J-A24012-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
RICHARD YOUNG
Appellant No. 1532 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence December 20, 2013
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0008336-2013
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., WECHT, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED OCTOBER 29, 2015
Appellant, Richard Young, appeals form the judgment of sentence
entered December 20, 2013, in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia
County, following his conviction of aggravated assault, simple assault,
recklessly endangering another person, possession of an instrument of
crime, and terroristic threats.1 We affirm.
We take the underlying history of this matter from the trial court’s
Rule 1925(a) opinion.
FINDINGS OF FACT
On May 30, 2013, at approximately 10 p.m., Jerome Pierce
(hereinafter “the complaining witness”) was at home on 6230
____________________________________________
*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702(a)(4), 2701, 2705, 907 and 2706, respectively.
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Reedland Street. N.T. 10/28/2013 at 8-9. He and his girlfriend,
Patricia Jenkins (hereinafter “Jenkins”), had a verbal argument
upstairs in the home. Id. at 10. At the time, [Young] … was at
the home visiting Jenkins’ daughter. Id. at 21. During the
argument between the complaining witness and Jenkins, [Young]
ran from the lower floor of the home to the floor where the
complaining witness and Jenkins were arguing, and words were
exchanged between the complaining witness and [Young]. Id. at
10.
During the exchange of words, both the complaining
witness and Jenkins requested [Young] to leave the home. Id.
at 12. While [Young] was leaving, but still inside the home, he
informed the complaining witness that he was a “dead man.” Id.
He reiterated the threat once outside the home. Id. Once the
complaining witness made his way outside of the home, he
instructed [Young] to “throw away his guns and his knives … and
knuckle up.” Id. at 13. The complaining witness got into the
fighting position. Id. At this time, without a punch yet being
thrown by either man, [Young] pulled out a razor from the right
side of his body with his right hand and sliced the complaining
witness’ left hand. Id. The complaining witness was cut while
standing in the street in front of the home. Id. at 28.
After being cut, the complaining witness immediately left
the altercation and went inside the home to attend to his
wounds. Id. at 14. An ambulance was called to the home. Id.
at 15. When the police arrived, a blood trail led Officer
Thompson inside the home and up the steps to the second floor,
where he found the complaining witness in the bathroom with a
blood-soaked towel wrapped around his left hand. Id. at 31-32.
[The complaining witness] received 16 stiches and was cut so
deep, he suffered nerve damage in his hand. Id. at 15.
Although [Young] admits he purposely sliced the
complaining witness (Id. at 37), he contends, contrary to the
complaining witness’ testimony, that he was hit twice by the
complaining witness in the back of the head, once inside the
home and once outside. Id. at 37. However, the
Commonwealth illustrated that on the day of the incident …
[Young] informed the police that he was only struck once in the
back of the head. Id. at 40.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
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[Young] requested and was granted a waiver of a jury
trial. The bench trial took place before the Honorable Sean F.
Kennedy on October 28, 2013. Based on the evidence and
testimony, [Young] was found guilty of [the aforementioned
charges]. [The trial court later sentenced Young] to three to six
years[’] incarceration.
Trial Court Opinion, 12/12/14 at 1-3 (footnote omitted).
Young raises the following issues for our review.
A. Was not the evidence insufficient to convict appellant of
aggravated assault, simple assault, recklessly endangering
another person, and possession of instrument of crime, where
the Commonwealth failed to disprove appellant’s claim of self-
defense beyond a reasonable doubt?
B. Even assuming arguendo appellant was reckless or negligent
in appraising the amount of force necessary to protect
himself, was not the evidence insufficient to convict him of
the specific intent crimes of aggravated assault and
possession of instrument of crime?
Appellant’s Brief at 3.
Young first argues that the Commonwealth failed to disprove his self-
defense claim beyond a reasonable doubt. We note that “[t]he use of force
upon or toward another person is justifiable when the actor believes that
such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself
against the use of unlawful force by the other person.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. §
505(a). “Although the defendant has no burden to prove self-defense, …
before the defense is properly in issue, ‘there must be some evidence, from
whatever source, to justify such a finding.’” Commonwealth v. Mouzon,
53 A.3d 738, 740 (Pa. 2012) (citation omitted). Once a justification defense
is properly raised, “the Commonwealth bears the burden to disprove such a
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defense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Torres, 766 A.2d
342, 345 (Pa. 2001) (citations omitted).
