SD3, LLC v. Black & Decker Inc.

ON REHEARING

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-1746

SD3, LLC; SAWSTOP LLC,

Plaintiffs – Appellants,

v.

BLACK & DECKER (U.S.) INC.; BLACK & DECKER CORPORATION;
CHANG TYPE INDUSTRIAL CO., LTD.; DELTA POWER EQUIPMENT
CORP.; HITACHI KOKI CO., LTD.; HITACHI KOKI USA LTD.; MAKITA
CORPORATION; MAKITA U.S.A., INC.; MILWAUKEE ELECTRIC TOOL
CORP.; ONE WORLD TECHNOLOGIES, INC.; OWT INDUSTRIES, INC.;
ROBERT BOSCH GMBH; ROBERT BOSCH TOOL CORPORATION; RYOBI
TECHNOLOGIES, INC.; STANLEY BLACK & DECKER, INC.; TECHTRONIC
INDUSTRIES, CO., LTD.; TECHTRONIC INDUSTRIES NORTH AMERICA,
INC.; PENTAIR WATER GROUP, INC.; EMERSON ELECTRIC COMPANY;
PENTAIR, INC.,

Defendants – Appellees,

and

DEWALT INDUSTRIAL TOOLS; EMERSON ELECTRIC COMPANY, INC.;
PENTAIR CORPORATION; PORTER-CABLE CORPORATION; SKIL POWER
TOOLS,

Defendants.

----------------------------

AMERICAN ANTITRUST INSTITUTE; NATIONAL CONSUMERS LEAGUE,

Amici Supporting Appellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Claude M. Hilton, Senior
District Judge. (1:14−cv−00191−CMH−IDD)

Argued: May 12, 2015 Decided: October 29, 2015

Before WILKINSON, AGEE, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by published
opinion. Judge Agee wrote the opinion, in which Judge Wynn
joined. Judge Wynn wrote a separate concurring opinion. Judge
Wilkinson wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in
part.

ARGUED: Joel Davidow, CUNEO GILBERT & LADUCA, LLP, Washington,
D.C., for Appellants. James Scott Ballenger, LATHAM & WATKINS,
LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Jonathan W.
Cuneo, Matthew E. Miller, CUNEO GILBERT & LADUCA, LLP,
Washington, D.C., for Appellants. John D. Harkrider, Richard B.
Dagen, AXINN, VELTROP & HARKRIDER LLP, Washington, D.C., Bernard
J. DiMuro, DIMURO GINSBERG PC, Alexandria, Virginia, for
Appellees Stanley Black & Decker, Incorporated, Black & Decker
(U.S.) Incorporated, and Black & Decker Corporation; Christopher
S. Yates, Christopher B. Campbell, Aaron T. Chiu, LATHAM &
WATKINS LLP, San Francisco, California, for Appellee Emerson
Electric Company; Paul Devinsky, Stefan M. Meisner, MCDERMOTT
WILL & EMERY LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellees Hitachi Koki
USA Ltd. and Hitachi Koki Co., Ltd.; Lee H. Simowitz, Elizabeth
A. Scully, Katherine L. McKnight, BAKER & HOSTETLER LLP,
Washington, D.C., for Appellees Makita USA Incorporated and
Makita Corporation; David M. Foster, Washington, D.C., Layne E.
Kruse, Eliot Fielding Turner, FULBRIGHT & JAWORSKI LLP, Houston,
Texas, for Appellees Robert Bosch Tool Corporation and Robert
Bosch GmbH; James G. Kress, BAKER BOTTS L.L.P., Washington,
D.C., Scott W. Hansen, Steven P. Bogart, James N. Law, REINHART
BOERNER VAN DEUREN S.C., Milwaukee, Wisconsin, for Appellees
Milwaukee Electric Tool Corporation, One World Technologies,
Incorporated, OWT Industries, Incorporated, Ryobi Technologies,
Incorporated, Techtronics Industries Co., Ltd., and Techtronic
Industries North America, Incorporated. Seth D. Greenstein,
David D. Golden, CONSTANTINE CANNON LLP, Washington, D.C., for
Amici Curiae.

2
AGEE, Circuit Judge:

SD3, LLC and its subsidiary, SawStop, LLC (together,

“SawStop”), contend that several major table-saw manufacturers

conspired to boycott SawStop’s safety technology and corrupt a

private safety-standard-setting process, all with the aim of

keeping that technology off the market. Consequently, SawStop

sued nearly two dozen saw manufacturers and affiliated entities,

alleging that they violated § 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15

U.S.C. § 1. The district court dismissed SawStop’s amended

complaint based on, among other things, its belief that SawStop

had failed to plead facts establishing an unlawful agreement.

See SD3, LLC v. Black & Decker (U.S.), Inc., No. 11:14-cv-191,

2014 WL 3500674 (E.D. Va. July 15, 2014). SawStop appealed.

We agree with the district court that several parts of

SawStop’s case cannot go forward. SawStop’s complaint does not

plausibly allege any conspiracy to manipulate safety standards,

so we affirm the district court’s decision to dismiss SawStop’s

claims concerning standard-setting. Likewise, the complaint

fails to allege any facts at all against several corporate

parents and affiliates, so we affirm the district court’s

decision to dismiss all claims against those defendants.

But as to the remaining defendants, SawStop has alleged

enough to suggest a plausible agreement to engage in a group

boycott. Although that claim may not prove ultimately

3
successful at trial, or even survive summary judgment, the

complaint offers enough to survive the defendants’ motion to

dismiss. “[A] well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it

strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is

improbable, and that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.” 1

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). Thus, we

vacate the district court’s decision dismissing SawStop’s group-

boycott claim and remand for further proceedings.

I. Background

A. Relevant Facts

This appeal concerns a decision on a motion to dismiss, so

we draw the relevant facts only from allegations in SawStop’s

complaint and from sources incorporated into that complaint.

“In reviewing the dismissal of a complaint, we must assume all

well-pled facts to be true and draw all reasonable inferences in

favor of the plaintiff.” Cooksey v. Futrell, 721 F.3d 226, 234

(4th Cir. 2013). Keeping that standard in mind, we now consider

the relevant facts.

1 We have omitted any internal quotation marks, alterations,
emphasis, or citations here and throughout this opinion, unless
otherwise noted.

4
 1.

In the 1990s, SawStop’s founder, Dr. Stephen Gass, created

a form of “active injury mitigation technology” (“AIMT”) meant

to prevent some hand and finger injuries on table saws. In

basic terms, Gass’ technology “detects contact between a person

and the blade and then stops and retracts the blade to mitigate

injury.” J.A. 83 ¶ 60. When this system works as it should, a

table-saw user who makes contact with the blade will suffer only

a small nick rather than more serious injury.

Gass and his co-inventors initially sought to capitalize on

their invention by pursuing licensing agreements with the major

table-saw manufacturers. The effort began in August 2000, when

SawStop first took a “prototype table saw” to a trade show to

publicly demonstrate the technology. J.A. 86 ¶ 66. That

demonstration spurred meetings with some table-saw

manufacturers, including S-B Power Tool Corp.; Black & Decker

(U.S.), Inc.; Emerson Electric Company; and Ryobi Technologies,

Inc. J.A. 86 ¶ 67. During these meetings, SawStop sought

royalties at “typical commercial rates” of about “8% of

wholesale prices” in any license agreement. J.A. 86 ¶ 65.

The technology “impressed” the manufacturers. J.A. 87

¶ 68. Ryobi, for instance, formed a team to determine whether

it could incorporate SawStop’s technology into its products;

Ryobi’s counsel wanted to adopt the technology “as fast as they

5
[could].” J.A. 87 ¶ 69. S-B Power Tool likewise expressed

interest in “going forward.” J.A. 88 ¶ 73. One Black & Decker

U.S. employee told Gass that he felt a licensing agreement was

“inevitable,” even though Black & Decker was “used to being able

to crush little guys.” J.A. 88 ¶ 76. Emerson’s then-president

also held in-person meetings with SawStop to discuss a potential

deal. J.A. 88-89 ¶ 77. Several manufacturers conducted

technical studies to evaluate SawStop’s effectiveness in

preventing table-saw accidents, which produced positive results.

J.A. 87-88 ¶¶ 70, 74.

Still, table-saw manufacturers also held reservations, one

of which was product liability exposure. If some manufacturers

adopted AIMT while others did not, then an issue could arise as

to whether the non-adopters might be sued for producing an

inherently unsafe product. J.A. 90 ¶ 81. But a lawyer for one

defendant noted that the AIMT technology might be deemed

infeasible, and therefore less relevant in product-liability

suits, if it did not enter the market for some period. J.A. 87-

88 ¶ 72.

Putting aside product liability, some saw manufacturers

held other concerns, including that engineering and cost factors

could render the technology infeasible. By all accounts,

SawStop had not yet tested its technology in the marketplace.

That testing would take some time, and SawStop itself estimated

6
that the device could not have been fully implemented on all

table saws until as late as 2008. J.A. 92 ¶ 90. At least one

industry insider also believed that SawStop’s AIMT could induce

consumers to dispense with other safety features. J.A. 87 ¶ 71.

Furthermore, AIMT did not prevent certain other common table-saw

injuries, like kickback. Id.

SawStop’s licensing discussions did not produce any

immediate results. One manufacturer, S-B Power Tool, ended

licensing discussions in September 2001. J.A. 88 ¶ 75.

2.

In October 2001, table-saw manufacturers allegedly met and

“decide[d] how to respond, as an industry, to the SawStop

[t]echnology.” J.A. 89 ¶ 80. The meeting occurred in

conjunction with the annual meeting of the Power Tool Institute,

a trade association. Like the broader annual meeting, the

table-saw session drew representatives from across the industry,

including S-B Power Tool; Ryobi; Makita USA, Inc.; Emerson;

Porter-Cable Corp.; Hitachi Koki USA Ltd.; Black & Decker U.S.;

and Milwaukee Electric Tool Corp. J.A. 89 ¶ 79.

SawStop alleges that the October 2001 meeting gave birth to

a group boycott against SawStop. The manufacturers first

purportedly determined to take an “all” or “nothing” approach,

in which all table-saw manufacturers would adopt SawStop’s

technology or none would. J.A. 89-90 ¶ 80. Then, they

7
allegedly took the latter path: they “agree[d] not to purchase

technology licenses from [SawStop] or otherwise implement AIMT.”

J.A. 90 ¶ 80. “[N]o contrary views [were] articulated.” Id.

By keeping SawStop out of the market, the manufacturers hoped

that “it would remain . . . at least plausible for [them] to

contend, in defending product liability lawsuits, that AIMT was

not viable.” J.A. 90 ¶ 81.

Ultimately, SawStop contends, the group boycott succeeded.

“[T]hose Defendants not yet in license negotiations with SawStop

refrained from requesting a license, [while] Defendants who were

already in negotiations found ways to abort them as

opportunities arose.” J.A. 91 ¶ 85.

According to the complaint, it took only a matter of months

for the few defendants who had been negotiating with SawStop to

find ways to end those discussions. In January 2002, for

instance, Ryobi had agreed to a non-exclusive licensing

agreement with an initial 3% royalty and a 5% to 8% escalator

clause. J.A. 91-92 ¶ 87. SawStop, however, identified a “minor

ambiguity” in the agreement and asked Ryobi to correct the

“error.” J.A. 92 ¶ 87. Although Ryobi’s counsel assured

SawStop that would happen, Ryobi instead ended negotiations

entirely; Ryobi stopped responding to SawStop’s communications,

and never explained its failure to communicate further. Id.

Similarly, Emerson abruptly ended negotiations, “offering

8
pretextual reasons for its lack of interest.” J.A. 92 ¶ 88.

And Black & Decker U.S. offered a “disingenuous and not made in

good faith” offer: a 1% royalty, paired with an indemnification

provision that would have placed liability on SawStop for

“various risks.” J.A. 92 ¶ 89.

3.

Having failed to sign any manufacturer to a licensing

agreement, SawStop turned to a private safety-standard-setting

organization, Underwriters Laboratories, Inc. (“UL”), to advance

the AIMT product. In December 2002, Gass submitted a proposal

to UL suggesting that the organization modify its widely

accepted safety standards to require AIMT on all table saws.

J.A. 96 ¶ 104. UL in turn referred the proposal to Standards

Technical Panel 745 (“STP 745”), a subgroup of UL that sets

standards for table saws. J.A. 96 ¶ 104.

SawStop’s proposal to modify the UL standards failed, and

SawStop alleges that the failure traces to a second conspiracy,

which we will term the “standard-rejection conspiracy.” In

SawStop’s view, STP 745 was “under the firm control of the

Defendants,” as its members comprised “either employees of the

Defendants or . . . purportedly unaffiliated consultants . . .

who are aligned with the Defendants.” J.A. 97 ¶ 106. Thus, the

defendants allegedly “agreed to vote as a bloc” to “thwart” the

proposal. J.A. 97 ¶ 105. After the vote, the defendants are

9
said to have “promulgated falsehoods, factual distortions and

product defamation” to ensure that STP 745 would not adopt any

standard incorporating AIMT. J.A. 101 ¶ 123.

4.

Later, the defendants are alleged to have additionally

conspired to develop their own safety standards, purportedly to

impose unnecessary costs on SawStop and foreclose any wide

adoption of AIMT. SawStop says that the defendants implemented

this conspiracy in multiple stages. First, in October 2003,

several defendants -- Black & Decker Corp.; Hitachi; Pentair,

Inc.; Robert Bosch Tool Corp.; Robert Bosch GmbH; Ryobi; One

World Technologies Inc.; and Techtronics Industries Co., Ltd. --

formed a joint venture to develop blade avoidance technology.

J.A. 97 ¶ 109. SawStop maintains that this venture was a mere

“smokescreen” to “fend off” intervention from the Consumer

Products Safety Commission, a federal safety agency, and

constituted an “act of fraudulent concealment.” Id. The

venture failed to produce any results. Later, in November 2004,

four defendants -- Black & Decker Corp., Makita USA, Robert

Bosch Tool Corp., and Techtronic Industries North America --

formed another joint venture. J.A. 98 ¶ 111. This venture,

too, was alleged to be a fake effort “to develop a uniform blade

guard standard to preclude quality competition on blade guard

10
standards.” Id. Members of the Power Tool Institute also began

work on a new blade guard design around the same time.

This third conspiracy, which we will call the “contrived-

standards conspiracy,” led to two standards changes adopted by

UL in 2005 and 2007. The first change added certain anti-

kickback devices. The second “specified that the blade guard

should not be a hood, but rather a modular design with a top-

barrier element and two side-barrier guarding elements.” J.A.

99 ¶ 115. SawStop maintains that this second change is too

designed-focused and ineffective; it deduces that the change

must therefore serve an illegitimate purpose.

SawStop further believes that the manufacturers are trying

to extend the contrived-standards conspiracy abroad, as they

“control” the International Electrotechnical Commission, the

European counterpart to UL. J.A. 100 ¶ 122.

5.

SawStop maintains that all of the alleged conspiracies have

continued through today, and the defendants purportedly

communicate weekly “to maintain” the conspiracies. J.A. 100

¶ 121. Nonetheless, SawStop was eventually able to enter the

market by making its own table saws employing AIMT in 2004.

