Pendergast v. Meade Electric Co.

ILLINOIS OFFICIAL REPORTS
Appellate Court

Pendergast v. Meade Electric Co., 2013 IL App (1st) 121317

Appellate Court THOMAS PENDERGAST, as Executor of the Estate of LISA
Caption RICHTER, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MEADE ELECTRIC
COMPANY, INC., an Illinois Corporation; THORNE ELECTRIC, INC.,
an Illinois Corporation; ECONOLITE GROUP, INC., a California
Corporation, d/b/a Econolite Group Company, Econolite Control
Products, Inc., and Econolite; ALEX P. DYCHE, Individually; and
OLSSON ROOFING COMPANY, INC., an Illinois Corporation,
Defendants-Appellants (Metro Transportation Group, Inc., an Illinois
Corporation, and Traffic Control Corporation, an Illinois Corporation,
Defendants).–ROBERT R. LEATHERS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ALEX P.
DYCHE, Individually; OLSSON ROOFING COMPANY, INC., an
Illinois Corporation; MEADE ELECTRIC COMPANY, INC., an Illinois
Corporation; THORNE ELECTRIC, INC., an Illinois Corporation; and
ECONOLITE GROUP, INC., a California Corporation, d/b/a Econolite
Group Company, Econolite Control Products, Inc., and Econolite,
Defendants-Appellants (Traffic Control Corporation, an Illinois
Corporation; Metro Transportation Group, Inc., an Illinois Corporation;
and Thomas Pendergast, Executor of the Estate of Lisa Richter,
Deceased, Defendants).

District & No. First District, Second Division
Docket No. 1-12-1317

Filed August 27, 2013
Held In two actions filed in Cook County arising from a traffic accident that
(Note: This syllabus occurred in Kendall County, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
constitutes no part of denying a motion to transfer both cases to Kendall County based on the
the opinion of the court doctrine of forum non conveniens, since only two of the relevant factors
but has been prepared favored a transfer, but due to the passage of more than 30 days from the
by the Reporter of trial court’s order transferring third-party claims to Kendall County, the
Decisions for the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to consider that issue.
convenience of the
reader.)

Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, Nos. 10-L-4072, 10-L-
Review 4075; the Hon. James N. O’Hara, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.

Counsel on Steven E. Danekas and Catherine Basque Weiler, both of Swanson,
Appeal Martin & Bell, LLP, Francis J. Marasa, of Marasa & Lewis, Jeremiah P.
Connolly, of Bollinger Connolly Krause LLC, and Joseph B. Carini III,
of Johnson & Bell, Ltd., all of Chicago, for appellants.

Scott R. Clewis, of Law Offices of Thomas J. Popovich, PC, and Martin
Healy, Jr., David Huber, and Dennis M. Lynch, all of Healy Law Firm,
both of Chicago, for appellees.

Panel JUSTICE CONNORS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices Quinn and Simon concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶1 Following a traffic accident, plaintiff Robert Leathers initially filed a negligence action
in the circuit court of Kendall County. Lisa Richter was killed in that accident and plaintiff
Thomas Pendergast, as executor of her estate, filed a wrongful death and survival action in
the circuit court of Cook County. Leathers then voluntarily dismissed the Kendall County
action and refiled his action in Cook County, adding new defendants. Several defendants
moved to transfer both actions to Kendall County under the doctrine of forum non
conveniens. The circuit court of Cook County denied the motion. Defendants now appeal,

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 arguing that the court’s decision was an abuse of discretion. They also contend that the court
abused its discretion in severing third-party claims against the County of Kendall and
transferring them back to the circuit court of Kendall County. For the following reasons, we
affirm.

