J-S61043-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
EMMANUEL PERREL JONES, :
:
Appellant : No. 636 MDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 23, 2015,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County,
Criminal Division, at No(s): CP-36-CR-0005293-2000
BEFORE: PANELLA, WECHT, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED OCTOBER 27, 2015
Emmanuel Perrel Jones (Appellant) appeals from a judgment of
sentence which followed the revocation of his probation. We affirm.
The trial court aptly summarized the background underlying this
matter as follows.
On October 27, 2000, Lancaster City Police executed a
search warrant at 721 North Shippen Street, Lancaster,
Pennsylvania. During the search, [Appellant] was found in
possession of approximately three grams of crack cocaine, along
with associated paraphernalia. [Appellant] was arrested and
charged with two offenses, as follows: (1) PWID-Cocaine [] and
(2) Possession of Drug Paraphernalia []. [Appellant] pled guilty
to both counts and was sentenced on December 6, 2001. On
Count 1, [h]e was sentenced to a minimum of 1 year of
incarceration to a maximum of 2 years of incarceration, followed
by two years of probation consecutive to the incarceration on
Count 1 and a fine of $5000. On Count 2, [Appellant] was
sentenced to 1 year of probation consecutive to the incarceration
period on Count 1. [He] was given credit for 353 days. Costs
and Restitution totaled $831.13. The sentences were concurrent
to any other sentences.
*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S61043-15
Since [Appellant’s] release from the SCI on December 17,
2002, he committed eight probation violations for new criminal
charges, drug use, missed appointments, and discharge from the
Wedge Treatment Center.
[Appellant stipulated to his eighth probation violation. 1 On
February 23, 2015, the trial court sentenced him] to one-and-a-
half to three years of incarceration with credit from September
25, 2014 until the sentencing date, noted that [Appellant] was
RRRI eligible with a RRRI minimum sentence of thirteen and
one-half months, and made him immediately eligible for any
drug, alcohol, educational, and vocational programs while
incarcerated.
On March 6, 2015, [Appellant] filed a counseled nunc pro
tunc post-sentence motion to modify sentence. [The trial court
granted Appellant’s request to file his post-sentence motions
nunc pro tunc.] [Appellant’s] motion to modify sentence alleged
six grounds for reconsideration of [his] sentence: (1) that [the
court] failed to consider the Sentencing Guidelines, 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 9721(b) in fashioning [his] sentence; (2) that [the court] failed
to consider the protection of the public because [Appellant’s]
violation does not threaten the public in any way; (3) that [the
court] failed to consider the gravity of the offense as it relates to
the impact on the life of the victim and on the community
because [Appellant’s] alleged disease is both allegedly de
minimis and non-threatening to himself and the community; (4)
that [the court] failed to consider the rehabilitative needs of
[Appellant] because the sentence imposed treats addiction as a
crime rather than as a medical condition; (5) that [the court]
abused [its] discretion by imposing a sentence that was
unreasonable and excessive under the circumstances; and (6)
that [the court] failed to adequately consider the age of the
docket, and especially the amount of time which had passed
since [Appellant] committed a new crime, when fashioning
[Appellant’s] sentence. [The trial court] denied [Appellant’s]
motion to modify sentence [in a] March 17, 2015 Order.
[Appellant] then filed a notice of appeal with the Superior Court
of Pennsylvania on March 18, 2015. [Appellant] filed a timely
concise statement of matters complained of on appeal[.]
1
According to Appellant, his latest violation stems from his testing positive
for marijuana. Appellant’s Brief at 6.
-2-
J-S61043-15
Trial Court Opinion, 6/4/2015, at 1-3 (footnotes, citations, and unnecessary
capitalization omitted).
In his brief to this Court, Appellant asks us to consider one question,
namely, “Was a sentence of one and one half to three years [of]
incarceration for a probation and parole violation so manifestly excessive as
to constitute too severe a punishment and contrary to the fundamental
norms of the sentencing process?” Appellant’s Brief at 4. Appellant
challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence.2
It is well settled that, with regard to the discretionary aspects of
sentencing, there is no automatic right to appeal.
