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[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 14-12082
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 4:14-cv-0024-HLM
JOSHUA PARNELL,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
CASHCALL, INC.,
Defendant - Appellant,
WESTERN SKY FINANCIAL, LLC,
MARTIN A. (“BUTCH”) WEBB,
Defendants.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
________________________
(October 28, 2015)
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Before WILSON and MARTIN, Circuit Judges, and HODGES, ∗ District Judge.
WILSON, Circuit Judge:
This case requires us to determine whether a plaintiff properly challenges an
arbitration agreement’s validity when he does not specifically challenge the
delegation provision contained therein. The Supreme Court has explained that
where an arbitration agreement contains a delegation provision—committing to the
arbitrator the threshold determination of whether the agreement to arbitrate is
enforceable—the courts only retain jurisdiction to review a challenge to that
specific provision. Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 72, 130 S.
Ct. 2772, 2779 (2010). Absent such a challenge, the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA) requires that we treat a delegation provision as valid and permit the parties
to proceed to arbitration. Id. at 71–72, 130 S. Ct. at 2779; see 9 U.S.C. § 2. We
hold that when a plaintiff seeks to challenge an arbitration agreement containing a
delegation provision, he or she must challenge the delegation provision directly.
The district court erred in neglecting to recognize the delegation provision in
the agreement in this case. Accordingly, we reverse and remand.
I
Upon completing his service in the United States Army and experiencing
less-than-ideal financial circumstances, Plaintiff-Appellee Joshua Parnell
∗
Honorable Wm. Terrell Hodges, United States District Judge for the Middle District of
Florida, sitting by designation.
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responded to a television advertisement for short-term loans. Parnell, situated in
Georgia, logged onto his computer and applied for a loan from Western Sky
Financial, LLC (Western Sky), a South Dakota limited liability company with its
principal place of business in Timber Lake, South Dakota. Just ten minutes after
Parnell submitted his online loan application, a Western Sky employee called
Parnell to inform him that he had been approved for a $1000 loan and relevant
paperwork would be emailed to him shortly. The email Parnell received contained
a document titled “Western Sky Consumer Loan Agreement” (Loan Agreement),
which stated the terms of the contract between the parties. The Loan Agreement’s
Truth in Lending Act Disclosure Statement made plain the 232.99% annual
percentage rate and finance charge of $3,905.56. In total, after making twenty-five
scheduled repayments on the $1,000 loan, Parnell would pay $4,905.56.
Most importantly, the Loan Agreement contained an agreement to arbitrate
any potential disputes between the parties. This provision stated in relevant part:
WAIVER OF JURY TRIAL AND ARBITRATION.
PLEASE READ THIS PROVISION OF THE AGREEMENT
CAREFULLY. Unless you exercise your right to opt-out of
arbitration in the manner described below, any dispute you have
with Western Sky or anyone else under this loan agreement will
be resolved by binding arbitration. Arbitration replaces the
right to go to court, including the right to have a jury, to engage
in discovery (except as may be provided in the arbitration
rules), and to participate in a class action or similar proceeding.
In Arbitration, a dispute is resolved by an arbitrator instead of a
judge or jury. Arbitration procedures are simpler and more
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limited than court procedures. Any Arbitration will be limited
to the dispute between yourself and the holder of the Note and
will not be part of a class-wide or consolidated arbitration
proceeding.
Agreement to Arbitrate. You agree that any Dispute, except as
provided below, will be resolved by Arbitration, which shall be
conducted by the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Nation by an
authorized representative in accordance with its consumer
dispute rules and the terms of this Agreement.
Arbitration Defined. Arbitration is a means of having an
independent third party resolve a Dispute. A “Dispute” is any
controversy or claim between you and Western Sky or the
holder or servicer of the Note. The term Dispute is to be given
its broadest possible meaning and includes, without limitation,
all claims or demands (whether past, present, or future,
including events that occurred prior to the opening of this
Account), based on any legal or equitable theory (tort, contract,
or otherwise), and regardless of the type of relief sought (i.e.
money, injunctive relief, or declaratory relief). A Dispute
includes, by way of example and without limitation, any claim
based upon marketing or solicitations to obtain the loan and the
handling or servicing of my account whether such Dispute is
based on a tribal, federal or state constitution, statute,
ordinance, regulation, or common law, and including any issue
concerning the validity, enforceability, or scope of this loan or
the Arbitration agreement. . . .
