MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Oct 29 2015, 9:37 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Ellen F. Hurley Gregory F. Zoeller
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Paula J. Beller
Deputy Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
D.S., October 29, 2015
Appellant-Respondent, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A04-1504-JV-161
v. Appeal from the Marion County
Superior Court, Juvenile Division
State of Indiana, The Honorable Marilyn Moores,
Appellee-Petitioner. Judge
The Honorable Geoffrey Gaither,
Magistrate
Trial Court Cause No.
49D09-1412-JD-002913
Pyle, Judge.
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Statement of the Case
[1] D.S. appeals from the juvenile court’s order determining him to be a juvenile
delinquent for an act that would constitute Class A misdemeanor battery if
committed by an adult. D.S. does not dispute that he touched the victim and
caused her bodily injury; instead, he argues that there was insufficient evidence
to show that he knowingly or intentionally did so. Concluding that there is
sufficient evidence of D.S.’s intent, we affirm his true finding.
[2] We affirm.
Issue
Whether there is sufficient evidence to support D.S.’s true finding
for battery.
Facts
[3] On October 29, 2014, seventeen-year-old D.S. was at the house of fifteen-year-
old J.D., whom he had known for over three years. While there, the two
“argued” for approximately thirty minutes. (Tr. 4). When J.D. started to walk
away, D.S. grabbed at her shirt to pull her back and scratched her neck. D.S.
then left the house.
[4] The following day, J.D.’s father saw the scratch on J.D.’s neck and called the
police. J.D. spoke to Detective Jeremy Nix (“Detective Nix”) of the
Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department, and he took a photograph of the
injury to J.D.’s neck.
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[5] Thereafter, the State filed a petition alleging that D.S. was a delinquent child for
committing an act that would have been Class A misdemeanor battery if
committed by an adult. On March 10, 2014, the juvenile court held a fact-
finding hearing, during which the State presented testimony from J.D. and
Detective Nix and introduced an exhibit showing the injury to J.D.’s neck.
During J.D.’s testimony, she testified that she thought that D.S. had
“accidently” grabbed and scratched her neck when he was trying to pull her
back by her shirt. (Tr. 4). At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court
determined that D.S. had committed the act of battery as alleged and entered a
true finding for battery. At the disposition hearing, the juvenile court placed
D.S. on probation and ordered him to have no contact with J.D. D.S. now
appeals his true finding.
Decision
[6] D.S. challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his true finding for
battery.
[7] We have explained our standard of review for a challenge to the sufficiency of
the evidence in a juvenile delinquency case as follows:
When the State seeks to have a juvenile adjudicated as a
delinquent child for committing an act which would be a crime if
a committed by an adult, the State must prove every element of
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In reviewing a juvenile
adjudication, this court will consider only the evidence and
reasonable inferences supporting the judgment and will neither
reweigh evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses. If
there is substantial evidence of probative value from which a
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reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the juvenile was guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt, we will affirm the adjudication.
E.D. v. State, 905 N.E.2d 505, 506-07 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (internal citations
omitted).
[8] The battery statute, INDIANA CODE § 35-43-2-1(b)(1), provides that “[a] person
who knowingly or intentionally . . . touches another person in a rude, insolent,
or angry manner . . . commits battery, a Class B misdemeanor.” The offense is
a Class A misdemeanor if the battery results in bodily injury to the other
person. I.C. § 35-43-2-1(c). Thus, to support a true finding for battery as
alleged, the State was required to establish that D.S. “knowingly or
intentionally touched” J.D. “in a rude, insolent, or angry manner, which
resulted in bodily injury, to wit: scratched skin.” (App. 25). “A person engages
in conduct ‘knowingly’ if, when he engages in the conduct, he is aware of a
high probability that he is doing so.” I.C. § 35-41-2-2(b). “A person engages in
conduct ‘intentionally’ if, when he engages in the conduct, it is his conscious
objective to do so.” I.C. § 35-41-2-2(a).
[9] D.S. does not dispute that he touched J.D. in a manner that caused her bodily
injury. Instead, he argues that there is insufficient evidence to show that he
knowingly or intentionally did so. D.S. acknowledges that he “grabbed at
J.D.’s shirt as she walked away,” and did so “to pull her back[.]” (D.S.’s Br. 5).
D.S., however, disputes that this action shows that he knowingly or
intentionally touched her in a rude, insolent, or angry manner. To support his
argument that there was insufficient evidence of his intent, D.S. points to J.D.’s
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testimony that she did not think that D.S. intended to touch her neck and
scratch her when he grabbed her shirt. He also contends that there is no
evidence that they were engaged in a heated argument because J.D. did not
characterize it as such.
[10] Contrary to D.S.’s assertion, there is sufficient evidence to support the trial
court’s conclusion that D.S. knowingly or intentionally committed battery
causing bodily injury. The “requisite intent [for the offense of battery] may be
presumed from the voluntary commission of the act.” Mishler v. State, 660
N.E.2d 343, 348 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). The trial court, acting as the trier of fact,
may resort to reasonable inferences based on examination of the surrounding
circumstances to determine the existence of the requisite intent. White v. State,
772 N.E.2d 408, 413 (Ind. 2002). “We will affirm a conviction for battery so
long as there is evidence of touching, however slight.” Mishler, 660 N.E.2d at
348.
[11] Furthermore, as our supreme court explained long ago:
A battery is the actual infliction of violence on the person. This
averment will be proved by evidence of any unlawful touching of
the person of the plaintiff, whether by the defendant himself, or
by any substance put in motion by him. The degree of violence is
not regarded in the law; it is only considered by the jury, in
assessing the damages in a civil action, or by the judge in passing
sentence upon indictment. Thus, any touching of the person in
an angry, revengeful, rude, or insolent manner; spitting upon the
person; jostling him out of the way; pushing another against him;
throwing a squib or any missile, or water upon him; striking the
horse he is riding, whereby he is thrown; taking hold of his clothes
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in an angry or insolent manner, to detain him, is a battery. So, striking
the skirt of his coat or the cane in his hand, is a battery. For
anything attached to his person partakes of its inviolability.
Kirland v. State, 43 Ind. 146, 149 (1873) (quoting Greenleaf on Evidence)
(emphasis added). “Indeed, a person my commit the ‘touching’ necessary for
battery by touching another’s apparel” because “a person’s apparel is so
intimately connected with the person that it is regarded as part of the person for
purposes of the battery statute.” Impson v. State, 721 N.E.2d 1275, 1285 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2000) (citing Stokes v. State, 115 N.E.2d 442, 443 (Ind. 1953), reh’g
denied).
[12] D.S.’s argument that J.D.’s testimony regarding her belief regarding his intent is
simply a request to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See E.D., 905
N.E.2d at 506. Here, the evidence shows that D.S. and J.D. “argued” for
approximately thirty minutes and that D.S. grabbed J.D. as she tried to walk
away from him. (Tr. 4). There is no dispute that D.S. intended to grab J.D.’s
shirt and pull her back when she walked away from him. When pulling her
back by her shirt, he scratched her neck. J.D. testified that she did not give D.S.
permission to grab her. After considering both J.D.’s testimony and the
reasonable inferences surrounding the circumstances of D.S.’s actions, the trial
court, as trier of fact, determined that D.S. had the requisite intent for the
offense of battery. We will not reweigh the evidence or reevaluate the trial
court’s credibility determination. See E.D., 905 N.E.2d at 506. Accordingly, we
affirm D.S.’s true finding for battery.
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[13] Affirmed.
Vaidik, C.J., and Robb, J., concur.
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