FIRST DIVISION
March 3, 2008
No. 1-06-2914
MICHAEL PETRASKI, Guardian of the ) Appeal from the
Estate of MARGARET PETRASKI, a ) Circuit Court of
Disabled Person, ) Cook County.
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
)
v. )
)
DEBORAH THEDOS, individually and as )
agent/employee of the SHERIFF OF )
COOK COUNTY, and MICHAEL SHEEHAN, )
SHERIFF OF COOK COUNTY, ) Honorable
) Richard J. Elrod,
Defendants-Appellants. ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE WOLFSON delivered the opinion of the court:
Margaret Petraski was seriously injured when she turned her
car into the path of a high-speeding Cook County Sheriff’s police
car driven by Officer Deborah Thedos. A jury found for
Petraski’s guardian and returned a verdict in the amount of
$35,835,684. The award was reduced by 25% to $26,876,763, based
on Petraski’s contributory negligence.
This appeal by the County and Thedos raises issues
concerning expert testimony. One of them--whether evidence of
Petraski’s consumption of alcohol should have been admitted--
causes us to reverse the judgment and order a new trial.
FACTS
On May 28, 2001, at approximately 2:26 a.m., Thedos and
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Petraski were involved in a motor vehicle accident at the
intersection of Central Avenue and Midlothian Turnpike.
Thedos was on duty as a Cook County sheriff’s police
officer. She and another officer, Yolanda Collins, were sitting
in their vehicles in a White Hen parking lot on 143rd Street. At
2:19 a.m., a police dispatcher relayed a call for help involving
an "unwanted subject, ex-wife." Officer Craig Januchowski
responded on the radio that he was en route to the call. Thedos
responded that she also was en route to the location. A third
officer, Michael Healy, responded that he would provide backup.
None of the officers notified dispatch that he or she was
proceeding "code," a phrase meaning a request for permission to
proceed at a high rate of speed with emergency lights and siren
activated.
Thedos testified she responded to the call as if it were an
emergency. About two blocks before each intersection, she
manually operated her siren, which emitted a "whoop-whoop" sound.
Her emergency lights were on at all times. As she traveled east
on Midlothian Turnpike toward Central Avenue, Thedos saw a red
light facing her at the intersection. She slowed and checked
both sides of the intersection to make sure other drivers saw and
heard her. She saw no northbound or southbound traffic. To her
left, she saw a green light that controlled northbound traffic on
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Central. To her right, she saw a "green glow" for southbound
traffic on Central. When Thedos was 20 feet from the
intersection, she saw Petraski’s car stopped in the left-turn
lane facing west on Midlothian. Thedos proceeded through the red
light at the intersection. Petraski made a left turn in front of
Thedos’ vehicle. The two cars collided. Petraski was severely
injured in the collision.
Officer Yolanda Collins responded to the scene. She
testified Thedos’ emergency lights were on when Thedos left the
White Hen, and the lights were still on when she arrived at the
accident scene. Five witnesses who lived near the accident scene
testified they heard the sound of the crash. Two of the
witnesses said they heard a police siren before the crash. The
other three witnesses did not hear a siren. Four of the
witnesses saw the emergency lights activated on Thedos’ squad car
when they viewed the accident scene. The fifth witness said she
saw a police car with its lights on but did not specify whether
they were emergency lights.
Plaintiff’s expert witness Arnold Siegel estimated Thedos’
car was going 70 to 75 miles per hour at the time of impact. He
estimated the speed of Petraski’s car at 15 to 20 miles per hour.
In his reconstruction of the accident, Siegel assumed Petraski
had a green left-turn arrow when she turned. He based that
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assumption on Thedos’ testimony that Petraski’s car was stopped
in the left-turn lane, the fact that there was another car
stopped on Midlothian on the eastbound side, and the sequencing
of the lights at the intersection. Siegel testified the traffic
lights on northbound and southbound Central could not be green at
the same time.
DECISION
I. Blood-Alcohol Evidence
The jury heard no evidence that Petraski was intoxicated or
found to have an elevated blood-alcohol level. Prior to trial,
the court granted the plaintiff’s motion in limine barring any
evidence that the plaintiff consumed alcohol, was intoxicated, or
any other reference to alcohol.
Defendants sought to introduce expert witness James
O’Donnell, who would have testified that a test of Petraski’s
blood following the accident revealed an elevated blood-alcohol
level, and that Petraski’s blood-alcohol level would have been
above .08 at the time of the accident.
