J. A26032/15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: P.N. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: P.N., :
: No. 683 MDA 2015
Appellant :
Appeal from the Order Entered March 18, 2015,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County
Civil Division at No. 2015-718
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., WECHT AND PLATT,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED OCTOBER 30, 2015
Appellant, P.N.,1 appeals from the trial court’s order denying his
petition for review of certification for involuntary inpatient mental health
treatment. We affirm.
On February 19, 2015, a warrant was issued against appellant to
compel his examination and need for psychiatric treatment under the Mental
Health Procedures Act (“MHPA”).2 An application to extend his involuntary
treatment for a period not to exceed 20 days was filed with the trial court on
February 20, 2015. After a hearing on February 23, 2015, appellant was
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1
Mindful of the sensitive nature of the case, we have amended the case
caption to utilize only the initials of appellant.
2
50 P.S. §§ 7101-7503.
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committed for a period not to exceed 20 days.3 On March 12, 2015, an
application to extend his involuntary treatment for a period not to exceed
90 days was filed. Following a hearing on March 13, 2015, the Mental
Health Review Officer (“MHRO”) filed a report with the trial court
recommending the extension of the involuntary treatment.
On March 18, 2015, the trial court entered an order committing
appellant to inpatient treatment at SCI-Rockview Mental Health Unit or other
facility approved by his treatment team and the Pennsylvania Department of
Corrections for a period not to exceed 90 days. (Docket #11.) Appellant
timely sought a petition for review of his certification for involuntary
treatment. The petition was denied on March 27, 2015, prompting the
instant appeal.4 Appellant was ordered to file a concise statement of errors
complained of on appeal, and he timely complied.
3
According to the February 23, 2015 Report of the Mental Health Review
Officer, appellant is serving a sentence of 15 years to 40 years’ incarceration
after having been convicted of third degree murder on December 16, 2011.
While serving his sentence, appellant charged another inmate resulting in a
broken arm. Appellant has a diagnosis of schizophrenia and post-traumatic
stress disorder; appellant exhibits paranoia; appellant indicated that he
sometimes hears voices; appellant has been prescribed benedryl and prolixin
and has been non-compliant with the medication and has shown no
improvement. The Report also found appellant continues to be a danger to
others and that if treatment is not afforded him under the MHPA within
30 days, he would likely injure or kill others. (Docket #2).
4
Although appellant’s period of commitment has expired, this appeal is not
moot because involuntary commitment affects an important liberty interest,
and because by their nature, involuntary commitment orders expire before
appellate review is possible. See In re Woodside, 699 A.2d 1293, 1296
(Pa.Super. 1997).
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Appellant raises one issue for our consideration:
I. WHETHER THE LOWER COURT WAS REQUIRED
TO DISCHARGE [APPELLANT] FOLLOWING ITS
FAILURE TO ABIDE BY ITS STATUTORY
REQUIREMENT TO RENDER A DECISION
WITHIN 48 HOURS OF THE CLOSE OF THE
EVIDENCE?
Appellant’s brief at 4.
This question presents an issue of law, and as such, “our standard of
review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.” AAA Mid-Atlantic
Ins. Co. v. Ryan, 84 A.3d 626, 631 (Pa. 2014). Appellant is not
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support the order certifying
him for involuntary inpatient mental health treatment. Rather, appellant
argues the trial court erred in filing a commitment order more than 48 hours
after the close of the evidentiary hearing in contravention of 50 P.S.
§ 7304(e)(7).
We note that the MHPA, 50 P.S. § 7101 et seq., provides:
§ 7304. Court-ordered involuntary treatment
not to exceed ninety days
(a) Persons for Whom Application May
be Made.--(1) A person who is severely
mentally disabled and in need of
treatment, . . . may be made subject to
court-ordered involuntary treatment
upon a determination of clear and
present danger under section 301(b)(1)
(serious bodily harm to others), or
section 301(b)(2)(i) (inability to care for
himself, creating a danger of death or
serious harm to himself), or 301(b)(2)(ii)
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(attempted suicide), or 301(b)(2)(iii)
(self-mutilation).
(2) Where a petition is filed for a
person already subject to
involuntary treatment, it
shall be sufficient to
represent, and upon hearing
to reestablish, that the
conduct originally required by
section 301 in fact occurred,
and that his condition
continues to evidence a clear
and present danger to
himself or others. In such
event, it shall not be
necessary to show the
reoccurrence of dangerous
conduct, either harmful or
debilitating, within the past
30 days.