J.A. 95 ¶ 101. When SawStop filed its complaint, it sold three

types of these saws. J.A. 95-96 ¶ 102. The company represented

at oral argument that it now makes additional models.

11
 B. Proceedings Below

Based on the three purported conspiracies, SawStop filed a

complaint in February 2014 in the U.S. District Court for the

Eastern District of Virginia. The original three-count

complaint against 22 separate defendants alleged that the

manufacturer-defendants, conspiring with UL and the Power Tool

Institute, violated § 1 of the Sherman Act. After the

defendants moved to dismiss, however, SawStop filed a first

amended complaint -- the operative pleading on appeal --

dropping some defendants and adding three new counts under state

law. For convenience, we refer to the first amended complaint

as simply “the complaint.”

The district court dismissed SawStop’s complaint under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) after identifying a

number of problems that it perceived in the facts alleged.

First, “Plaintiffs’ conspiracy allegations [were] belied by

their negotiating history with varying Defendants.” SD3, LLC,

2014 WL 3500674, at *3. In the district court’s view, SawStop

could not plausibly allege a refusal to deal when several

defendants had actually offered to deal, and the facts alleged

did not “tend[] to exclude” lawful explanations. Id. at *4.

Second, SawStop failed to allege anything as to several

defendants, instead choosing to lump them together in the

complaint without explanation. Id. Third, SawStop did not

12
allege “direct evidence” of agreement by referring to testimony

from a Ryobi engineer, David Peot. The district court found

that Peot’s testimony, when read in its full context, indicated

only that certain defendants launched a joint venture to develop

technology to prevent table-saw accidents. Id. at *5. Fourth,

SawStop had not established any harm from any of its alleged

conspiracies because the “purported motivation for the alleged

conspiracy is non-existent.” Id. And fifth, SawStop’s

standard-setting conspiracies alleged nothing more than ordinary

participation in trade groups, standard-setting organizations,

and joint ventures, which does not create antitrust liability.

Id. at *6.

SawStop timely appealed, challenging the district court’s

decision as to its three Sherman Act claims. SawStop does not

address the district court’s decision to dismiss its three

remaining state law claims. As to those claims, SawStop has

forfeited review, and we do not consider them. See Powell v.

Palisades Acquisition XVI, LLC, 782 F.3d 119, 127 (4th Cir.

2014). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

II. Standard of Review

“We review the district court’s grant of the defendants’

motion to dismiss de novo.” Johnson v. Am. Towers, LLC, 781

F.3d 693, 706 (4th Cir. 2015). “[W]e accept as true all well-

13
pled facts in the complaint and construe them in the light most

favorable to [SawStop].” United States v. Triple Canopy, Inc.,

775 F.3d 628, 632 n.1 (4th Cir. 2015). We do not, however,

“accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual

allegation.” Anand v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 754 F.3d 195,

198 (4th Cir. 2014). Nor do we accept “unwarranted inferences,

unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.” United States ex rel.

Oberg v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency, 745 F.3d 131, 136

(4th Cir. 2014). We can further put aside any “naked assertions

devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id.

III. Allegations Against Parents and Affiliates

We begin by addressing a problem common to all counts of

the complaint.

A plaintiff in a § 1 case cannot assemble some collection

of defendants and then make vague, non-specific allegations

against all of them as a group. At trial, a § 1 plaintiff will

be required to make a “factual showing that each defendant

conspired in violation of the antitrust laws.” AD/SAT, Div. of

Skylight, Inc. v. Associated Press, 181 F.3d 216, 234 (2d Cir.

1999); cf. United States v. Foley, 598 F.2d 1323, 1336 (4th Cir.

1979) (examining whether a jury charge in a criminal antitrust

case “require[d] a sufficient involvement by each defendant”).

Thus, the complaint must forecast that factual showing, and if

14
it fails to allege particular facts against a particular

defendant, then the defendant must be dismissed. In other

words, the complaint must “specify how these defendants [were]

involved in the alleged conspiracy,” without relying on

“indeterminate assertions” against all “defendants.” In re

Travel Agent Comm’n Antitrust Litig., 583 F.3d 896, 905 (6th

Cir. 2009); see also Total Benefits Planning Agency, Inc. v.

Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 552 F.3d 430, 436 (6th Cir.

2008); In re Elevator Antitrust Litig., 502 F.3d 47, 50-51 (2d

Cir. 2007).

Nevertheless, SawStop means to bring claims against some

corporate parents -- including Hitachi Koki Co., Ltd.; Makita

Corporation; Chang Type Industrial Co., Ltd.; and Techtronic

Industries Co., Ltd. -- even though no factual allegations are

made against them. Instead, SawStop nakedly alleges only that

all of the corporate subsidiaries are “dominated by, and [are]

alter ego[s] of,” these corporate parents. J.A. 73-78. That

allegation offers only a legal conclusion, and SawStop has

alleged no facts suggesting the kind of unity of interests that

we usually require a party to plead before permitting them to

advance an alter ego theory. See, e.g., C.F. Trust, Inc. v.

First Flight Ltd. P’ship, 306 F.3d 126, 134 (4th Cir. 2002).

“The fact that two separate legal entities may have a corporate

affiliation does not alter [the] pleading requirement” to

15
separately identify each defendant’s involvement in the

conspiracy. In re Aluminum Warehousing Antitrust Litig., No.

13–md–2481 (KBF), 2015 WL 1344429, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23,

2015).

The complaint also fails to allege any facts pertaining to

certain of the corporate subsidiaries. In discussing the

alleged group boycott, for example, SawStop never mentions

Techtronic Industries North America, Inc.; OWT Industries, Inc.;

or Pentair Water Group, Inc. OWT Industries, Inc. and Pentair

Water Group also go unmentioned in SawStop’s allegations as to

the UL safety standards. A defendant obviously may not pursue

an antitrust claim against a defendant who is not alleged to

have done anything at all. Antitrust law doesn’t recognize

guilt by mere association, imputing corporate liability to any

affiliate company unlucky enough to be a bystander to its sister

company’s alleged misdeeds.

SawStop tries to tie other defendants to the purported

conspiracies with nothing more than conclusory statements, even

though those defendants entered the table-saw industry well

after these conspiracies allegedly began. Stanley Black &

Decker, Inc., for instance, is purportedly liable because

“persons speaking for [the company] have affirmed its

understanding of the purpose of [the conspiracies], and agreed

to participate in [them].” J.A. 99 ¶ 117. SawStop alleges the

16
same as to Delta Power Equipment, Inc. J.A. 99 ¶ 116.

“[U]nadorned conclusory allegations” like these are akin to no

allegations at all. Vitol, S.A. v. Primerose Shipping Co., 708

F.3d 527, 543 (4th Cir. 2013).

For these reasons, SawStop cannot proceed against all of

the defendants. In particular, Hitachi Koki Co., Ltd.; Makita

Corporation; Chang Type Industrial Co., Ltd.; OWT Industries,

Inc.; Pentair Water Group, Inc.; Stanley Black & Decker, Inc.;

and Delta Power Equipment, Inc. must be dismissed as to all

counts. The group-boycott claims against Techtronic Industries

North America, Inc. and Techtronic Industries Co., Ltd. must

also be dismissed. The district court correctly dismissed these

defendants because, at least as to them, the “complaint was

vague, never explained its case, and lumped [them] together

without sufficient detail.” Bates v. City of Chicago, 726 F.3d

951, 958 (7th Cir. 2013).

We now consider whether SawStop has properly alleged an

antitrust conspiracy against the remaining manufacturers.

IV. Pleading a § 1 Conspiracy

Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act prohibits “[e]very

contract, combination . . ., or conspiracy in restraint of

trade.” 15 U.S.C. § 1. “To establish a § 1 antitrust

violation, a plaintiff must prove (1) a contract, combination,

17
or conspiracy; (2) that imposed an unreasonable restraint of

trade.” N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 717 F.3d 359,

371 (4th Cir. 2013).

This appeal principally concerns the first element, the

conspiracy. “[S]ection one’s prohibition against restraint of

trade applies only to concerted action, which requires evidence

of a relationship between at least two legally distinct persons

or entities.” Robertson v. Sea Pines Real Estate Cos., 679 F.3d

278, 284 (4th Cir. 2012). To be actionable, the defendants must

have specifically made a “conscious commitment to a common

scheme designed to achieve an unlawful objective.” Monsanto Co.

v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764 (1984). Not even

“conscious parallelism” is enough, Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown &

Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 227 (1993), as

“independent action is not proscribed by § 1,” Va. Vermiculite,

Ltd. v. Historic Green Springs, Inc., 307 F.3d 277, 280 (4th

Cir. 2002).

Accordingly, a plaintiff bringing a § 1 claim must first

plead an agreement to restrain trade. In Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007), the Supreme Court explained

that such a plaintiff must plead “enough factual matter (taken

as true) to suggest that [the requisite] agreement was made.”

In other words, the complaint must contain “enough fact to raise

a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of

18
illegal agreement.” Id. For this reason, “allegations of

parallel conduct [on the part of the defendants] . . . must be

placed in a context that raises a suggestion of a preceding

agreement, not merely parallel conduct that could just as well

be independent action.” Id. at 557. “[A] conclusory allegation

of agreement at some unidentified point [also] does not supply

facts adequate to show illegality.” Id.

At bottom, Twombly applies a long-held principle in

antitrust law to the pleading stage: parallel conduct, standing

alone, does not establish the required agreement because it is

equally consistent with lawful conduct. The Twombly plaintiffs

asked the Court to reject that idea and assume a conspiracy

“exclusively” from action that seemed too coincidentally similar

to be independent. Id. at 565 n.11. The Court refused, and for

good reason. “Parallel conduct or interdependence,” after all,

is “just as much in line with a wide swath of rational and

competitive business strategy unilaterally prompted by common

perceptions of the market.” Id. at 554. Thus, the complaint in

Twombly failed because it rested only on “descriptions of

parallel conduct” that could be just as easily explained by

“natural, unilateral reaction[s]” from each defendant. Id. at

564, 566; see also Robertson, 679 F.3d at 289 (“Twombly required

contextual evidence to substantiate a speculative claim about

the existence and substance of a conspiracy.”).

19
 For a § 1 claim to survive, then, a plaintiff must plead

parallel conduct and something “more.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at

557. That “more” must consist of “further circumstance[s]

pointing toward a meeting of the minds.” Id. Allegations could

suffice, for instance, where a plaintiff demonstrates that the

parallel behavior “would probably not result from chance,

coincidence, independent responses to common stimuli, or mere

interdependence unaided by an advance understanding among the

parties.” Id. at 556 n.4. Often “characterized as ‘parallel

plus’ or ‘plus factors,” Evergreen Partnering Grp., Inc. v.

Pactiv Corp., 720 F.3d 33, 45 (1st Cir. 2013), these facts must

be evaluated holistically, see Cont’l Ore Co. v. Union Carbide &

Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 699 (1962) (cautioning courts not to

“compartmentaliz[e] the various factual components” of an

antitrust case).

We do not take the approach that the dissent pursues, which

seems to parse each “plus factor” individually and ask whether

that factor, standing alone, would be sufficient to provide the

“more.” Cf. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551

U.S. 308, 310 (2007) (explaining that “courts must consider the

complaint in its entirety” to determine whether “all of the

facts alleged, taken collectively,” give rise to relevant

inferences, rather than asking “whether any individual

allegation, scrutinized in isolation, meets that standard”).

20
Actions that might seem otherwise neutral in isolation can take

on a different shape when considered in conjunction with other

surrounding circumstances. See William E. Kovacic, et al., Plus

Factors and Agreement in Antitrust Law, 110 Mich. L. Rev. 393,

426-34 (2011) (explaining why plus factors must be analyzed in

groups or “constellations”).

Importantly, Twombly’s requirement to plead something

“more” than parallel conduct does not impose a probability

standard at the motion-to-dismiss stage. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Courts must be careful, then, not to

subject the complaint’s allegations to the familiar

“preponderance of the evidence” standard. Text Messaging

Antitrust Litig., 630 F.3d 622, 629 (7th Cir. 2010). When a

court confuses probability and plausibility, it inevitably

begins weighing the competing inferences that can be drawn from

the complaint. But it is not our task at the motion-to-dismiss

stage to determine “whether a lawful alternative explanation

appear[s] more likely” from the facts of the complaint. Houck

v. Substitute Tr. Servs., Inc., 791 F.3d 473, 484 (4th Cir.

2015). Post-Twombly appellate courts have often been called

upon to correct district courts that mistakenly engaged in this

sort of premature weighing exercise in antitrust cases. See,

e.g., Evergreen Partnering Grp., 720 F.3d at 50; Erie Cnty.,

Ohio v. Morton Salt, Inc., 702 F.3d 860, 868-69 (6th Cir. 2012);

21
Anderson News, L.L.C. v. Am. Media, Inc., 680 F.3d 162, 189 (2d

Cir. 2012).

Similarly, courts must be careful not to import the

summary-judgment standard into the motion-to-dismiss stage. At

summary judgment in a § 1 case, a plaintiff must summon

“evidence tending to exclude the possibility of independent

action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 554; see also Monsanto, 465 U.S.

at 764; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475

U.S. 574, 588 (1986). But the motion-to-dismiss stage concerns

an “antecedent question,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 554, and “[t]he

‘plausibly suggesting’ threshold for a conspiracy complaint

remains considerably less than the ‘tends to rule out the

possibility’ standard for summary judgment,” Starr v. Sony BMG

Music Entm’t, 592 F.3d 314, 325 (2d Cir. 2010). Thus,

“[a]lthough Twombly’s articulation of the pleading standard for

§ 1 cases draws from summary judgment jurisprudence, the

standards applicable to Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 56 motions remain

distinct.” In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300,

323 n. 21 (3d Cir. 2010). “[T]here is no authority . . . for

extending the [Monsanto/Matsushita] standard to the pleading

stage.” Erie Cnty., 702 F.3d at 869. Indeed, such an extension

would be wholly unrealistic, as “a plaintiff may only have so

much information at his disposal at the outset.” Robertson, 679

F.3d at 291. Here, for instance, SawStop was three months into

22
its case and had not conducted any discovery when the defendants

moved to dismiss. We can hardly expect it to have built its

entire case so early on.

We therefore consider whether the district court properly

applied this plausibility-focused standard.

V. Group Boycott

SawStop initially alleges a group boycott, which generally

constitutes a “concerted refusal[] by traders to deal with other

traders.” Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S.

207, 212 (1959). Most often, group boycotts involve “horizontal

agreements among direct competitors” with the aim of injuring a

rival. NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 135 (1998).

This sort of “naked concerted refusal occurs when the defendants

are not engaged in any significant integration of production or

distribution, and the only rationale for the restraint is the

elimination of additional, lower-cost, higher-quality, or more

innovative output from the market.” Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert

Hovenkamp, Fundamentals of Antitrust Law § 22.02a (4th ed. 2014

supp.). “[S]uch agreements . . . cripple the freedom of traders

and thereby restrain their ability to sell in accordance with

their own judgment.” Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram &

Sons, 340 U.S. 211, 213 (1951).