¶2 BACKGROUND
¶3 Lisa Richter, a resident of Oswego, Kendall County, was driving eastbound on Lewis
Street in Oswego, Kendall County, when her car collided with a truck driven by defendant
Alex Dyche of Montgomery, Kendall County, allegedly while he was in the course of his
employment with defendant Olsson Roofing Company, of neighboring Kane County. Richter
was killed instantly and her passenger, plaintiff Robert Leathers, who also lived in Kendall
County at the time, was injured. Shortly thereafter, Leathers filed a negligence action in
Kendall County against Dyche and Olsson.
¶4 Richter’s mother initially was appointed as the administrator of her estate, which was
probated in Kendall County. About a year after the accident, the probate court granted an
emergency motion to substitute Richter’s uncle, plaintiff Thomas Pendergast, as the
administrator of her estate. The same day, Pendergast, of Tinley Park, Cook County, filed the
instant lawsuit on Richter’s behalf in Cook County. Pendergast asserted wrongful death and
survival claims which pleaded negligence against defendants Meade Electric Company,
Thorne Electric, Metro Transportation Group, and Traffic Control Corporation for their
allegedly negligent design of the traffic signal system at the intersection where the accident
occurred. He also asserted negligence claims against Dyche and Olsson. Additionally,
Pendergast asserted products liability claims in negligence and strict liability against
defendant Econolite for its allegedly faulty design and manufacture of the traffic signal
equipment used at the intersection.
¶5 At about the same time, Leathers voluntarily dismissed his complaint in Kendall County
and refiled in Cook County. In his new lawsuit, Leathers reasserted his negligence claims
against Dyche and Olsson and added claims against Meade, Thorne, Metro Transportation
Group, and Traffic Control Corporation. He asserted the same products liability claims
against Econolite and Atlantic Scientific, which made component parts for the traffic signals.
Additionally, Leathers included a negligence claim against Richter.
¶6 Dyche and Olsson then filed motions to transfer both actions to Kendall County pursuant
to the doctrine of forum non conveniens. They argued that this litigation has no meaningful
connection to Cook County and that Kendall County is a more appropriate venue.
Specifically, they argued that Kendall County was more convenient for most of the parties
and that witnesses and evidence were located in or near Kendall County. The accident
occurred in Kendall County between three Kendall County residents. The two known
witnesses to the accident were residents of Kendall County and La Salle County, which is
adjacent to Kendall County. The Oswego fire department responded to the accident and
transported Leathers to a Kane County hospital. The Kendall County coroner investigated
Richter’s death. The Oswego police department investigated the accident and conducted an
accident reconstruction.

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¶7 Dyche and Olsson argued that although a plaintiff’s choice of venue ordinarily is entitled
to great weight, less deference is given to that decision when the plaintiff’s choice is not the
site of the accident or the county in which he resides. Thus, they argued that the accident did
not occur in Cook County; that Leathers’ choice of venue is not entitled to deference because
he does not live in Cook County; and that Pendergast is a nominal plaintiff whose residence
is immaterial for determining the appropriate venue. Additionally, they argued that Cook
County was not Leathers’ first choice of venue and is entitled to less deference.
¶8 Dyche and Olsson asserted that of the defendants, Meade has offices in northern Illinois,
southern Wisconsin, and northwest Indiana; Thorne is located in Carol Stream, Du Page
County; Traffic Control Corporation has offices across the Midwest, including its corporate
headquarters in Woodridge, Du Page County; and Econolite is a California corporation. They
contend that only Metro Transportation has offices in Chicago and Hoffman Estates, Cook
County, but the fact that it “merely conduct[s] business” in Cook County “does not affect the
forum non conveniens issue.”
¶9 Moreover, they argued that the public interest considerations weighed in favor of
litigating the case in Kendall County. They contend that Kendall County has a strong interest
in deciding this dispute, which involves injuries sustained by its residents in an accident
occurring within its boundaries, and it would be unfair to burden Cook County and its
potential jurors with resolving a case in which it has no interest. Thorne joined Dyche and
Olsson’s motion.
¶ 10 Meade also filed a motion to transfer. It admitted that its principle place of business is
in Cook County and it represented that Traffic Control Corporation “has a place of business
in” Cook County. Nevertheless, it argued that the alleged liability in this case arose out of
work it performed in Kendall County, making the latter the more appropriate venue.
Econolite joined Meade’s motion. Neither Metro Transportation Group nor Traffic Control
Corporation contested venue.
¶ 11 Leathers and Pendergast filed briefs in response, challenging transfer to Kendall County.
They each attached copies of the defendants’ forum non conveniens interrogatories and
admissions to support their arguments.
¶ 12 Dyche and Olsson filed a reply brief to which they attached plaintiffs’ answers to the
defendants’ requests for admissions and affidavits of seven potential witnesses attesting that
it would be inconvenient and burdensome for them to travel to Cook County to testify at trial.
Meade also filed a reply brief in which it argued that it had no relationship to the accident
and that it was named as a defendant “for the sole purpose of circumventing the forum non
conveniens motion.” It attached the deposition of an employee of the Kendall County
Highway Department to support its argument.
¶ 13 At about the same time that Dyche and Olsson filed their motions to transfer, they also
filed third-party contribution claims against the County of Kendall (County) in Leathers’ case
and in Pendergast’s case. The County then moved to transfer the third-party claims to the
circuit court of Kendall County pursuant to section 2-103(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure
(Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-103(a) (West 2010)). It argued that section 2-103(a) required that any
action brought against a governmental corporation must be brought in the county in which

