United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
Nos. 14-2020
14-2040
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
JOEL DUDLEY,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
[Hon. George Z. Singal, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch, Thompson, and Kayatta,
Circuit Judges.
Lauren Wille, with whom John Paul DeGrinney and DeGrinney Law
Offices were on brief, for appellant.
Renée M. Bunker, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom
Thomas E. Delahanty II, United States Attorney, was on brief, for
appellee.
October 30, 2015
THOMPSON, Circuit Judge. After two separate jury
trials, Defendant-Appellant Joel Dudley (Dudley) was convicted of
one count of possession of child pornography, in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(5)(B) and 2256(8)(A), and one count of false
declaration before the court, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1623(a).
On appeal, Dudley contests the denial of his motion to suppress in
the possession matter and further argues that the district court
erred by permitting the government to play two video excerpts of
child pornography for the jury. Dudley also contests the denial
of his motion for judgment of acquittal in the perjury matter.
For the reasons that follow, we affirm Dudley's convictions.
OVERVIEW1
Around noon on August 20, 2012, state and federal
officers executed a search warrant, obtained in the course of a
child pornography investigation, at Dudley's Westbrook, Maine
residence. Officers had traced to Dudley's apartment an internet
protocol (IP) address that had shared child pornography using a
peer-to-peer file sharing software called Ares. While the search
of Dudley's apartment was underway, two Homeland Security
Investigations (HSI) Special Agents, David Fife (Fife), the lead
investigator and case agent in the matter, and Martin Conley
(Conley), interviewed Dudley in Agent Fife's SUV for about forty
1 We summarize the underlying facts and history of the case,
saving additional details for our analysis of the alleged errors.
- 2 -
minutes. During this interview, Dudley admitted that he was
familiar with the Ares network and made other incriminating
statements concerning the downloading of child pornography.
Ultimately, two CDs containing child pornography were found on a
desk in Dudley's office. Dudley was subsequently arrested and
indicted on one count of possession of child pornography.
Prior to trial on the possession matter, Dudley filed a
motion to suppress statements made to Agents Fife and Conley, and
testified at the suppression hearing. The district court denied
the motion.2 Later, based on statements he made while testifying
at the suppression hearing, the government charged Dudley by
indictment with one count of false declaration before the court.
After a two-day jury trial on the possession matter,
Dudley was found guilty of possessing child pornography. A few
months later, another jury found Dudley guilty, this time of
providing materially false testimony during the suppression
hearing.
2 The suppression hearing was held before a magistrate judge.
Following Dudley's objection to the magistrate judge's recommended
decision and a response by the government, the district judge
adopted the magistrate judge's proposed findings and decision, and
denied the motion to suppress. For simplicity's sake, we will
refer to the findings and conclusions of the magistrate judge as
those of the district court.
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Dudley now appeals his convictions.3 On appeal, Dudley
raises three issues.4 With regard to the possession charge, Dudley
argues that the district court (1) committed reversible error when
it denied his motion to suppress, and (2) erred in allowing the
government to play two thirty-second video excerpts of child
pornography to the jury during its closing. As for the perjury
charge, Dudley contends that the district court erred when it
denied Dudley's motion to acquit.
THE POSSESSION MATTER
I. Dudley's Motion to Suppress
Dudley sought to suppress all evidence obtained as a
result of his allegedly illegal interrogation by Agents Fife and
Conley, arguing that the agents continued to question him after he
had invoked his right to counsel. The thrust of Dudley's testimony
was that he had requested an attorney on three separate occasions.5
3 Dudley's appeals have been consolidated pursuant to Federal
Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(b)(2).
4 Dudley was sentenced to 96 months of imprisonment on the
possession conviction and 60 months of imprisonment on the perjury
conviction, to be served concurrently. He does not challenge his
sentence on appeal.
5 Six other witnesses testified at the suppression hearing.
Dudley offered three witnesses who had been present on the day of
the search: his wife, Lori Dudley; his mother, Cheryl Dearborn;
and a close family friend and roommate of the Dudleys, Charal
Boothby. In addition, three law-enforcement officers -- Agents
Fife and Conley, and their supervisor, Resident Agent in Charge
(RAC) Gary Cote -- testified for the government.
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First, Dudley testified that, as he was led out of his apartment,
he told his wife "to call Gordon to get ahold of Joseph about the
-- about getting a lawyer." Second, Dudley claimed that when Agent
Fife asked if he was willing to talk to him, Dudley said that he
"would be willing to listen to an explanation" but that he wanted
a lawyer. According to Dudley, Agent Fife responded by telling
him that he could have a lawyer if he wanted one, but he was not
a suspect and it would look better if he agreed to speak with them.
