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ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION II
No. CR-15-157
OPINION DELIVERED OCTOBER 28, 2015
JACKIE COLLINS
APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE CRITTENDEN
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. CR-2004-1090]
V.
HONORABLE RANDY F.
PHILHOURS, JUDGE
STATE OF ARKANSAS
APPELLEE AFFIRMED
ROBERT J. GLADWIN, Chief Judge
Appellant Jackie Collins appeals from the revocation of his probation by the
Crittenden County Circuit Court. Appellant argues that the trial court’s findings that he
violated two of the conditions of his probationary sentence are against the preponderance of
the evidence. We affirm.
On January 31, 2005, appellant pleaded guilty to burglary, a Class B felony, in the
Crittenden County Circuit Court, case number CR-2004-1090, and was sentenced to forty-
eight months’ probation. On July 7, 2005, the State filed a petition for revocation of
probation, and on September 8, 2005, appellant pleaded guilty to the revocation and was
sentenced to 120 months’ imprisonment in the Arkansas Department of Correction (ADC),
with the imposition of an additional suspended sentence of 120 months.
Appellant was released on parole on November 4, 2008. The State filed its petition
for revocation of suspended sentence on August 18, 2014, alleging the following violations:
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(1) failure to pay fines, costs, and fees as directed; (2) failure to notify sheriff of current address
and employment; and (3) commission of residential burglary and theft of property. After a
hearing on November 26, 2014, appellant was found to have violated two conditions of his
probation, (1) failure to pay fines, costs, and fees, and (2) failure to lead a law-abiding life, and
was sentenced to 120 months in the ADC pursuant to a sentencing order filed on November
26, 2014. He filed a timely notice of appeal on December 9, 2014.
In a revocation proceeding, the trial court must find by a preponderance of the
evidence that the defendant has inexcusably failed to comply with a condition of his or her
suspension or probation, and on appellate review, we do not reverse the trial court’s decision
unless it is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Egger v. State, 2015 Ark. App.
471, __ S.W.3d __; Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-308(d) (Supp. 2015). Because the burdens are
different, evidence that is insufficient for a criminal conviction may be sufficient for a
probation or suspended-sentence revocation. Id. Since determination of a preponderance of
the evidence turns on questions of credibility and weight to be given testimony, we defer to
the trial court’s superior position. Id. Furthermore, the State need only prove that the
appellant committed one violation of the conditions in order to revoke appellant’s sentence.
Peals v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 1, 453 S.W.3d 151.
I. Failure to Pay Costs, Fines, and Fees
Where the alleged violation involves the failure to pay ordered amounts, and the State
has introduced evidence of nonpayment, the burden shifts to the probationer to provide a
reasonable excuse for the failure to pay. Truitt v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 276. It is the
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probationer’s obligation to justify his failure to pay, and this shifting of the burden of
production provides an opportunity to explain the reasons for nonpayment. Id. The State,
however, shoulders the ultimate burden of proving that the probationer’s failure to pay was
inexcusable. Id.
Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-93-308(d) states, “If a court finds by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant has inexcusably failed to comply with a
condition of his or her suspension or probation, the court may revoke the suspension or
probation at any time prior to the expiration of the period of suspension or probation.”
Condition number one of appellant’s conditions of suspended imposition of sentence
required him to “pay all fines, court costs, and restitution.” Amy Peyton, the collector of
fines for the Crittenden County Sheriff’s Department, testified that she received
documentation reflecting the following fines and costs assessed against appellant: (1) $750
in fines; (2) $750 in fees under the original conviction; and (3) $500 in costs and fees from
the first revocation. Ms. Peyton testified that she had not received any payments from
appellant since the first revocation hearing. She further stated that appellant had not
contacted her at all since 2008 to apprise her of where he was working, where he was living,
or when he would begin paying his fines and costs. A copy of the computer-generated
account that is kept at the sheriff’s office, along with the corresponding ledger sheet, and the
criminal cost bill from the trial court reflecting the amounts that Ms. Peyton testified to were
introduced into evidence without objection.
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Appellant testified that, upon his release on parole, he was employed with Delta Ice
Service and Southland Greyhound Park. Appellant acknowledged that, despite being able to
pay his fines, he failed to do so. He testified that he “didn’t have no idea about [the fines]”
and that he may have “lost [his] paperwork or something like that.” Appellant testified that
he was paying his parole fee. On cross-examination, appellant admitted that he had signed
the conditions of suspended imposition of sentence. He also testified that the required costs
sounded “familiar.” Appellant conceded that he never called the sheriff’s office to discuss his
costs and fines and said he “never had no clue about that . . . I was just thinking about parole
fees . . . .”
No testimony was offered through the parole officer, Ms. Mary Marshall, that he was
behind on his parole payments, and appellant submits that his testimony was in harmony with
that of Ms. Peyton in all respects. He maintains that his faithful payment of his parole fees,
coupled with his evident ability and willingness to pay, constituted a “reasonable excuse” for
his failure to pay.
We disagree. Through the testimony of Ms. Peyton and appellant, the State
established that appellant violated the first condition of his suspension—that he pay all fines,
costs, and restitution—and this single violation justifies revocation. See Rudd v. State, 76 Ark.