Parnell digitally signed the Loan Agreement and, seventy-two hours later,
Western Sky directly deposited $1,000 in Parnell’s bank account. Prior to the due
date of his first repayment, Parnell received notification that Defendant-Appellant
CashCall, Inc. (CashCall) had taken over his loan and he should make all his
payments to CashCall, not Western Sky.
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After sending his final payment to CashCall, Parnell filed suit in state court,
alleging that CashCall and Western Sky’s business practices exploit tribal
sovereign immunity and illicitly avoid federal and state regulations, including the
Georgia Payday Lending Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-17-2. CashCall removed the case to
federal court and moved to compel arbitration. The district court denied the
motion after determining that (i) Parnell articulated a challenge to the arbitration
provision in the parties’ contract and (ii) the arbitration provision was
unconscionable. CashCall now appeals.
II
We have jurisdiction under 9 U.S.C. § 16. “We review de novo the district
court’s denial of a motion to compel arbitration.” Jenkins v. First Am. Cash
Advance of Ga., LLC, 400 F.3d 868, 873 (11th Cir. 2005).
III
The district court erred in holding that Parnell properly challenged the Loan
Agreement. We hold that the Loan Agreement contains a delegation provision
and, though Parnell challenged the validity of the arbitration provision, he did not
articulate a challenge to the delegation provision specifically. Therefore, the FAA
requires that we treat the delegation provision as valid, enforce the terms of the
Loan Agreement, and leave to the arbitrator the determination of whether the Loan
Agreement’s arbitration provision is enforceable.
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A
The FAA places arbitration agreements on equal footing with all other
contracts and sets forth a clear presumption—“a national policy”—in favor of
arbitration. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443, 126 S.
Ct. 1204, 1207 (2006); accord AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333,
___, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011); Rent-A-Center, 561 U.S. at 67, 130 S. Ct. at
2776; Inetianbor v. CashCall, Inc., 768 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2014). The
FAA governs the Loan Agreement because the parties conducted their business
across state lines. See 9 U.S.C. § 2. From the State of Georgia, Parnell used the
Internet to contact and then contract with Western Sky and CashCall, which are
South Dakota and California corporations, respectively. Neither party disputes that
Western Sky and CashCall are engaged in interstate commerce.
Section 2 of the FAA requires the courts to enforce an arbitration provision
within a contract unless “such grounds exist at law or in equity for the revocation
of any contract.” Arbitration provisions will be upheld as valid unless defeated by
fraud, duress, unconscionability, or another “generally applicable contract
defense.” Rent-A-Center, 561 U.S. at 67–68, 130 S. Ct. at 2776. Further, § 4 of
the FAA permits one party to seek the assistance of the district court when the
other party refuses to proceed with arbitration, and requires the court to “make an
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order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of
the agreement.” 9 U.S.C. § 4.
Importantly, parties may agree to commit even threshold determinations to
an arbitrator, such as whether an arbitration agreement is enforceable. The
Supreme Court has upheld these so-called “delegation provisions” as valid, Rent-
A-Center, 561 U.S. at 68–70, 130 S. Ct. at 2777–78, and explained that they are
severable from the underlying agreement to arbitrate, Buckeye, 546 U.S. at 445,
126 S. Ct. at 1209. When an arbitration agreement contains a delegation provision
and the plaintiff raises a challenge to the contract as a whole, the federal courts
may not review his claim because it has been committed to the power of the
arbitrator. Instead, the plaintiff must “challenge[] the delegation provision
specifically.” Rent-A-Center, 561 U.S. at 72, 130 S. Ct. at 2779 (emphasis added).