Defendants’ offer of proof included the transcript of
O’Donnell’s discovery deposition. If called to testify,
O’Donnell would have testified he is board-certified in
pharmacology, has been qualified in the past as an expert in
pharmacology, and has testified as an expert concerning blood-
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alcohol test results and the effects of blood-alcohol test levels
on individuals operating motor vehicles. He reviewed medical
records, police reports, laboratory test results, and depositions
of witnesses. Among the documents he reviewed was a Christ
Hospital blood test result for Petraski that revealed a blood
serum reading of 116 milligrams per deciliter, or .116 grams per
deciliter. That test was conducted at 4 a.m. on May 28, 2001,
approximately 1 1/2 hours after the accident.
O’Donnell would testify the blood serum level must be
converted to a whole blood equivalent. He performed the
conversion by lowering the blood serum results by 18%, according
to statute or regulation. Using the 1.18 conversion factor, he
would opine the serum blood alcohol level converted to whole
blood equivalent would be approximately .095 or .096. O’Donnell
testified the conversion factors generally range from 1.09 to
1.22. Nevertheless, he would opine that even if the conversion
factor were as high as 1.25, Petraski’s blood alcohol level would
have exceeded .08, the statutory presumptive level of
intoxication.
O’Donnell would testify he assumed Petraski’s blood-alcohol
level was in the elimination phase during the entire period after
the accident. With that assumption, he performed retrograde
extrapolation to obtain a blood-alcohol level at the time of the
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accident, in effect, a backward estimate. He would testify that
22 to 24 units of alcohol would have to be added back, bringing
Petraski’s blood-alcohol level to the range of .116 to .120 at
the time of the accident.
Plaintiff’s counsel had an opportunity to cross-examine
O’Donnell at the deposition. O’Donnell admitted he did not know
when Petraski started and stopped drinking, what she drank or
ate, or how much she drank. He recognized a number of factors
could influence the conversion rate from blood serum to whole
blood. He recognized Petraski could have been in the absorption
phase for some of the alcohol. He agreed absorption rates vary
between individuals, from 45 minutes to 3 hours.
O’Donnell opined that Petraski’s blood-alcohol level would
have affected her depth perception, peripheral vision, and
ability to judge speeds. The threshold level of alcohol
intoxication for someone to have these visual impairments would
be .07 to .08. Petraski’s blood-alcohol level would have
affected her judgment of risk-taking because alcohol is a
disinhibitor. O’Donnell was unable to render an opinion as to
whether Petraski’s blood-alcohol level caused or contributed to
the accident. He said a blood alcohol level of .116, for "an
overwhelming majority of the population," would impair a person’s
ability to operate a vehicle safely.
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The trial court barred O’Donnell from testifying, finding
the testimony too speculative to be admissible. The court also
found the prejudicial effect of the testimony outweighed its
probative value. The court granted plaintiff’s motion in limine
to bar any evidence to suggest Petraski consumed alcohol or was
intoxicated.
Whether a motion in limine should be granted is subject to
the trial court’s discretion. Sher v. Deane H. Tank, Inc., 269
Ill. App. 3d 312, 317, 645 N.E.2d 1046 (1995). A reviewing court
will not reverse a trial court’s order allowing or excluding
evidence in limine absent a clear showing of an abuse of that
discretion. Sher, 269 Ill. App. 3d at 317. An abuse of
discretion may be found where the trial court’s ruling is
arbitrary, unreasonable, or where no reasonable man would take
the view adopted by the trial court. Hilgenberg v. Kazan, 305
Ill. App. 3d 197, 204, 711 N.E.2d 1160 (1999). The decision of
whether to admit expert testimony also is subject to an abuse of
discretion standard. Reed v. Jackson Park Hospital Foundation,
325 Ill. App. 3d 835, 842, 758 N.E.2d 868 (2001).
We first address the relevance of the proposed evidence.