23
 A.

The district court held that SawStop had not adequately

alleged an agreement to boycott. However, in reaching that

conclusion, the district court committed the two errors that we

earlier cautioned against.

First, it confused the motion-to-dismiss standard with the

standard for summary judgment. The district court twice cited

Matsushita -- the case defining the “tends to exclude” standard

for summary judgment -- as a basis for its ruling. See SD3,

LLC, 2014 WL 3500674, at *3, 4. It then mistakenly dismissed

certain claims because the facts alleged did not “tend[] to

exclude” independent action. Id. at *4. It made explicit

findings of fact -- including a finding that motive was “non-

existent” -- that were plainly contradicted by the terms of the

complaint. See J.A. 89-90 ¶¶ 80-81 (alleging motive). The

district court further required SawStop to definitively “show an

agreement,” SD3, LLC, 2014 WL 3500674, at *3, rather than asking

whether the allegations “plausibly suggest[ed]” such an

agreement, Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557. And it erroneously looked

to summary judgment cases to define the relevant standards.

See, e.g., SD3, LLC, 2014 WL 3500674, at *3 (citing Gtr.

Rockford Energy & Tech. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 998 F.2d 391,

396 (7th Cir. 1993)).

24
 Second, the district court applied a standard much closer

to probability than plausibility. For instance, the district

court’s opinion adopts defendants’ characterizations of the

licensing negotiations and then draws unsurprisingly adverse

inferences against SawStop based on them. The district court

noted, for example, that Emerson had made a pre-conspiracy offer

to license, but believed that SawStop had made “no allegation

that Emerson rescinded that offer.” SD3, LLC, 2014 WL 3500674,

at *4. SawStop specifically alleged to the contrary that

“Emerson cut off all license negotiations with SawStop, offering

pretextual reasons for its lack of interest, and did not renew

them.” J.A. 92 ¶ 88. In much the same way, it concluded that a

“disingenuous” offer to license from Black & Decker USA was

inconsistent with conspiracy, SD3, LLC, 2014 WL 3500674, at *4,

without explaining why an offer that SawStop pled was intended

to be rejected was unavoidably inconsistent with a refusal to

license. On the whole, these inferences seem to have been

colored by the district court’s belief that SawStop was “a

technology with uncertain commercial viability and safety.” Id.

at *5.

In short, the district court imposed a heightened pleading

requirement -- but such a standard does not apply on a Rule

12(b)(6) motion, even in an antitrust case. See Marucci Sports,

L.L.C. v. Nat’l Collegiate Ath. Ass’n, 751 F.3d 368, 373 (4th

25
Cir. 2014); W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys., Inc. v. UPMC, 627

F.3d 85, 98 (3d Cir. 2010). This heightened pleading standard

was error. Instead, the district court should have asked

whether SawStop has alleged parallel action and something “more”

that indicates agreement, as Twombly provides.

Our de novo standard of review means that we can decide the

matter without deference to the lower court. Thus, we may apply

the appropriate, Twombly-based standard ourselves rather than

remanding to the district court for another attempt of its own.

See, e.g., Houck, 791 F.3d at 484-86; Triple Canopy, 775 F.3d at

637-40. Further, we enjoy the benefit of the parties’ briefs,

and can read and understand the complaint in the same way as

could the district court. Thus, we proceed to consider whether

SawStop has adequately alleged a group boycott.

B.

A plaintiff establishes parallel conduct when it pleads

facts indicating that the defendants acted “similarly.”

Petruzzi’s IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., 998

F.2d 1224, 1243 (3d Cir. 1993); see also Hyland v. HomeServices

of Am., Inc., 771 F.3d 310, 320 (6th Cir. 2014) (considering

whether the defendants’ actions were “uniform”).

SawStop adequately alleged parallel conduct. The similar

or uniform actions alleged are obvious: none of the defendants

ultimately took a license or otherwise implemented SawStop’s

26
technology. As a result, SawStop could not pursue its initial

business strategy of entering the market through a license

agreement with a major table-saw manufacturer. Such actions are

classically anticompetitive, as “parallel action that excludes

new entrants both facilitates price elevation and can slow

innovation.” C. Scott Hemphill & Tim Wu, Price Exclusion, 122

Yale L.J. 1182, 1185 (2013).

The manufacturers incorrectly insist that their conduct

must be deemed dissimilar at this stage because some licensing

negotiations continued after the conspiracy formed. The

district court agreed. See SD3, LLC, 2014 WL 3500674, at *4

(“The sequence of all of these events undermines the Plaintiffs’

group boycott allegations.”). So does the dissent.

But that argument misunderstands the nature of the alleged

boycott, while again confusing “probability” with

“plausibility.” The manufacturers could have achieved their

alleged objective of keeping SawStop off the market in any

number of ways: they could refuse any licensing discussions at

all, they could engage in spurious licensing discussions, see,

e.g., J.A. 93 ¶ 94, they could sign a license agreement and then

never implement it, or they could scare SawStop off with

commercially unreasonable offers. All of these actions could be

consistent with the boycott’s ultimate alleged objective,

exclusion from the marketplace. See Evergreen Partnering Grp.,

27
720 F.3d at 51 (faulting the district court for “improperly

weigh[ing] [the] defendants’ alleged[ly] inconsistent

responses”); Anderson News, 680 F.3d at 191 (holding that

defendants’ “varied” actions during the initial stages of the

alleged conspiracy did not render the existence of a conspiracy

implausible).

SawStop never alleged that the manufacturers agreed on a

common manner of preventing SawStop’s entry into the market.

That’s not surprising. Commercially sophisticated parties like

the defendants could well understand the red flags that would be

raised from a blanket, total refusal to negotiate. See, e.g.,

Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 800-01 (1946)

(detailing a price-fixing conspiracy in which the defendants

used a variety of differing methods to achieve the same ultimate

objective, an understood and settled price for tobacco).

SawStop might have become suspicious if all of the defendants

fled the negotiations en masse without any pretextual cover.

But if the defendants employed different courses of action, then

their conspiracy might better avoid detection. SawStop alleges

they did exactly that. See J.A. 94 ¶ 96 (“Defendants

fraudulently concealed the AIMT Boycott by, among other things,

giving separate excuses for not taking a license[.]”); J.A. 95

¶ 100 (“[SawStop]’s inquiries were met with silence, false

denials . . . and misleading explanations[.]”).

28
 The dissent, however, is unwilling to credit SawStop’s

factual allegation that the different paths of negotiations were

themselves part of the claimed conspiratorial ruse. It contends

that, in crediting SawStop’s allegation, we “underestimate[] the

difficulty of getting a group of competitors to agree on a

course of action that separate contract negotiations may or may

not have shown to be in their best commercial interest.”

Dissenting op. at 85. But the same thing could be said about

most any alleged agreement between competing businesses -- and

yet the law has never embraced a presumption against business

agreements. Much of antitrust law is premised on such

agreements. More importantly, we are in no position at this

stage to make “estimates” of the sort the dissent posits. It

should hardly need to be said again that we must proceed “on the

assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true

(even if doubtful in fact).” Twombly, 550 U.S. 555. “Rule

12(b)(6) does not countenance dismissals based on a judge’s

disbelief of a complaint’s factual allegations.” Colon Health

Ctrs. of Am., LLLC v. Hazel, 733 F.3d 535, 545 (4th Cir. 2013).

We must be careful not to rely on our own subjective

disbelief here, as even the acts that the manufacturers and the

dissent say are dissimilar might also be read to suggest

deception. Ryobi and Emerson, for example, suddenly ended

negotiations without sufficient explanation after proceeding all

29
the way to a draft license agreement. See J.A. 92 ¶¶ 77, 87-88.

This sort of abrupt and unexplained shift in behavior can

suggest that a defendant’s acts were not entirely independent,

as the shift came after the alleged October 2001 agreement to

launch the boycott. See, e.g., Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. FTC, 221

F.3d 928, 935 (7th Cir. 2000) (explaining that the defendants’

sudden “decision to stop dealing,” which was an “abrupt shift

from the past,” provided more reason to infer a horizontal

agreement). For its part, Black & Decker USA purportedly

tendered only a “disingenuous” offer that was “not made in good

faith.” J.A. 92 ¶ 89. Assuming that characterization is

accurate (as we must), few benign purposes would be served by

such an offer.

But the dissent would require more, even at this early

stage of the proceedings; it would find “parallel conduct” only

when defendants move in relative lockstep, achieving their

common anticompetitive ends (exclusion) only by substantially

identical means. So far as we can tell, this standard finds no

support in any existing authority.

The three decisions that the dissent cites do not support

the proposed rule, as they all involved non-parallel “ends.” One

involved inconsistent pricing in an alleged price-fixing

conspiracy, see City of Moundridge v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 429 F.

Supp. 2d 117, 131-32 (D.D.C. 2006), while another addressed

30
wildly varying surcharges (in both amount and timing) in an

alleged fuel-surcharge-fixing conspiracy, LaFlamme v. Societe

Air France, 702 F. Supp. 2d 136, 151 (E.D.N.Y. 2010). The last,

an appeal from a summary judgment decision, held only that the

defendant had not established conscious parallelism on the part

of one defendant; it assumed, however, that the actions alleged

were parallel. See Cosmetic Gallery, Inc. v. Schoeneneman

Corp., 495 F.3d 46, 54 (3d Cir. 2007). At best, these cases

stand for an unremarkable proposition: parallel conduct must

produce parallel results. And they further recognize the very

point so hotly contested by the dissent: parallel conduct “need

not be exactly simultaneous and identical in order to give rise

to an inference of agreement.” LaFlamme, 702 F. Supp. 2d at

151; cf. City of Moundridge v. Exxon Mobil Corp., Civil Action

No. 04-940 (RWR), 2009 WL 5385975, at *5 (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 2009)

(“Price-fixing can occur even though the price increases are not

identical in absolute or relative terms.”).

Our own precedent does not support the dissent’s view.

Take, for example, United States v. Foley, 598 F.2d 1323 (4th

Cir. 1979), in which a group of real estate brokers were

convicted of violating § 1 by conspiring to fix real estate

commissions. It seems an understatement to say that the Foley

defendants did not move in any way close to perfect tandem: some

defendants did not act to implement the commission-fixing

31
agreement until months after it formed, while at least one

defendant implemented the new commissions before the conspiracy

formed. Id. at 1332-34. Still other defendants only

“partially” joined, taking higher commissions when available but

otherwise pursuing lower ones. Id. Had Foley been decided

under the dissent’s framework, these “divergent paths to the

same end” (higher commissions) would apparently have required

reversal of the convictions. The Court, however, reached a

different result -- it affirmed all nine criminal convictions

after finding sufficient evidence of agreement. Id. at 1335.

Foley, then, effectively rejects the dissent’s proposed

methodology.

Lastly, we disagree that the dissent’s definition is needed

to avoid imposing antitrust liability on innocent activities.

The dissent proceeds as if a finding of parallel conduct

inexorably leads to liability. But Twombly’s foundational

principle is that parallel conduct, standing alone, is not

enough to impose antitrust liability. In other words, the

plaintiff’s initial showing of parallel conduct is only an

initial step in a multi-step process. It is the additional

steps required of an antitrust plaintiff that are meant to

ensure that innocent business activities are not tarred as

antitrust violations, whether at the motion-to-dismiss stage or

later.

32
 Thus, we think it plain that SawStop alleged parallel

conduct. The remaining question is whether SawStop also pleads

the requisite “more” that “point[s] toward a meeting of the

minds.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557.

C.

SawStop has alleged the “more” necessary to move its

allegations of parallel conduct into the realm of plausibility.

The group-boycott claim pled in the complaint builds a

detailed story. SawStop identifies the particular time, place,

and manner in which the boycott initially formed, describing a

separate meeting held for that purpose during the Power Tool

Institute’s October 2001 annual meeting. See J.A. 89-90 ¶¶ 79-

81. The complaint names at least six specific individuals who

took part in forming the boycott, noting which defendant each

person ostensibly represented. See J.A. 89 ¶¶ 78-79. The

complaint further tells us the means by which the defendants

sealed their boycott agreement: a majority vote. See J.A. 89

¶ 80. And the complaint then explains how the manufacturers

implemented the boycott: refusing to respond to entreaties from

SawStop, going silent after long negotiations, or offering only

bad-faith terms that were intended to be rejected. Thus,

“[u]nlike the plaintiffs in Twombly . . ., [SawStop] clearly has

alleged an express agreement to restrain trade.” Watson Carpet

& Floor Covering, Inc. v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., 648 F.3d 452, 457

33
(6th Cir. 2011); cf. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506,

514 (2002) (explaining that a Title VII complaint should not

have been dismissed where it “detailed the events leading to his

termination, provided relevant dates, and included the ages and

nationalities of at least some of the relevant persons involved

with his termination”).

Antitrust complaints, like SawStop’s, “that include

detailed fact allegations as to the ‘who, what, when and where’

of the claimed antitrust misconduct not surprisingly survive

dismissal.” William Holmes & Melissa Mangiaracina, Antitrust

Law Handbook § 9:14 (2014 supp.); see also Carrier Corp. v.

Outokumpu Oyj, 673 F.3d 430, 445 (6th Cir. 2012); Kendall v.

Visa U.S.A., Inc., 518 F.3d 1042, 1048 (9th Cir. 2008); cf.

Goldfarb v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 791 F.3d 500, 511

(4th Cir. 2015) (“A complaint should not be dismissed as long as

it provides sufficient detail about the claim to show that the

plaintiff has a more-than-conceivable chance of success on the

merits.”). Detail in a complaint of “further circumstances

pointing toward a meeting of the minds” allays the suspicion

that the plaintiff is merely speculating a conspiracy into

existence from coincidentally similar action. Twombly, 550 U.S.

at 557. That, after all, was Twombly’s principal concern. See

Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 405 (7th Cir. 2010) (“A

more complex case [like one] involving . . . antitrust

34
violations[] will require more detail, both to give the opposing

party notice of what the case is all about and to show how, in

the plaintiff’s mind at least, the dots should be connected.”).

The dissent contends that the complaint rests on a “casual

presumption” of liability. But that view overlooks the

complaint’s detailed account of the alleged events -- an account

that, again, we must take as true for Rule 12(b)(6) purposes.

Instead, the dissent seems to rely on a series of factual

suppositions that might “perhaps” explain the relevant parallel

conduct. But that approach forces us to ignore the factual

allegations that form the heart of SawStop’s complaint: a

particular meeting on a particular day with particular

participants making a particular agreement that generated the

conspiracy at issue. And by favoring its perception of the

relevant events over the narrative offered by the complaint, the

dissent makes the very mistake that the district court made,

recasting “plausibility” into “probability.”