And finally, Dudley asserted that after being read his Miranda
rights, see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), he reiterated
to Agents Fife and Conley his desire to have an attorney present
for any questioning.
As may be expected, the government disputed Dudley's
version of events, countering that Dudley was not in custody when
he spoke to the Agents and that, even if Dudley had been in custody
when he was interviewed, he knowingly and voluntarily waived his
rights. Specifically, the government argued that Dudley's "claim
that he invoked his right to counsel after being read his Miranda
rights [was] simply false" and that Dudley "voluntarily elected to
speak with investigators."
A. Findings and Conclusions of the District Court
On the whole, the district court did not find Dudley's
testimony credible, and largely crediting the agents' version of
events, the district court found the following relevant facts,
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which are reasonably supported by the record. See United States
v. Hughes, 640 F.3d 428, 434 (1st Cir. 2011).
On the afternoon of August 20, 2012, twelve law-
enforcement officers, including six uniformed police officers,
detectives and task force officers, and six HSI agents in plain
clothes, arrived at Dudley's apartment to execute the search
warrant. Prior to arriving at the apartment building, the
officers6 had been informed by the Westbrook Police Department that
Dudley lived in the apartment with his wife, Lori Dudley (Lori),
their three children, and a roommate, Charal Boothby (Boothby).
Officers had also been cautioned that there were frequent
transients in and out of the apartment and that Dudley was
potentially in possession of a firearm.
While Agent Gary Cote (Cote) and another officer kept
watch outside the multi-unit apartment building, the other
officers entered the building and proceeded to Dudley's second-
floor apartment with their guns drawn and in the "low ready"
position. When an officer knocked on the door and announced the
presence of law enforcement, Lori answered but, when asked by the
officer about Dudley's whereabouts, claimed that Dudley was not
home. With unfortunate timing perhaps, Dudley then stepped into
view of the officers behind Lori. Officer Fred Williams (Williams)
6
For clarity, we will refer to the officers and agents
collectively as "officers."
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of the Saco, Maine police department immediately removed Dudley
from the apartment, brought him to a landing midway down the
stairwell, and frisked him. Officer Williams then proceeded to
remove Dudley's cell phone, handcuff him, and lead him down the
stairs and outside to the front of the building.
As Dudley was being removed from the building, the
remaining officers conducted a protective sweep of the apartment.
In addition to Dudley and Lori, the officers came across five
people in the apartment: the Dudleys' three children; the Dudleys'
roommate, Boothby; and Boothby's younger brother, Robert Duquette.
When officers completed the protective sweep, the search
began. At that point, Agent Fife left the apartment to find Dudley
and located him downstairs with Agent Cote and a Westbrook police
officer. When Agent Fife arrived, Dudley asked to smoke a
cigarette, and Agent Fife removed Dudley's handcuffs so that he
could do so. Agent Fife then explained that the officers were
there because they had information that someone using an IP address
at Dudley's apartment was sharing child pornography through the
Ares peer-to-peer file sharing program.7 Agent Fife further told
Dudley that he was not under arrest but that he could not return
to the apartment until the search was complete. Dudley asked to
see the search warrant, which Fife provided.
7 Internet service providers assign individual computers
specific IP addresses to access the internet.
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Around this time, Agent Fife asked Dudley if he would be
willing to speak with him, and Dudley said that he would. For
privacy reasons, Agent Fife suggested that they talk inside his
SUV, which he had parked in a driveway adjacent to Dudley's
apartment. Dudley again agreed. Agent Fife sat in the driver's
seat, while Dudley took the passenger seat, and Agent Conley, who
by this point had joined Agent Fife, sat in the backseat behind
Dudley. The doors to the SUV remained unlocked, and Dudley was
reminded that he was free to leave. Agent Fife then apprised
Dudley of his Miranda rights, reading from a standardized form.
Dudley agreed to speak to the agents, remarking that he knew his
rights and that he had been read the Miranda warnings on a previous
occasion. Agent Fife did not have Dudley sign the standardized
form because he did not believe that Dudley was in custody.
The interview, which was not recorded, lasted about
forty minutes. According to Agent Fife, the conversation was very
"cordial," and at no point did Dudley request that the interview
stop. Near the end of the interview, Agent Cote signaled to Agent
Fife that he needed to speak with him. There was a brief pause in
the conversation as the agents spoke outside the vehicle, but
Dudley remained in the car and the interview resumed shortly
thereafter.
At the conclusion of the interview, Agent Fife told
Dudley that he still could not return to the apartment because the
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search was ongoing, but Dudley was allowed to sit alone and
unhandcuffed on the front stoop near Agent Cote and other officers.