"Relevant evidence is evidence that has ‘any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination
of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
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without the evidence.’ " Voykin v. Estate of DeBoer, 192 Ill. 2d
49, 57, 733 N.E.2d 1275 (2000), quoting Fed. R. Evid. 401; People
v. Monroe, 66 Ill. 2d 317, 322, 362 N.E.2d 295 (1977) (adopting
Rule 401). "[T]estimony grounded in guess, surmise, or
conjecture, not being regarded as proof of a fact, is irrelevant
as it has no tendency to make the existence of a fact more or
less probable." Modelski v. Navistar International
Transportation Corp., 302 Ill. App. 3d 879, 886, 707 N.E.2d 239
(1999), citing Dyback v. Weber, 114 Ill. 2d 232, 244-45, 500
N.E.2d 8 (1986).
"Evidence of a plaintiff’s intoxication is relevant to the
extent that it affects the care that he takes for his own safety
and is therefore admissible as a circumstance to be weighed by
the trier of fact in its determination of the issue of due care."
Marshall v. Osborn, 213 Ill. App. 3d 134, 140, 571 N.E.2d 492
(1991).
O’Donnell opined that Petraski’s blood-alcohol level at the
time of the accident was over .08, within the statutory
presumption in the Illinois Vehicle Code for driving under the
influence of alcohol. Subsection 11-501.2(b) of the Code applies
to "any civil or criminal action or proceeding arising out of
acts alleged to have been committed by any person while driving
or in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the
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influence of alcohol." 625 ILCS 5/11-501.2(b) (West 2000). A
person whose alcohol concentration is .05 or less is presumed to
not be under the influence of alcohol. 625 ILCS 5/11-501.2(b)(1)
(West 2000). An alcohol concentration between .05 and .08 does
not give rise to a presumption that the person was or was not
under the influence of alcohol, but "such fact may be considered
with other competent evidence in determining whether the person
was under the influence of alcohol." 625 ILCS 5/11-501.2(b)(2)
(West 2000). An alcohol concentration of .08 or more creates a
presumption that the person was under the influence of alcohol.
625 ILCS 5/11-501.2(b)(3) (West 2000).
Plaintiff contends the blood-alcohol evidence was irrelevant
to the issues in the case because the expert could not conclude
Petraski suffered impairment. O’Donnell opined that alcohol had
an effect on her functions, but he could not quantify the
impairment, nor could he render an opinion as to whether alcohol
caused or contributed to the accident. Plaintiff contends the
testimony only would have fueled speculation as to whether
alcohol affected Petraski’s conduct, without any supporting
evidence that the consumption caused impairment. There was no
eyewitness evidence of Petraski’s actual consumption of alcohol,
erratic driving, or physical characteristics of intoxication.
The cases plaintiff cites in support of this contention hold
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that evidence of alcohol consumption alone is inadmissible absent
other supporting evidence of intoxication. See Sullivan-Coughlin
v. Palos Country Club, 349 Ill. App. 3d 553, 561, 812 N.E.2d 496
(2004); People v. Barham, 337 Ill. App. 3d 1121, 1131-32, 788
N.E.2d 297 (2003); Bodkin v. 5401 S.P., Inc., 329 Ill. App. 3d
620, 633-34, 768 N.E.2d 194 (2002). In those cases, however, the
only evidence of intoxication was evidence of the parties’
consumption of alcohol. Here, there was evidence that Petraski’s
blood-alcohol level was more than .08 at the time of the
accident, supporting a presumption that she was under the
influence.
We find the alcohol consumption evidence is relevant to the
issue of Petraski’s contributory negligence. The plaintiff’s
expert, Siegel, told the jury Petraski accelerated as she turned,
that there would have been no accident if she had braked in the
first two seconds. The jury could have used O’Donnell’s
testimony as an explanation for Petraski’s conduct. It would
have provided the jury with a reason why Petraski turned left in
front of an on-coming emergency vehicle, green arrow or not.
Instead, plaintiff’s lawyer was left free to argue the defendants
did not "give any reason" why Petraski would have turned in front
of Thedos’ car unless she had the green arrow. The defendants
were not permitted to give a reason. See Marshall, 213 Ill. App.
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3d at 140-41.
Plaintiff also contends the evidence lacked the necessary
foundation for reliability. Expert opinion testimony generally
is admissible if the expert is qualified by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education in a field with "at least a
modicum of reliability," and the testimony would assist the jury
in understanding the evidence. Turner v. Williams, 326 Ill. App.
3d 541, 552, 762 N.E.2d 70 (2001). However, an expert’s opinion
is only as valid as the reasons for the opinion. A party must
lay a foundation sufficient to establish the reliability of the
bases for the expert’s opinion. Turner, 326 Ill. App. 3d at 552-
53.