The dissent underscores the weakness in its position by

mischaracterizing the factual allegations in SawStop’s complaint

as “conclusory” in an effort to avoid them. It may be that the

dissent doesn’t believe the complaint’s detailed allegations,

but that skepticism does not render the allegations

“conclusory.” See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681 (explaining

allegations cannot be called “conclusory” merely because a judge

35
views them as “extravagantly fanciful,” “unrealistic,” or

“nonsensical”). Indeed, just two weeks after Twombly, the

Supreme Court reversed one of our sister circuits for making

much the same error. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 90

(2007) (reversing dismissal of a complaint as “conclusory” where

the complaint alleged harm only by saying that prison officials

“endanger[ed] his life” by taking away needed treatment). And,

as a practical matter, demanding more than the particularized

allegations that SawStop offered here would compel an antitrust

plaintiff to plead evidence -- and we have already expressly

refused to impose such a requirement. See Robertson, 679 F.3d

at 291.

In any event, we observe that SawStop not only alleges the

“who, what, when, and where” in its complaint, but also the

“why.” “[M]otivation for common action” is a key circumstantial

fact. Einer R. Elhauge & Damien Geradin, Global Antitrust Law

and Economics 837 (2007); see also Hyland, 771 F.3d at 320

(listing “common motive to conspire” as a potential plus

factor); Mayor & City Council of Balt. v. Citigroup, Inc., 709

F.3d 129, 136 (2d Cir. 2013) (same). According to the

complaint, the defendants here were motivated to conspire out of

a fear of product-liability exposure: if one manufacturer

adopted the technology, then non-adopting manufacturers could

face liability exposure from their failure to employ AIMT.

36
Thus, under SawStop’s theory, the manufacturers conceived a

group boycott to keep AIMT off the market, thereby preventing

its use as a design alternative in product-liability cases. And

even though a complaint need not “forecast evidence” to support

its theory, Robertson, 679 F.3d at 291, SawStop’s complaint does

so by referencing testimony from Peot (the former Ryobi

engineer), who agrees that non-adopting manufacturers “could”

have been in “real legal trouble” if a major manufacturer had

adopted AIMT. Transcript of Trial at 4-125, Osorio v. One World

Techs. Inc., No. 06-CV-10725 (D. Mass. Feb. 25, 2010), ECF No.

137 (cited at J.A. 89 ¶ 80). The complaint further describes

statements in which Black & Decker’s counsel is alleged to have

said that product liability could be lessened “if a couple of

years passed without implementation of the SawStop

[t]echnology.” J.A. 87 ¶ 72.

The defendants insist that this alleged motive is

implausible, and the dissent agrees. They theorize that, if

SawStop’s theory of motive were true, one would have expected

all of the manufacturers to take a license once SawStop began

making its own AIMT-equipped saws in 2004. The complaint

indicates that course of events did not occur.

Once more, the manufacturers’ argument -- embraced by the

dissent -- seems to misconstrue the complaint’s allegations.

SawStop entered the market as a peripheral player. See

37
Appellant’s Br. 44 (“SawStop’s sales . . . did not even

constitute 1% of total industry sales of table saws in the

United States[.]”). Thus, the manufacturers were still

conceptually able to argue that SawStop was peddling a fringe

technology, as reflected in its “marginaliz[ed]” market

position. See J.A. 90 ¶ 81; see, e.g., Osorio v. One World

Techs., Inc., 659 F.3d 81, 87-88 (1st Cir. 2011) (describing

defendant’s argument that SawStop’s technology was not viable).

Indeed, the fact that the conspiracy did not include every

player in the table-saw industry implies that the conspirators

were concerned with major manufacturers taking a license, not

smaller ones. Thus, the defendants’ post-2004 actions -- which,

in any event, are not fully discussed in the complaint -- are

not much help in evaluating the manufacturers’ potential

motives.

Even if the “who, what, where, when, and why” were not

enough, the complaint also describes a number of communications

among the defendants. Allegations of communications and

meetings among conspirators can support an inference of

agreement because they provide the means and opportunity to

conspire. See, e.g., Evergreen Partnering Grp., Inc., 720 F.3d

at 49; Hyland, 771 F.3d at 320; Mayor & City Council of Balt.,

709 F.3d at 136. Here, in addition to discussing the October

2001 meeting where the alleged conspiracy formed, the complaint

38
describes phone calls, meetings, and discussions among the

various conspirators. Such “allegation[s] identif[y] a

practice, not illegal in itself, that facilitates [an antitrust

conspiracy] that would be difficult for the authorities to

detect.” Text Messaging, 630 F.3d at 628; accord Todd v. Exxon

Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 213 (2d Cir. 2001); see also Sharon E.

Foster, LIBOR Manipulation and Antitrust Allegations, 11 DePaul

Bus. & Com. L.J. 291, 304 (2013) (“Facilitating practices . . .

may evidence the plus factors necessary to establish the

inference of an agreement.”).

A market in which sales power is concentrated in the hands

of the few can also facilitate coercion. See, e.g., Evergreen

Partnering Grp., 720 F.3d at 48; Todd, 275 F.3d at 208; In re

High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 656

(7th Cir. 2002). Fewer “minds” must “meet” in a concentrated

market. And the complaint implies that the table-saw market is

so concentrated, as the defendants here purportedly control 85%

of that market. J.A. 81 ¶¶ 44, 48; see, e.g., Starr, 592 F.3d

at 323 (listing the defendants’ control of 80% of the market as

a relevant plus factor). Further, the complaint describes ways

in which the manufacturers attempted to hide their actions,

including a mutual agreement not to “leave a paper trail.” See

J.A. 93-94 ¶¶ 92-97. These alleged attempts by the

manufacturers to hide their actions could suggest that the

39
defendants knew their actions “would attract antitrust

scrutiny,” Starr, 592 F.3d at 324; in other words, the alleged

facts suggest consciousness of guilt. Those actions give us

further reason to conclude that a group boycott is plausibly

alleged. 2

D.

Generally, “[i]n addition to establishing a conspiracy, a

successful plaintiff must also show . . . that the conspiracy

produced adverse, anti-competitive effects within the relevant

product and geographic market.” Terry’s Floor Fashions, Inc. v.

Burlington Indus., Inc., 763 F.2d 604, 611 n.10 (4th Cir. 1985).

In a viable complaint, “the plaintiff must allege, not only an

injury to himself, but an injury to the market as well.” Agnew

v. Nat’l Collegiate Ath. Ass’n, 683 F.3d 328, 335 (7th Cir.

2012); accord Todd, 275 F.3d at 213. “Actual anticompetitive

effects include, but are not limited to, reduction of output,

2 SawStop also argued that the complaint alleged sufficient
direct evidence of a conspiracy to avoid dismissal. See
Robertson, 679 F.3d at 289 (holding that a complaint can state a
§ 1 claim if it alleges “direct evidence” of the agreement
itself); but see Am. Chiropractic Ass’n v. Trigon Healthcare,
Inc., 367 F.3d 212, 226 (4th Cir. 2004) (indicating that
“smoking gun” direct evidence is “extremely rare in antitrust
cases”). As SawStop’s complaint meets “Twombly’s requirements
with respect to allegations of illegal parallel conduct,”
Robertson, 679 F.3d at 290, we need not determine whether
SawStop has adequately alleged direct evidence.

40
increase in price, or deterioration in quality.” Jacobs v.

Tempur-Pedic Int’l, Inc., 626 F.3d 1327, 1339 (11th Cir. 2010).

In cases involving “per se” violations of the Sherman Act,

however, this anti-competitive harm is essentially presumed.

“[C]ertain agreements or practices” have such a “pernicious

effect on competition” that they “are conclusively presumed to

be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry

as to the precise harm” that they caused. TFWS, Inc. v.

Schaefer, 242 F.3d 198, 209 (4th Cir. 2001). Claims that such

agreements “lacked anticompetitive effects . . . are simply

irrelevant.” In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896,

909 (6th Cir. 2003).

Although the manufacturers contend that SawStop failed to

allege anticompetitive harm, SawStop maintains that its alleged

group boycott violates the Sherman Act per se -- such that no

separate allegations of harm were necessary. “[I]n some

circumstances a group boycott may be considered a per se

violation.” Precision Piping & Instruments, Inc. v. E.I. du

Pont de Nemours & Co., 951 F.2d 613, 617 n.4 (4th Cir. 1991).

And the alleged agreement here comes close to the “paradigmatic

boycott,” in which “a group of competitors” (here, the

manufacturers) take “collective action” (here, the refusal to

license or implement) that “may inhibit the competitive vitality

of rivals” (here, SawStop). NYNEX Corp., 525 U.S. at 135; see

41
also Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery &

Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 294 (1985) (explaining that per se

illegal boycotts “often cut off access to a supply, facility, or

market necessary to enable the boycotted firm to compete and

frequently the boycotting firms possessed a dominant position in

the relevant market”).

Despite the facial appeal of SawStop’s per se argument,

neither the manufacturer’s brief nor the district court’s

opinion directly address it. The district court remarked only

in passing that SawStop had “fail[ed] to establish a naked

boycott organized for a concerted refusal to deal.” SD3, LLC,

2014 WL 3500674, at *5. It did not discuss the issue further,

and offered only a cursory citation to Northwest Wholesale. The

manufacturers similarly assert, without explanation, that

SawStop “failed to allege any per se violation of the Sherman

Act.” Response Br. 58.

Because the issue of competitive harm is inadequately

briefed, and because the district court’s opinion likewise gives

us no guidance, we cannot decide that issue or affirm on that

basis. If the manufacturers so choose, however, they may again

raise the issue of competitive harm before the district court on

remand so that it may fully consider and discuss the question

with the benefit of proper argument.

42
 E.

In sum, SawStop’s complaint is very different from the one

seen in Twombly, which rested solely on “descriptions of

parallel conduct and not on any independent allegation of actual

agreement.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 564; see also id. at 548

(“[T]he question . . . is whether a § 1 complaint can survive

when it alleges . . . certain parallel conduct . . . , absent

some factual context suggesting agreement[.]” (emphasis added)).

SawStop’s complaint alleges an actual agreement to boycott in

detail and does not rely, as in Twombly, on parallel conduct

alone. The dissent’s observation to the contrary is,

respectfully, simply an inaccurate reading of Twombly. See

Dissenting Op. 75. In particular, the Supreme Court directly

rejected the dissent’s reading of the Twombly complaint:

“Although in form a few stray statements sp[oke] directly of

agreement, on fair reading these [were] merely legal conclusions

resting on the prior allegations.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 564.

The Supreme Court was explicit in finding that the Twombly

complaint did not contain “any independent allegation of actual

agreement among the ILECs.” Id.

As to the district court, it erred by applying a summary-

judgment standard to SawStop’s group boycott claim and by

confusing “plausibility” with “probability.” Again, because the

complaint pleads parallel conduct in conjunction with

43
“circumstance[s] pointing toward a meeting of the minds,”

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, SawStop has adequately alleged the

agreement needed to support a Sherman Act § 1 conspiracy. Of

course, it remains to be seen whether SawStop has also

adequately alleged any requisite harm to the market.

Our decision should not be mistaken for an endorsement of

the ultimate merits of SawStop’s case. At this point, SawStop’s

prospects for success are largely irrelevant, as “[a] lawsuit

need not be meritorious to proceed past the motion-to-dismiss

stage.” Ringgold-Lockhart v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 761 F.3d

1057, 1066 (9th Cir. 2014). In fact, “a well-pleaded complaint

may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof

of those facts is improbable, and that a recovery is very remote

and unlikely.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556; accord Cardigan

Mountain Sch. v. N.H. Ins. Co., 787 F.3d 82, 89 (1st Cir. 2015);

N.J. Carpenters Health Fund v. Royal Bank of Scotland Grp., PLC,

709 F.3d 109, 125 (2d Cir. 2013); cf. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681

(“[W]e do not reject these bald allegations on the ground that

they are unrealistic or nonsensical.”). To dismiss SawStop’s

complaint because of some initial skepticism would be to

mistakenly “collapse discovery, summary judgment[,] and trial

into the pleading stages of a case.” Petro-Hunt, L.L.C. v.

United States, 90 Fed. Cl. 51, 71 (2009).

44
 Our decision also is not meant to afford SawStop a license

for unlimited discovery. Like the dissent, we are well aware of

the substantial cost that discovery in an antitrust case can

impose, Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558-59, and recognize that the cost

largely falls on the defendants. When not appropriately

managed, that cost can have an extortionate effect, compelling

some defendants to enter early settlements even in meritless

suits. But we are neither the Advisory Committee on the Rules

of Civil Procedure, nor the Supreme Court, nor Congress. We

must take the rules as we find them.

District courts possess a number of tools -- including

limitations on discovery or consideration of a timely motion for

summary judgment -- to combat any sort of predatory discovery.

See Federal Judicial Center, Manual for Complex Litigation

§ 30.1 (4th ed. 2004) (“Effective management of antitrust

litigation requires identifying, clarifying, and narrowing

pivotal factual and legal issues as soon as practicable[.]”).

Although tools like these do not permit us to give the benefit

of the doubt to groundless claims, Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559,

they confirm that our antitrust jurisprudence cannot be driven

solely by fears about the expense of modern antitrust

litigation. We have faith that district courts possess both the

will and the ability to make good use of available case-

45
management mechanisms, employing them as needed to preserve a

level playing field -- particularly in antitrust cases. 3

VI. Standard-Setting Conspiracies

In addition to its group-boycott claim, SawStop alleges two

separate but related conspiracies concerning private standard-

setting -- the standard-rejection conspiracy and the contrived-

standards conspriacy. Industry particpants allegedly used their

influence over UL to prevent the private organization from

adopting AIMT as a required safety device. The defendants then

purportedly encouraged UL to adopt other standards that imposed

needless costs on SawStop and insulated the defendants from

liability.

We find that the complaint does not plausibly establish

either conspiracy. Although the standard-rejection and

contrived-standards conspiracies are separately alleged, they

fail for the same fundamental reason: the facts alleged imply

nothing beyond ordinary participation in lawful standard-setting

processes. Thus, in contrast to its group-boycott claim,

3 Many of the same allegations that carry SawStop’s
complaint past a motion to dismiss –- the “who, what, when, and
where” –- may substantially focus the discovery in a way that
was not possible in Twombly. See id. at 560 n.6 (noting the
difficulty and expense of discovery directed toward “some
illegal agreement” “between unspecific persons” “at some point
over seven years.”).

46
SawStop’s standards-focused conspiracies fail to allege the

“more” necessary to raise an inference of agreement.

A.

Standard-setting organizations are voluntary membership

organizations whose participants develop “technical

specifications to ensure that products from different

manufacturers are compatible with each other,” address certain

threshold safety concerns, or serve other beneficial functions.

Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 875 (9th Cir.

2012). These organizations have enjoyed a rather complicated

relationship with antitrust law. “[M]embers of such

associations often have economic incentives to restrain

competition and [] the product standards set by such

associations have a serious potential for anticompetitive harm.”

Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492,

500 (1998); see also Soc’y of Mech. Eng’rs v. Hydrolevel Corp.,

456 U.S. 556, 571 (1982). As a result, “private standard-

setting associations have traditionally been objects of

antitrust scrutiny.” Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 500.

Still, such ventures can also have “decidedly

procompetitive effects” by encouraging “greater product

interoperability,” generating “network effects,” and building

“incentives to innovate.” Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n,

616 F.3d 1318, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2010); accord Lotes Co., Ltd. v.

47
Hon Hai Precision Indus. Co., 753 F.3d 395, 400 (2d Cir. 2014);

Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 308 (3d Cir.

