MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Oct 23 2015, 9:22 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Mark Olivero Gregory F. Zoeller
Fort Wayne, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Angela N. Sanchez
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Alvin R. Hollis, Jr., October 23, 2015
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
02A03-1502-CR-43
v. Appeal from the Allen Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable John F. Surbeck,
Appellee-Plaintiff Jr., Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
02D06-1405-FC-140
Riley, Judge.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
[1] Appellant-Defendant, Alvin R. Hollis, Jr. (Hollis), appeals his conviction for
resisting law enforcement, a Class D felony, Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-
1(a)(3),(b)(1)(A) (2013); resisting law enforcement, a Class A misdemeanor,
I.C. § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(3) (2013); false informing, a Class B misdemeanor, I.C. §
35-44.1-2-3(d)(1) (2013); and failure to stop after an accident resulting in non-
vehicle property damage, a Class B misdemeanor, I.C. §§ 9-26-1-4; -8(b).
[2] We affirm.
ISSUES
[3] Hollis raises two issues on appeal, which we restate as follows:
(1) Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support Hollis’
conviction; and
(2) Whether Hollis’ sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of his offense
and his character.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[4] At approximately 2:00 a.m. on May 10, 2014, Officer Robert Warstler (Officer
Warstler) of the Fort Wayne Police Department initiated a traffic stop on State
Street in Fort Wayne, Allen County, Indiana, after observing a 2008 silver
Dodge Caliber exceeding the posted speed limit by fifteen miles per hour.
Officer Warstler approached the vehicle and, after asking the driver to produce
his driver’s license and vehicle registration, explained that his reason for
stopping the vehicle was due to a speed limit violation. Officer Warstler
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observed that the driver was a black male with long dreadlocks and some facial
hair.
[5] The driver handed Officer Warstler a printout copy of the vehicle registration,
which did not have the registered owner’s name printed on it. He also stated
that he did not have his driver’s license on him but identified himself as
“Shaqueal O’Neal Arrington.” (State’s Exh. 1). Officer Warstler requested the
spelling of his name, and the driver hesitantly stated, “C-H-A-Q-A” before
trailing off. (State’s Exh. 1). Officer Warstler asked the driver for his “real
name,” to which the driver again answered that it was Shaqueal Arrington.
(State’s Exh. 1). In a second attempt to spell his name for the officer, the driver
made it as far as “C-H-A-Q-U-A.” (State’s Exh. 1). When asked his date of
birth, the driver hesitated before answering October 13, 1989. The driver
indicated that the vehicle belonged to his girlfriend, “Ashley.” (State’s Exh. 1).
Officer Warstler instructed the driver to “sit tight” while he returned to his
squad car. (State’s Exh. 1).
[6] Moments after Officer Warstler returned to his squad car in order to run the
driver’s information through his computer, the driver sped away. Officer
Warstler activated his lights and sirens and radioed for assistance as he pursued
the vehicle through the city streets. “The vehicle was driving recklessly fast to
the point that it would have been unsafe for [Officer Warstler] to maintain that
speed.” (Tr. p. 138). For several blocks, the driver hurtled through
intersections without regard for stop signs or other traffic laws. At some point
the driver attempted to make a left turn, but he turned too wide and ran over
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the curb, slamming into a tree in Lakeside Park. As Officer Warstler
approached the scene of the accident, he observed that the driver had exited the
vehicle and was fleeing on foot through the park. By this time, other officers
had arrived to assist in the search, but they were unable to locate the driver.
[7] When Officer Warstler returned to the crashed vehicle, he discovered a loaded
handgun on the passenger-side floorboard. He also located a traffic ticket that
had been issued to Hollis several months prior. Officer Warstler ran a check on
the license plate and found that it was jointly registered to Hollis and “A[.]
Wilson.” (State’s Exh. 3). “It appeared that [someone named] Ashley signed
the registration.” (Tr. p. 160). Because searching for the name “Shaqueal
Arrington” (using multiple spelling variations) did not yield any results that
matched the driver of the vehicle, Officer Warstler searched for Hollis. 1 Upon
seeing Hollis’ photograph, Officer Warstler “[i]mmediately” identified him as
the driver of the vehicle. (Tr. p. 161). Officer Warstler also noted that Hollis’
birthday—September 12, 1988—is “one month, one day, and one year off of”
the date provided by the driver of the vehicle. (Tr. p. 164).
[8] On May 27, 2014, the State filed an Information, charging Hollis with Count I,
carrying a handgun without a license, a Class C felony, I.C. §§ 35-47-2-1; -
23(c)(2)(A)(i) (2013); Count II, resisting law enforcement, a Class D felony, I.C.
1
We use the spelling “Shaqueal Arrington” throughout this decision based on the results of the information
check conducted by Officer Warstler, who—after trying multiple spelling variations of the name provided by
the driver—located a “Shaqueal Arrington” with a date of birth of November 20, 1992, and a photograph
that did not match the driver of the vehicle. (Tr. p. 159).