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 its principal office is located.
¶ 14 Dyche and Olsson stated that they had “no grounds to object to [the County’s] motion
to transfer.” However, in the interest of judicial economy, they requested that the court either
grant their pending motions to transfer the entire action to the circuit court of Kendall County
or defer ruling on the County’s motion until their other motions to transfer have been
decided. In its reply brief, the County argued that the plaintiffs’ cases should be heard in
Cook County, but that the third-party claims against it should be severed and transferred to
the circuit court of Kendall County.
¶ 15 On September 8, 2011, the circuit court granted the County’s motion, severed the third-
party claims, and transferred them to the circuit court of Kendall County. No petition for
leave to appeal was filed following entry of that order.
¶ 16 On April 5, 2012, the circuit court entered a case management order setting a date for a
status hearing on the remaining claims and also stating, “Defendants’ motions to transfer for
forum non conveniens are all denied. 14 days to propound discovery on Metro
Transportation’s motion for summary judgment. Status on pleadings and discovery.” Dyche
and Olsson, Thorne, Meade, and Econolite (collectively, defendants) filed a timely petition
for leave to appeal that order pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 306(a)(2) (eff. Feb. 26,
2010), which this court granted.

¶ 17 ANALYSIS
¶ 18 In Illinois, an action must be commenced in: (1) the county of residence of any defendant
who is joined in good faith; or (2) the county in which the cause of action arose. Dawdy v.
Union Pacific R.R. Co., 207 Ill. 2d 167, 172 (2003); 735 ILCS 5/2-101 (West 2010). If more
than one appropriate forum exists, a defendant may invoke the doctrine of forum non
conveniens to determine which forum is most appropriate. Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 172. The
doctrine permits the court in which the action was filed to decline jurisdiction and direct the
lawsuit to an alternative forum that the court determines can better serve the convenience of
the parties and the ends of justice. Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 172.
¶ 19 In making its determination as to the appropriate forum in which the case should be tried,
the court must balance certain private and public interest factors. Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 172.
Private interest factors include: the convenience of the parties; the relative ease of access to
sources of evidence; the availability of compulsory process to secure attendance of unwilling
witnesses; the cost to obtain attendance of willing witnesses; the possibility of viewing the
premises, if appropriate; and all other practical considerations that make a trial easy,
expeditious, and inexpensive. Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 172. Public interest factors include: the
administrative difficulties caused by litigating cases in congested forums; the unfairness of
imposing jury duty on residents of a county with no connection to the litigation; and the
interest in having local controversies decided locally. Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 173.
¶ 20 Significantly, the court must also consider the plaintiff’s choice of forum. A plaintiff’s
right to select the forum is substantial and is entitled to deference. Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 173.
The plaintiff’s choice of forum should not be disturbed unless the factors weigh strongly in
favor of transfer. Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 173.