2007). “As a result, one can hardly infer anticompetitive

intent to exclude from rule making alone[.] . . . Antitrust

must therefore seek out the exceptional case, where rule making

is used to facilitate collusion or the exclusion of rivals whose

competitiveness or innovation threatens the relevant decision

makers.” Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra, § 22.06b.

Courts have found standard-setting organizations and their

members to have violated the antitrust laws in some cases, but

those cases are relatively few and far between. Of most

relevance here, “an entity may be prosecuted for an antitrust

violation on the basis of improper coercion of a standards-

setting body.” Coalition for ICANN Transparency, Inc. v.

VeriSign, Inc., 611 F.3d 495, 506 (9th Cir. 2010). Allied Tube

is the oft-cited example of that concept. In that case, the

defendant deliberately packed a standard-setting panel with paid

supporters who then banned a competing product. Allied Tube,

486 U.S. at 496. Coalition for ICANN Transparency is another

example. There, the Ninth Circuit found potential antitrust

liability when a powerful corporation allegedly used vexatious

litigation and financial pressure to coerce a standards

organization into providing advantages to that defendant.

Coalition for ICANN Transparency, 611 F.3d at 501, 506.

48
 The common thread in the few cases finding liability in the

private standard-setting context is unique, external pressure

applied to achieve an anti-competitive end. “[T]he principal

concern has been the use of standards setting as a predatory

device . . . ; normally there is a showing that the standard was

deliberately distorted by competitors of the injured party,

sometimes through lies, bribes, or other improper forms of

influence, in addition to a further showing of market

foreclosure.” DM Research, Inc. v. Coll. of Am. Pathologists,

170 F.3d 53, 57-58 (1st Cir. 1999). In other words, a plaintiff

must ordinarily show that the standard-setting activity had a

market-closing effect that was committed “through the use of

unfair, or improper practices or procedures.” Clamp-All Corp.

v. Cast Iron Soil Pipe Inst., 851 F.2d 478, 488 (1st Cir. 1998)

(Breyer, J.).

In the usual case, neither the standard-setting

organization nor its participants will run afoul of antitrust

law when they use ordinary processes to adopt unexceptional

standards. It is “axiomatic that a standard setting

organization must exclude some products, and such exclusions are

not themselves antitrust violations.” Golden Bridge Tech., Inc.

v. Motorola, Inc., 547 F.3d 266, 273 (5th Cir. 2008); see also

Gtr. Rockford Energy & Tech. Corp., 998 F.2d at 396 (“The

failure of a private, standard-setting body to certify a product

49
is not, by itself, a violation of § 1.”); Plant Oil Powered

Diesel Fuel Sys., Inc. v. ExxonMobil Corp., 801 F. Supp. 2d

1163, 1193 (D.N.M. 2011) (holding that the plaintiff did not

plausibly allege an antitrust conspiracy based on the

defendant’s mere opposition to a particular standard). “To hold

otherwise would stifle the beneficial functions of such

organizations[.]” Golden Bridge Tech., 547 F.3d at 273.

Similarly, it is not problematic, standing alone, for market

participants to try to influence the standard-setting process

through the organization’s ordinary procedures. See Clamp-All

Corp., 851 F.2d at 488.

B.

SawStop never alleges that UL’s normal procedures were

thwarted, or that the defendants engaged in some form of

external misconduct. Instead, it asks us to infer malfeasance

because some of the defendants’ representative served on the

relevant standard-setting panel. But SawStop provides no

authority drawing that sort of naked inference, and we have

found none. “Certifiers may reasonably believe that they can do

their job properly (a job that benefits consumers) only if all

interested parties are allowed to present proposals, frankly

present their views, and vote.” Id.

SawStop’s complaint takes issue with UL’s actions largely

because the organization is alleged to have erred in rejecting

50
SawStop’s proposed standard and selecting another one. The

unstated assumption of this argument is that, lacking a valid

“technical” justification, the only remaining explanation must

be an antirust conspiracy.

Even if UL’s ultimate decision can be called “wrong,” that

mistake alone does not indicate concerted action to manipulate

the result. “[S]tandard-setting bodies sometimes err,” but

simple error creates no reason for liability without some

further indication that the organization’s activities are

“merely a ploy to obscure a conspiracy against competing

producers.” Consol. Metal Prods., Inc. v. Am. Petroleum Inst.,

846 F.2d 284, 294 (5th Cir. 1988); see also DM Research, 170

F.3d at 57 (“Merely to say that the standards are disputable or

have some market effects has not generally been enough to

condemn them as ‘unreasonable’ under the Sherman Act.”); Moore

v. Boating Indus. Ass’ns, 819 F.2d 693, 711-13 (7th Cir. 1987)

(finding no evidence of an actionable conspiracy despite the

jury’s finding that the association was “unreasonable and

arbitrary” in setting standards); cf. Brookins v. Int’l Motor

Contest Ass’n, 219 F.3d 849, 854 (8th Cir. 2000) (“So long as

IMCA made game-defining rules decisions based upon its purposes

as a sports organization, an antitrust court need not be

concerned with the rationality or fairness of those

decisions.”); M & H Tire Co. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 733

51
F.2d 973, 984 (1st Cir. 1984) (“We discern no duty to provide an

absolutely objective or scientific basis for decision.”).

“[A]ntitrust is not concerned with whether a standard might be

unreasonable as an abstract proposition.” Areeda & Hovenkamp,

supra, § 22.06c.

If antitrust suits were permitted to go forward based

solely on an allegation that the standard-setting body erred,

courts would be cast into the role of standard-setting appellate

bodies. Consol. Metal Prods., 846 F.2d at 297. Any

disagreement big or small with the ultimate adoption of a safety

standard would, to follow SawStop’s reasoning, create potential

antitrust liability. “Not only would this tax the abilities of

the federal courts, but fear of treble damages and judicial

second-guessing would discourage the establishment of useful

industry standards.” Id.

Beyond its error-based allegations, the complaint’s only

assertions of concerted action are conclusory and non-specific:

“a collective decision was made,” or the defendants “agreed to

vote as a bloc,” or non-SawStop designs were a “smokescreen.”

J.A. 96-97 ¶¶ 103, 105, 109. The complaint identifies no fact

other than consistent votes against SawStop’s proposal (and for

the other designs) to establish the alleged illegal agreements.

That would be parallel conduct, but such conduct is equally

consistent with legal behavior. After all, even if SawStop is

52
right that technical reasons did not support the standard-

setting organizations decisions, other non-anticompetitive

explanations remain. See, e.g., Golden Bridge Tech., 547 F.3d

at 272-73 (“[T]he existence of an independent financial motive

to [change the standard] might be an independent reason for each

Appellee company to support [the change].”); Advanced Tech.

Corp., Inc. v. Instron, Inc., 925 F. Supp. 2d 170, 179 (D. Mass.

2013) (dismissing a complaint where “[t]he crux of [the

plaintiff’s] antitrust claim [wa]s simply that competitors in a

market declined to support a standard that would promote another

competitor’s technology”).

Lastly, we note that SawStop does not allege the sort of

anticompetitive objectives that are ordinarily seen in standard-

setting cases. Usually, standard-setting cases are brought when

products are effectively excluded from the market by adopted

safety standards. Here, SawStop largely complains that it could

not use the standard-setting process to impose its own product

on everyone else. The anticompetitive harms of a “refusal to

impose” are much harder to identify. Nothing that UL or the

standards-setting groups did barred SawStop’s AIMT-equipped saws

from the market, as SawStop’s entry into the competitive table-

saw market establishes. From all appearances, SawStop remains

free to offer its saws with the UL seal of approval, along with

its perceived market advantage of also offering AIMT on those

53
saws. And if UL’s newer standards generate some additional

costs, those costs are common to each member of the industry who

chooses to make a UL-compliant table saw. We see nothing

anticompetitive or exclusionary in that.

The district court thus did not err in granting the

defendants’ motions to dismiss on the standard-setting claims.

VII.

For the reasons described above, the district court

correctly dismissed the standard-setting claims as to all the

defendants. The district court also correctly dismissed the

group-boycott claims against Hitachi Koki Co., Ltd.; Makita

Corporation; Chang Type Industrial Co., Ltd.; OWT Industries,

Inc.; Pentair Water Group, Inc.; Stanley Black & Decker, Inc.;

Delta Power Equipment, Inc.; Techtronic Industries North

America, Inc.; and Techtronic Industries Co., Ltd. However, the

district court erred in dismissing the group-boycott claims

against the remaining defendants.

Therefore, the district court’s decision dismissing

SawStop’s complaint is

AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART,
AND REMANDED FOR PROCEEDINGS
CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION.

54
WYNN, Circuit Judge, concurring:

“Judges ought to remember that their office is jus dicere,

and not jus dare—to interpret law, and not to make law, or give

law.” Francis Bacon, “Essay LVI: Of Judicature,” Essays (1625),

reported in Richard Whately, Bacon’s Essays With Annotations 511

(1857). Here, the judiciously well-reasoned majority opinion

resists the temptation to move beyond our limited role and into

the colorful realm of policy. Respectfully, the dissenting

opinion strays beyond our limited review here and encroaches on

policy issues best left to other branches of government.

I.

First, rather than confront the issues actually in play,

the dissenting opinion dresses up points of agreement as dire

rifts. The dissent asserts, for example, that plaintiffs “seek

to achieve through litigation a monopoly for their product” and

claims that the majority opinion “turns a blind eye” to

“anticompetitive impulse[s]” driving SawStop’s claims. Post at

70, 96. The dissenting opinion claims that the majority opinion

“ignores all [the benefits of ventures such as standards setters

and trade groups] in its rush to flatten pleading standards,

make communications perilous, and consign antitrust law to

isolationist ends.” Id. at 97. Thus, the dissent takes the

policy view that today’s opinion will doom “American companies”

to “competitive disadvantage at the very time global commercial

55
interactions are becoming more commonplace.” Id. Nonsense

(beyond the obvious problem that a competitive disadvantage is

meaningful only in the context of a comparison with America’s

global competitors, many of whom also have antitrust laws).

The majority opinion fully accords with the view that

“[j]oint ventures, standard-setting organizations, and trade

association meetings may allow individuals of different

specialties to benefit from each other’s expertise. These fora

may prove invaluable for efficient and effective product

development.” Post at 96. As the majority opinion plainly

states, “such ventures” can have “decidedly procompetitive

effects by encouraging greater product interoperability,

generating network effects, and building incentives to

innovate.” Ante at 47 (quotation marks and citations omitted).

The majority opinion in no uncertain terms affirms the district

court’s dismissal of SawStop’s standards-setting-related claims—

a crucial fact relegated to a dissenting footnote.

Second, rather than address SawStop’s complaint as it is

written, the dissenting opinion employs verbiage like

“commercial interactions” to revise the complaint so as to omit

the allegations of a secret agreement to refuse to deal. Again

sounding in policy, the dissenting opinion asserts that the

majority “drape[s] innocent commercial activity in sinister

garb” because the complaint “hardly bespeaks a collective

56
agreement not to deal.” Post at 67, 73. Thus, the dissenting

opinion editorializes that due to the majority opinion, “HOLDING

OR ATTENDING [A] TRADE ASSOCIATION MEETING WILL INCREASE YOUR

EXPOSURE TO ANTITRUST SUITS.” Id. at 68 (emphasis added).

Yet, when read with a judicious eye, SawStop’s complaint

clearly alleges that Defendants entered into a secret agreement

to refuse to deal at a trade association meeting—not just that

Defendants “held” or “attended” such meetings. Indeed, the

complaint plainly bespeaks a collective agreement not to deal.

Specifically, the complaint alleges, among other things:

• “In conjunction with the [Power Tool Institute] annual
meeting, a separate meeting of representatives of
table saw manufacturers was held. Attendees at the
meeting included, but were not necessarily limited to,
Domeny (on behalf of SBTC and Bosch), Peot (on behalf
of Ryobi, TIC and affiliates), Stanley Rodrigues (for
Makita), Ray Mayginnes (for Emerson), David V. Keller
(of Porter-Cable, who also spoke for Pentair and
DICM), Steven Karaga (for Hitachi), and
representatives of B&D and Milwaukee Electric. Mr.
Domeny, at the time, was the Chair of the [Power Tool
Institute]’s Product Liability Committee, and chaired
the meeting.” J.A. 89 ¶ 79 (emphasis added).

• “At the meeting, Mr. Domeny and the other participants
expressed concerns that if one manufacturer adopted
SawStop Technology, then all manufacturers would be
subject to greater liability in future product
liability cases. Mr. Peot shared this concern.
[Power Tool Institute]’s table saw manufacturers
determined at that meeting that they would decide how
to respond, as an industry, to the SawStop Technology.
A consensus was reached that (1) all should take a
SawStop license and/or implement AIMT, or (2) none
take it or otherwise implement AIMT; since if one or
more took a license and/or offered a product with
AIMT, the others would be more vulnerable to product

57
 liability. It was also agreed that collective action
would proceed only if all, or at least a substantial
majority, of participants voted to participate.
Members also discussed developing something like
SawStop Technology, without having to pay a royalty to
Dr. Gass. The consensus reached by the attendees,
with no contrary views articulated, was that industry
members would collectively agree not to purchase
technology licenses from Plaintiffs or otherwise
implement AIMT.” J.A. 89-90 ¶ 80 (emphasis added and
citations omitted).

• “The consensus reached at the meeting was based on a
calculated economic determination that the
manufacturers would, collectively, fare better by
collectively agreeing to marginalize SawStop and AIMT,
than by allowing the marketplace to determine whether
any manufacturers did business with SawStop or
otherwise implemented AIMT. The Defendants believed
that bringing AIMT into the mass market would have
catastrophic product liability consequences for them.
Purchasers of their existing and prior inventories of
table saws (and, perhaps, other products) would point
to the viability of AIMT as evidence that other
products were inherently unsafe because they lacked
AIMT. Defendants believed that, in the short term, if
SawStop was unable to obtain a major manufacturing
partner, it would not be able to produce or market a
meaningful quantity of saws with its AIMT – this way,
the major manufacturers could continue to earn current
profit margins on their existing inferior product
lines without paying royalties to Plaintiffs, and it
would remain (for the time being) at least plausible
for the major manufacturers to contend, in defending
product liability lawsuits, that AIMT was not viable.
Thus, Defendants’ business calculation was that they,
collectively, would fare better by marginalizing
SawStop and AIMT, than by working with SawStop and/or
otherwise adopting AIMT.” J.A. 90 ¶ 81.

• “It was agreed at the meeting and thereafter that all
discussions concerning a collaborative response to
SawStop would be confidential and concealed from
persons other than [Power Tool Institute] members who
manufactured table saws. It was further agreed that,
going forward, information relevant to SawStop and
table saw product liability defense issues would only

58
 be shared among those industry participants who
affirmatively agreed to act collectively in response
to SawStop.” J.A. 90 ¶ 82 (emphasis added).