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§ 35-44.1-3-1(a)(3),(b)(1)(A) (2013); Count III, resisting law enforcement, a
Class A misdemeanor, I.C. § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(3) (2013); Count IV, false
informing, a Class B misdemeanor, I.C. § 35-44.1-2-3(d)(1) (2013); and Count
V, failure to stop after an accident resulting in non-vehicle property damage, a
Class B misdemeanor, I.C. §§ 9-26-1-4; -8(b).
[9] On December 2, 2014, the trial court conducted a jury trial. During his case-in-
chief, Hollis testified that he was not driving his Dodge Caliber at the time these
offenses occurred; rather, he claimed that he was out of town and had left the
vehicle parked at his mother’s house. At the close of the evidence, the jury
returned a guilty verdict for Counts II, III, IV, and V, and the trial court entered
a judgment of conviction on the same. As to Count I, carrying a handgun
without a license as a Class C felony, the trial court entered a judgment of
acquittal. On January 5, 2015, the trial court held a sentencing hearing. The
trial court imposed a sentence of three years, with two years executed and one
year suspended, on Count II; one year on Count III; 180 days on Count IV; and
180 days on Count V. The trial court ordered all sentences to run concurrently,
resulting in an aggregate sentence of three years, of which two years would be
executed in the Indiana Department of Correction and one year would be
suspended to probation.
[10] Hollis now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
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DISCUSSION AND DECISION
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
[11] Hollis claims that the State presented insufficient evidence to support his
conviction. When reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, it is well
established that our court does not reweigh evidence or assess the credibility of
witnesses. Walker v. State, 998 N.E.2d 724, 726 (Ind. 2013). Instead, we
consider all of the evidence, and any reasonable inferences that may be drawn
therefrom, in a light most favorable to the verdict. Id. We will uphold the
conviction “‘if there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each
element of the crime from which a reasonable trier of fact could have found the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id. (quoting Davis v. State, 813
N.E.2d 1176, 1178 (Ind. 2004)).
[12] Hollis contends that there is insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction
because the State “failed to prove the identity elements in each of the [C]ounts.”
(Appellant’s Br. p. 10). As an element for each of the four charges at issue, the
State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that it was Hollis who
committed the offense. In arguing that the State failed to meet its burden,
Hollis points out that the driver of the vehicle identified himself as Shaqueal
Arrington—a black male with long braided hair whose photograph “look[s]
extremely similar” to that of Hollis. (Appellant’s Br. p. 11). Furthermore,
Hollis argues that Officer Warstler’s “face to face interaction with the driver of
the vehicle in question was maybe only fifteen (15) to twenty (20) seconds or
more.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 11). Finally, Hollis cites his own testimony, in
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which he denied driving the vehicle at the time of the offenses, positing instead
that he left the keys in the vehicle because he believed it was going to be
repossessed, so “[i]t was possible that the vehicle was stolen.” (Appellant’s Br.
p. 11).
[13] In this case, Officer Warstler unequivocally identified Hollis as the perpetrator
of the charged crimes, and it is well established that “[a] single eyewitness’
testimony is sufficient to sustain a conviction.” Emerson v. State, 724 N.E.2d
605, 609-10 (Ind. 2000). At trial, Officer Warstler testified that during the
traffic stop, Hollis’ nervousness and evasiveness about his identity—namely
Hollis’ inability to spell his name and recall his date of birth—prompted Officer
Warstler to “pa[y] extra special attention to facial features, things that would
help me identify [the driver] when I went back to my car to try and look up the
name and match a photo that happened to be in our system to the name that
was provided.” (Tr. p. 136). Although Officer Warstler’s search for a
“Shaqueal Arrington” in his system yielded a photograph of a black male with
long braided hair, much like Hollis’ hair, Officer Warstler immediately
recognized that the facial features of Shaqueal Arrington did not match those of
the driver. Moreover, Shaqueal Arrington’s birthday was November 20,
1992—not October 13, 1989, as the driver indicated. However, as soon as
Officer Warstler retrieved a photograph of Hollis, he confirmed that there was
not a doubt in his mind that it was Hollis who had been driving the vehicle and
who led the police on a dangerous pursuit.
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[14] We find Hollis’ contention that his conviction should be reversed based on his
testimony that he was not driving the vehicle is nothing more than an attempt
to have the evidence reweighed in his favor. It is not the role of this court to
“weigh the evidence or resolve questions of credibility when determining
whether the identification evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction.”