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¶ 21 However, the plaintiff’s choice of forum is not entitled to such deference in all cases.
Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 173. When a plaintiff chooses to litigate his cause of action in his home
forum or in the forum in which his accident or injury occurred, it is reasonable to assume that
the forum was chosen for reasons of convenience. Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 173. However, when
the plaintiff is foreign to his chosen forum or the events that gave rise to the litigation did not
occur in that forum, that assumption is less reasonable and his choice is afforded less
deference. Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 173-74. In fact, our supreme court has said that under those
circumstances, it is instead reasonable to conclude that the plaintiff engaged in forum
shopping to suit his individual interests, which is disfavored. Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 174.
¶ 22 Thus, in ruling on a motion to transfer, the circuit court must take all of these factors into
account and give each factor proper deference or weight under the circumstances. Dawdy,
207 Ill. 2d at 176 (quoting Griffith v. Mitsubishi Aircraft International, Inc., 136 Ill. 2d 101,
107-08 (1990)). The circuit court must evaluate the total circumstances of the case to
determine whether the balance of factors strongly favors dismissal. Fennell v. Illinois Central
R.R. Co., 2012 IL 113812, ¶ 17. Accordingly, the determination of a forum non conveniens
motion lies within the sound discretion of the circuit court. Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 176. The
court’s decision will only be reversed if it can be shown that it “abused its discretion in
balancing the relevant factors,” meaning that no reasonable person would take the view
adopted by the court. Fennell, 2012 IL 113812, ¶ 21; Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 177.
¶ 23 The parties did not explicitly indicate whether the circuit court held a hearing on the
motions to transfer. In their brief, defendants represented that “the circuit court orally denied
all of the motions to transfer. The circuit court did not issue a written ruling.” Plaintiffs
represented that the circuit court denied the motions “after a full course of briefing.” Both
parties cite to the April 5, 2012, case management order, which simply states that
“[d]efendants’ motions to transfer for forum non conveniens are all denied.”
¶ 24 We ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefs addressing whether this court could
review the circuit court’s balancing of the public and private interest factors without a written
order or hearing transcript setting forth the manner in which the court balanced those factors.
Our concern is that on the one hand, our supreme court recently reiterated its admonition to
circuit courts to “include all of the relevant private and public interest factors in their
analyses.” (Emphasis in original.) Fennell, 2012 IL 113812, ¶ 24 (citing First American Bank
v. Guerine, 198 Ill. 2d 511, 520-21 (2002) (urging trial courts to “leave a better record of
their analyses” when ruling on forum non conveniens motions to “allow our appellate court
to make informed decisions on Rule 306(a)(2) petitions”)). In Fennell, the circuit court
issued a written ruling containing its analysis of some, but not all, of the public and private
interest factors. Fennell, 2012 IL 113812, ¶ 24. However, as defendants note, the supreme
court did not hold that omitting factors from the analysis necessarily results in reversal.
Rather, in that case, after admonishing the circuit court, it reviewed the circuit court’s
analysis of the factors that were addressed in the order and reversed the court on the merits.
Fennell, 2012 IL 113812, ¶ 24.
¶ 25 On the other hand, this court long ago held that an appellant’s failure to include a
transcript of the hearing on the motion to transfer did not preclude appellate review. Walker
v. Iowa Marine Repair Corp., 132 Ill. App. 3d 621, 626 (1985); see also DeVries v. Bankers

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 Life Co., 128 Ill. App. 3d 647, 650 (1984). The Walker court concluded:
“The fact that the trial court may have espoused certain reasons for its order not
appearing on the face of the [complaint, answer, affirmative defense, motion to transfer,
and supporting affidavits] does not support the necessity of a transcript on appeal where,
as here, the record contains everything that was presented to the judge in support of or
in opposition to the motion.” Walker, 132 Ill. App. 3d at 626.
However, this reasoning suggests that the appellate court may disregard the circuit court’s
rationale in ruling on motions to transfer and conduct an independent review of the motions
presented below, as we would do if applying de novo review. That runs counter to the well-
established legal proposition that when reviewing a decision on a motion to transfer for
forum non conveniens, we must evaluate whether the circuit court “abused [its] discretion
in weighing the relevant considerations.” (Emphasis added.) Meyers v. Bridgeport Machines
Division of Textron, Inc., 113 Ill. 2d 112, 118 (1986) (citing Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454
U.S. 235, 257 (1981)); see also Fennell, 2012 IL 113812, ¶ 21; Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 177.
¶ 26 Although it would be beneficial to remand the matter to the circuit court with instructions
to provide its analysis of the public and private interest factors, we lack a clear directive from
the supreme court to do so. See Fennell, 2012 IL 113812, ¶ 75 (Kilbride, C.J., dissenting
upon denial of rehearing) (noting that “[t]he trial court’s exercise of its discretion cannot be
reviewed adequately when several of the forum non conveniens factors are not included in
the analysis” and suggesting that remand is appropriate under these circumstances).
Accordingly, we will undertake our review of the court’s decision to deny the motion to
transfer as we have done in the past. Ammerman v. The Raymond Corp., 379 Ill. App. 3d
878, 887-88 (2008). That is, we will endeavor to analyze the factors based on the
“undisputed” facts, as defendants characterize them. Where any doubts arise due to the
incompleteness of the record, we will resolve them against defendants, who bear the burden
of presenting us with a sufficiently complete record to support their claim of error.
Ammerman, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 888.
¶ 27 We begin with the presumption that a plaintiff’s choice of forum is entitled to deference
and must not be disturbed unless the other factors strongly favor transfer. Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d
at 173. As noted above, a plaintiff’s choice of forum is entitled to somewhat less deference
if it is neither his place of residence nor the place where the injury occurred. Langenhorst v.
Norfolk Southern Ry. Co., 219 Ill. 2d 430, 442-43 (2006). Here, Pendergast is a resident of
Cook County and filed his original cause of action in Cook County. Although defendants
contend that Pendergast’s status as the administrator of Richter’s estate makes him a
“nominal plaintiff” whose residence is inconsequential for purposes of honoring choice of
forum, that argument has been rejected by this court. Glass v. DOT Transportation, Inc., 393
Ill. App. 3d 829, 834 (2009).
¶ 28 Leathers was a resident of Kane County when he filed his lawsuit. Additionally, his first
choice of forum was Kendall County, where the accident occurred, which diminishes the
degree of deference accorded to him in this analysis. Fennell, 2012 IL 113812, ¶ 25.
However, that does not mean his choice deserves no deference. Ammerman, 379 Ill. App. 3d
at 885 (quoting Guerine, 198 Ill. 2d at 518). Indeed, Leathers only dismissed his original