• “At, or within a period of months following the
October 2001 meeting, each of Defendants Bosch, Ryobi,
Makita, Hitachi, Pentair, Emerson and Milwaukee
Electric, and entities affiliated with them, had
agreed to enter into a boycott (the ‘AIMT Boycott’) of
SawStop’s intellectual property, by collectively (1)
refusing to license SawStop technology, and (2)
agreeing not to otherwise implement AIMT.” J.A. 90-91
¶ 83 (emphasis added).

• “During this time frame, in which [Power Tool
Institute]’s table saw manufacturers voted to respond
collectively to SawStop Technology, those Defendants
not yet in license negotiations with SawStop refrained
from requesting a license, and the Defendants who were
already in negotiations found ways to abort them as
opportunities arose.” J.A. 91 ¶ 85 (emphasis added).

In other words, SawStop’s complaint alleges a specific meeting

in which Defendants agreed to refuse to deal with SawStop and to

keep that pact a secret. Around the same time, Defendants

refrained from seeking SawStop’s technology or, if in licensing

negotiations with SawStop, found ways to abort them. The

dissenting opinion’s dismissive characterization of these

detailed allegations as mere “conclusory assertions,” post at

71, thus plainly misses the mark.

On the contrary, SawStop’s allegations squarely conform to

what we require Sherman Act § 1 plaintiffs to plead. “To

establish a § 1 antitrust violation, a plaintiff must prove, and

therefore plead, (1) a contract, combination, or conspiracy; (2)

that imposed an unreasonable restraint of trade.” Robertson v.

59
Sea Pines Real Estate Companies, Inc., 679 F.3d 278, 284 (4th

Cir. 2012) (Wilkinson, J.) (quotation marks and citation

omitted). Further, “Iqbal and Twombly do not require a

plaintiff to prove his case in the complaint.” Id. at 291.

Instead, the complaint “need only allege facts sufficient to

state elements of the claim.” Id. (quotation marks and

citations omitted). And at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, which is

where we are, the complaint is to be “construed liberally so as

to do substantial justice.” Pub. Employees’ Ret. Ass’n of Colo.

v. Deloitte & Touche LLP, 551 F.3d 305, 311 (4th Cir. 2009)

(Wilkinson, J.) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

In its revisionist account of SawStop’s allegations, the

dissenting opinion essentially turns the Rule 12(b)(6) standard

on its head. “A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the

sufficiency of a complaint; importantly, it does not resolve

contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the

applicability of defenses.” Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin,

980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992). Instead, “a well-pleaded

complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that

actual proof of the facts alleged is improbable and that a

recovery is very remote and unlikely.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (quotation marks and citation

omitted).

60
 Despite our crystal-clear mandate in reviewing this Rule

12(b)(6) dismissal, the dissenting opinion nevertheless attacks

the complaint in a light least favorable to SawStop, viewing the

facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to

Defendants. For example, the dissenting opinion opines that

“[i]gnoring the many practical reasons for declining [SawStop]’s

offers, the majority hones in on the fear of product liability

as the key motivation behind defendants’ alleged boycott.” Post

at 91. Yet, the majority opinion rightly focuses on the

products liability reasoning—because SawStop specifically

alleges it. See, e.g., J.A. 89-91. We are thus not at liberty

to swap that pled reasoning out for other “practical reasons” we

might make up out of whole cloth. A further example: The

dissenting opinion asserts that “it was consistent with each

manufacturer’s best interest to reject an expensive, unproven,

undeveloped, and possibly unsafe technology. Each defendant

could easily have arrived at this business decision on its own.”

Post at 90. But SawStop alleges that they didn’t arrive at that

decision independently. Instead, the complaint specifically

alleges that Defendants expressly agreed to refuse to deal and

to keep that agreement secret. See, e.g., J.A. 89-91. Ignoring

such specific allegations to SawStop’s detriment is nothing shy

of an all-out perversion of the generous lens through which we

61
must view the complaint. Pub. Employees’ Ret. Ass’n of Colo.,

551 F.3d at 311.

Finally, the dissenting opinion focuses on its own policy

preferences, thereby abandoning this Court’s limited role—which

is simply to assess whether SawStop plausibly alleges the

elements of its Section 1 claim. Because the majority opinion

sticks to its limited role, it steers clear of considering

things like different “approach[es]” in a “globalized

marketplace,” whether the word “‘conspiracy’ is bound to stoke

paranoia,” or the appropriate amount of “lag time” in “product

development.” Post at 66, 79, 91.

The dissenting opinion sees itself in no way so bound and

thus insists, for example, that “[h]ere, plaintiffs are the ones

acting anti-competitively.” Post at 70. It is simply not our

job in reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to assess which party’s

conduct we deem more pro-competitive. In refusing to stick to

our limited role, the dissenting opinion engages in breathtaking

judicial activism.

“As the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized, . . .

Congress is the policymaker—not the courts.” In re Sunterra

Corp., 361 F.3d 257, 269 (4th Cir. 2004). See also, e.g.,

Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530

U.S. 1, 13-14 (2000) (“Achieving a better policy outcome . . .

is a task for Congress, not the courts.”). It is thus

62
inappropriate to suggest, for example, that, as a matter of law,

a boycott conspiracy may not be motivated by liability concerns.

Congress can pencil such categorical limitations into the

Sherman Act; we cannot.

The dissenting opinion embarks on yet another odyssey into

policy, as well as assumptions untethered to reality, much less

the complaint at issue here, when it asserts that “[t]hese days

secrets are harder to keep. A secret is something that is held

by only one. Or maybe two. But twenty-two? Managers everywhere

must be relieved to learn from my concurring colleague that you

can let twenty-two people in on a secret and have nothing leak

out.” Post at 87. Yet in reviewing a complaint for Rule

12(b)(6) purposes, we may not peer into a crystal ball and

decide how many people we personally believe can keep a secret

and kick complaints out of court on such a basis.

Moreover, to the extent the dissenting opinion suggests

that a large, multi-firm conspiracy by definition cannot exist,

it is simply uninformed. Large antitrust conspiracies have not

only existed but have been caught—a perfect example being the

famous international vitamin scandal of the 1990s—which involved

21 firms engaged in a conspiracy that lasted over a decade:

From 1988 to 1992 21 chemical manufacturers
headquartered in seven nations joined . . . vitamins
cartels . . . . Sales by these cartels exceeded $30
billion . . . . The pharmaceutical manufacturers
involved became virtually addicted to the infusion of

63
 monopoly profits, giddy financial results that
prompted the conspirators to continue their
clandestine activities for up to 15 years. These
illegal activities persisted in the face of [among
other things] several public prosecutions of parallel
conspiracies [and] multiple antitrust investigations .
. . . The conspirators simply burrowed deeper and
developed more elaborate methods of subterfuge.

John M. Connor, The Great Global Vitamins Cartels 8, available

at http://ssrn.com/abstract=885968.

In other words, large, multi-player conspiracies involving

elaborate ruses can indeed exist as a matter of law and fact.

And here, SawStop alleges that one did, and that it undertook a

group boycott to freeze SawStop technology out of the

marketplace. In refusing to accept those allegations, as we

must at this stage, the dissenting opinion plainly oversteps its

bounds.

II.

In sum, courts exist to resolve disputes, not to pervert

procedural rules into swords with which to fight policy battles.

And today, we do not confront whether SawStop should ultimately

succeed on its boycott claim. Instead, we confront only

whether, when viewing SawStop’s complaint with an unjaundiced

eye and using the proper standard, we can say that it has made

allegations sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss for

failure to state such a claim. It has. Accordingly, with all

64
due respect for the dissenting view, I join in the judicious and

well-reasoned majority opinion.

65
WILKINSON, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in
part:

The majority’s view of modern commerce is unfortunate. It

takes an isolationist approach in which each business must all

but lock itself in semi-solitary or risk the taint of antitrust

claims. Whatever validity the isolationist approach may once

have had, it is profoundly injurious in an increasingly

interconnected, necessarily collaborative, and globalized

marketplace. The majority rightly observes that agreement is the

crux of an antitrust claim, but it has made mere communication

the touchstone of liability. Ante at 29.

The majority rejects this as a statement of policy, ante at

45, 56, but it is hardly that. It is rather a statement of

consequences that flow from the majority’s refusal to follow the

Supreme Court’s decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544 (2007), which established pleading requirements for a

Sherman Act Section 1 complaint. The Supreme Court lacks the

institutional resources to ensure full compliance with its

decisions. Among other things, it has room on its docket for a

limited number of cases, and the Twombly decisions from the

lower courts may be routinely pitched as pertaining to no more

than the particulars of an individual complaint.

It just may be, however, that the institutional limitations

at the Court impart institutional obligations on the courts of

66
appeals to respect in fullest measure the highest Court’s

approach. In this obligation, I believe the majority has

defaulted. I shall show throughout how it has failed to follow

Twombly at every turn. I would suggest, most respectfully, that

the majority has committed basic conceptual errors and that the

consequences of those errors, which the majority prefers not to

face and to dismiss as policy, are regrettable. Most

regrettable, however, is the treatment of a Supreme Court

decision, even a controversial one, at the hands of this court.

Among Twombly’s insights was that markets, every bit as

much as conspiracies, play a significant role in governing

commercial conduct. See 550 U.S. at 557. Twombly counsels that

we not leap to pejorative explanations when legitimate business

considerations are more likely at play. Id. at 554. The fact

that Sherman Act conspiracies in restraint of trade do assuredly

continue to exist does not mean that we should rush too quickly

to drape innocent commercial activity in sinister garb.

The majority, however, adopts the reverse sequence. It

fashions a template for the frustrated market participant:

Whenever routine business decisions don’t go your way, for

whatever reason, simply claim an industry conspiracy under the

Sherman Act and the courts will infer malfeasance. But such

casual presumptions of antitrust infractions can only chill

communications among companies, which in turn may hinder product

67
development, innovative joint ventures, and useful trade

association conclaves. WARNING: HOLDING OR ATTENDING THIS TRADE

ASSOCIATION MEETING WILL INCREASE YOUR EXPOSURE TO ANTITRUST

SUITS.

The chilling effect is most acute when the majority

considers independent market-driven behavior to be parallel

conduct warranting antitrust scrutiny. Parallel industry conduct

is, of course, the lynchpin of many a Sherman Act Section 1

claim. The majority’s cardinal conceptual error lies in the

adoption of an ends-based approach to parallel conduct in a

circumstantial antitrust case. See infra Part II.A. The end of

course is the fact that a plaintiff’s product was not adopted.

But the products most likely to meet the end of rejection are

those of the least utility or those that would cause the most

expense. The majority thus uses its ends-based analysis to

reward the least marketable products with the greatest

possibility of litigation success. WARNING: FAILURE TO ADOPT

THIS PRODUCT FOR WHATEVER REASON WILL INCREASE YOUR EXPOSURE TO

ANTITRUST SUITS.

This treatment of ends and means in antitrust litigation

undermines the Twombly decision. An analysis of means rather

than ends is the most sensitive tool we possess to measure the

plausibility of a complaint. See Twombly, 550 U.S. 544. And

here, the means by which the so-called conspiracy was carried

68
out paint a clear picture of non-parallel conduct. The complaint

is the best evidence of that. After SD3 introduced its product,

certain defendants entered into licensing negotiations that

continued well after the alleged group boycott agreement. Some

of them offered to license the technology, again after the

supposed agreement, and were rebuffed by SD3. Other negotiations

yielded no offers, with one defendant leaving the table saw

industry altogether. The vast majority of named defendants are

not even mentioned in SD3’s account of the supposedly “parallel”

behavior. Their negotiation posture, which would seem well

within plaintiffs’ knowledge, is nowhere set forth or detailed.

While the majority highlights cases in which plaintiffs

successfully alleged parallel conduct, none of them features

disparate actions such as these. If defendants’ behavior

qualifies as parallel conduct, then plainly divergent actions

among competitors in any field will now give rise to antitrust

claims. This is but part and parcel of the majority’s attempt to

impose a presumption of guilt on antitrust defendants who now

must bear the burden of proving a negative when the burden

properly lies with the party bringing the claim.

It is no accident that Twombly itself was an antitrust

decision. For what we confront in antitrust law is a perfect

storm of treble damages, large discovery costs, and relaxed

pleading standards. It is the three factors in combination that

69
pose a threat to legitimate marketplace behavior. The Supreme

Court in Twombly sought to calm the waters by addressing the

latter two. The majority, however, adds to the turbulence by

sanctioning complaints that would in all likelihood have failed

even under pre-Twombly standards. Here, plaintiffs are the ones

acting anti-competitively. They seek to achieve through

litigation a monopoly for their product that neither the table

saw market nor contractual negotiations would yield. The result,

as noted, is that marketplace failures will increasingly lead to

litigation success. And that is only the beginning of the

difficulty.

The majority appears to believe that the full course of

discovery is the proper mechanism for winnowing out meritless

claims. In many fields, that observation would be correct. The

bone of contention in federal civil litigation is most

frequently over summary judgment versus trial. In antitrust law,

however, the flashpoint is often over motions to dismiss versus

summary judgment. For the Supreme Court has clearly recognized

that in the area of antitrust it is the threat of steep

litigation costs that produces deleterious consequences in and

of itself, no matter who the victor in the antitrust marathon

may ultimately prove to be.

As Twombly emphasized, discovery costs have escalated

dramatically since the adoption of the Federal Rules. Twombly,

70
550 U.S. at 558-60; see Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Twombly and Iqbal

Reconsidered, 87 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1621, 1638 (2012).

Multiplying electronic and paper records, combined with

increased regulatory obligations, have caused discovery costs to

mount even further since the issuance of Twombly itself. Before

we impose these climbing costs on companies, there must exist

confidence that the claims leveled against them allege actual

facts that make conspiracy and other illicit intentions

plausible. SD3 fails to clear this bar, but still the majority

just piles it on.

I.

A.

The majority’s approach to Twombly tells an old

intermediate appellate story. The majority alights on a minor

motif of that Supreme Court decision, while leaving its main

point wholly unobserved. The Court made clear in Twombly, and

reiterated in Iqbal, that a plaintiff must allege enough factual

content in the complaint to render his legal claim for relief

“plausible on its face” in order to survive a motion to dismiss

under Rule 12(b)(6). Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Plausibility requires “more

than a sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully.” Id.

(citation omitted). SD3’s complaint cannot clear this hurdle.

Its conclusory assertions that defendants agreed to an industry-

71
wide “boycott” of its product are fully consistent with, and

most plausibly reflect, independent and legitimate business

decisions. Put simply, the majority proceeds as if Twombly were

at most persuasive authority, and not very persuasive authority

at that.

Twombly is particularly important here, for the Supreme

Court in that case addressed the meaning of plausibility in the

context of a conspiracy allegation based on descriptions of

parallel conduct. The Court instructed that “when allegations of

parallel conduct are set out in order to make a § 1 claim, they

must be placed in a context that raises a suggestion of a

preceding agreement, not merely parallel conduct that could just

as well be independent action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557. “Even

‘conscious parallelism,’ a common reaction of ‘firms in a

concentrated market that recognize their shared economic

interests and their interdependence with respect to price and

output decisions’ is ‘not in itself unlawful.’” Id. at 553-54

(citations omitted). Nor should a court infer “that the

companies had agreed among themselves to do what was only

natural anyway.” Id. at 566. Thus, a plaintiff fails to

adequately plead his claim that a defendant unlawfully conspired

under Section 1 if there exists an “obvious alternative

explanation” for the defendant’s conduct that renders the

72
prohibited explanation implausible. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 682

(citation omitted); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 567.