In sum, absent a challenge to the delegation provision itself, the federal courts must
treat the delegation provision “as valid under § 2, and must enforce it under §§ 3
and 4, leaving any challenge to the validity of the Agreement as a whole for the
arbitrator.” Id.
B
When federal courts interpret arbitration agreements, state contract law
governs and directs the courts’ analyses of whether the parties committed an issue
to arbitration. See First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944, 115 S.
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Ct. 1920, 1924 (1995); Paladino v. Avnet Computer Techs., Inc., 134 F.3d 1054,
1061 (11th Cir. 1998); see also In re Checking Account Overdraft Lit., 685 F.3d
1269, 1275 (11th Cir. 2012) (applying South Carolina law to interpret an
arbitration agreement subject to the FAA). However, as the Supreme Court
explained in First Options, “[c]ourts should not assume that the parties agreed to
arbitrate arbitrability unless there is clear and unmistakable evidence that they did
so.” 514 U.S. at 944, 115 S. Ct. at 1924 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Although the Loan Agreement expressly provides that the laws of the
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe (the Tribe) govern the agreement,1 the parties
provided this court with no rule of tribal law regarding contract interpretation and
our research uncovered none. We faced similar circumstances in Paladino, where
we made an assumption regarding the proper choice of law based on one party’s
place of employment because neither party addressed which state’s law applied
and the relevant “principles of contract construction [were], in any event, matters
1
The Loan Agreement provides in relevant part:
GOVERNING LAW. This Agreement is governed by the Indian
Commerce Clause of the Constitution of the United States of America and
the laws of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe. We do not have a presence
in South Dakota or any other states of the United States. Neither this
Agreement nor Lender is subject to the laws of any state of the United
States of America. By executing this Agreement, you hereby expressly
agree that this Agreement is executed and performed solely within the
exterior boundaries of the Cheyenne River Indian Reservation, a sovereign
Native American Tribal Nation. You also expressly agree that this
Agreement shall be subject to and construed in accordance only with the
provisions of the laws of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, and that no
United States state or federal law applies to this Agreement.
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of hornbook law.” See 134 F.3d at 1061 n.1. Here, the plain-meaning rule is a
foundational principle of common law contract interpretation widely adopted in the
United States, including in Georgia, the forum that Western Sky specifically
targeted with its television advertisement and in which Parnell viewed and signed
the Loan Agreement. Accordingly, we look to Georgia law for a statement of the
plain-meaning rule and apply it in this case.
Under Georgia law, “[i]f the language of the contract is plain, unambiguous,
and capable of only one reasonable interpretation, that interpretation must control,
and no construction of the contract is required or even permissible.” See City of
Decatur v. DeKalb Cty., 713 S.E.2d 846, 849 (Ga. 2011). Applying this rule and
remaining cognizant of the requirement that a contractual commitment to arbitrate
arbitrability must be “clear and unmistakable,” we hold that the Loan Agreement’s
plain language contains an express delegation provision. This provision conveys
the parties’ intent to submit to an arbitrator the threshold issue of arbitrability.
The delegation provision appears in the third sub-paragraph of the Loan
Agreement’s arbitration provision. The portion of the Loan Agreement titled
“Arbitration Defined” commits all “Disputes” to arbitration and expressly states
that a Dispute includes “any issue concerning the validity, enforceability, or scope
of this loan or the Arbitration agreement.” Though contained within a sub-
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provision, this language unambiguously commits to the arbitrator the power to
determine the enforceability of the agreement to arbitrate.
Parnell urges us to hold that no delegation provision exists because this
language appears within a string citation of examples. However, there is no
requirement that a delegation provision be offset from other contractual language
or solely discuss arbitration of arbitrability in order to be valid. Moreover, the
Loan Agreement (i) requires that all Disputes be resolved in arbitration, with
Disputes construed broadly, and (ii) specifically defines Disputes to include at
least “issue[s] concerning the validity, enforceability, or scope of this loan or the
Arbitration agreement,” regardless of what other matters may also constitute a
Dispute. Thus, the Loan Agreement contains a delegation provision, providing
clear and unmistakable evidence that the parties intended to commit the issue of
arbitrability to the arbitrator.