Before [this Court may] reach the merits of [a challenge to
the discretionary aspects of a sentence], we must engage
in a four part analysis to determine: (1) whether the
appeal is timely; (2) whether Appellant preserved his
issue; (3) whether Appellant’s brief includes a concise
statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of
appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects of
sentence; and (4) whether the concise statement raises a
substantial question that the sentence is appropriate under
the sentencing code.... [I]f the appeal satisfies each of
these four requirements, we will then proceed to decide
the substantive merits of the case.
Commonwealth v. Disalvo, 70 A.3d 900, 902 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citations
omitted).
Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal; he preserved his issue in his
post-sentence motion; and his brief contains a Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement.
2
“[T]his Court’s scope of review in an appeal from a [probation] revocation
sentencing includes discretionary sentencing challenges.” Commonwealth
v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030, 1034 (Pa. Super. 2013)
-3-
J-S61043-15
Thus, we must determine whether Appellant has raised a substantial
question worthy of appellate review.
The determination of whether a substantial question exists
must be made on a case-by-case basis. It is only where
an aggrieved party can articulate clear reasons why the
sentence issued by the trial court compromises the
sentencing scheme as a whole that we will find a
substantial question and review the decision of the trial
court. This [C]ourt has been inclined to find that a
substantial question exists where the appellant advances a
colorable argument that the sentencing judge’s actions
were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific provision of
the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental
norms underlying the sentencing process.
Also, a bald allegation that a sentence is excessive does not
raise a substantial question.
Commonwealth v. Lutes, 793 A.2d 949, 964 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citations
omitted).
In his Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement, Appellant contends that his
sentence is excessive because the trial court “failed to consider [his] need
for drug and alcohol rehabilitation as well as the fact that the public did not
need to be protected from [him] as he had not committed a crime in seven
years.” Appellant’s Brief at 10. Appellant has raised a substantial question
for our review. Commonwealth v. Riggs, 63 A.3d 780, 786 (Pa. Super.
2012) (concluding that Riggs raised a substantial question by arguing “that
the trial court failed to consider relevant sentencing criteria, including the
protection of the public, the gravity of the underlying offense and [Rigg’s]
rehabilitative needs[], as 42 Pa.C.S.A § 9721(b) requires…”).
-4-
J-S61043-15
The proper standard of review when considering whether to
affirm the sentencing court’s determination is an abuse of
discretion. The trial court is afforded broad discretion in
sentencing criminal defendants because of the perception that
the trial court is in the best position to determine the proper
penalty for a particular offense based upon an evaluation of the
individual circumstances before it. An abuse of discretion may
not be found merely because an appellate court might have
reached a different conclusion, but requires a result of manifest
unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or
such lack of support so as to be clearly erroneous.
Commonwealth v. Hoch, 936 A.2d 515, 519 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations
and quotation marks omitted).
After a review of the parties’ briefs and the certified record, we
conclude that the trial court’s 1925(a) opinion adequately addresses and
properly rejects Appellant’s challenge to the discretionary aspects of his
sentence. We therefore adopt that portion of the court’s opinion in response
to Appellant’s argument on appeal. Trial Court Opinion, 6/4/2015, at 7-10.
The parties shall attach a copy of the trial court’s April 30, 3015 opinion to
this memorandum in the event of further proceedings.
For these reasons, we affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/27/2015
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. ~~E &~T OF COMMON PLEAS OF LANCASTER COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
~ 'i-~~r::, CRI M I NA L .
\,~
COMMONWEALTH .OF PENNSYLVANIA
V. No. 5293-2000
EMMANUEL JONES
OPINION
BY: WRIGHT, J. June~. 201.5
This Opinion is written pursuant to Rule 1925(a) of the Pennsylvania. Rules of
Appellate Procedure. Defendant, Emmanuel Jones, claims that I erred in the sentence I
imposed on Defendant on February 23, 2015 for his eighth probation violation. (See
N.T. Sentencing, 2/23/15, at 6:24-7:4.) A review of the record and applicable law
demonstrates that Defendant's claim lacks merit and, therefore, his appeal should be
dismissed.