The Commonwealth sustains its burden if “it establishes at least one of
the following: 1) the accused did not reasonably believe that he was in
danger of death or serious bodily injury; or 2) the accused provoked or
continued the use of force; or 3) the accused had a duty to retreat and the
retreat was possible with complete safety.” Commonwealth v.
McClendon, 874 A.2d 1223, 1230 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation omitted). “It
remains the province of the [finder of fact] to determine whether the
accused’s belief was reasonable, whether he was free of provocation, and
whether he had no duty to retreat.” Id. (citation omitted).
The Commonwealth can negate a self-defense claim if it proves
the defendant did not reasonably believe he was in imminent
danger of death or great bodily injury and it was necessary to
use deadly force to save himself from that danger.
The requirement of reasonable belief encompasses two
aspects, one subjective and one objective. First, the
defendant must have acted out of an honest, bona fide
belief that he was in imminent danger, which involves
consideration of the defendant's subjective state of mind.
Second, the defendant's belief that he needed to defend
himself with deadly force, if it existed, must be reasonable
in light of the facts as they appeared to the defendant, a
consideration that involves an objective analysis.
Commonwealth v. Smith, 97 A.3d 782, 787 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citations
omitted).
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In rejecting Young’s justification defense, the trial court determined
that there was no evidence to suggest that Young was in imminent danger of
death or serious bodily injury:
Here, evidence presented by the Commonwealth
established that there was no reasonable basis from which to
conclude that the use of the razor was necessary by [Young].
Prior to slicing the complaining witness, [Young] was not in any
danger of death or serious bodily harm. Although the
complaining witness testified that he was willing to enter into
mutual combat with [Young], he did not make any attempt to
throw a punch prior to, or subsequent to, being sliced with the
razor. The complaining witness also did not possess any
weapons at the time of the attack. Further, [Young] presented
no evidence that he acted in self-defense, other than his own
testimony, which was found not to be credible. As illustrated by
the Commonwealth during trial, [Young’s] testimony was
inconsistent with statements previously made to law
enforcement regarding the events that preceded the attack.
Furthermore, [Young] used the weapon while on a public street,
away from the house. He could have, at any point after leaving
the home, retreated from the scene to complete safety without
harming the complaining witness. Therefore, the
Commonwealth met its burden of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt that [Young] did not act in self-defense at the time of the
attack.
Trial Court Opinion, 12/12/14 at 5.
We agree with the trial court’s cogent analysis. The evidence
presented was insufficient to support a finding that Young – either
subjectively or objectively – reasonably believed he was in danger of death
or serious bodily injury. The trial court clearly concluded that Young
unreasonably and unjustifiably escalated the confrontation when he sliced
the unarmed victim with a razor blade. Based on the foregoing, we conclude
that the Commonwealth sustained its burden of disproving Young’s
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justification defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, Young’s first
claim is without merit.
Young next argues that, even assuming his self-defense claim does not
warrant relief, the evidence was still insufficient to convict him of aggravated
assault and possession of an instrument of crime. Our review of the record
reveals that this precise issue was not raised in Young’s Rule 1925(b)
statement of matters complained of on appeal. See Statement of Errors
Complained of On Appeal, 7/18/14.2 Therefore, we are constrained to find
this issue is waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) (“Issues not included in
the Statement and/or not raised in accordance with the provisions of this
paragraph (b)(4) are waived.”); Commonwealth v. Melvin, 103 A.3d 1, 39
(Pa. Super. 2014).
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/29/2015
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2
Young raised two issues in his Rule 1925(b) statement. The first issue
mirrored the first claim raised in Young’s appellate brief. The second issue
challenged the weight of the evidence to support his convictions. See
Statement of Errors Complained of On Appeal, 7/18/14.
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