When officers found a CD containing child pornography in
Dudley's office, Agent Fife approached Dudley on the stoop to ask
if the items on his desk belonged to him. Dudley responded
affirmatively to Agent Fife's questions.8
Three hours after it began the search concluded,
resulting in Dudley being handcuffed and placed under arrest. As
Dudley was transported to the county jail, he became agitated,
repeatedly asked the officers what probable cause they had for the
arrest, and threatened to sue.
In its decision, the district court assumed Dudley was
in custody,9 and also assumed that as he was escorted from the
apartment he asked his wife to contact his attorney. Nevertheless,
the district court concluded that there was no evidence that any
law enforcement officer actually heard Dudley's statement to his
wife and, therefore, the statement "was not in itself an
unambiguous invocation of his right to counsel." The district
court also determined that Dudley's assertion that he had twice
invoked his right to counsel during his interview with Agents Fife
8
Although Dudley's response is not part of the district
court's factual findings, Agent Fife testified that Dudley
responded that the items in his office belonged to his business.
9
The parties do not contest the district court's assumption
that Dudley was in custody.
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and Conley was not credible. Instead, the district court credited
the agents' testimony that Dudley never requested an attorney and
never asked to stop the interview.
In particular, the district court noted that Dudley
"admitted on cross-examination that (i) he knew his Miranda rights
prior to his encounter that day with officers, (ii) he knew enough
to ask to see the search warrant, (iii) upon his arrest later that
day, he accused the officers of arresting him without probable
cause and threatened to sue them, and (iv) he was 'quite
protective' of his rights." Therefore, the district court found
that Dudley "likely would have invoked his right to counsel, and
ceased answering officers' questions, if he did not wish the
interview to continue."
Dudley now challenges this ruling, arguing, as he did
below, that he unambiguously invoked his right to counsel as he
was led from the apartment and again both before and during his
interview with Agents Fife and Conley. Consequently, Dudley argues
the district court erred in denying his suppression motion. We
see no error.
B. Standard of Review
When reviewing a denial of a motion to suppress, "[w]e
view the facts in the light most favorable to the district court's
ruling." United States v. Camacho, 661 F.3d 718, 723 (1st Cir.
2011) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Soares,
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521 F.3d 117, 118 (1st Cir. 2008)). And "we review the district
court's findings of fact and credibility determinations for clear
error." Id. Under clear error review, we will reverse "only if,
after considering all the evidence, we are left with a definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." Id. (quoting
United States v. McCarthy, 77 F.3d 522, 529 (1st Cir. 1996)). On
the other hand, we review the district court's legal
determinations, including its application of the law to the facts,
de novo. Id. at 724.
C. Discussion
Once a suspect has invoked the right to counsel during
a custodial interrogation, all questioning must stop until counsel
can be provided. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981).
But this request for counsel must be clear and unambiguous. Davis
v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994) (statement, "Maybe I
should talk to a lawyer," was not an unambiguous request for
counsel, id. at 462). "[I]f a suspect makes a reference to an
attorney that is ambiguous or equivocal in that a reasonable
officer in light of the circumstances would have understood only
that the suspect might be invoking the right to counsel," officers
need not stop questioning. Id.
1. Dudley's Request to "call Gordon"
Here, Dudley first argues that his statement to his wife
as he was taken from the apartment (something along the lines of
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"call Gordon to get ahold of Joseph about the -- about getting a
lawyer" or "call Higgins") was a clear and unambiguous invocation
of his right to counsel. We do not agree.
Dudley testified that on the day of the search he was
coming out of the bathroom when he heard "a commotion." According
to Dudley, when he walked into the living room, a police officer
immediately grabbed his shoulder and led him from the apartment.
As he was being taken outside, and while "everybody was rushing
into the house," he "made mention" to his wife, who was standing
at the door, that she should "call Gordon to get ahold of Joseph
about the -- about getting a lawyer." Lori similarly testified
that shortly after the police entered her home, Dudley told her
"to call Higgins, his lawyer." Dudley contends that if Lori "heard
his request, there can be no doubt that the officers seizing []
Dudley also heard the request." But neither Dudley nor Lori
claimed that Dudley yelled or shouted his request -- testifying
instead that Dudley "said" or "mentioned" to Lori that she should
call his attorney.
Lori further said that when, in response to her husband's
request, she reached for the telephone to call Dudley's attorney,
an officer told her that she could not use the telephone.10 The
10 She acknowledged on cross examination, however, that she
was never handcuffed or told that she could not leave the
apartment, and that if she had wanted to call someone she could
have left the apartment and used someone else's phone.
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implication being, Dudley argues, that the officer must have heard
Dudley's request and was prohibiting her from carrying it out.