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 lawsuit and refiled in Cook County after Pendergast filed his action in Cook County, which
could be interpreted as forum shopping, as defendants suggest, or merely an appreciation for
judicial economy. The record does not indicate the degree to which the circuit court deferred
to the plaintiffs’ choice of forum. Consequently, we must construe this factor against
defendants and presume that on the whole, plaintiffs’ choice of forum is entitled to
deference. Ammerman, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 888.
¶ 29 In light of that, defendants must demonstrate that the other factors strongly favor transfer.
Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 173. This high burden comports with the supreme court’s directive that
a case should be transferred only under “exceptional circumstances when it has been shown
that the interests of justice require a trial in a more convenient forum.” (Emphasis in original
and internal quotations marks omitted.) Guerine, 198 Ill. 2d at 520.
¶ 30 The first private interest factor considers the convenience of the parties. Here, defendants
must show that the plaintiffs’ chosen forum is inconvenient to them and that another forum
is more convenient to all parties. Ammerman, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 888. However, they cannot
assert that plaintiff’s chosen forum is inconvenient for plaintiff. Ammerman, 379 Ill. App.
3d at 889 (citing Langenhorst, 219 Ill. 2d at 448).
¶ 31 Of the defendants, Meade indicated in its answers to interrogatories that it resides in
McCook, Illinois, which is in Cook County. Metro Transportation has headquarters in Cook
County, and in the court below, several of the defendants conceded that Traffic Control is
considered a Cook County resident. Thorne is located in Du Page County. Econolite is
located in California. Dyche resides in Kendall County and Olsson is located in Kane
County. Dyche and Olsson’s president and chief executive officer, William Lynch, were the
only defendants who submitted affidavits stating that Cook County would be an inconvenient
forum for them and Kendall County would be more convenient. However, three defendants
are residents of Cook County and two defendants (Metro Transportation and Traffic Control)
did not object to proceeding in Cook County. The remaining two defendants reside in
counties other than Kendall. Thus, on the whole, defendants have not demonstrated that
Kendall County is more convenient to all parties.
¶ 32 Next, we consider the relative ease of access to testimonial, documentary, and other
evidence. In their answers to interrogatories, plaintiffs identified potential witnesses who
would testify at trial. Cheryl Alexander, of Kendall County; Gary Balzarini, of La Salle
County; Brayden Dyche, of Kendall County; Leathers; and Dyche were identified as
eyewitnesses to the accident. Plaintiffs also identified six Oswego police officers, five
paramedics with the Oswego fire department, the Kendall County coroner, and two engineers
from Kendall County as potential witnesses. Additionally, Leathers indicated that he has seen
two doctors in Aurora, Illinois, and three other doctors whose locations were not identified,
for injuries he suffered in the accident. Six of these potential witnesses submitted affidavits
stating that it would be inconvenient and burdensome to travel to Cook County to testify in
this case. Nevertheless, they are amenable to compulsory process and can appear in Cook
County, notwithstanding the relatively minor expense involved in appearing to testify on a
particular day. On the other hand, defendants listed their corporate officers as people with
knowledge of this case, who reside in several different counties and California, as noted
above. Nevertheless, the preponderance of witnesses reside in or near Kendall County.