First, plaintiff says O’Donnell had no knowledge of the
appropriate factors to perform an accurate conversion of blood
serum to whole blood. Evidence of a person’s blood-alcohol level
may be introduced through whole blood test results or blood serum
results converted into whole blood equivalents. People v.
Thoman, 329 Ill. App. 3d 1216, 1218, 770 N.E.2d 228 (2002).
Because a blood serum alcohol concentration test result can be
anywhere from 12% to 20% higher than a whole blood alcohol
concentration test result, blood serum results generally are
converted by dividing by a corresponding factor between 1.12 and
1.20. Thoman, 329 Ill. App. 3d at 1218-19.
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To perform the blood serum conversion, O’Donnell used the
conversion factor in section 1286.40 of the Illinois
Administrative Code, which provides: "[t]he blood serum or blood
plasma alcohol concentration result will be divided by 1.18 to
obtain a whole blood equivalent." 20 Ill. Adm. Code § 1286.40
(2000). That section is part of a set of regulations to
implement the sections of the Illinois Vehicle Code that govern
the offense of driving under the influence. 20 Ill. Adm. Code
1286.10 et seq. (2000).
Plaintiff says the defendants were required to prove that
the blood-test procedures in the regulations, i.e., taking the
sample in the presence of the arresting officer, were followed.
See 20 Ill. Adm. Code § 1286.320 (2000). It appears plaintiff is
not challenging the actual procedures used to collect Petraski’s
blood; rather, plaintiff argues O’Donnell’s opinion was deficient
because he was not aware of the procedures in the regulations.
Those regulations are limited to the offense of driving under the
influence. People v. Emrich, 113 Ill. 2d 343, 351, 498 N.E.2d
1140 (1986); People v. Murphy, 108 Ill. 2d 228, 236, 483 N.E.2d
1288 (1985). In a civil case, the ordinary standards of
admissibility apply to evidence of a blood-alcohol test. Cuellar
v. Hout, 168 Ill. App. 3d 416, 420-21, 522 N.E.2d 322 (1988);
Burris v. Madison County, 154 Ill. App. 3d 1064, 1069, 507 N.E.2d
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1267 (1987).
As for O’Donnell’s decision to use a conversion factor of
1.18, he testified that factors from 1.09 to 1.22 are generally
accepted in the scientific community, and even using a 1.25
conversion factor, Petraski’s blood-alcohol concentration would
have been more than .08. See People v. Cortez, 361 Ill. App. 3d
456, 468-69, 837 N.E.2d 449 (2005) (1.18 conversion factor is
generally accepted in scientific community, and defendant’s
blood-alcohol level would have measured over the statutory limit
using the conversion factor most favorable to defendant (1.20));
People v. Stipp, 349 Ill. App. 3d 955, 958, 812 N.E.2d 574 (2004)
(blood serum alcohol concentration test results are admissible
where evidence is presented that converts the results into whole
blood equivalents); People v. Menssen, 263 Ill. App. 3d 946, 953,
636 N.E.2d 1101 (1994) (simple mathematical calculation (rates
from 12% to 20%) would show translating serum-alcohol results to
blood-alcohol level still places defendant in a state of
intoxication).
Next, the plaintiff contends O’Donnell’s opinion was
unreliable because he lacked knowledge of the factors that
influence the blood serum conversion rate, such as the person’s
hydration and hemoglobin. Plaintiff also challenges the
reliability of the calculation O’Donnell used to extrapolate
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Petraski’s blood-alcohol test results to the time of the
accident. O’Donnell admitted he did not know when, what, or how
much Petraski drank, and he assumed she was in the alcohol
elimination phase during the entire period after the accident.
Since it is unlikely that a blood sample would be drawn at
the exact time of the accident, the Vehicle Code permits
extrapolation testimony estimating the alcohol level at a time
earlier than the sample was drawn. People v. Johnigk, 111 Ill.
App. 3d 941, 944, 444 N.E.2d 739 (1982).
