Cite as 2015 Ark. App. 625
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION III
No. CV-15-532
MORRIS VOAN Opinion Delivered November 4, 2015
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS
V. WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
COMMISSION [NO. F601217]
CITY OF TEXARKANA
APPELLEE AFFIRMED
M. MICHAEL KINARD, Judge
Morris Voan appeals from an order of the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation
Commission awarding him additional temporary-total disability (TTD) benefits for the six
weeks following his August 2012 surgery, the purpose of which was to remove hardware
implanted in a 2009 surgery. He contends that there is no substantial evidence to support the
Commission’s decision that he was not also entitled to TTD for the sixteen-month period
leading up to the 2012 surgery and for an undetermined period beyond his recovery from that
surgery. Specifically, he argues that the Commission erred in not finding that he entered a
second healing period and was entitled to additional TTD starting as early as April 2011,
when his pain intensified and he sought treatment from anesthesiologist and pain-management
specialist Dr. Sunder Krishnan. We affirm.
The injured party bears the burden of proving entitlement to workers’ compensation
benefits and must sustain that burden by a preponderance of the evidence. Clardy v. Medi-
Homes LTC Services LLC, 75 Ark. App. 156, 55 S.W.3d 791 (2001). An employee who
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suffers a compensable injury is entitled to TTD benefits during the period in which he is
healing from the injury and is totally incapacitated to earn wages. Searcy Industrial Laundry,
Inc. v. Ferren, 92 Ark. App. 65, 211 S.W.3d 11 (2005). This healing period ends when the
employee is as far restored as the permanent nature of his injury will permit; if the underlying
condition causing the disability has become stable and nothing in the way of treatment will
improve that condition, the healing period has ended. Belin v. United Parcel Service, 2011 Ark.
App. 587. An injured employee may enter a second healing period after the first has ended,
where a second complication is found to be a natural and probable result of the first injury.
Id. However, the persistence of pain may not of itself prevent a finding that the healing
period is over, provided that the underlying condition has stabilized. Id.; Mad Butcher, Inc. v.
Parker, 4 Ark. App. 124, 628 S.W.2d 582 (1982).
In reviewing workers’ compensation decisions on appeal, we view the evidence and
all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the Commission’s
findings, and we affirm if the decision is supported by substantial evidence. Loar v. Cooper Tire
& Rubber Co., 2014 Ark. App. 240. Substantial evidence is that which a reasonable person
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Id. The determination of the credibility
and weight to be given a witness’s testimony is within the sole province of the Commission;
the Commission is not required to believe the testimony of any witness but may accept and
translate into findings of fact only those portions of the testimony it deems worthy of belief.
Id. It is the responsibility of the Commission to draw inferences when the testimony is open
to more than a single interpretation, whether controverted or uncontroverted, and when it
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does so, its findings have the force and effect of a jury verdict. Dorris v. Townsends of Arkansas,
Inc., 93 Ark. App. 208, 218 S.W.3d 351 (2005). When the Commission denies benefits
because the claimant has failed to meet his burden of proof, the substantial-evidence standard
of review requires that we affirm if the Commission’s decision displays a substantial basis for
the denial of relief. Wright v. Conway Freight, 2014 Ark. App. 451, 441 S.W.3d 45.
Here, the administrative law judge’s opinion, adopted by the Commission as its own,
adequately explains the decision. Having determined that the Commission’s findings are
supported by substantial evidence, we affirm by this memorandum opinion pursuant to
sections (a) and (b) of In re Memorandum Opinions, 16 Ark. App. 301, 700 S.W.2d 63 (1985).
Affirmed.
VIRDEN and HOOFMAN, JJ., agree.
Martin Law Firm, by: Aaron L. Martin, for appellant.
J. Chris Bradley, for appellees.
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