(b) Procedures for Initiating Court-
ordered Involuntary Treatment for
Persons Already Subject to
Involuntary Treatment.--(1) Petition
for court-ordered involuntary treatment
for persons already subject to treatment
under sections 303, 304 and 305 may be
made by the county administrator or the
director of the facility to the court of
common pleas.
....
(5) Treatment shall be permitted
to be maintained pending the
determination of the petition.
....
(e) Hearings of Petition for Court-order
Involuntary Treatment.--A hearing on
a petition for court-ordered involuntary
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treatment shall be conducted according
to the following:
....
(7) A decision shall be rendered
within 48 hours after the
close of evidence.
50 P.S. § 7304 (a)(2), (b)(5), and (e)(7) (internal footnotes omitted).
In rebutting appellant’s claim of error, the trial court explained:
Pursuant to 50 Pa.C.S.A. §7304(e)(7), a
decision on a petition for court-ordered involuntary
treatment must be rendered within 48 hours after
the close of evidence. Appellant’s hearing before the
Mental Health Review Officer took place on March 13,
2015, a Friday. On March 18, 2015, a Wednesday,
this Court entered an order regarding Appellant’s
commitment.
While a strict interpretation of subsection (e)
requires this Court’s decision to have been filed by
March 17, 2015, a Tuesday, the Honorable Superior
Court “has categorically rejected a mechanical
interpretation of the MHPA.” In re: W.A., 91 A.3d
702, 704 (Pa.Super. 2014), citing In re S.L.W., 698
A.2d 90 (Pa.Super. 1997). The Court explained that
[o]ne of the goals of the Mental Health
Procedures Act is to protect the due
process interests of the patient who loses
his or her liberty by being committed to
an institution. Protection of those
interests requires fundamental fairness
to the patient and respect for the
patient’s dignity and individuality.
Achieving this standard requires common
sense application of statutory provisions,
not mechanical application. A distinction
must be made between those standards
that directly affect the due process and
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liberty interests of the patient and those
that do not.
Due process “is not a technical conception with
a fixed content unrelated to time, place, and
circumstances.” Id. Rather, “due process is flexible
and calls for such procedural protections as the
particular situation demands.” Id. The Mental
Health Procedures Act must be construed in a
common-sense, non-mechanical manner so as to
protect the due process rights of the committee and
to ensure mental health professionals can provide
proper treatment to those in their care. See In re
S.L.W., 698 A.2d 90 (Pa.Super. 1997). Appellant’s
due process rights or liberty interests were not
violated by the filing of the order one day past the
48-hour deadline under subsection (e). Adherence
to a strict enforcement of the 48-hour time limit
would have deprived Appellant of necessary care.
Trial court opinion, 5/11/15 at 2. Based on our review of the record and
applicable jurisprudence, we agree with the trial court.
Appellant cites In re J.S., 739 A.2d 1068 (Pa.Super. 1999), for its
holding that the failure to timely file the commitment order requires the
order be vacated. (Appellant’s brief at 11). Appellant points out the trial
court acknowledged that the order was not filed within the time limits
prescribed by the MHPA. Appellant goes on to argue the trial court’s reliance
on In re S.L.W., supra, and In the Interest of W.A., supra, to excuse
the delay was in error. We disagree.
In In re J.S., the panel was addressing § 7303 and not § 7304, which
is the relevant section in the case sub judice. The In re J.S. court laid out
the issue as follows:
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The quandary that exists here for our question is
posed with reference to § 7303 as to the time within
which a judicial determination must be made as to
the detention or release of a mental patient. The
Mental Health Procedures Act (MHPA) provides that
under § 7304, the Judge or the mental health review
officer must decide within forty-eight (48) hours of
the Master’s decision whether to continue the
patient’s stay in the hospital or to release him or her
from the hospital. However, § 7303 has no time
specifically set forth within which a judicial review
must be made as to the time of stay or release.
Since J.S. was committed under the twenty (20) day
stay provision, the question here is whether there is
a need to determine what time is fair within which a
judge must make a review determination of the
patient’s status, either that he be detained or
otherwise released, especially when his twenty (20)
day stay is such a short term.
In re J.S., 739 A.2d at 1069. The J.S. court went on to apply the 48-hour
time frame of § 7304; specifically holding,
we see no logic in absence of legislative direction
that a prompt judicial decision should not be made
within 48 hours after the review hearing regarding
the findings of the mental health Master, if not
sooner. By setting this time test in § 7303 we see
no disruption in the total view and endeavor sought
by the legislature to fix a time for judicial review
which can be fairly applied in the interest of the
designated mental health agency and the patient.
