SECOND DIVISION
May 22, 2007
No. 1-05-3123
In re MALCOLM H., a Minor )
) Appeal from the
(The People of the State of Illinois, ) Circuit Court of
) Cook County.
Petitioner-Appellee, )
)
v. )
)
Malcolm H., a Minor, ) Honorable
) Marianne Jackson,
Respondent-Appellant). ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE SOUTH delivered the opinion of the court:
Minor respondent Malcolm H. appeals from an order of the
circuit court of Cook County adjudicating him delinquent of
battery and placing him on probation for one year. On appeal,
respondent challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain
the delinquency determination made by the court.
The State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship
alleging that respondent was delinquent based on his commission
of aggravated battery and aggravated assault against two school
employees, Verthola Webb and Victor Martin, on school grounds.
At the adjudicatory hearing, the State amended the petition to
add a third count of simple battery against Martin, then
presented testimony from the two alleged victims.
Verthola Webb testified that on October 8, 2004, she was
employed as a security monitor at Frederick Douglass Junior High
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School, which was located at 543 North Waller Street in Chicago.
That morning, Webb saw respondent in the hallway with two other
students and instructed them to go to class. She asked
respondent if he had received his new class schedule and
attempted to take him to retrieve it, but respondent was
uncooperative and told her that she had "no business approaching
him." Respondent began swearing at her, and Webb felt that he
had threatened her life.
While Webb and respondent were arguing, Dr. Tawana Ewing,
the assistant principal, came out of her office and attempted to
quiet respondent. Respondent, however, continued his verbal
threats and stated that "some people are going to come up dead."
At that point, Webb saw Officer Victor Martin and told him that
she wanted respondent arrested. When Officer Martin told
respondent that they were going to the discipline office,
respondent walked in front of him, and Webb observed respondent
hit Officer Martin in the rib cage with his elbow.
Officer Martin testified that on the day in question, he was
employed by the board of education as a security supervisor at
the school. He then provided his star number and described the
uniform he was wearing that day as a blue jacket with "Board of
Education" and Chicago Public School (CPS) security labels on the
front and back. After Webb approached him, Officer Martin
attempted to escort respondent to the discipline office, but
respondent refused to accompany him. After they argued for a few
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minutes, respondent got up from the table where he was sitting.
Officer Martin escorted respondent to the office, holding
respondent’s jacket while respondent protested.
When they reached the office, respondent knocked Officer
Martin’s hands off of him by hitting the officer with his elbows.
When Officer Martin informed respondent that he was going to
arrest him for battery, respondent attempted to resist arrest by
raising his hands in the air and knocking Officer Martin’s hands
away from him. Officer Martin handcuffed one of respondent’s
hands, and respondent used his free hand to grab Officer Martin’s
throat. After respondent let go of his throat, Officer Martin
was able to subdue respondent.
The defense called Dr. Ewing as a witness. She testified
that she was the assistant principal at the school, and on the
day in question, heard respondent and Webb arguing. She called
respondent over to a table to speak with him, and while they were
talking, Officer Martin came over to take respondent to the
discipline office. As the three of them walked there, Dr. Ewing
did not see respondent hit Officer Martin. When they reached the
office, respondent wanted to enter the office on his own, and
Officer Martin tried to handcuff him. Respondent stated that he
had not done anything to be handcuffed, and a "wrestling match"
ensued. Dr. Ewing did not see respondent grab Officer Martin’s
neck, but also testified that for a brief time, she stepped
outside the office to call security and did not see the
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altercation.
Officer Craig Williams testified that on the day in
question, he went to the school on a complaint that a student had
battered an officer and assaulted a teacher. He also testified
that he created a police report of the incident.
Respondent testified that on the day in question, he argued
with Webb and then spoke with Dr. Ewing for 15 minutes. Officer
Martin approached him while he was speaking with Dr. Ewing,
grabbed him from the table, and tried to escort him to the
discipline room. Respondent told him that he could walk to the
room on his own, but Officer Martin continued to push him and
"slammed" him three times against a table. Respondent denied
grabbing Officer Martin by the throat or hitting him, but
admitted he grabbed Officer Martin’s shirt during the struggle.
After reviewing the evidence, the court found that a
struggle had ensued as Officer Martin attempted to handcuff
respondent and that respondent had knocked Officer Martin’s hands
off of him. The court noted that respondent had placed his hands
on Officer Martin while he was trying to resist arrest and that
the officer’s arrest was warranted given the manner in which
respondent had behaved. Accordingly, the court found respondent
delinquent of simple battery.
