Opinion issued October 27, 2015
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
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NO. 01-15-00725-CR
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ADAM JARIEL TAYLOR, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 185th Judicial District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 1410146
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Adam Jariel Taylor, pleaded guilty to the first-degree felony
offense of aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon, reduced from capital murder,
with the agreed recommendation that he receive ten years’ confinement. See TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 29.03(a)(2), (b) (West Supp. 2014). On August 3, 2015, the
trial court assessed appellant’s punishment at ten years’ confinement, in
accordance with the terms of his plea bargain with the State. The trial court
certified that this is a plea-bargain case and that appellant has no right of appeal.
Nevertheless, appellant timely filed a pro se notice of appeal,
acknowledging that his punishment did not exceed the amount recommended by
the State and agreed to by appellant. However, appellant contends that his guilty
plea does not preclude appealing any pretrial issues, such as a lack of procedural
and substantive due process, ineffective assistance of counsel, withholding defense
evidence, and wrongful indictment. Appellant also filed a motion for appointment
of appellate counsel with a motion for extension of time to file his appellate brief
in this Court. We dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.
An appeal must be dismissed if a certification showing that the defendant
has the right of appeal has not been made part of the record. TEX. R. APP. P.
25.2(d); see Dears v. State, 154 S.W.3d 610, 613 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). The
trial court’s certification, which is included in the clerk’s record, states that this is a
plea-bargain case and that appellant has no right of appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P.
25.2(a)(2), (d).
In a plea-bargain case—where a defendant pleaded guilty and the
punishment did not exceed the punishment recommended by the prosecutor and
agreed to by the defendant—as here, a defendant may only appeal those matters
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that were raised by written motion filed and ruled on before trial or after getting the
trial court’s permission to appeal. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. § 44.02 (West
Supp. 2014); TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a)(2). To the extent appellant wishes to allege
that his trial counsel was ineffective, that claim is generally raised more thoroughly
in a habeas application rather than on direct appeal. See Andrews v. State, 159
S.W.3d 98, 102 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (noting that “the record on direct appeal is
in almost all cases inadequate to show that counsel’s conduct fell below an
objectively reasonable standard of performance and . . . the better course is to
pursue the claim in habeas proceedings.”). Similarly, to the extent appellant
contends that his plea was involuntary, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has
held that the voluntariness of a guilty plea may not be contested on direct appeal
following a plea bargain agreement. See Woods v. State, 108 S.W.3d 314, 316 &
n.6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); Cooper v. State, 45 S.W.3d 77, 81, 83 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2001).
In any event, the clerk’s record contains plea waiver and admonishment
papers indicating that appellant was indicted for capital murder, but that he pleaded
guilty to the reduced offense of aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon in
exchange for the State’s recommendation that his punishment be assessed at ten
years’ confinement, and the standard waiver of his right of appeal if the trial court
accepted the plea-bargain agreement. The reporter’s record for the plea hearing
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shows that appellant voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly pleaded guilty to the
reduced charge of aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon in exchange for ten
years’ confinement, and that the trial court accepted the plea bargain and assessed
his punishment at ten years’ confinement.
The judgment of conviction in the clerk’s record also reflects that the trial
court accepted the plea-bargain agreement because it assessed appellant’s
punishment at ten years’ confinement. See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a)(2). Thus, the
record supports the trial court’s certification that this is a plea-bargain case and that
the trial court did not give its permission to appeal on any matters, including any
rulings on pretrial motions. See Dears, 154 S.W.3d at 615.
To the extent appellant’s pro se notice of appeal contends that his plea–
bargain did not preclude him from appealing any rulings on his pretrial motion for
discovery and inspection of evidence—the only pretrial motion in the record—
apparently no ruling on that motion was signed because he filed that motion while
proceeding pro se when he was represented by counsel. Appellant is not entitled to
hybrid representation, and the trial court was under no duty to take action on his
pro se motion. See Ex parte Bohannon, 350 S.W.3d 116, 116 n.1 (Tex. Crim. App.
2011); Scheanette v. State, 144 S.W.3d 503, 505 n.2 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
Because appellant has no right of appeal in this plea-bargain case, we must
dismiss this appeal without further action. See Menefee v. State, 287 S.W.3d 9, 12
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n.12 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Chavez v. State, 183 S.W.3d 675, 680 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2006) (“A court of appeals, while having jurisdiction to ascertain whether an
appellant who plea-bargained is permitted to appeal by Rule 25.2(a), must dismiss
a prohibited appeal without further action, regardless of the basis for the appeal.”);
see also Greenwell v. Court of Appeals for Thirteenth Judicial Dist., 159 S.W.3d
645, 649 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (explaining purpose of certification requirements
is to resolve cases that have no right of appeal quickly without expense of
appointing appellate counsel, preparing reporter’s record or preparing appellate
brief).
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction. See TEX. R.
APP. P. 43.2(f). We dismiss all pending motions as moot.
PER CURIAM
Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Higley, and Brown.
Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
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