Agent Fife, who was a member of the entry team, testified
that he did not hear Dudley say anything as he first made contact
with him upon entering the apartment.11 And Agent Conley, who was
also a member of the entry team and who was present on the landing
when Dudley was removed from the apartment, testified that he never
heard Dudley say anything about an attorney.
In considering all the evidence presented and making
credibility determinations, the district court concluded that
there was no evidence the officers had heard Dudley's request to
his wife. And the evidence shows that -- crediting that Dudley
made this statement -- it nonetheless would have been made in the
chaos of the initial protective sweep, as ten officers, with their
guns in the low and ready position, moved quickly through the front
door trying to secure the apartment.
Taken as a whole, we find that the evidence supports the
district court's findings, and, as such, we find no clear error.
See Camacho, 661 F.3d at 723 ("[W]e 'will uphold a denial of a
motion to suppress if any reasonable view of the evidence supports
it.'" (quoting United States v. Mendez-de Jesus, 85 F.3d 1, 2 (1st
Cir. 1996))). "[W]hen 'the district court chooses to draw a
11Agent Fife acknowledged that he may have been branching off
into another area by the time Dudley passed his wife at the door.
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reasonable (though not inevitable) inference from a particular
combination of facts,' that inference is entitled to respect."
Hughes, 640 F.3d at 434 (quoting United States v. Espinoza, 490
F.3d 41, 46 (1st Cir. 2007)). This is especially true where, as
here, "evaluations of witnesses' credibility are concerned" since
we must be especially deferential to the district court's
credibility findings. United States v. Nee, 261 F.3d 79, 84 (1st
Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v. Jones, 187 F.3d 210, 214 (1st
Cir. 1999)).
Finding no clear error in the district court's findings,
our inquiry is a simple one. If no officer heard Dudley's
statement to his wife, it could not have been a clear invocation
of his right to counsel. "[T]his is an objective inquiry," Davis,
512 U.S. at 459, and officers could not have objectively understood
a statement they did not hear to be an assertion of the right to
counsel.
But even assuming the entry team officers heard Dudley's
request to his wife as they moved through the apartment, such a
request simply "does not unequivocally demand assistance, request
the lawyer's presence, or otherwise clearly indicate an
unwillingness to make a statement absent presence of an attorney."
United States v. Oquendo-Rivas, 750 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 2014).
Under the Davis standard, Dudley had to "articulate his desire to
have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police
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officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be
a request for an attorney." Davis, 512 U.S. at 459. Telling his
wife "to call Gordon to get ahold of Joseph about the -- about
getting a lawyer," is not sufficiently clear to adequately inform
officers whether or not Dudley wanted an attorney present for
subsequent questioning.12 See Grant-Chase v. Comm'r, N.H. Dep't
of Corr., 145 F.3d 431, 436 (1st Cir. 1998) (finding reasonable a
state court's determination that a pre-Miranda request to call a
lawyer was "ambiguous as to purpose" because it was unclear whether
the suspect sought "the assistance of an attorney in dealing with
the forthcoming interrogation" and concluding that in the face of
such ambiguity officers were "within their rights" "to continue
the interrogation without asking for clarification"); United
States v. Fontana, 948 F.2d 796, 806 (1st Cir. 1991) (suspect's
instruction to his wife to call an attorney -- made while in the
presence of an officer -- was not a reassertion of the right to
counsel); cf. Obershaw v. Lanman, 453 F.3d 56, 65 (1st Cir. 2006)
(suspect inquiring "whether he could talk to a lawyer, rather than
expressly asserting that he in fact wanted to do so" was not an
unambiguous request for counsel). Accordingly, we conclude that
Dudley's request to his wife that she "call Gordon" was not an
unambiguous invocation of his right to counsel.
12
We note that Dudley made no incriminating statements until
after he received the Miranda warnings.
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2. Dudley's Other Alleged Requests for Counsel
As for Dudley's alleged requests for counsel before and
during his interrogation in Agent Fife's SUV, Dudley argues that
the district court committed clear error in finding that Dudley
never invoked this right. At the suppression hearing, both Agents
Fife and Conley testified that Dudley never mentioned an attorney.
Agent Fife further testified that Dudley never asked to stop the
interview. And while Dudley did testify that he requested a
lawyer, he also testified that he understood his rights and was
"quite protective" of them (indeed he testified that he knew to
ask to see the search warrant and to use the phrase "probable
cause" when challenging his arrest), but that he nevertheless
continued answering the officer's questions after allegedly
invoking his right to counsel on three separate occasions.