The court in Cuellar v. Hout, 168 Ill. App. 3d 416, 522
N.E.2d 322 (1988), addressed issues similar to those raised by
the plaintiff. In Cuellar, a blood-alcohol test performed on the
plaintiff approximately two hours after the accident indicated a
blood-alcohol level of .064. James O’Donnell, the same expert in
this case, testified he performed retrograde extrapolation to
determine plaintiff’s blood-alcohol level at the time of the
accident. Cuellar, 168 Ill. App. 3d at 419. O’Donnell used a
.02-per-hour elimination rate based on plaintiff’s elevated
levels of certain enzymes. Assuming the .02-per-hour elimination
rate, and assuming plaintiff was in the elimination phase rather
than the absorptive phase during the entire period after the
accident, O’Donnell opined that plaintiff’s blood-alcohol level
was .104 at the time of the accident. Cuellar, 168 Ill. App. 3d
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at 419.
The plaintiff challenged the opinion as inadmissible,
"essentially pointing out several facts tending to impeach that
opinion." Cuellar, 168 Ill. App. 3d at 422. The plaintiff
contended O’Donnell "was testifying about a ‘hypothetical’ or
‘average’ individual rather than the defendant [sic], and that he
based his opinion on facts (that plaintiff had an empty stomach,
was at rest, drank noncarbonated alcoholic beverages, and had not
undergone trauma) not supported by the evidence." Cuellar, 168
Ill. App. 3d at 422-23. The court rejected those arguments,
finding:
"Although there was some mention of ‘average’
persons in his testimony, O’Donnell did take
into account facts specific to plaintiff
(e.g., the elevated enzyme levels) in coming
to his opinion. Also, some of the facts
plaintiff cites as significant appear to
affect primarily absorption and so would be
of little relevance if the jury concluded
that O’Donnell was correct in assuming
plaintiff was in the elimination phase
throughout the period between the accident
and the drawing of blood. We believe that
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all of the facts cited by plaintiff, which
were presented and ably argued to the jury,
go to the weight of O’Donnell’s testimony and
not its admissibility." Cuellar, 168 Ill.
App. 3d at 423, citing Wilson v. Clark, 84
Ill. 2d 186, 417 N.E.2d 1322 (1981) (burden
is on adverse party during cross-examination
to elicit facts underlying expert opinion).
Similarly, in People v. Johnigk, 111 Ill. App. 3d 941, 444
N.E.2d 739 (1982), the defendant objected to opinion evidence
using retrograde extrapolation based on a blood-alcohol level
test. The court found the witness’ expertise was well-
established; he was merely asked to render an opinion based on
his scientific knowledge and the results of a blood test.
"Additional facts relating to the number of drinks consumed by
defendant would go to the weight of his opinion evidence, not to
its admissibility." Johnigk, 111 Ill. App. 3d at 943. In Rice
v. Merchants National Bank, 213 Ill. App. 3d 790, 797, 572 N.E.2d
439 (1991), where the driver’s blood-alcohol level was .12 nearly
two hours after the accident, the court held retrograde
extrapolation testimony would have been admissible but was not a
foundational requirement for the test results to be admitted at
trial.
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O’Donnell’s opinion was not, as plaintiff suggests, based
entirely on speculation and conjecture. The factual basis for an
expert’s opinion generally does not affect his standing as an
expert; it is for the jury to determine the weight of the
opinion. Snelson v. Kamm, 204 Ill. 2d 1, 26-27, 787 N.E.2d 796
(2003). While opinions based on sheer speculation should be
stricken as irrelevant, testimony based on "expert analysis of
the known physical facts" is admissible. Modelski, 302 Ill. App.
3d at 886.
In this case, the blood-alcohol test result was the known
physical fact, and O’Donnell would have testified regarding his
expert analysis of that fact. By contrast, in the cases cited by
the plaintiff, the experts had no factual basis for their
opinions. See Modelski, 302 Ill. App. 3d at 886 (expert’s
opinions regarding a mechanical breakdown necessitating Modelski
to dismount the tractor were based on sheer speculation and
should have been stricken); Reed v. Jackson Park Hospital
Foundation, 325 Ill. App. 3d 835, 844, 758 N.E.2d 868 (2001)
(expert lacked experience and failed to indicate a reliable,
credible foundation for opinions; opinions were based on nothing
more than an educated guess).
We do not believe O’Donnell’s assumption that Petraski’s
blood-alcohol level was in the elimination phase when her blood
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was drawn is unwarranted. The blood draw took place at least
one-and-one-half hours after the collision, most probably longer
than that. Nowhere in O’Donnell’s proposed testimony was he
asked to offer an estimate of Petraski’s blood-alcohol level if
she were in the absorption phase at the time of the draw. Nor
did the plaintiff offer any such evidence.