This could not be more clear. In light of Twombly’s

directives, SD3’s allegations fall well short of the

plausibility requirement. The complaint hardly bespeaks a

collective agreement not to deal. Instead, it most plausibly

reflects typical market forces at work and rational business

choices being made -- the kind of things that happen every day.

Why did the manufacturers not adopt SD3’s product? Perhaps they

realized the technology was too nascent to license, in short

unproven. Perhaps it would not have been cost effective for the

manufacturers to incorporate it. Or perhaps SD3’s incipient

product actually increased the risk of injury to consumers.

These varied market explanations may well have been different

for different companies. They reflect business decisions of the

most common and ordinary character. They are “obvious

alternative explanations” and have not been sufficiently

rebutted by any valid assertions of a preceding agreement to

collude. All the behavior described by SD3 “was not only

compatible with, but indeed was more likely explained by,

lawful, unchoreographed free-market behavior.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.

at 680 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 567).

In the majority’s eyes, however, the above discussion is

all wasted effort, merely “practical reasons” and “factual

73
suppositions” that must not be considered. Ante at 35, 61.

Instead, we should take plaintiffs’ allegations at face value

and call it a day. It is certainly true that we assume the truth

of factual allegations at the motion-to-dismiss stage. Twombly,

550 U.S. at 572 (citations omitted). Even after accepting

plaintiffs’ claims as true, however, the court must further

analyze whether those allegations are “plausible” under Twombly.

Id. at 556. The majority refuses to undertake this second, more

analytic step. My concurring colleague simply wishes it away.

There is a time warp here, a nostalgia for the old pleading ways

and days. Those earlier standards were easier on us, I admit.

But our nostalgia now flies in the face of a controlling Supreme

Court decision.

SD3’s boycott claim is not “plausible” for the same reasons

Twombly’s was not plausible. SD3’s boycott claim is hardly

distinguishable from the very allegations that the Supreme Court

rejected in Twombly. According to the complaint in that case,

defendants -- who, like the defendants here, owned a significant

share of the market -- agreed to “engage in parallel conduct”

and “prevent competitive entry.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 550-51,

550 n.1. The complaint charged that the defendants’ “‘compelling

common motivation’ to thwart plaintiffs’ competitive efforts

naturally led them to form a conspiracy.” Id. at 551. If these

allegations sound familiar, it is because they almost perfectly

74
parrot the claims made by SD3 in its complaint. SD3 argued that

the defendants -- at least the few named defendants it actually

bothered to discuss -- “agreed among themselves to collectively

refuse” SD3’s licensing offers “based on a calculated economic

determination” that they would fare better in the marketplace if

SD3 were excluded. J.A. 71, 90. If Twombly’s complaint could not

pass as well-pleaded, then SD3’s should not fare any better.

The majority claims that the complaint in Twombly “rested

solely on descriptions of parallel conduct, and not on any

independent allegation of actual agreement.” Ante at 43

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). This is simply

incorrect. The majority overlooks the actual language in the

Twombly complaint: “Defendants had compelling common motivations

to include in their unlawful horizontal agreement an agreement

that each of them would engage in a course of concerted conduct

calculated to prevent effective competition from [plaintiffs] .

. . .” Amended Complaint at ¶ 50, Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp.,

313 F. Supp. 2d 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); see also id. at ¶ 51

(noting that defendants “have agreed not to compete with one

another”). To be sure, after Twombly complaints have sought

length in the hope that courts would mistake such length for

substance. But the substance here is thin gruel. The complaint’s

allegation of an agreement is weaker than in Twombly, boiling

down to a contention that the defendants met at a trade

75
association meeting followed by the inconvenient fact for the

majority that non-parallel conduct ensued.

In fact, the Twombly complaint was much stronger than the

one in this case and it went much further. That complaint relied

on evidence that defendants refused to provide plaintiffs with

network connections and services of equal quality, that they

billed plaintiffs’ customers in a manner to ruin plaintiffs’

customer relations, that they refused plaintiffs access to

certain facilities and delayed the provision of network elements

after plaintiffs had invested tens of billions of dollars.

Twombly, 313 F. Supp. at 177-78. Despite this support for

plaintiffs’ conspiracy allegations, the Court maintained that

each defendant “had reason to want to avoid dealing with

plaintiffs,” and each defendant “would attempt to keep

plaintiffs out, regardless of the actions of the other”

defendants. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 566. Defendants’ actions in

Twombly, like defendants’ actions in this case, were “just as

much in line with a wide swath of rational and competitive

business strategy unilaterally prompted by common perceptions of

the market.” Id. at 554 (citation omitted). Consequently,

plaintiffs’ conspiracy claims in both cases “stop short of the

line between possibility and plausibility.” Id. at 557 (citation

omitted). If only the plaintiffs in Twombly could have called

upon this court to refashion their complaint.

76
 B.

But, insists the majority, “[t]o dismiss SawStop’s

complaint because of some initial skepticism would be to

mistakenly ‘collapse discovery, summary judgment[,] and trial

into the pleading stages of a case.’ . . . District courts

possess a number of tools . . . to combat any sort of predatory

discovery.” Ante at 45-46 (citation omitted). That approach is

astonishing, for it is precisely what Twombly warned against:

“It is no answer to say that a claim just shy of a plausible

entitlement to relief can, if groundless, be weeded out early in

the discovery process . . . given the common lament that the

success of judicial supervision in checking discovery abuse has

been on the modest side.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559 (citation

omitted).

The majority’s assurance that of course district courts can

control discovery is the sort of appellate wand-waving that

ignores every reality on the ground. Trial judges are busy; they

must set priorities. Many understandably feel that time is

better spent in trial or in dealing with dispositive motions to

dismiss or for summary judgment than in wading into the big

muddy of discovery disputes. There is the temptation, and it is

again an understandable one, to say to the parties, “Folks, go

work this out among yourselves.” The problem has become even

more acute with the advent of e-discovery. Modern electronic

77
devices generate and record a great variety and volume of

information. It is now easier and faster to store evidence,

which in turn has spawned greater opportunities for discovery

requests and conflict. Regulatory mandates from governments at

every level add to the store of both paper and electronic files.

All of this makes companies more and more vulnerable to open-

ended discovery requests. The majority pays no more than lip

service to what has become a serious problem. Its casualness

stands in contrast to the gravity of the Twombly Court’s

concern.

To overlook this concern is to resurrect the dangers that

Twombly sought to lay to rest. Conley v. Gibson was doubtless

correct when decided. See 355 U.S. 41 (1957), abrogated by

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544. It made sense to skip through the

pleadings on the theory that discovery would somehow sort it all

out. See id. at 47-48. But times have changed. Although the

majority pooh-poohs “the expense of modern antitrust

litigation,” ante at 46, it is altogether legitimate for the

Supreme Court to take cognizance of the shifting interplay

between causes of action (here Sherman Act Section 1 claims) and

the Federal Rules (here those of pleading and discovery). Thus,

the Court in Twombly sought to shield defendants from what it

later described as the “heavy costs of litigation in terms of

efficiency and expenditure of valuable time and resources” by

78
allocating the plausibility burden to those who allege unlawful

conduct. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 685.

The Court understood what the majority does not: that an

antitrust complaint is often too tempting to pass up. It

provides a tantalizing weapon for parties whose business

endeavors are going badly. The term “conspiracy” is bound to

stoke paranoia, and to kindle an effort to pin on others the

blame for business failures of one’s own. The treble damages

awards of antitrust actions are a further temptation for

floundering companies armed with the knowledge that defendants

would rather settle than face the prospect of such damages,

especially with the attendant high litigation costs. See

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558-59. Twombly sought to reduce these

dangers in language of no moment to the majority: “It is only by

taking care to require allegations that reach the level

suggesting conspiracy that we can hope to avoid the potentially

enormous expense of discovery . . . .” Id. at 559. So much for

that hope: the majority just loads it on.

II.

A.

With its inverted version of Twombly, the majority allows

plaintiffs to contort normal marketplace behavior into a

potential antitrust violation. Even by the majority’s diluted

pleading standard, however, SD3’s group boycott claim fails as

79
its complaint plainly alleges non-parallel conduct. The majority

bases its contrary conclusion on an expansive definition of

parallel conduct focused solely on a perceived uniformity of

ends without regard to dissimilarity of means. The majority

observes: “The similar or uniform actions alleged are obvious:

none of the defendants ultimately took a license or otherwise

implemented SawStop’s technology.” Ante at 26-27. The

defendants’ vastly “different courses of action” are seen as

part of some grand scheme to conceal the underlying conspiracy.

Ante at 28. By that logic, the majority would find parallel

conduct as long as defendants all allegedly reached the same end

-- not adopting a product -- regardless of how the dealings

between plaintiffs and defendants proceeded or fell apart.

Such an ends-based focus misses the entire point of

Twombly, which is to determine whether allegedly anticompetitive

conduct “stems from independent decision or from an agreement,

tacit or express.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 553 (citation omitted).

If defendants act in parallel whenever they arrive at the same

general end or outcome, then parallel conduct will embrace

independent but identical business decisions borne by market

forces -- precisely the conduct that Twombly excluded from

antitrust liability. In distinguishing horizontal conspiracies

from innocuous coincidences, the means matter. That competitors

80
travelled divergent paths to the same end reflects the absence,

not the presence, of illicit coordination or agreement.

Certainly, direct evidence of a collusive end would amount

to a plausible Section 1 claim. See American Chiropractic Ass’n

v. Trigon Healthcare, Inc., 367 F.3d 212, 226 (4th Cir. 2004)

(“Direct evidence in antitrust cases is explicit and requires no

inferences to establish the proposition or conclusion being

asserted.”). By contrast, when plaintiffs rely on circumstantial

evidence of conspiracy, as in Twombly and the case at hand, the

ends-based approach carries an unacceptably high risk of finding

parallel conduct in wildly disparate behaviors motivated by

independent economic concerns. With its over-inclusive sweep,

the majority erodes the long-recognized right of one party not

to deal with another. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp.,

465 U.S. 752, 761 (1984). As long as competitors respond in the

same way to an unappealing offer or product, a business’s

refusal to deal now becomes part of parallel conduct potentially

triggering antitrust liability.

The assumption running throughout the complaint is that

SawStop was the only product anyone could have thought of

adopting. No other business decision could have been reasonable.

Therefore, defendants’ rejection of SawStop must have been part

of a group boycott. Case closed. We are not told exactly why

SD3’s product was demonstrably superior to other competing

81
products in terms of cost effectiveness and safety, such that

only one business decision with respect to it was conceivable.

The naked assumption of its irresistible appeal and inevitable

adoption operates in a comparative vacuum. But defendants faced

comparative decisions. They had to weigh options. The majority’s

ready acceptance of SD3’s unsupported superiority assumption is

part of the fallacy of its ends-based perspective, namely that

any ultimate refusal to adopt is nothing more than one more

instance of parallel behavior.

A means-based analysis, one that focuses on the means by

which the so-called conspiracy was carried out, is the most

sensitive gauge of parallel conduct and complaint plausibility.

The majority contends the dissent would find parallel conduct

“only when defendants move in relative lockstep” or “by

substantially identical means.” Ante at 30. Not so. A focus on

means-based analysis comes nowhere close to requiring identical

means. As circumstantial evidence of a conspiracy, the

similarity of conduct lies along a spectrum. Beyond a certain

point, starkly dissimilar means render a secret agreement among

competitors less plausible. The majority dismisses this means-

based analysis, apparently because dissimilar means “might also

be read to suggest deception” rather than independent business

activity. Ante at 29. The majority thus sets a nifty trap: if

defendants engage in similar means, it’s collusion; if they

82
engage in dissimilar means, it’s deceit. Given those options,

businesses should either keep to themselves or close up shop.

For good reason then, courts have shied away from the

majority’s ends-driven conception of parallel conduct and

instead required more specific similarities. See, e.g., Cosmetic

Gallery, Inc. v. Schoeneman Corp., 495 F.3d 46, 54 (3d. Cir.

2007) (deeming uniform refusal to sell insufficient to show

conscious parallelism because one distributor decided not to

deal prior to the alleged agreement); LaFlamme v. Societe Air

France, 702 F. Supp. 2d 136, 151 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (casting doubt

on parallel conduct claim where defendants engaged in disparate

strategies at different times); City of Moundridge v. Exxon

Mobil Corp., 429 F. Supp. 2d 117, 131-32 (D.D.C. 2006)

(expressing skepticism towards an allegation of parallel conduct

based on evidence that defendants did no more than exchange

information). Although the majority insists these cases

foundered on findings of “non-parallel ends,” their common

failing was in fact patently disparate means. Ante at 30-31

(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Turning to the means here, there is simply nothing parallel

about separate licensing discussions proceeding along separate

timetables with different results and different motivations. SD3

alleges that defendants collectively agreed not to license its

technology in October 2001. J.A. 89-90. Defendants then

83
supposedly “found ways to abort” the negotiations and conceal

their agreement by “giving separate excuses.” J.A. 91, 94. As

stated in the complaint, however, three defendants continued to

negotiate with SD3 after October 2001 while the fourth, Bosch,

ended negotiations a month before and restarted discussions

years later. J.A. 88, 92. Ryobi sent a signed non-exclusive

licensing agreement to SD3 in January 2002 -- three months after

the so-called collective refusal to deal. J.A. 91-92. The

contract offered a 3% royalty initially that would increase to

5%-8% if the technology proved successful on the market. J.A.

91-92. SD3 refused to accept what appear to be generous terms

based on a minor wording issue. J.A. 92. Emerson offered the

same royalty rate as Ryobi and participated in negotiations for

several months after October 2001, eventually ending talks and

leaving the table saw industry altogether the following year.

J.A. 56-57, 97. Six months after the alleged refusal to deal,

Black & Decker offered SD3 a licensing agreement with a 1%

royalty. J.A. 92. SD3 balked at what it considered unreasonably

stingy terms for its untested and undeveloped technology. Id. If

all this is parallel conduct and evidence of a refusal to deal,

well then anything will qualify.

And yet, despite all this, the agreement is repeatedly

characterized as a refusal to deal. E.g., ante at 27-28. How can

this be? Defendants did deal and did offer to purchase SD3’s

84
technology. How were the eighteen defendants not discussed in

the complaint supposed to deal when, insofar as the complaint is

concerned, they were never even approached?