The district court did not find this testimony
credible,13 "deem[ing] it unlikely that the defendant would have
13Highlighting minor inconsistencies in the agents' testimony
(e.g., differences among the agents as to when, or if, Dudley's
interview was interrupted by Agent Cote), Dudley argues that it
was clear error for the district court to find Dudley's testimony
unreliable because his testimony, as opposed to the agents, "was
comprehensive and unwavering." Dudley also argues that because
the agents admittedly did not consider Dudley to be in custody,
"his asking for an attorney was not perceived as invoking his right
to counsel under Miranda and therefore [was] more forgettable to
the agents." These arguments go nowhere as the district court
explicitly noted a number of these same inconsistencies when making
its credibility determinations. For example, the district court
noted the discrepancies surrounding Agent Cote's disruption of the
interview, but unambiguously credited Agent Fife's testimony while
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proceeded to answer the officers' questions had he invoked his
right to an attorney." Rather, the district court found it likely
that Dudley chose to continue answering questions "because he
perceived an advantage, or at least no harm, in doing so." This
credibility determination was reasonable and was well within the
trial court's purview. As such, we will not second-guess the
district court's findings. See United States v. McGregor, 650
F.3d 813, 820 (1st Cir. 2011) ("Clear-error review is highly
deferential, requiring us to let the judge's fact-sensitive
conclusions and credibility calls stand unless we are left with a
definite and firm conviction that the judge made a mistake.").
The district court's conclusion that Dudley never
unambiguously invoked his right to counsel was not clearly
erroneous. Accordingly, the motion to suppress was properly
denied. See Davis, 512 U.S. at 462 ("Unless the suspect actually
requests an attorney, questioning may continue.").
II. Dudley's Evidentiary Challenge
Dudley next argues that the district court committed
reversible error by permitting the government to play two thirty-
second video excerpts depicting child pornography for the jury in
violation of Federal Rule of Evidence 403.
noting that nothing turned on the distinction. The evidence
adequately supports the district court's findings.
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A. Standard of Review
We review the district court's Rule 403 determination
for abuse of discretion. United States v. Mangual-Corchado, 139
F.3d 34, 43 n.22 (1st Cir. 1998). Under the rule, "court[s] may
exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice . . . or needlessly
presenting cumulative evidence." Fed. R. Evid. 403. But "this
rule protects defendants only against evidence that would produce
unfair prejudice, as '[b]y design, all evidence is meant to be
prejudicial.'" United States v. Breton, 740 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir.
2014) (emphasis and brackets in original) (quoting United States
v. Varoudakis, 233 F.3d 113, 122 (1st Cir. 2000)). And "[w]e give
great deference to a district judge's balancing of probative value
versus unfair prejudice." Id.
B. The Video Excerpts
Prior to trial on the possession matter, Dudley filed a
motion in limine offering to stipulate that the CDs found in his
home contained child pornography as defined by federal law, and
thus, sought to preclude the government from showing the jury any
images of child pornography. Alternatively, Dudley sought to limit
publication to one image and/or to limit the image, or images, to
those that were "less inflammatory," such as "those depicting
children in sexually suggestive poses" rather than, for example,
an image of "adults sexually abusing children." Dudley also sought
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to limit the images to show only the bodies of the children because
"[t]he expressions on the faces of the children who are being
abused are heartbreaking and [would] most certainly inflame the
passions of the jury."
For its part, the government sought to introduce three
videos (out of approximately one hundred) from the DVDs found in
Dudley's office14 and to play a thirty-second clip from each for
the jury. The first two videos were approximately twelve and
fifteen minutes long, respectively, and depicted sexual activity
between adults and children.15 The forensic evidence showed that
both of these videos had been opened using the password-protected
laptop computer seized from Dudley's bedroom. The third video,
which the government ultimately chose not to play for the jury,
was over two minutes long and also showed explicit images of
children. That video had been shared from Dudley's IP address and
downloaded by Agent Conley during the course of his investigation.
In opposing Dudley's motion, the government argued that: (1) it
was not obligated to accept Dudley's stipulation and was "entitled
14 Evidence showed that a similar Phillips DVD was found in
Dudley's office containing church-related materials. During his
interrogation with Agents Fife and Conley Dudley had claimed to be
a pastor and said that he held weekly services in his apartment.
15These video files were titled: "pthc -- open -- euro family
young sex education very young girl a.mpg" and "(pthc) compilation
(sex bj cum).wmv". The third video was titled: "(pthc) 8yr mom
rubbs daughter.mpg".
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to prove its case by evidence of its own choice"; (2) the nature
of the videos was relevant to issues of knowledge and lack of
mistake that the videos were child pornography; and (3)
introduction of those particular videos (along with the forensic
evidence) would "demonstrate the unlikelihood that the videos were
present in [Dudley's] apartment without his knowledge."