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 Additionally, defendants note that the equipment at issue is stored in Kendall County,
making it easier to transport to a Kendall County courtroom. On balance, this factor weighs
in favor of transfer. See Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 178.
¶ 33 In considering the other factors that make a trial easy, expeditious and inexpensive, we
acknowledge that the accident took place in Kendall County and that, in the event that a court
later determined that it was necessary to view the accident site, it would be more convenient
for a Kendall County jury to do so. Nevertheless, the importance of these factors diminishes
where, as here, the case concerns products liability claims because “any local interest is
largely supplanted by a more general interest in resolving a claim concerning an allegedly
defective product [making] jury views of the accident site *** generally unnecessary.”
Ammerman, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 886; Guerine, 198 Ill. 2d at 525. Pendergast and Leathers
asserted products liability claims against Econolite claiming that it negligently designed and
manufactured the traffic signal equipment used at the accident location and that it should be
strictly liable for plaintiffs’ injuries. Moreover, while also entitled to less weight, it is worth
considering that all of plaintiffs’ and defendants’ attorneys are located in Cook County and
would be required to travel to Kendall County every day to attend trial. Ammerman, 379 Ill.
App. 3d at 891. Thus, we cannot say that this factor strongly favors transfer.
¶ 34 Turning to the public interest factors, we first consider the interest in having local
controversies decided locally. As stated above, because this case involves products liability
claims, the location of the accident is less significant because defective products in the
stream of commerce can affect the residents of many counties. Ammerman, 379 Ill. App. 3d
at 892. For the same reason, it is not unfair to impose jury duty on the residents of Cook
County because they are as likely to be affected by the allegedly faulty products at issue in
this case as Kendall County residents. Ammerman, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 892. Additionally,
three of the defendants are residents of Cook County and, thus, Cook County has an interest
in deciding controversies involving its residents. Ammerman, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 892. Thus,
these factors do not strongly favor transfer.
¶ 35 The final public interest factor considers the relative congestion of the two court systems.
However, this factor, “ ‘by itself, is relatively insignificant.’ ” Ammerman, 379 Ill. App. 3d
at 892 (quoting Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 181). Nevertheless, defendants submitted caseload
statistics showing that Cook County is a more congested venue than Kendall County. In
2009, Kendall County had less than 10,000 cases pending whereas Cook County had over
925,000, which favors transfer to Kendall County.
¶ 36 We reiterate that we lack any information about how the circuit court balanced the private
and public interest factors on the whole. However, in light of the fact that only two of the six
factors could possibly be said to favor transfer to Kendall County, any reasonable person
would conclude that defendants have failed to satisfy their burden of showing that the factors
strongly favor transfer. See Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 173. Nor would any reasonable person
conclude that these circumstances are so exceptional that the interests of justice require
transfer to Kendall County. See Guerine, 198 Ill. 2d at 520. Accordingly, we cannot say that
the circuit court abused its discretion in denying the motion. Fennell, 2012 IL 113812, ¶ 21;
Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 177.

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¶ 37 Defendants also argue on appeal that the circuit court abused its discretion when it
severed the third-party claims against the County and transferred them to the circuit court of
Kendall County, while retaining jurisdiction over the remaining claims. This argument comes
notwithstanding defendants’ representation in the circuit court that they had “no grounds to
object to [the County’s] motion to transfer.” Nevertheless, we lack jurisdiction to review
defendants’ argument. Appeals taken from orders granting or denying motions to transfer
must be filed within 30 days of entry of that order. Ill. S. Ct. R. 306(c)(1) (eff. Feb. 26,
2010). The time limit for filing a petition for leave to appeal is jurisdictional. Kemner v.
Monsanto Co., 112 Ill. 2d 223, 236 (1986). The circuit court granted the County’s motion
to transfer for forum non conveniens and entered its order on September 8, 2011. No petition
for leave to appeal was filed within 30 days of that order. The petition for leave to appeal in
this case was filed on March 7, 2012, well beyond the 30-day period allowed to file a petition
addressing the court’s September 8, 2011, ruling. Accordingly, we are without jurisdiction
to consider that issue.
¶ 38 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the circuit court denying transfer
pursuant to the doctrine of forum non conveniens.

¶ 39 Affirmed.

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