C
Because the Loan Agreement contains a delegation provision, we only retain
jurisdiction to review a challenge to that particular provision. Absent a direct
challenge, we must treat the delegation provision as valid and allow the arbitrator
to determine the issue of arbitrability. Rent-A-Center, 561 U.S. at 72, 130 S. Ct. at
2779. Parnell’s complaint only challenges the arbitration provision generally, and
therefore falls short of the Rent-A-Center pleading requirement.
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In Rent-A-Center, Plaintiff Jackson brought a discrimination suit against his
former employer, who responded with a motion to compel arbitration based on the
signed employment agreement between the parties. In opposing the motion to
compel arbitration, Jackson stated that “the entire agreement seems drawn to
provide Rent-A-Center with undue advantages should an employment-related
dispute arise” and that “the arbitration agreement as a whole is substantively
unconscionable.” Id. at 73, 130 S. Ct. at 2779. The Supreme Court determined
that the arbitration agreement contained a delegation provision because it gave the
arbitrator “exclusive authority to resolve any dispute relating to the . . .
enforceability . . . of this Agreement,” id. at 71, 130 S. Ct. at 2779, and Jackson’s
opposition to the motion only challenged the arbitration agreement as a whole.
Accordingly, the Court ignored Jackson’s arguments that the agreement was
procedurally and substantively unconscionable because at no point did Jackson
make out a challenge to the delegation provision itself, id. at 72, 130 S. Ct. at 2779,
and enforced the arbitration agreement as § 2 of the FAA required.
Parnell’s complaint largely parallels the shortcomings of Jackson’s
opposition to the motion in Rent-A-Center. Parnell includes in the final paragraphs
of his complaint that the Loan Agreement contains an arbitration provision that
violates substantive Georgia law. The cited Georgia law states that “[a]n
arbitration clause in a payday loan contract shall not be enforceable if the contract
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is unconscionable” and lists a variety of factors the courts should consider when
evaluating unconscionability under state law. O.C.G.A. § 16-17-2(c)(2) (emphasis
added). Echoing the generalized allegations in Rent-A-Center, Parnell’s complaint
further alleges that “[t]he Loan Agreement is unconscionable” because the interest
rate is usurious; the designation of tribal law and jurisdiction is contrary to Georgia
law and public policy; the forum selection clause “is unconscionable as such a
forum deprive[s] Plaintiff and the putative class of their day in court”; arbitration is
prohibitively expensive; and the Loan Agreement prohibits class actions. These
allegations all address the validity of the underlying agreement and reflect the
extent of Parnell’s challenge. At no point in his complaint does Parnell
specifically challenge the parties’ agreement to commit to arbitration the question
of the enforceability of the arbitration agreement. Rather, he asks us to review the
validity of the arbitration agreement as a whole, a task which the delegation
provision expressly commits to an arbitrator.
Our holding in this case does not, as Parnell suggests, require future
plaintiffs to “file one challenge to an agreement as a whole, followed by a
challenge to a certain clause, followed by challenges to single sentences, followed
by challenges to words tacked onto conjunctions at the end of a sentence.” To the
contrary, the result in this case merely follows the directive set forth in Rent-A-
Center and emphasizes that when a would-be plaintiff seeks to challenge an
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arbitration agreement containing a delegation provision, he or she must challenge
the delegation provision directly.
IV
We hold that the Loan Agreement between the parties contained a delegation
provision and because Parnell did not directly challenge that provision, § 2 of the
FAA requires us to treat it as valid and enforce the Loan Agreement according to
its terms. Thus, we reverse the district court’s denial of CashCall’s motion to
compel arbitration and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. As
this case remains in its pre-trial stages, Parnell may still seek leave from the district
court to amend his complaint to reflect a proper challenge to the delegation
provision.2
REVERSED and REMANDED for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
2
The record reflects that Parnell already once amended his complaint. However, before trial,
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit a party to amend his or her complaint with the
court’s leave, which should be “freely give[n].” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 15(a)(2).
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