BACKGROUND
On October 27, 2000, Lancaster City Police executed a search warrant at 721
North Shippen Street, Lancaster, Pennsylvania. (Aff. Prob. Cause ,r 3.) During the.
search, Defendant was found in possession of approximately three grams of crack
cocaine, along with associated paraphernalia. (Id.) Defendant was arrested and
charged with two offenses, as follows: (1) PWID-Cocaine (F)1 and (2) Possession of
Drug Paraphernalia (M)2• Defendant pied guilty to both counts and was sentenced on
1 At the time the statute cited was§ 13(a)(30) of Act 64. (Compl.) Now the statute would be 35 Pa. C.S.A.
§ 780-113(a)(30). · • ·
2 N.. the time the statute cited was§ 13(a)(32} of Act 64. (Compl.} Now the statute would be 35 Pa. C.S.A.
§ 780-113(a)(32).
APPENDIX B
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December 6, 2001. (Guilty Plea Slip, 12/6/01; Sentencing Orders, 12/6/01.) On Count 1,
He was sentenced to_ a minimum of 1 year of incarceration to a maximum of 2 years .of
incarceration, followed by two years of prob~tion consecutive to the incarceration on
Count 1 and a fine of $5000. (Sentencing Orders, 12/6/01.) On Count 2, Defendant was
sentenced to 1 year of probation consecutive to the incarceration period on Count 1.
(kl)
. Defendant
. was given credit for 353 days. Costs and Restitution totaled $831.13.
(Court Commitment Sentencing W.orksheet, 12/19/2001; Guilty Plea Slip.) The
sentences were concurrent to any other sentences. (19.:.)
Since Defendant's release from the SCI on December 17, 2002, he committed
eight probation violations· for new criminal charges, drug use, missed appointments, and
. .
discharge_ from the Wedge Treatment Center.3 (P~I 3-10; 14; Petition-to Issue Capias
· and Bench Warrant, '04/18/2012).
On February
. 23, 2015, I sentenced Defendant
.
on his eighth probation violation to
one-and-a-half to three years of incarceration wlth credit from September 25, ·2014 until
the sentencing date, noted that Defendant was RRRI eligible with a RRRI minimum
sentence of thirteen and one-half months, and made him immediatelyeligible for any
drug, alcohol,. educational, and vocational programs while incarcerated. (N.T..
Sentencing, 2/23/15, at 6:24-7:4.)
3 See N.T. Sentencing, 2/23/2015, at 5:21-22 (describing criminal history); Notice of Charges and
Hearings Special Probation/Parole, 4/7/2003 (providing release date); Pre-Sentence Investigation Report
("PSI") 3-10 (providing crimina,I history); Petition to Issue Capias and Bench Warrant, 04/18/2012}
(describing discharge fro'm Wedge Treatment Center.}
2
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On March 6, 2015, Defendant filed a counseled Nuno Pro Tune Post-Sentence
Motion to Modify Sentence.4 I granted Defendant's request to consider his Motion in my
March 16, 2015 Order. Defendant's Motion to Modify Sentence alleged six grounds for
reconsideration of Defendant's sentence: (1) that I failed to oonsder the Sentencing
Guidelines, 42 Pa. C.S.A.· § 9721(b) in fashioning my sentence; (2) that I failed to
· consider the protection of the public because Defendant's violation does not threaten
the public in any way; (3) that I failed to consider the gravity of the offense as it relates
to the impact on the life of the victim and on the community because Defendant's
alleged disease is both allegedly de minimis and non-threatening to himsetf and the
community; (4) that I failed to consider the rehabilitative needs of the defendant
· because the sentence imposed treats addiction as a crime rather than as a medical
condltlon: (5) that I abused my dlscretlon by imposing a sentence that was
unreasonableand excessive under the circumstances; and (6) that I failed to
adequately consider the age of the docket, and especially the amount of time which had
passed since Defendant committed a new crime, when fashioning Defendant's
sentence. I denied D.efendant's Motion to Modify Sentence in my March 17, 2015 Order.
Defendant then filed a Notice of Appeal with the Superior Court of Pennsylvania on
March 18, 2015. Defendant filed a timely Concise Statement of Matters Complained of
on Appeal ("Concise Statement") and the Commonwealth filed a timely Response.
4 Defendant filed the Motion nunc pro tune on March 6, 2015 rather than by the ten-day deadline of March
5, 2015 because the Lancaster County Courthouse was closed on March 5, 2015 due to inclement
weather.
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DISCUSSION
In his Concise Statement Defendant claims that I erred by sentencing him to
eighteen to thirty-six months of incarceration for his eighth probation violation on this
docket, contending that my sentence was "so manifestly excessive as to consntute too
severe a punishment and clearly unreasonable under the circumstances of this case."
