S. Ct.
2781, 2789 (1979). It is within the province of the trial court to properly assess the
credibility of witnesses, determine the appropriate weight of the testimony and resolve
conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence. See People v. Evans, 209 Ill. 2d 194, 211
(2004). Therefore, we will not retry a defendant or substitute our judgment for that of
the trial court. See Evans, 209 Ill. 2d at 209.
Defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to support his guilt because
his confession should have been suppressed and Foggs' testimony was unreliable.
Because we have already determined that defendant's confession was properly
considered by the trial court, we turn to Foggs' testimony. Defendant attacks Foggs'
testimony on the bases of "observational difficulties," "inconsistencies," and a "motive to
lie." Specifically, he maintains that Foggs' testimony was flawed because Foggs
observed very little of the underlying incident and was intoxicated at the time; his
statements were inconsistent with Detective Benoit's testimony; and he incriminated
defendant only after having taken a lie detector test. Defendant's attacks, however, go
only to the credibility of Foggs' testimony, which was properly assessed by the trial
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court. See Evans, 209 Ill. 2d at 211. Moreover, the trial court was the proper forum for
determining what weight to give Foggs' testimony and for resolving any inconsistencies
within it or among the other witnesses' testimonies presented at trial. See Evans, 209
Ill. 2d at 211. Again, we will not substitute our judgment in this regard for that of the trial
court, especially when we are unaware what weight, if any, the trial court placed on
Foggs' testimony. See Evans, 209 Ill. 2d at 209. Therefore, we conclude that there was
sufficient evidence for the trial court to find that defendant committed acts constituting
first degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for all the foregoing reasons, we dismiss defendant's appeal.
Appeal dismissed.
McNULTY, P.J., and TULLY, J., concur.
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