FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION OCT 23 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
PHILLIP C. COLLICOTT, No. 14-35272
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:12-cv-01443-BR
v.
MEMORANDUM*
SNAKE RIVER DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS ADMINISTRATION; et
al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Anna J. Brown, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted October 14, 2015**
Before: SILVERMAN, BERZON, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.
Oregon state prisoner Phillip C. Collicott appeals pro se from the district
court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional
claims arising from a disciplinary hearing. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
§ 1291. We review de novo, Lemire v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 726 F.3d
1062, 1074 (9th Cir. 2013), and we affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Collicott’s due
process claims premised on his disciplinary proceedings because Collicott failed to
raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he received the proper
procedural safeguards, and whether some evidence supported the hearing officer’s
findings. See Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455-56 (1985) (requirements of
due process are satisfied if “some evidence” supports the disciplinary decision);
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-67 (1974) (setting forth due process
requirements during a prison disciplinary proceeding); see also Cousins v. Lockyer,
568 F.3d 1063, 1070-71 (9th Cir. 2009) (failure to follow internal prison policy
does not amount to a constitutional violation).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Collicott’s due
process claims regarding reduction in his incentive-level classification and
compensation for his work because Collicott failed to raise a genuine dispute of
material fact as to whether these actions were imposed as discipline for the offense
found. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84 (1995) (a constitutionally
protected liberty interest arises only when a restraint imposes an “atypical and
significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison
2 14-35272
life”).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Collicott’s equal
protection claim because Collicott failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact
as to whether he was intentionally and without a rational basis treated differently
than any similarly situated inmate. See N. Pacifica LLC v. City of Pacifica, 526
F.3d 478, 486 (9th Cir. 2008) (elements of equal protection claim).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Collicott’s motion
for appointment of counsel because Collicott failed to demonstrate exceptional
circumstances. See Cano v. Taylor, 739 F.3d 1214, 1218 (9th Cir. 2014) (setting
forth standard of review and requirements for appointment of counsel).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
AFFIRMED.
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