Emerson, 724 N.E.2d at 610. During the trial, Hollis testified that he drove his
“silver Dodge Caliber” home from work just a few hours prior to Officer
Warstler’s traffic stop. (Tr. p. 187). However, he claimed that he parked the
vehicle at his mother’s house and left the keys in the console, believing it was
going to be repossessed, and that he and his brother subsequently left for
Illinois. Despite his claim that the vehicle was subject to immediate
repossession, the State presented evidence that the vehicle contained numerous
items of personal property, including cellular phones, children’s booster seats,
loose change, shoes, and clothing. In addition, the driver of the vehicle
informed Officer Warstler that his girlfriend, Ashley, owned the vehicle, and
Hollis testified that he jointly owned the vehicle with “Ashley Wilson, my ex-
wife.” (Tr. p. 187). Accordingly, because it was entirely within the province of
the jury to believe Officer Warstler’s positive identification of Hollis while
discrediting Hollis’ testimony that he was not driving the vehicle, we affirm
Hollis’ conviction.
II. Appropriateness of Sentence
[15] Hollis also claims that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the
offense and his character. In this case, Hollis was convicted of one Class D
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felony, one Class A misdemeanor, and two Class B misdemeanors. The trial
court imposed the maximum sentence for each of the four charges and ordered
them to run concurrently, resulting in an aggregate term of three years, with
two years executed and one year suspended to probation. See I.C. § 35-50-2-
7(a) (fixing the maximum sentence for a Class D felony at three years); I.C. §
35-50-3-2 (setting the maximum sentence for a Class A misdemeanor at one
year); and I.C. § 35-50-3-3 (providing for a maximum sentence of 180 days on a
Class B misdemeanor).
[16] The matter of sentencing “is principally a discretionary function in which the
trial court’s judgment should receive considerable deference.” Cardwell v. State,
895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Ind. 2008). Even where the trial court has imposed a
sentence that is authorized by law, as in this case, our court may nevertheless
revise the sentence if, “after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, [we
find] that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and
the character of the offender.” Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B). “The principal role of
appellate review should be to attempt to leaven the outliers, and identify some
guiding principles for trial courts and those charged with improvement of the
sentencing statutes, but not to achieve a perceived ‘correct’ result in each case.”
Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1225. “‘[R]easonable minds may differ’ on the
appropriateness of a sentence[,]” but our determination of whether a sentence is
inappropriate turns “on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the
severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that
come to light in a given case.” Parks v. State, 22 N.E.3d 552, 555 (Ind. 2014)
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(quoting Buchanan v. State, 767 N.E.2d 967, 970 (Ind. 2002)); Cardwell, 895
N.E.2d at 1224. Ultimately, “the length of the aggregate sentence and how it is
to be served are the issues that matter.” Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1224. Hollis
bears the burden of persuading our court that his sentence is inappropriate.
Sanquenetti v. State, 917 N.E.2d 1287, 1289 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
[17] In the present case, the nature of the offense is that Hollis was pulled over for a
traffic infraction—speeding. He subsequently attempted to hinder Officer
Warstler’s ability to complete the traffic stop by providing a false name and
birthdate. Despite Officer Warstler’s clear instruction to “sit tight,” Hollis sped
away in his vehicle, leading Officer Warstler on a high speed chase through the
city streets without regard for stop signs or other traffic laws. (State’s Exh. 1).
The vehicle pursuit only ended when Hollis lost control of his vehicle and
slammed into a tree; yet, he abandoned his vehicle and fled on foot. Hollis
acted with complete disregard for the safety of other motorists and
pedestrians—such as those people Officer Warstler observed walking their dog
in the park as he pursued Hollis. Thus, it is most fortunate that the severity of
damage Hollis inflicted was limited to a tree because the consequences of his
reckless and selfish conduct could easily have been tragic.
[18] As to the character of the offender, Hollis has a criminal history that consists of
four prior misdemeanor convictions. While this is a relatively minor criminal
history compared to others this court has observed, it nevertheless demonstrates
his disregard for the laws that govern our society. The fact that Hollis was not
leading a law-abiding life is further evidenced by the fact that he apparently did
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not possess a valid driver’s license at the time of the present offenses. It is also
noteworthy that two of his prior crimes are similar in nature to the present
offenses: resisting law enforcement in 2011 and operating a vehicle without
ever having received a license in 2014. This indicates that Hollis’ prior
suspended sentences were insufficient to deter him from committing such acts
in the future, and a harsher penalty is warranted.
[19] Hollis now contends that “[t]he imposition by the trial court of an executed
sentence above the advisory sentence has the unintended result of undue
hardship to [his] [four] dependents.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 13). However, we find
Hollis’ argument unpersuasive in light of the fact that his PSI report indicates
that he is not paying any child support for at least two of his children, and
Hollis had not otherwise demonstrated how his children would suffer as a result
of his incarceration. Accordingly, we find that Hollis has failed to satisfy his
burden of establishing that his sentence is inappropriate.
CONCLUSION
[20] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence
beyond a reasonable doubt to prove that Hollis was the perpetrator of the
crimes. We further conclude that Hollis’ sentence is not inappropriate in light
of the nature of the offense and his character.
[21] Affirmed.
[22] Brown, J. and Altice, J. concur
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