SIXTH DIVISION
March 10, 2006
No. 1-05-0402
In re MARRIAGE OF CAROLINE ) Appeal from the
ANN SAPUTO, ) Circuit Court of
) Cook County
)
Petitioner-Appellant, )
)
) No. 65 D 10478
and )
)
)
LOUIS SAPUTO, ) Honorable Leida Santiago
) Judge Presiding
Respondent-Appellee. )
)
)
PRESIDING JUSTICE McNULTY delivered the opinion of the
court:
Petitioner Caroline Ann Saputo appeals from an order of the
circuit court of Cook County dismissing her petition for revival
of judgment. Caroline filed her petition in order to obtain
payment from her former husband, Louis Saputo, for child support
due pursuant to a divorce decree entered in 1966. The circuit
court found the petition to be time-barred by section 13-218 of
the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/13-218 (West
2004)). We find that Caroline's petition was not time-barred in
light of the July 1, 1997, amendment to section 12-108(a) of the
Code (735 ILCS 5/12-108(a) (West 2004)), which provides that
child support judgments may be enforced at any time. We
therefore reverse and remand.
No. 1-05-0402
BACKGROUND
Caroline and Louis married on August 16, 1958, and four
children were born as a result of that marriage. Thereafter,
Caroline filed for divorce, and the circuit court issued a
divorce decree on June 15, 1966. Pursuant to the decree, the
court awarded Caroline sole care and custody of the minor
children and ordered Louis to pay $30 per week for support,
maintenance, and education of the minor children.
On August 30, 2004, Caroline filed a petition titled
"Petition for Revival of Judgment" contending that Louis had
failed to make any child support payments since the divorce
decree was entered in 1966. Caroline alleged that Louis owed her
the sum of $375,529.71 in child support arrearages after
calculation of interest at the rate of 9% per annum.
On October 6, 2004, Louis moved for involuntary dismissal of
the petition pursuant to section 2-619(a)(5) of the Code (735
ILCS 5/2-619(a)(5) (West 2004)). Louis contended that Caroline's
petition for revival was time-barred under section 13-218 of the
Code, which only permits revival of judgments within 20 years of
the judgment date. See 735 ILCS 5/13-218 (West 2004). Louis
noted that each child support payment due from him constituted a
separate money judgment on the date it was due. Because the last
such installment was due on or before September 14, 1982, the
last judgment became barred by the 20-year statute of limitations
on September 14, 2002.
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Louis acknowledged that section 12-108(a) of the Code
provides that "[c]hild support judgments, including those arising
by operation of law, may be enforced at any time." 735 ILCS
5/12-108(a) (West 2004). However, Louis contended that this
section applies to public aid cases only. Louis cited to the
annotated comments showing that this portion of section 12-108(a)
was an amendment that took effect on July 1, 1997, pursuant to
Public Act 90-18, which dealt with changes to the child support
enforcement program under Title III of the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996.
735 ILCS Ann. 5/12-108, Historical and Statutory Notes, at 698
(Smith-Hurd 2003). Louis also cited to session records of the
corresponding House Bill 1707 that he contended supported a
finding that the 1997 amendment to section 12-108(a) applied to
public aid cases only.
On January 27, 2005, the circuit court issued its order
dismissing Caroline's petition. The court agreed with Louis that
legislative history and intent supported a finding that the 1997
amendment to section 12-108(a) applied only to public aid cases
and further noted that a subsequent appellate court case, In re
Marriage of Smith, 347 Ill. App. 3d 395 (2004), had applied the
20-year statute of limitations in 13-218 to a non-public-aid case
despite the 1997 amendment to section 12-108(a). Caroline now
appeals from the circuit court's order of dismissal.
ANALYSIS
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No. 1-05-0402
In this appeal, Caroline contends that her action was not
time-barred pursuant to the plain language of section 12-108(a)
of the Code and that the circuit court erred in restricting the
language therein to public aid cases. Resolving this issue is
solely a matter of statutory construction, which we review de
novo. People ex rel. Department of Public Aid v. Smith, 212 Ill.
2d 389, 396-97 (2004).
"The primary objective in construing a statute is to
determine and give effect to the legislature's intent." Smith,
212 Ill. 2d at 397. The best evidence of legislative intent is
the language used in the statute, which must be given its plain
and ordinary meaning. King v. First Capital Financial Services
Corp., 215 Ill. 2d 1, 26 (2005). If the legislative intent can
be ascertained from the language of the statute itself, it must
prevail and be given effect without resorting to other aids for
construction. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Aldridge, 179 Ill.
2d 141, 149, 151 (1997). The court may not depart from the plain
language of the statute by reading into it exceptions,
limitations or conditions which conflict with the clearly
expressed legislative intent. Aldridge, 179 Ill. 2d at 149.
Here, Louis admits that each of his weekly child support
obligations became a separate judgment in favor of Caroline and
against him on the date it became due. See 750 ILCS 5/505(d)
(West 2004). He also admits that the 1997 amendment to section
12-108(a) added that child support judgments may be enforced at
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No. 1-05-0402
any time. He contends, however, that this provision of the Code
conflicts with section 13-218, which places a 20-year limitations
period on the revival of money judgments. He further contends
that the resulting ambiguity requires us to turn to the
legislative history behind the 1997 amendment to section 12-
108(a) in interpreting its application and limiting it to public
aid cases only. We disagree.
Section 12-108(a) of the Code is titled "Limitation on
enforcement" and provides in relevant part as follows:
"(a) Except as herein provided, no judgment
shall be enforced after the expiration of 7 years
from the time the same is rendered, except upon
the revival of the same by a proceeding provided
by section 2-1601 of this Act ***. *** Child
support judgments, including those arising by
operation of law, may be enforced at any time."
