FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION OCT 23 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LAWRENCE E. SALONE, No. 13-56228
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:13-cv-00368-PSG-JCG
v.
MEMORANDUM*
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Philip S. Gutierrez, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted October 14, 2015**
Before: SILVERMAN, BERZON, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.
Lawrence E. Salone appeals pro se from the district court’s order denying
his motion requesting the return of approximately $127,860 in currency seized by
the United States government. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
review de novo the district court’s interpretation of federal forfeiture law and for
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
clear error its findings of fact, United States v. Alcaraz-Garcia, 79 F.3d 769, 772
(9th Cir. 1996), and we affirm.
The district court properly determined that Salone’s motion for the return of
property was barred by the statute of limitations because Salone did not file the
motion within five years of the date of final publication of notice of seizure. See
18 U.S.C. § 983(e)(1), (3) (providing that “[a]ny person entitled to written notice in
any nonjudicial civil forfeiture proceeding under a civil forfeiture statute who does
not receive such notice may file a motion to set aside a declaration of forfeiture,”
but “not later than 5 years after the date of final publication of notice of seizure of
the property”); id. § 983(e)(5) (motion brought under this section “shall be the
exclusive remedy for seeking to set aside a declaration of forfeiture under a civil
forfeiture statute”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to equitably toll
the statute of limitations. See Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96
(1990) (“[T]he principles of equitable tolling . . . do not extend to what is at best a
garden variety claim of excusable neglect.”); Leong v. Potter, 347 F.3d 1117, 1121
(9th Cir. 2003) (setting forth standard of review).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Salone leave to
amend his motion because amendment would be futile. See Lopez v. Smith, 203
2 13-56228
F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (setting forth standard of review and
explaining that leave to amend should be given unless the deficiencies cannot be
cured by amendment).
Because Salone’s motion for return of property was time-barred, we do not
consider Salone’s arguments that there was no probable cause for the search.
AFFIRMED.
3 13-56228