After viewing the challenged videos (and proposed
excerpts) and conducting its Rule 403 balancing, the district court
concluded that Dudley's "requested limitations would limit the
probative value of the proffered evidence while doing little to
nothing to limit the prejudicial impact," which the district court
noted was "not unfair prejudice in any event." In the district
court's assessment, the government was entitled to present a
limited number of images to meet its burden to prove -- not just
possession -- but knowledge and lack of mistake. The district
court further determined it could not force the government to
accept Dudley's offer to stipulate "[b]ecause the images [were]
part of the Government's narrative and probative on multiple
elements of the offense."
In the end, two (of three) videos were admitted during
the government's case-in-chief, and two thirty-second excerpts
were played for the jury during the government's closing argument.
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C. Discussion
On appeal, Dudley argues that the district court
committed reversible error when it permitted the government to
play these thirty-second excerpts of child pornography to the jury
because the -- admittedly "disturbing" -- videos created a risk of
unfair prejudice that far outweighed the probative value. Finding
no abuse of discretion, we affirm.
Acknowledging that "the prosecution is entitled to prove
its case by evidence of its own choice and is not required to
accept a defendant's offer to stipulate," see Old Chief v. United
States, 519 U.S. 172, 183 (1997) ("[A] defendant's Rule 403
objection offering to concede a point generally cannot prevail
over the Government's choice to offer evidence showing guilt and
all the circumstances surrounding the offense."), Dudley
nevertheless argues that his willingness to stipulate that the
images on the disks were child pornography lessened the probative
value of the videos to such an extent that it was reversible error
for the district court to allow them to be played -- no matter how
brief the excerpt.16 Although Dudley was willing to stipulate to
16Dudley relies on United States v. Merino-Balderrama, 146
F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 1998) and United States v. Cunningham, 694 F.3d
372 (3d Cir. 2012) to argue that it was reversible error to play
the video excerpts to the jury given Dudley's willingness to
stipulate. But those cases are easily distinguishable. In Merino-
Balderrama, the government offered no direct or circumstantial
evidence that the defendant ever saw the films -- only the box
covers. 146 F.3d at 762-63. As such, the court concluded that
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the content of the DVDs, however, he consistently denied knowledge,
maintaining that he did not know what was on the disks and that he
had never accessed the files. Consequently, his proposed
stipulation only went so far. See United States v. Eads, 729 F.3d
769, 778 (7th Cir. 2013) ("A stipulation about the content of
charged images only goes so far if it is silent with respect to
the defendant's knowledge of the images in his possession.").
Framing these issues for the jury at opening, defense
counsel queried "[w]ho was in possession, who was in knowing
possession," and noted: "the Government references knowing
possession of the diskettes and that's all this case is about."
Defense counsel explained to the jury that the evidence would show
Dudley ran a computer salvage operation and that he had "lots of
computers . . . lots of hard drives . . . and all kinds of different
ways in which one could come into possession of computer material
. . . ." Given Dudley's salvage business, defense counsel
emphasized Dudley's "disavow[al] that all of this stuff is his,"
the films were less probative of scienter than were their covers.
Id. at 762. The court's decision in Cunningham largely turned on
the fact that the district judge had not personally examined the
videos before deciding to admit them under Rule 403. 694 F.3d at
388 (explaining that "because the District Court abused its
discretion when it decided not to watch the videos before admitting
them under Rule 403, its underlying Rule 403 determination is not
entitled to the full range of deference that we would normally
give to it on appeal").
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concluding "if you don't do something intelligently, if you don't
do something voluntarily, you do something because of either
mistake or accident or error, you're not knowingly in possession
of that item."
Despite Dudley's proposed stipulation, then, it seems
clear that the government would have retained the burden to prove
that Dudley had knowingly possessed child pornography and,
therefore, "showing the images served a valid, non-cumulative,
purpose." Eads, 729 F.3d at 778. The videos provided evidence
that anyone who played those files for just thirty seconds -- files
that had been opened and played on Dudley's password-protected
laptop -- would have known that the videos contained child
pornography, thus making it more probable that Dudley knowingly
possessed child pornography.
The government offered the clips, along with forensic
evidence that the graphically-titled files were downloaded and
played on Dudley's computer and that the same password-assigned
user had searched the Ares program for keywords typical of child
pornography (e.g., "teen sex," "family sex," "inzest," "kids
having sex," "voyeir young girls," and "daughter sex"), to prove
Dudley's knowledge and lack of mistake or accident. Indeed, before
playing the excerpts,17 the prosecutor explained that he was going
17
Dudley further claims that the risk of unfair prejudice was
"maximized" because the clips were played during the closing
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to show "the very first 30 seconds" of the two videos so that the
jury could consider if there was any question in their minds
whether someone who accessed the DVD, opened the file, and saw
just the very first seconds "would know that these videos
constituted child pornography and that the possessor of those DVDs
was knowingly possessing child pornography." And the government
specifically cautioned that although the jury "had to see a very
short excerpt from these videos" to "appreciate what it was," they
should not make "a decision based on raw emotion or because [they]
view these videos as being evil."