(Concise Statement ,r 1.) Specifically, he argues that the sentence I imposed (1) was
not consistent with the protection of the public, maintaining that the "public did not need
protection from Defendant"; (2) was not consistent with the gravity of the offenses; (3)
was not consistent with Defendant's rehabilitative needs, arguing that Defendant "would
have benefitted from rehabilitation" for his addiction; and (4) was not individualized for
Defendant' because it did not consider "that Defendant had not committed a new crime
in at least seven years." (kh ,r 1.)
Defendant's argument amounts to a challenge to the discretionary aspects of
sentencing for which there is no automatic right of appeal. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781;
Commonwealth v. Colon, 102 A.3d 1033, 1042-.(Pa. Super. Ct. 2014) (citing
Commonwealth v. Hanson, 856 A.2d 1254, 1257 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004). Before a court
may even consider the merits of a discretionary-sentencing claim, a defendant first must
demonstrate that: (1) the issue was properly preserved at sentencing or in a motion to
reconsider and modify sentence; (2) a timely notice of appeal was filed; (3) Defendant
fully complied with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 2119(f); and (4) there was
a "substantial question" that the sentence imposed was not appropriate under the
4
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. Sentencing Code.5 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b); Colon, 102 A.3d at 1042-43. These
prerequisites will be addressed in turn.
· Here, Defendant has met the first three prerequisites. He preserved his claim by
filing a timely post-sentence motion to modify the new sentence followed by a timely
. .
notice of appeal. For. the purpose of this appeal, I will assume that he will likewise
satisfy the requirements of Rule 2119(f) when he files his appellate. brief.
· As to the fourth prerequisite, whether an issue constitutes a "substantial
question" is "evaluated on a case-by-case basis." Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 805
A.2d 566, 574 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (citation omitted). A substantial question must
"advance a colorable argument" that the sentence imposed was either "D inconsistent
with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code; or D contrary to the fundamental
norms which underlie the sentencing process." kL. (citation omitted). To determine
whether a challenqetoa sentence imposed after a revocation of probation raises a
substantial question, I "focus on the pertinent statutory provisions in the Sentencing
Code." Commonwealth v. Williams, 69 A.3d 735, 741 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013). The
relevant statutory provisions are 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9771(b), 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9771(c), and
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 972f(b). k!:.
Here, Defendant's .general claim that the sentence is "manifestly excessive" and·
first three specific claims each raise a substantial question because they argue that the
sentence I imposed was contrary to the fundamental norms of the sentencing process
or are taken from 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). (See Commonwealth v. Colon, 102 A.3d
1033, 1043 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014) (noting that a claim that a sentence of total
5 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9701 et seq.
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confinement for a technical probation violation is excessive raises a substantial
question); Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 10.30, 1042 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013)
(finding that a challenge to a sentence based on alleged inconsistencies
.
with 42
.
Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b) raises a substantial question).) Defendant's fourth_specific claim
does not raise a suostantia' question and, accordingly, will not be addressed.s
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania has succinctly set forth the standard for
_ reviewing a claim of excessiveness:
The imposition· of sentence following the revocation of probation is vested
within the sound discretion of the trial court, whlch, absent an abuse of
that discretion, will not be disturbed on appeal. An abuse of discretion is
more than an error in judgment-a sentencing court has not abused its
discretion unless the record discloses that the judgment exercised was
manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will.
. .
Colon, 102 A.3d at 1043 (quoting Commonwealth v. Simmons, 56 A.3d 1280,
1283-84 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012). When imposing a sentence of incarceration after
revocation of probation, "the [sentencing] court is limited only by the maximum sentence
that it could have imposed originally at the time of the probationary sentence." Colon
