COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-15-00030-CR
TRISTON RAY MCDONALD APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
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FROM THE 371ST DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY
TRIAL COURT NO. 1244269D
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MEMORANDUM OPINION 1
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Appellant Triston Ray McDonald appeals the trial court’s judgment
adjudicating him guilty of the offense of deadly conduct and sentencing him to
ten years’ confinement. We affirm.
Appellant pled guilty to deadly conduct pursuant to a plea bargain. The
trial court followed the plea bargain and placed appellant on deferred
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See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
adjudication community supervision for four years. The State subsequently filed
a motion to adjudicate alleging that appellant had committed three new offenses,
including aggravated assault by threatening his girlfriend with a firearm. The
State also alleged that appellant violated the terms of his community supervision
by possessing a firearm. After hearing evidence, the trial court found that
appellant had committed the new offense of aggravated assault and that
appellant had possessed a firearm. The trial court revoked appellant’s deferred
adjudication community supervision and rendered a judgment adjudicating him
guilty of deadly conduct.
Appellant’s court-appointed counsel has filed a motion to withdraw as
counsel and a brief in support of that motion. In the brief, counsel states that in
his opinion the appeal is frivolous and that there are no grounds that could be
argued successfully on appeal. Counsel’s brief and motion meet the
requirements of Anders v. California by presenting a professional evaluation of
the record and demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds for relief. 386
U.S. 738, 744–45, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (1967); see In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d
403, 406–12 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (orig. proceeding). Although we gave
appellant an opportunity to file a pro se response to the Anders brief, he did not
do so. The State declined to file a brief.
Once an appellant’s court-appointed attorney files a motion to withdraw on
the ground that an appeal is frivolous and fulfills the requirements of Anders, we
must independently examine the record. See Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503,
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511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). Only then may we grant counsel’s motion to
withdraw. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 82–83, 109 S. Ct. 346, 351 (1988).
We have carefully reviewed the record and counsel’s brief, and we agree
with counsel that this appeal is frivolous and without merit; we find nothing in the
record that might arguably support the appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178
S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); see also Meza v. State, 206 S.W.3d
684, 685 n.6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion to
withdraw and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
PER CURIAM
PANEL: LIVINGSTON, C.J.; GABRIEL and SUDDERTH, JJ.
DO NOT PUBLISH
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: October 29, 2015
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