In this court, respondent claims that he was justified in
his use of force in resisting his unlawful arrest by Victor
Martin, a private citizen, who did not have reasonable grounds to
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believe he was committing a crime at the time that he attempted
to handcuff him. As a result, he claims that the State failed to
prove him delinquent of battery beyond a reasonable doubt.
In making that argument, respondent contends that a de novo
standard of review applies because the resolution of his claim
does not entail any assessment of the credibility of witnesses or
the weight of the evidence but only the determination of whether
a set of facts was sufficient to meet the State’s burden of
proof. We disagree.
The constitutional safeguard of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt applies during the adjudicatory stage of juvenile
delinquency proceedings. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368, 25 L.
Ed. 2d 368, 377-78, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 1075 (1970); In re Smith, 40
Ill. App. 3d 248, 252-53 (1976). Since respondent essentially
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the court’s
delinquency determination, it is our responsibility to determine
whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In re
W.C., 167 Ill. 2d 307, 336 (1995).
In this case, respondent was delinquent of battery. To
sustain that determination, the evidence must show that
respondent intentionally or knowingly without legal justification
and by any means caused bodily harm to an individual or made
physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature with an
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individual. 720 ILCS 5/12-3(a) (West 2004).
Here, respondent does not contest the evidence showing that
he intentionally or knowingly made physical contact with Officer
Martin. Rather, he challenges the "legal justification" element,
contending that he was justified in his use of force in resisting
arrest by Victor Martin, who was a private citizen and had no
authority to effectuate an arrest because respondent was not
committing an offense at the time. In making that argument,
respondent maintains that the State did not establish that Martin
was a "peace officer," and he could therefore resist an unlawful
arrest by a private citizen.
The State responds that a rational trier of fact could have
found that the evidence established that Officer Martin was a
peace officer and that respondent had no legal justification for
his actions.
We initially observe that respondent never questioned
Officer Martin’s status as an officer or his commensurate
authority at the hearing, nor sought to excuse his actions on the
officer’s lack of authority to detain him. Rather, the defense
focused on whether respondent caused Officer Martin bodily harm,
a claim abandoned on appeal. That said, our review of the
evidence, in the light most favorable to the prosecution, shows
that it was more than sufficient to permit the circuit court to
conclude that respondent acted without legal justification for
his actions in the committing of the battery.
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At the adjudicatory hearing, Officer Martin testified that
he was employed as a security supervisor at the school by the
board of education, and on that day, he was wearing a blue jacket
stating "Board of Education" and identifying him as a member of
"CPS Security." He also identified himself by his star number,
which was not challenged at the hearing, and, as noted,
respondent never questioned the officer’s status during the
hearing. In addition, security officer Webb, Dr. Ewing, Officer
Williams, and even respondent consistently referred to Martin as
an officer in their testimony, and he was so addressed by defense
counsel. Furthermore, Webb’s testimony showed that she deferred
to Officer Martin to detain respondent when she wanted him
arrested.
It is the function of the trier of fact to draw all
reasonable inferences from the evidence (In re W.C., 167 Ill. 2d
at 336), and in this case, we find that the evidence was
sufficient to permit the trial court to find that Officer Martin
was a peace officer and that respondent had no legal
justification to excuse his battery of the officer.
In reaching this conclusion, we find People v. Perry, 27
Ill. App. 3d 230 (1975), cited by respondent, distinguishable.
In Perry, defendant challenged the authority of Chicago Housing
Authority guards to arrest from the outset of the trial which
required the State to prove that they had authority greater than
that of private citizens. Perry, 27 Ill. App. 3d at 238. The
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court found that the State failed to do so, and thus failed to
prove that defendant’s actions for being handcuffed by them was
without legal justification. Perry, 27 Ill. App. 3d at 239.
In contrast, respondent raised no challenge at trial to the
officer’s authority to detain him and defended on other bases.
Moreover, the evidence here showed that respondent, a juvenile,
physically resisted the school’s security officer who was called
to intervene by a security monitor when respondent failed to
comply with school procedure. As we have already found, the
circumstantial evidence was sufficient to establish that Officer
Martin was a peace officer, and thus, respondent’s actions
towards him were not legally justified.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of
Cook County.
Affirmed.
WOLFSON, P.J., and HOFFMAN, J., concur.
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