102 A.3d 1033 at 1044 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014) (citation omitted).
6 Defendant's specific claim of error (4) does not raise a substantial question because it is not taken from
a relevant statutory provision and does not address the fundamental norms of the sentencing process. It
is settled law that the alleged failure of a sentencing Judge to consider mitigating factors like abreak in
accruing new criminal charges or personal struggles with drug addiction do not raise a substantial
question, at least in the context of guideline sentences as· opposed to sentences imposed after probation
revocations. See, e.g .• Commonwealth v. McNabb, 819 A.2d 54, 57 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003); Coolbaugh,
770 A.2d at 792-93. Thus, I consider specific claim (4) only the extent that it addresses Defendant's
rehabilitative needs. I note that I imposed Defendant's sentence after considering an extremely
comprehensive and detailed Pre-sentence Investigative ("PSI") Report (N.T. Sentencing 2/23/2015, at
5:25-6:1.) See Commonwealth v~ Griffin, 65 A3d 932, 937.:.38 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013) (noting that use of
PSI Report gives rise to assumption that sentencing Court considered defendant's character along with
any mitigating factors when fashioning sentence). Furthermore, I specifically mentioned, on the record,
conslderafion of the statements of counsel, by which his attorney informed me, among other things, that
Defendant had not"committed a new crime" for some time. (N.T. Sentencing, 2/23/2015, at 4:7-8.)
6
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· ·· As evidenced· bythe-foregoi·ng·,·oefendcfiit's sentence was entite1y· jusfifieo hy the ·
circumstances of his. offense and his character. Probation has proven to be an
ineffective tool to accomplish rehabilitation as well an inadequate deterrent to future
offenses. This was not the first time Defendant was convicted of a drug-related offense.
Defendant's PSI indicates that he, in addition to ei_ght probation violations on this docket
as described previously, also has six other dockets in three jurisdictions, several of
which involve narcotics offenses.7 (PSI 3-10.) The PSI reflects Defendant's report that:
he began selling drugs at age 13, was placed on juvenile probation, and successfully
completed juvenile programs in Pennsylvania and Texas. 8 (PSI 12.) Additionally,
Defendant's PSI indicates that Defendant started smoking marijuana at age 13, smoked
· marijuana every day until he started adult probation, and smoked approximately 20
times while on probation. (PSI 14.) Contrary to Defense Counsel's assertion that
Defendant had not committed a new crime in twelve (12) years, the PSI reveals that
Defendant was convicted of several crimes in Bucks County, Pennsylvania in 2008.9
(N.T. Sentencing, 2/23/2015, at 4:6~8); bY! see (PSI 7.)
Defendant's history demonstrates that rehabilitative treatment alone is not
effective. While Defendant reportedly completed the Wedge Treatment Program in
Philadelphia in 2007'or 2008, he violated his probation by being discharged from that
same center on November 17, 2011, due to disengagement. (PSI 14; Petition to Issue
1 Any contact with law enforcement may be considered when fashioning a sentence. Commonwealth v.
Lupatsky, 492 A.2d 845, 847 (Pa Super. Ct. 1985} ("[p]rior connections, of whatever nature, with law
enforcement authorities are unquestionably among the circumstances to be scrutinized' in determining
the appropriate sentence.")
8 This information was an appropriate sentencing· consideratiOn. See Commonwealth v. Petras, 534 A.2d
483, 488 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987} (holding thatjuvenile contact with law enforcementdetailed in PSI is
. appropriate sentencing consideration.)
0 Defendant later amended this assertion from twelve years to seven years. (Concise Statement 1f 1.)
Either way, Defendant Is mistaken about his criminal history.
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· Gapias and Bench·Warrant;·04l18/2012:)-Defendant·fttrther demonstratedthatha lsnot ·
amenable to treatment by violating probation on four separate occasions after
reportedly completing treatment at the Wedge Center. (PSI 7-10, 14; Probation Violation
Stipulation 10/31/2014.) Finally, while the PSI indicates that Defendant completed a
treatment-program for drugs and alcohol in 20111 Defendant vioiated probation three
times after that, with his eighth and most recent violation due to a positive test for
marijuana in 2014. (PSI 9-10, 14; Petition to Issue Capias and Bench Warrant,
04/23/2014.) Thus, Defendant's behaviorshows that treatment programs alone do not
adequately address his rehabilitative needs.
The PSI also reveals that, despite a diagnosis of Attention Deficit Disorder and
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder ( ADD/ADHD
11 11), Defendant is otherwise in good
physical and mental health. (PSI 14.) At his probation violation hearing, Defendant
claimed that he wanted to support his wife and newborn baby. (N.T. Probation Violation
Hr'g., 10/31/2014, at 3:4-6.) Yet, Defendant has no verifiable work history and despite
.
bein~ only 34 years old, having completed the eleventh grade, and generally enjoying
good physical and mental health, Defendant's sole source of income is $700 per month
due to his ADD/ADHD diagnosis. (See N.T. Sentencing, 2123/2014, at 5:15-17; PSI 1,
14-15.) Furthermore, while Defendant claimed he worked eightto twelve hours per day
to supplement his disability income, he has "never paid any child support for this first
three children and has paid nothing on his fines and costs for over twelve years." (N.T.
