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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 15-11728
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 4:14-cr-00307-WTM-GRS-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
LATWON TYRONE MOSBY,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia
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(November 3, 2015)
Before CARNES, Chief Judge, MARCUS, and WILLIAM PRYOR, Circuit
Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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A federal grand jury indicted Latwon Mosby for violating 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1), which makes it a crime for a convicted felon to possess a gun. Mosby
moved to suppress evidence of the gun, but after conducting a hearing, a magistrate
judge determined that the gun was admissible. The district court agreed and
Mosby entered a conditional guilty plea to the charge, preserving his right to
appeal the district court’s ruling. Mosby contends that the district court should
have suppressed the gun because police discovered it only after unlawfully
detaining him. Because the officers who detained Mosby reasonably suspected
that he was engaged in criminal activity, the district court properly admitted the
gun discovered in the course of that detention.
Mosby’s appeal concerns the district court’s appraisal of Officer Chris
Tucker’s and Officer Christopher Samatis’ testimony at the evidentiary hearing.
The essence of that testimony is as follows. On March 28, 2014, Tucker and
Samatis, both members of the Savannah-Chatham Metro Police Department, were
patrolling Westlake Apartments. Westlake is located in a high-crime area of
Savannah and has a history of problems with loitering and drug-related activity. In
the course of their patrol, Tucker and Samatis spotted Mosby walking along a
second floor hallway. As Mosby descended to the first floor, Tucker and Samatis
approached him. Tucker asked Mosby if he lived at Westlake. When Mosby
answered yes, Tucker asked which apartment Mosby lived in. Mosby hesitated
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and looked around, which the officers took as a sign that he was trying to fabricate
a credible answer. Tucker then asked Mosby for identification proving he lived at
Westlake, at which point Mosby attempted to flee. Samatis grabbed Mosby to
prevent him from fleeing. While Samatis grappled with Mosby, Tucker noticed
Mosby reaching for a gun in his pants. After a struggle, the officers subdued and
arrested Mosby.
Mosby moved to suppress the gun as the fruit of an unconstitutional seizure,
but after hearing the officers’ uncontradicted testimony, the magistrate judge
recommended denying the motion. Mosby objected to the magistrate judge’s
recommendation, challenging the findings that Westlake was a high crime area and
that Mosby had falsely answered the officers’ questions. The district court rejected
Mosby’s arguments, adopted the magistrate judge’s fact findings and
recommendation, and denied Mosby’s motion to suppress. Mosby appeals that
decision.
Mosby makes three arguments, all unavailing, that Tucker and Samatis
violated his Fourth Amendment rights. First, he argues that the officers lacked
reasonable suspicion to stop and question him at the bottom of the stairs. Mosby
has forfeited this argument, however, because he acknowledged in his motion to
suppress that the officers’ initial approach and questioning was the type of
consensual police-citizen encounter that does not implicate the Fourth
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Amendment. A defendant may not challenge a district court’s ruling on appeal
after effectively inviting the district court to adopt that ruling. See United States v.
Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1290 (11th Cir. 2003); United States v. Brannan, 562
F.3d 1300, 1306 (11th Cir. 2009).
Mosby’s second argument is that the district court incorrectly found that: (1)
his answers to the officers’ questions had been evasive; (2) he had attempted to
flee; and (3) Westlake was a high crime area. We will reverse based on a district
court’s factual determination only “if the record lacks substantial evidence to
support it,” or if, after viewing all of the evidence, we are otherwise left with “a
definite and firm conviction” that the district court made a mistake. Knight v.
Thompson, 797 F.3d 934, 942 (11th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). None of the
findings Mosby challenges warrants reversal because each was supported by the
officers’ testimony at the hearing. In particular: (1) Tucker testified that Mosby
stalled and appeared uncertain when asked where in the complex he lived; (2) both
officers testified that Mosby began to flee when asked for identification; and (3)
both officers testified that Westlake had recurring problems with loitering and
drug-related activities and was in a high-crime part of the city. There was thus
substantial evidence in the record to support the district court’s factual findings on
all three of the facts Mosby challenges, especially since we give “particular
deference to credibility determinations of a fact-finder who had the opportunity to
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see live testimony.” United States v. Lebowitz, 676 F.3d 1000, 1009 (11th Cir.
2012) (alteration omitted).
Based on a few minor inconsistencies in the officers’ testimony and police
reports, Mosby argues that the district court should not have credited the officers’
testimony. The inconsistencies to which Mosby adverts, however, are all so trivial
as to be inconsequential. Indeed, read in context, many of the alleged
inconsistencies in the officers’ testimony are not inconsistencies at all, but merely
different ways of expressing the same underlying fact. With respect to the
essential details of the encounter, the officers’ testimony and reports are in
complete agreement. Accordingly, the district court did not clearly err in crediting
Tucker’s and Samatis’ accounts of the encounter.
Mosby’s final argument is that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to
seize him as he was attempting to get away from them, but the events preceding
Samatis’ grabbing Mosby belie that contention. First, as both officers testified,
Westlake is a high-crime area. That a stop occurred in a high-crime area is a
“relevant contextual consideration[]” for purposes of establishing reasonable
suspicion. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124, 120 S. Ct. 673, 676 (2000).
The record also contained evidence that Mosby responded to the officers’
questions in a way that indicated he was lying or at least being evasive.
“[E]vasive, nervous or apprehensive conduct in response to [officers’] attention[]
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has many times been noted as a significant factor in the creation of reasonable
suspicion.” United States v. Willis, 759 F.2d 1486, 1497 (11th Cir. 1985). Third,
and most obviously, Mosby attempted to flee from the officers. Flight from
officers, particularly in a high-crime area, supports reasonable suspicion. United
States v. Gordon, 231 F.3d 750, 757 (11th Cir. 2000). The officers thus had ample
bases for reasonably suspecting that Mosby was engaged in criminal activity and,
therefore, for detaining him.
AFFIRMED.
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