735 ILCS 5/12-108(a) (West 2004).
The last sentence with respect to child support judgments
comprises the 1997 amendment, which became effective July 1,
1997. 735 ILCS Ann. 5/12-108, Historical and Statutory Notes, at
698 (Smith-Hurd 2003).
The language added by the 1997 amendment plainly and
unambiguously provides that child support judgments may be
enforced at any time, and section 12-108(a) as amended thus
excludes child support judgments from those judgments that have a
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No. 1-05-0402
time limit on their enforcement and require revival. There is no
limitation restricting this exception for child support judgments
to public aid actions, and this court cannot read such a
restriction into the statute's plain and unambiguous terms.
Aldridge, 179 Ill. 2d at 149, 154-55.
Nor do we find that section 13-218 conflicts with section
12-108(a). Section 13-218 is titled "Revival of judgment" and
provides in relevant part as follows:
"Judgments in a circuit court may be revived
as provided by Section 2-1601 of this Act, within
20 years next after the date of such judgment and
not after ***." 735 ILCS 5/13-218 (West 2004).
Section 13-218 by its plain terms places a 20-year
limitations period on the revival of judgments. The 1997
amendment to section 12-108(a), however, excepts child support
judgments from those judgments that require revival. See 735
ILCS 5/12-108(a) (West 2004). Since actual enforcement of child
support judgments may occur "at any time" pursuant to the amended
section 12-108(a), there is no need for revival of these
judgments under section 13-218. Compare 735 ILCS 5/12-108(a) and
13-218 (West 2004); see also First National Bank of Marengo v.
Loffelmacher, 236 Ill. App. 3d 690, 695 (1992) (noting that since
enforcement of judgments may occur up until the expiration of the
seven-year period under section 12-108(a), there is no
concomitant need for revival under section 13-218 during that
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No. 1-05-0402
period).
This is further evident in looking to section 2-1602 of the
Code. 735 ILCS 5/2-1602 (West 2004). Section 2-1602 became
effective on August 21, 2002, and sets forth the mechanism for
reviving a judgment. The section specifically provides that it
"does not apply to a child support judgment ***, which need not
be revived as provided in this [s]ection and which may be
enforced at any time as provided in [s]ection 12-108." 735 ILCS
5/2-1602(g) (West 2004). It is thus clear that the 1997
amendment to section 12-108(a) excepts child support judgments
from the application of section 13-218 and its 20-year
limitations period for revival of judgments.
We recognize that Caroline here titled her petition one for
revival of judgment. However, it is apparent from her petition
that she was seeking payment pursuant to the 1966 divorce decree
ordering weekly child support. In light of our holding that
revival is not necessary under section 12-108 because child
support judgments may be enforced at any time, we construe her
petition as one seeking enforcement of these weekly judgments and
conclude that the circuit court erred in finding this petition
time-barred under section 13-218 of the Code.
In reaching this conclusion, we recognize that past Illinois
case law has applied the 20-year statute of limitations contained
in section 13-218 to child support judgments. See, e.g., In re
Marriage of Kramer, 253 Ill. App. 3d 923, 927 (1993); People ex
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No. 1-05-0402
rel. Wray v. Brassard, 226 Ill. App. 3d 1007, 1013-14 (1992); In
re Marriage of Yakubec, 154 Ill. App. 3d 540, 544 (1987); Wadler
v. Wadler, 325 Ill. App. 83, 93 (1945). We observe, however,
that this case law was promulgated prior to the 1997 amendment to
section 12-108(a), which allows child support judgments to be
enforced at any time. See 735 ILCS 5/12-108(a) (West 2004).
For this reason, we also reject the circuit court's and
defendant's reliance on In re Marriage of Smith, 347 Ill. App. 3d
395. The court there was faced with a challenge to the
enforcement of child support judgments based on laches and, in
evaluating this argument, relied on case law from 1993 in stating
that the 20-year limitations period contained in section 13-218
applied to these judgments. In re Marriage of Smith, 347 Ill.
App. 3d at 402, citing Kramer, 253 Ill. App. 3d at 927. There is
no indication that the court there considered the application of
section 12-108(a) to these judgments. However, as stated, we
find section 12-108(a) is applicable and, since its 1997
amendment, excepts child support judgments from the application
of the limitations period in section 13-218.
We find this conclusion dispositive of the issue on appeal;
however, we observe that neither party has addressed whether the
1997 amendment to section 12-108(a) applies retroactively so as
to enable Caroline to enforce those child support judgments that
had become time-barred under section 13-218 at the time the 1997
amendment to section 12-108(a) became effective on July 1, 1997.
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No. 1-05-0402
See, e.g., Kramer, 253 Ill. App. 3d at 928 ("Subsequent
legislation extending the statute of limitations cannot be
applied retroactively to revive a time-barred cause of action
unless the legislature indicates otherwise ***"). We do not
reach this issue now because it is clear that part of the child
support installments due pursuant to the June 15, 1966, divorce
decree were not barred by the 20-year statute of limitations on
July 1, 1997. We thus leave the issue of retroactivity for the
circuit court's consideration after a full briefing on remand.
As stated, we find that the circuit court erred in
dismissing Caroline's petition based on the statute of
limitations contained in section 13-218 of the Code. We
therefore do not reach Caroline's further contention that the
circuit court violated her equal protection rights in holding
that section 12-108(a) applies to public aid cases only. We
remand this cause for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
TULLY and FITZGERALD-SMITH, JJ., concur.
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