App. 121, 61 S.W.3d 885 (2001). Because the State offered evidence of nonpayment, the
burden shifted to appellant to justify his failure to pay. See Truitt, supra. As the case law makes
clear, appellant’s alleged confusion over the owed amounts does not justify his nonpayment.
See, e.g., Burkhart v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 462, at 5 (holding that defendant’s alleged
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confusion about her obligation to make payments did not constitute a sufficient excuse for
her failure to pay).
Additionally, we defer to the trial court’s superior position regarding questions of
credibility and the weight to be given testimony and, after hearing the testimony of Ms.
Peyton and appellant, the trial court found that appellant had violated the conditions of his
suspended sentence by “never pay[ing] any money. . . .” Therefore, the trial court’s
determination that appellant inexcusably failed to pay his costs, fines, and fees is not clearly
against the preponderance of the evidence, and we affirm.
II. Commission of Theft
Additionally, appellant argues that the trial court clearly erred by finding that he
committed theft, which was contrary to the preponderance of the evidence. Condition
number two of appellant’s suspended imposition of sentence required appellant to “live a
law-abiding life, be of good behavior, and not violate any state, federal, or municipal law.”
The State alleged in its petition for revocation that appellant had violated this condition by
committing residential burglary and theft of property. The trial court found that appellant
had violated this condition, but appellant argues that the State’s offered proof was insufficient
to support that finding by a preponderance of the evidence.
Ms. Cambria Gatewood testified that someone had broken into her house and had
stolen her air conditioner. She further testified that she had not given it to anyone or
authorized anyone to take it. Ms. Gatewood explained that appellant cut her yard and
“apparently” had stolen the air conditioner as payment. This testimony was corroborated by
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appellant, who testified that Ms. Gatewood told him he was her “new yard person” after he
mowed her yard the previous week. He admitted that he took the air conditioner from her
back yard and sold it to a pawn shop. His testimony was corroborated by that of Detective
Ira Roundtree of the Criminal Investigation Division of the West Memphis Police
Department, who confirmed that the air conditioner was pawned by appellant in West
Memphis.
Theft of property occurs when a person “[t]akes or exercises unauthorized control
over . . . the property of another person with the purpose of depriving the owner of the
property.” Ark. Code Ann. § 5-36-103(a)(1) (Repl. 2013). According to appellant, an express
oral contract existed between Ms. Gatewood and himself regarding the mowing of her yard,
with the only missing terms being the amount and form of payment. He argues that the
admitted taking of the property was not shown to be “unauthorized,” as required by the
statute, because it was taken as reasonable compensation for agreed-upon services provided.
Appellant urges that, because the State failed to offer sufficient proof that appellant took the
property of the alleged victim without authorization, the trial court’s finding to the contrary
by a preponderance of the evidence was erroneous.
We disagree and hold that the following evidence supports the trial court’s finding.
Ms. Gatewood testified that someone broke into her home around July 31, 2014, and stole
her window-unit air conditioner, and that her neighbors told her who took it—appellant.
Ms. Gatewood’s back door also had been pried open around the time that the air conditioner
went missing. Ms. Gatewood further testified that she had not given the air conditioner to
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anyone or authorized anyone to take it from her window. After visiting a pawn shop in West
Memphis, Ms. Gatewood found and identified her stolen air conditioner.
Detective Roundtree testified that he conducted an interview with appellant regarding
the theft. After going to the above-referenced pawn shop, Detective Roundtree learned that
appellant had pawned the air conditioner. Detective Roundtree also testified that appellant
had “placed a thumb print on the receipt for the pawn ticket, [and] he signed for it.”
Detective Roundtree retrieved the air conditioner and returned it to Ms. Gatewood. On
cross-examination, Detective Roundtree testified that he questioned one of Ms. Gatewood’s
neighbors who witnessed the theft. The neighbor said that she saw “a young black male who
cuts her grass normally loading something in the back of a black taxi.”
Finally, appellant testified and admitted to having mowed Ms. Gatewood’s grass and
to stealing the air conditioner, referring to it as “the one that I did steal.” Appellant stated
that, while he did not break into the house, he did steal the air conditioner and sell it. On
cross-examination, appellant acknowledged that he knew he could not steal air conditioners
because he was on parole but that he had stolen it anyway. He said that he had pawned the
air conditioner and taken the money, using a portion of the money to pay the taxi driver.
Based on the testimony of Ms. Gatewood, Detective Roundtree, and appellant, the
trial court found that appellant stole the air conditioner, violating the terms of his suspended
sentence. We hold that the record before us indicates that the trial court’s finding was not
clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. See, e.g., Wade v. State, 64 Ark. App. 108,
983 S.W.2d 147 (1998). The trial court was in a superior position to evaluate the credibility
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of the witnesses and to determine the weight to be given to their testimony. Id. Further,
appellant admitted to stealing the air conditioner, thereby satisfying section 5-36-103(a)(1),
which provides that “[a] person commits theft of property if he . . . knowingly . . . [t]akes
or exercises unauthorized control over . . . the property of another person with the purpose
of depriving the owner of the property.” Accordingly, the trial court’s finding was not clearly
against the preponderance of the evidence and is affirmed.
Affirmed.
HARRISON and GRUBER , JJ., agree.
Tyler C. Ginn, for appellant.
Leslie Rutledge, Att’y Gen., by: Ashley Driver Younger, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.
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