While "[t]he trial judge's job is to avoid unfair
prejudice," the district court "is not required to scrub the trial
clean of all evidence that may have an emotional impact." United
States v. Morales-Aldahondo, 524 F.3d 115, 120 (1st Cir. 2008).
argument, immediately before the jury was asked to deliberate.
The government counters that this argument was waived because,
although Dudley objected to the publishing of the videos, he did
not specifically object to the videos being played during the
prosecution's closing. Indeed, when the prosecutor explained that
he planned to show the videos during his closing, defense counsel
stated that this procedure was "[f]ine." In any event, this
argument need not detain us long, since even assuming, favorably
to Dudley, that the argument was not waived, the distinction is
not determinative. Watching these videos was no doubt incredibly
difficult whether they were viewed at the end of the first trial
day (with a full night to dwell on them) or during the closing and
"from the vista of a cold appellate record" we cannot say that the
difference necessarily tips the scales in Dudley's favor. United
States v. Dowdell, 595 F.3d 50, 74 (1st Cir. 2010) (noting that
"[t]he trial court has wide latitude in determining when the amount
of unfair prejudice has tipped the scale too far").
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Here, the judge viewed the videos, and the proposed excerpts, and
"properly balanced the competing concerns of Rule 403" in denying
Dudley's objection to showing the video excerpts to the jury. Id.
The video excerpts (in combination with the forensic evidence)
were probative of whether Dudley knowingly possessed child
pornography and rebutted Dudley's defense that he mistakenly
acquired the DVDs. We see no reversible error.
THE PERJURY MATTER
As the reader may recall, after testifying at the
suppression hearing in the possession matter, Dudley was charged
by indictment with one count of false declaration before the court,
stemming from statements he made under oath that he had invoked
his right to an attorney. Here, Dudley challenges the district
court's denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal in the
perjury matter, arguing that the government "did not prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that his statements were false, nor did it prove
that [he] knew they were false at the time he made them." After
review, we affirm.
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
A. Perjury Trial
A jury trial was held in the perjury matter.18 Special
Agents Fife and Conley testified, as did Dudley's wife, Lori. In
18
Since Dudley attacks the sufficiency of the evidence in the
perjury matter, we recite the relevant facts in the light most
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brief, Agents Fife and Conley testified to the events surrounding
the search of Dudley's residence and the subsequent interrogation
of Dudley in Agent Fife's SUV. The agents testified that at no
time -- upon entry to the apartment, before the interrogation or
during -- did Dudley ask to speak with a lawyer. Agent Fife also
explained that he, Agent Conley, and Dudley had all testified at
the April 5, 2012 suppression hearing. Portions of the suppression
hearing transcript were then admitted into evidence.
At the close of the government's case-in-chief, the
district court denied Dudley's motion for judgment of acquittal,
rejecting Dudley's two arguments: (1) that the indictment
(specifically paragraph four)19 required the government to prove
favorable to the verdict. See United States v. Alverio-Meléndez,
640 F.3d 412, 416 n.1 (1st Cir. 2011).
19 The indictment provides, in relevant part:
3. At the time and place alleged, JOEL DUDLEY, while
under oath, knowingly declared before the Court . . . as
follows . . .
Q: No, sir, I'm asking on August 20th how many
times are you telling this Court that you told them
you wanted a lawyer?
A: Three.
Q: Three separate occasions.
A: Yes.
Q: Prior to being interviewed and during the
interview.
A: Yes.
Q: You told them you wanted a lawyer.
A: Yes, I did.
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that Dudley did not invoke his right to counsel at any point --
not just during the interrogation with Agents Fife and Conley --
and the government's failure to call the other officers on the
entry team rendered the evidence insufficient; and (2) that
evidence of materiality was insufficient because if, as Agents
Fife and Conley testified, Dudley was not in custody, whether he
invoked his right to counsel was immaterial. Denying the motion,
the district court concluded that the indictment "refers to Conley
and Fife throughout" and that "even if [Dudley] had asked for
lawyers at other times, if he testified falsely deliberately as
regards to what he told Fife and [Conley], the Government is safe
as far as the motion is concerned." Regarding the materiality
issue, the district court found that the statement was material
because "it was intended to be material as of the time the
statement was made."
After Dudley's sufficiency motion was denied, Lori
testified for the defense. Lori stated that as the officers
entered the apartment, Dudley told her to "call Higgins, his
Q: And your testimony under oath today is that
they basically ignored that and continued to
question you; is that correct?