Sentencing, 2/23/2015, at 5:15-19.)
Moreover, when given the opportunity to make a statement at his probation
violation hearing, Defendant never took responsibility for his repeated probation
8
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violations; statrng-instead that probation-has "beena burden on [his] life"· andthaftiEf ·
"can't see[m] to get off of' probation. (N.T. Probation Violation Hr'g., 10/31/2014, at
2:24-3:4.) pefendant's probation officer noted that Defendant l_ived in Philadelphia at
the time of the hearing, and that the Lancaster_ County Probation Office had attempted
three times to transfer Defendant's supervtslon to Philadelphia County. iliL,at.3:14-16.)
He added that he was "at a loss as to what to do with [Defendantr because
Philadelphia returned supetvision each time and would "no longer even accept a
transfer request" due to Defendant's repeatedly failing to report for appointments. (Id. at
3:15-20.) The Probation Officer stated that the sentence requested by his office was
"the only available remedy to address [Defendant) and his issues with reporting and
drug use." Q9.:. at 3:21-24.)
Given another opportunity to explain himself at the sentencing, Defendant again ·
offered only excuses when he stated that he had made "some mistakes in [his] life[,]"
but added that he felt did riot deserve a state sentence, .and concluded ·by requesting
"another chance" while admitting that this was his. seventh or eighth pr~bation violation
on this docket alone. (N.T. Sentencing, 2/23/2015, at 3:11-19.)
I tailored my sentence in accordance with the dictates of 42 Pa.C.SA. § 9721 (b)
· and considered Defendant's offenses, history, and conduct while being supetvised,
statements of Defendant and his Counsel, my own observations, the PSI, and the
November .5, 2014 letter written on Defendant's behalf by Tylicla Matthews. (See KL. at
5:1-5.). Defendant has convictions on six new dockets and eight probation violations on
this docket in the time he has been on supervision. Defendant has demonstrated a
. .
failure to take responsibility for his actions, to pay child support or fines and costs, and
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lei ·comply· witfl tner terms··and ·conditions· of probation ·and parole. A se-ntenc~- of less· ·-
than total incarceration would diminish the seriousness of the underlying offense,
especially in light of Defendant's criminal history. Finally, despite Defendant's contention
to the contrary, I expressly considered Defendant's rehabilitative needs when I said
"without question whatsoever, the defendant is in need of treatment" noting that
Defendant's best opportunity for effective rehabilitation would be achieved through his
"commitment to an institution outside of-this community." (N.T. Sentencing, 2/25/2015,
at 6:18-21.)
My sentence also complies with 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9771 (B)-(C). Given Defendant's
history of probation violations and other criminal behavior, his disregard for the safety of
· the community, and !he Court's need to protect the public, It is highly likely that
Defendant would commit another crime if s·imply given probation. Thus, a sentence of
total incarceration was warranted both in light of Defendant's propensity to reolfend and
to vindicate the authority of the Court. Under these circumstances, Defendant's
sentence at issue was entirely justified and is not manifestly excessive.
CONCLUSION
Defendant's claim of error lacks merit. Therefore, this Court respectfully requests
the dismissal of his appeal.
Accordingly, I.enter the following:
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IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF LANCASTER COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
CRIMINAL
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
v. No. 5293-2000
EMMANUEL JONES
ORDER
AND NOW, this b day of, June, 2015, the Court hereby submits this Opinion
pursuant to Rule 192S(a) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appeilate Procedure.
I certify this document to be filed BY THE COURT:
In the Lancaster County Office of
the C~ ~f the Courts. (2 : l~JtiFFERY O. WRIGHT
JUDGE
• $ -~
JEFFERY D. WRIGHT
:~i
·1r1:11 Joshua G. Parsons JUDGE
i
c.,n\",\'~
1 Clerk of the Courts
Copies to: .
J. Alexander Marcinko, Assistant District Attorney
Diana C. Kelleher, Esq., Assistant Public Defender