In short, all four discussed defendants were willing to

deal with SD3 but their negotiations broke down at various times

for various reasons, not least because SD3 demanded more than

defendants were willing to offer. The record shows no refusal to

deal, much less parallel means to that end. It is not plausible

to think that the defendants’ disparate actions were somehow a

carefully choreographed plan to exclude SD3 from the market. By

supposing it possible, the majority severely underestimates the

difficulty of getting a group of competitors to agree on a

course of action that separate contract negotiations may or may

not have shown to be in their best commercial interest. It would

be quite a feat of stage management, moreover, to have some of

those competitors actually extend generous but different

licensing offers at different times to the very party that was

the subject of the supposed group boycott. This is the type of

claim on the far margins of conceivability that Twombly

condemned.

The Hail Mary nature of SD3’s complaint is underscored by

the fact that only four of twenty-two named defendants are even

so much as discussed in the allegations (the “twenty-two” figure

comes from the original complaint as one defendant somehow

85
failed to appear in the amended version). Compare J.A. 30

(original complaint) with J.A. 70 (amended complaint). Indeed,

even the majority chides plaintiffs for “assembl[ing] some

collection of defendants and then mak[ing] vague, non-specific

allegations against all of them as a group.” Ante at 14.

Even plaintiffs appear to realize how tenuous their claim

of parallel conduct is. In contrast to the original complaint,

SD3’s amended complaint collapses its description of the various

negotiations and timelines to create an illusion of uniformity.

Compare J.A. 55-58 (original complaint) with J.A. 88-93 (amended

complaint). While the original version details each of the

discussed defendant’s negotiation history in a separate section,

plaintiffs’ second effort weaves those divergent strands into

one vague narrative, obscuring dates and distinctions along the

way. Id.

This attempt at obfuscation hardly inspires confidence in

SD3’s promise that discovery will bolster its claims. Even with

its artful redrafting, however, SD3 falls short of the bare

minimum required for alleging a group boycott. To hold otherwise

is to use antitrust law to badly skew the market forces normally

at play in contract negotiations. From now on, defendants

decline to deal with an entity proposing any new design feature

of product development at their peril. They also cannot refuse

to purchase a product in the course of licensing negotiations

86
because that too, under the majority’s rubric, is grounds for

possible antitrust liability if others arrive independently at a

similar business judgment. Again, SD3’s attempt to achieve

through litigation more than what markets or contracts would

ever independently confer is precisely the kind of abuse of

Sherman Act claims that Twombly sought to prohibit.

B.

The majority believes that all the non-parallel behavior

and disparate means of proceeding were hatched in secret. The

concurrence makes much of the fact that the meeting among table

saw manufacturers was “secret.” Ante at 56-58. In fact, no fewer

than four times does the concurring opinion refer to the alleged

agreement not to deal as a “secret agreement” or a “pact [kept]

secret.” Id. This is manifestly a cover for the fact that my

concurring colleague is unable to point to the traces of an

agreement, hoping, I suppose, that a fishing expedition will

unearth them.

But there is a larger problem here. These days secrets are

harder to keep. A secret is something that is held by only one.

Or maybe two. But twenty-two? Managers everywhere must be

relieved to learn from my concurring colleague that you can let

twenty-two people in on a secret and have nothing leak out.

We also run into a significant collective action difficulty

here. The larger the alleged conspiracy, the larger the number

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of alleged participants that need to be brought into line both

as to the object and execution of the conspiracy as well as the

need to keep it secret. The vast number of antitrust cases

involve a much smaller number of conspirators, and it is telling

that my concurring friend must venture back to the 1990s even to

find an inapposite situation. The concurrence again labels the

dissent’s discussion of collective action problems a foray into

policy. It is not. It is an inquiry into plausibility, which

Twombly absolutely requires that we undertake. The failure to do

this is but one more example of the majority’s failure to follow

that decision.

C.

Assuming, though only for the sake of argument, that

plaintiffs had properly alleged parallel conduct, the amended

complaint still fails to show the “something more” needed to

turn conscious parallelism into a plausible conspiracy. Twombly,

550 U.S. at 560. The majority contends that the “more” necessary

to nudge SD3’s group boycott claim across the goal line is the

complaint’s identification of “the particular time, place, and

manner in which the boycott initially formed, describing a

separate meeting [among table saw manufacturers] held for that

purpose during the Power Tool Institute’s October 2001 annual

meeting.” Ante at 33 (citation omitted). This, we are told, is

“the heart of SawStop’s complaint.” Ante at 35.

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 But perfectly lawful trade association meetings do in fact

take place on a particular day at a particular time for a

particular purpose. And the majority’s assertion that table saw

manufacturers broke off in a “separate meeting” in the course of

a larger trade convention is nothing more than a description of

ordinary conduct. Indeed, it would be unusual for a bar

association meeting, health care convention, or any other

industry-wide gathering not to break out into more specialized

subgroups to discuss matters of common interest. We need not

coin the term “breakout discussion liability” to note that these

sessions have long been a staple of business and professional

life, and the majority has now made even this form of

communication more perilous.

Courts have recognized behavior contrary to defendants’

economic interests as a plus factor for showing concerted

action. See, e.g., Hyland v. HomeServices of America, Inc., 771

F.3d 310, 320 (6th Cir. 2014). It is hard to see how any

defendant in this case acted against its economic interest. SD3

boldly asserts that, but for the boycott, all table saw

manufacturers would have licensed its technology. J.A. 92. There

is little support for such inflated self-confidence. Plaintiffs

conceded that any licensing agreements could not have taken

effect until 2004, and that its technology would not have been

fully implemented until 2008 -- years after it demanded

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industry-wide acceptance. J.A. 92. Defendants were also

concerned that the new technology could actually increase hand

injuries, discourage the use of blade guards, and fail to

address “kickback” injuries. J.A. 87, 101. Despite the lukewarm

reception, SD3 set its royalty rate at approximately 8% of

wholesale prices, a costly gamble for manufacturers operating on

often thin and always uncertain profit margins. Response Br. 1;

J.A. 86. For all these reasons, it was consistent with each

manufacturer’s best interest to reject an expensive, unproven,

undeveloped, and possibly unsafe technology. Each defendant

could easily have arrived at this business decision on its own.

One recalls the World’s Fairs at the end of the nineteenth

and beginning of the twentieth century. They were held almost

annually, most often serving as the epicenter for a brisk

competition among participating countries to produce the most

creative and technologically advanced exhibitions. It was then,

as now, a time of unusual inventiveness. The fairs were humming

with booths, tables, exhibits, and displays all designed to show

off new technologies and create a buzz about new products. Some

of those products succeeded spectacularly; a far larger number

cratered. The point is simply that manufacturers should be able

to take into account the time it takes, after the initial hype,

for an invention to become one of practical and marketable

utility that would not expose consumers to injury or

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manufacturers to liability. The majority, however, takes no

cognizance of lag time, which not only exists, as it always has,

in product development but in the most highly touted medical

discoveries. Yet consciousness of lag time is something no

prudent business is without.

Ignoring the many practical reasons for declining SD3’s

offers, the majority hones in on the fear of product liability

as the key motivation behind defendants’ alleged boycott. Ante

at 37-39. This, we are told, is the “why.” 1 Ante at 37.

Defendants counter that no manufacturer rushed to adopt SawStop

technology even after SD3 began producing its own saws in 2004.

Response Br. 32. The majority answers on plaintiffs’ behalf:

SD3 remained too small a player in the table saw market to pose

a significant threat in products liability suits. Ante at 38.

Yet the earlier products liability cases involving SawStop

technology focused on the “mechanical feasibility,” not the

1
In making this point, the majority credits scraps of
testimony from David Peot cherry-picked by SD3 while it ignores
the district court’s diligent review of the full trial
transcript. Ante at 37. When read in full, Peot’s testimony
focused on defendants’ joint venture, formed years after the
alleged group boycott. J.A. 134-40. Far from revealing a
collective refusal to deal, Peot clarified that defendants
planned “to use whatever technology we felt would be best to
prevent table saw accidents. There were no limitations that I
can remember one way or the other.” J.A. 140. This discrepancy
is emblematic of plaintiffs’ attempt to conjure a conspiracy and
of the majority’s willingness to overlook the holes in the
narrative.

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market share, of a “safer alternative design.” Osorio v. One

World Technologies Inc., 659 F.3d 81, 85 (1st Cir. 2011)

(citation omitted). Different design features anywhere in use

are routinely used comparatively in products liability

litigation. SD3’s entry into the market should have put

defendants at a serious disadvantage in products liability

suits. J.A. 90. And yet still defendants refused to bite at

SD3’s product. Either they were never motivated by product

liability concerns in the first place or those concerns were

outweighed by other drawbacks (too costly, ineffective, or

unsafe) to licensing SawStop technology.

Of course, if manufacturers miscalculate in failing to

adopt safer technologies, products liability lies in wait. But

products liability and antitrust law each serve different and

valid interests. Nothing is to be gained by scrambling them in a

way that has the two bodies of law working at cross purposes

such that manufacturers are forbidden, on pain of antitrust

liability, from discussing and weighing product liability

concerns.

D.

By casting product liability concerns as the driver of

anticompetitive conduct, the majority risks curtailing

communication critical to technological development. We would

seemingly want manufacturers to be concerned about products

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liability. Products liability law exists to make businesses

cognizant of the risks their products create and to encourage

them to take steps to avoid such liability. Open and honest

dialogue among competitors can help locate product

vulnerabilities and formulate solutions, hopefully leading to

improved consumer safety. But the majority forces the defendants

into yet another a double bind: They face product liability

suits either for refusing to use what SD3 alleges is a safer

product or for adopting an untested product that could well fail

to work as advertised. The industry would have been foolish not

to discuss the risks either way. It makes little sense to dampen

such discussions prematurely with the specter of antitrust

liability.

Working together, whether cooperating in a joint venture or

simply exchanging information at a trade association meeting,

can not only save industry participants -- and therefore

consumers -- time and money but can also spawn innovations that

no participant could have achieved alone. Given the speed at

which product development now moves and the increased

specialization of many industries, “much innovation today is

likely to require lateral and horizontal linkages as well as

vertical ones.” Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teece, Rule of Reason

Analysis of Horizontal Arrangements: Agreements Designed to

Advance Innovation and Commercialize Technology, 61 Antitrust

93
L.J. 579, 590 (1993). Particularly for smaller firms with

limited resources or in patent-heavy industries, professional

conclaves offer an efficient means of acquiring information. In

an ever more complex world, sharing information becomes vital to

the holistic perspectives so crucial for highly specialized

companies to keep pace. To that end, sharing information assists

American industry in the increasingly competitive global

marketplace.

To take but one example, industry-wide coordination has

been a driving force for technological progress in American

semiconductor manufacturing. In 1987, semiconductor producers

established a consortium that pooled resources and gathered

information from across what was then a stagnant industry.

Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teece, Innovation, Cooperation and

Antitrust, 4 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1, 35 (1989). Since then,

semiconductor manufacturers not only reduced the size of their

circuits -- from 500 nanometers (nm) to 45 nm -- but they also

more than quadrupled the number of transitors, or amplifiers, in

semiconductor chips. Rahul Kapoor & Patia J. McGrath, Unmasking

the Interplay Between Technology Evolution and R&D

Collaboration: Evidence from the Global Semiconductor

Manufacturing Industry, 1990-2010, 43 Res. Pol’y 555, 559

(2014).

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 Standard-setting bodies offer similar advantages. See

Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492,

500-01 (1988). Compatibility standards make markets more

efficient by making parts interchangeable, benefitting both

producers and consumers who want to change products or shop

around. Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Standardization,

Compatibility, & Innovation, 16 Rand J. Econ. 70, 70-71 (1985).

And properly devised safety standards both provide consumers

some guarantee of minimum safety and encourage producers to

adopt safer albeit more expensive features, buoyed by the hope

that consumers may realize these products are more expensive

because they are safer to use. The standards thus help to

prevent cheaper, shoddy or unsafe products from undercutting

manufacturers trying to protect consumer welfare. These and many

other benefits to consumers and competition alike can accrue

from standardization.

I commend the majority for recognizing some of the virtues

of standard-setting organizations. 2 Ante at 48. In doing so,

however, it gets caught in a contradiction: the majority

acknowledges the monopolistic aims in plaintiffs’ standard-

2I thus concur in Part VI of the majority opinion
dismissing SD3’s challenge to the actions of the standard-
setting organization, Underwriters Laboratories, Inc. (UL). I
also concur in Part III rejecting SD3’s claims against a number
of defendants simply lumped into a conspiracy through nothing
more than conclusory allegations.

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setting conspiracy claim but turns a blind eye to the same

anticompetitive impulse driving SD3’s group boycott allegation.

Compare ante at 51-54 with ante at 37. Its opinion fails to

comprehend the totality of what SD3 aims to achieve here.

When taken in its entirety, plaintiffs’ use of antitrust

law strikes at the heart of even the most constructive

horizontal cooperation. I recognize that collaboration may shade

into collusion, the very evil that the Sherman Act was designed

to prevent. See, e.g., Am. Soc’y of Mech. Eng’rs, Inc. v.

Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556 (1982) (finding liability where

competitors incorrectly declared product unsafe to exclude it

from market); Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke

Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961) (finding valid cause of action when

competitors excluded innovative product from market through non-

objective safety standards).

And yet many minds may be better than one. Joint ventures,

standard-setting organizations, and trade association meetings

may allow individuals of different specialties to benefit from

each other’s expertise. These fora may prove invaluable for

efficient and effective product development. Those efficiencies

in turn generate reduced costs of doing business that can then

be passed along to the consumer in the form of reduced prices

and better products. Some forms of collaborative endeavors, in

other words, are not so inherently conspiratorial that their

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benefits can be overlooked. The majority ignores all this in its

rush to flatten pleading standards, make communications

perilous, and consign antitrust law to isolationist ends. It is

an odd time for the majority to assume a more isolationist

stance. It raises the risk that antitrust law will render

American companies comparatively incommunicative and thus at a

competitive disadvantage at the very time global commercial

interactions are becoming more commonplace.

III.

I have seldom read a complaint where so many defendants

were named in the complaint (twenty-two) and so few were

actually discussed (four). I have seldom seen a complaint in

which a supposed group boycott fell apart for so many reasons

and in so many directions. Even applying the most generous

assumptions, one is hard pressed to find a plausible group

boycott claim in defendants’ divergent and market-explicable

conduct. After all, SD3 has not been excluded from the

marketplace. Its SawStop technology is currently available

through its own production. Though it would have liked to corner

the market through the industry’s leading manufacturers and

standard-setting organization, it had no right to establish what

was in effect a monopoly all its own. SD3 aims to force all

manufacturers, through its group boycott claim, to adopt its

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technology at its prices and to have the industry’s standard-

setting organization do the same.

It is disappointing that such a skimpy complaint pressing

such anticompetitive ends should be allowed to traduce the

Twombly standard and coopt antitrust law for the precise

monopolistic purposes that the Sherman Act was designed to

prevent. The fallout will disable American companies from all

sorts of cooperative communication, from the most innocuous to

the most productive. If the complaint had spun even a remotely

plausible narrative of impermissible collusion, I should have

been the first to wave it through the Twombly gates. See, e.g.,

Robertson v. Sea Pines Real Estate, 679 F.3d 278 (4th Cir.

2012). But I cannot conspire with my colleagues in the demise of

the Twombly decision. For the reasons stated above, I

respectfully dissent.

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