We agree with the court in Cuellar and hold the proposed
expert testimony had a sufficient foundational basis to be
reliable. Any questions about the facts upon which O’Donnell
based his opinion would go to the weight of his opinion, to be
challenged on cross-examination.
Once evidence is found to be relevant and reliable, the
trial court must conduct a balancing test to determine
admissibility. "Relevant evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice." People v. Bedoya, 325 Ill. App. 3d 926, 937,
758 N.E.2d 366 (2001). The danger of unfair prejudice " ‘speaks
to the capacity of some concededly relevant evidence to lure the
fact finder into declaring guilt on a ground different from proof
specific to the offense charged.’ " Bedoya, 325 Ill. App. 3d at
940, quoting Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180, 136
L. Ed. 2d 574, 588, 117 S. Ct. 644, 651 (1997).
While evidence of intoxication is highly probative in a
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negligence case, it also can be extremely prejudicial; therefore,
more is required than evidence of alcohol consumption alone.
Marshall v. Osborn, 213 Ill. App. 3d 134, 140, 571 N.E.2d 492
(1991). "It must be shown that the intoxication resulted in an
impairment of mental or physical abilities and a corresponding
diminution in the ability to act with ordinary care." Marshall,
213 Ill. App. 3d at 140.
Some courts have disallowed expert testimony using
retrograde extrapolation to opine that a driver was under the
influence at the time of the accident where there was no other
evidence of intoxication. McGrew v. Pearlman, 304 Ill. App. 3d
697, 704, 710 N.E.2d 125 (1999); Reuter v. Korb, 248 Ill. App. 3d
142, 154-55, 616 N.E.2d 1363 (1993). In those cases, however,
the expert testified the driver’s blood-alcohol level at the time
of the accident would have been less than .08. McGrew, 304 Ill.
App. 3d at 704 (.05 to .06); Reuter, 248 Ill. App. 3d at 154
(.075). A blood-alcohol level between .05 to .08 does not give
rise to a presumption that the person is under the influence of
alcohol absent other evidence of intoxication. 625 ILCS 5/11-
501.2(b)(2) (West 2000). Here, the expert would have testified
Petraski’s blood-alcohol level was over .08 at the time of the
accident.
We believe expert testimony that Petraski’s blood-alcohol
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level created a presumption of intoxication was extremely
probative of whether she was partially at fault for the accident.
This is particularly true where the jury found her 25% negligent
without hearing any evidence of alcohol consumption or
intoxication.
As for the other side of the scale, we see insubstantial
risk of unfair prejudice, that is, danger that the jury might
misuse the evidence. We reverse and remand this case for a new
trial based on the trial court’s abuse of discretion in
disallowing evidence of Petraski’s blood-alcohol content. We
next address the merits of two issues which might recur upon
retrial.
II. Left-Turn Arrow and Code Violation Evidence
First, defendants object to the admission of Arnold Siegel’s
testimony regarding Petraski turning left on a green arrow.
Defendants initially objected to the testimony through a
motion in limine, but did not renew their objection at the time
of the testimony. A party must make a timely objection to
preserve an issue for appellate review. Spurgeon v. Mruz, 358
Ill. App. 3d 358, 360, 832 N.E.2d 321 (2005). "A party who,
prior to trial, unsuccessfully moves to bar certain evidence,
must object again to the evidence when it is offered." Spurgeon,
358 Ill. App. 3d at 360-61. Following denial of a motion in
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limine, if a party fails to make a contemporaneous objection at
the time of the testimony, the right to raise the issue on appeal
is waived. Illinois State Toll Highway Authority v. Heritage
Standard Bank & Trust Co., 163 Ill. 2d 498, 502, 645 N.E.2d 896
(1994). Because defendants failed to renew their objection at
the time of the testimony, we find defendants waived
consideration of the issue.
Second, defendants contend the evidence that Thedos failed
to call in "code" before proceeding at a high rate of speed with
emergency lights and sirens activated was not relevant to the
issues in the case. We find the evidence was relevant for the
jury’s determination of whether Thedos was acting in a willful
and wanton manner at the time of the collision and was properly
admitted.
Because the trial court erred when it excluded evidence of
Petraski's alcohol consumption, we reverse the court's judgment
and remand this cause for a new trial.
Reversed and remanded.
CAHILL, P.J., and GARCIA, J., concur.
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