A: Yes, that is correct.
4. The italicized testimony of JOEL DUDLEY, as he
then and there well knew and believed, was false in that
DUDLEY did not invoke his right to counsel or otherwise
tell investigators he wanted a lawyer at any time prior
to or during the August 20, 2012 interview.
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lawyer." Lori testified that she was in the living room and that
Dudley was in the hallway when this request was made, but despite
that distance she confirmed that Dudley did not "yell" this
request. After Lori testified, the defense rested. Dudley did
not renew the motion for judgment of acquittal at the end of his
case. The case was then submitted to the jury, and Dudley was
found guilty. Dudley did not renew his motion for acquittal after
the guilty verdict.
B. Discussion
As a threshold matter, we note that Dudley's failure to
renew his motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the
entire case (after offering evidence in his defense) and following
the guilty verdict, constitutes a waiver of his motion. See United
States v. Maldonado-García, 446 F.3d 227, 230 (1st Cir. 2006)
(noting that failure to renew a motion for acquittal at the close
of all evidence or following a jury verdict constitutes a waiver
of an earlier motion). Therefore, we review for "clear and gross
injustice" only.20 Id. Finding none, we affirm.
20
The government also argues that Dudley waived specific
sufficiency arguments raised on appeal by failing to raise them
below. See United States v. Foley, 783 F.3d 7, 12 (1st Cir. 2015)
("Under our precedent, although a general sufficiency-of-the-
evidence objection preserves all possible sufficiency arguments,
a motion raising only specific sufficiency arguments waives
unenumerated arguments."). But given our broader conclusion as to
waiver, we need not determine whether (or not) Dudley's sufficiency
arguments below preserved his appellate arguments. See id. (noting
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To evaluate Dudley's challenge, "we consider whether a
rational jury could have concluded that the government proved each
element of the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt." United
States v. Morales-Machuca, 546 F.3d 13, 20 (1st Cir. 2008). "In
so doing, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
jury's guilty verdict and 'resolve all questions of credibility
and reasonable inferences in favor of the verdict.'" Id. (quoting
United States v. Lizardo, 445 F.3d 73, 81 (1st Cir. 2006)).
"A statement under oath constitutes perjury if it is [1]
false, [2] known to be so and [3] material to the proceeding."
United States v. Pagán-Santini, 451 F.3d 258, 266 (1st Cir. 2006)
(citing 18 U.S.C. § 1623). On appeal, Dudley asserts there was
insufficient evidence as to the first two elements -- falsity and
knowing falsity. Viewing the record in the light most favorable
to the verdict, however, we think that a rational jury could have
found Agents Fife's and Conley's testimony, that Dudley at no time
requested an attorney, more credible than Dudley's contradictory
suppression hearing testimony.
In addition to testifying that Dudley never requested an
attorney, Agent Fife testified that Dudley: (1) asked to see the
search warrant; (2) was read his Miranda warnings; and (3) affirmed
that he "understood his rights." Still, Agent Fife further
"that a general sufficiency objection accompanied by specific
objections [may] preserve[] all possible sufficiency objections").
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testified that Dudley continued to talk to the officers for
approximately forty minutes (despite Dudley's testimony that he
had repeatedly invoked his right to counsel). Agent Conley's
testimony largely mirrored Agent Fife's testimony, and Agent
Conley emphasized that he was "100 percent certain" that Dudley
did not ask for a lawyer at any point during Agent Conley's
interactions with him. From this, the jury reasonably could have
concluded -- much like the district court in the possession matter
-- that it was unlikely Dudley would have continued answering the
officers' questions for forty minutes if he had in fact invoked
his right to counsel. In other words, the jury reasonably could
have concluded that Dudley's unequivocal suppression-hearing
testimony -- that "prior to being interviewed and during the
interview" he invoked his right to counsel but that these
invocations were simply ignored by Agents Fife and Conley -- was
knowingly false.
Finally, Dudley argues that the evidence was
insufficient to prove that Dudley never requested counsel prior to
his interview with Agents Fife and Conley (i.e., his request to
his wife), and, therefore, the government has not meet its burden
to prove that Dudley knowingly made a false statement to the court.
But the indictment clearly referred to Dudley's testimony that he
had invoked his right to counsel during his interrogation by Agents
Fife and Conley. Specifically, the indictment concerned "whether
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[Dudley] had invoked his right to counsel during an interview with
law enforcement."
In sum, the jury had sufficient bases to convict Dudley
of false declaration before the court, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1623(a), and finding no "clear and gross injustice," we affirm.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons articulated above, we affirm Dudley's
convictions.
Affirmed.
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