Id. at 1070.
Fifteen years later in In the Interest of W.A., a panel of this court
addressed the In re J.S. decision. The specific argument in In the
Interest of W.A. is the same argument posed instantly; i.e., whether the
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failure to comply with the 48-hour timeframe of § 7304 required the reversal
of appellant’s commitment. The court explained:
W.A. relies on In re J.S., 739 A.2d 1068 (Pa.Super.
1999), to argue that the failure to comply with the
timeframe mandates the reversal of his commitment
order and his discharge. In In re J.S., the panel
took the 48–hour timeframe for the trial court to
render a decision in Section 304 and grafted it onto
Section 303, which failed to provide a timeframe for
a judicial determination. See id., at 1070. The
panel, without citing In re S.L.W. and its directive
to utilize a common sense, non-mechanical approach
in construing provisions of the MHPA, then held that
the failure of the trial court to render a decision in
that 48–hour period required reversal of the
commitment order. The establishment of this bright
line rule was in direct conflict with a prior case and
we decline to follow it.
Further, the bright line rule ignores the
difficult reality presented in these cases.
The “balanced approach” articulated in
In re S.L.W., which requires the MHPA
to be construed in a common sense,
non-mechanical manner is better suited
to protect the due process rights of the
involuntarily committed person and
ensure that the mental health
professionals provide proper treatment
to those in their care.
In the Interest of W.A., 91 A.3d at 705.
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Here, we consider that the filing delay was short, one day, 5 and the
MHPA provides that “[t]reatment shall be permitted to be maintained
pending the determination of the petition.” 50 P.S. § 7304(b)(5).
Moreover, we discern no prejudice to appellant; as reflected by the record,
we are mindful that appellant has a need for continued involuntary
psychiatric treatment without which appellant poses a risk of harm to others
and himself.6 See In re R.D., 739 A.2d 548, 555 (Pa.Super. 1999), citing
5
Appellant points out that the record closed at 12:30 p.m. on Friday,
March 13, 2015, and that an order committing appellant was statutorily
required to have been filed by 12:30 p.m. on Sunday March 15, 2015. We
disagree. According to Section 1908 of the Rules of Construction,
Computation of time:
When any period of time is referred to in any
statute, such period in all cases, except as otherwise
provided in section 1909 of this title (relating to
publication for successive weeks) and section 1910
of this title (relating to computation of months) shall
be so computed as to exclude the first and include
the last day of such period. Whenever the last day
of any such period shall fall on Saturday or Sunday,
or on any day made a legal holiday by the laws of
this Commonwealth or of the United States, such day
shall be omitted from the computation.
1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1908. Based on the above, the weekend of March 14 and 15,
2015, is excluded from the calculation. Consequently, the order was due
Tuesday, March 17, 2015.
6
Dr. Carol Eidsvoog, appellant’s treating psychiatrist, testified appellant
suffers from schizophrenia and intellectual disability. (Notes of testimony,
3/13/15 at 7.) Dr. Eidsvoog described appellant as a danger to himself and
others. (Id. at 7-8.) Dr. Eidsvoog stated she wanted to keep appellant a bit
longer so she could make some medication adjustments, and get him to the
point where he could participate in groups and therapy and gain some
insight into his illness. (Id. at 10.) Additionally, she was concerned with
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MHPA, § 102 (“The legislature’s purpose in enacting the Mental Health
Procedures Act was ‘to assure the availability of adequate treatment to
persons who are mentally ill’ and ‘to make voluntary and involuntary
treatment available where the need is great and its absence could result in
serious harm to the mentally ill person or to others.’”). This court explained:
We must be mindful that the fundamental purpose of
any [due process procedural] protections we apply is
to minimize the risk of erroneous decisions [and
that] [t]o discern the demands of due process, we
must adjudge the necessity of the protection sought
in view of the nature and purpose of the underlying
deprivation and the potential consequences in the
absence of that protection.
R.D., supra, at 554, citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425-427
(1979). Accordingly, applying the rationale espoused in the foregoing
authorities, we affirm the trial court’s Section 304 commitment order. See
In re Interest of W.A., supra at 705 (“We refuse to vacate [appellant’s]
Section 304 commitment on the technical grounds he asserts as it is evident
appellant’s claim that he was going to stop his medication the minute he is
out of the unit. (Id.)
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that [appellant’s] due process and liberty interests were not affected by the
short delay and his continued needed commitment.”).
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/30/2015
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