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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 12-14913
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D.C. Docket No. 1:11-cv-21982-JAL
ISAAC D. CASTILLO,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(November 4, 2015)
Before ED CARNES, Chief Judge, MARTIN, Circuit Judge, and THAPAR,*
District Judge.
PER CURIAM:
*
Honorable Amul R. Thapar, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of
Kentucky, sitting by designation.
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Isaac Castillo, a Florida prisoner, appeals the district court’s denial of his pro
se petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Castillo argues that the State
of Florida violated his right to a speedy trial because three years lapsed between
his arrest for possession of a gun in violation of the terms of his probation and his
state probation-revocation hearing. In the intervening time, Castillo was federally
prosecuted as a felon in possession for the same conduct. He was convicted after a
jury trial. We affirm the district court’s denial of Castillo’s § 2254 petition on the
merits because he failed to show that the Florida state court’s decision was
contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal
law.
I.
Castillo was arrested in July 2005 for possession of a firearm as a convicted
felon. At the time he was serving three-years probation for a separate unlawful-
possession charge from March 2005. In May 2007, Castillo was sentenced to 235-
months imprisonment based on his federal conviction for unlawful possession
arising out of the July 2005 arrest. This Court affirmed his federal conviction in
May 2008. Also arising out of Castillo’s July 2005 possession of a firearm, the
State of Florida charged Castillo with violating his term of state probation. The
hearing on the probation-violation charge was held in April 2008. The state
probation hearing resulted in a 15-year prison term for Castillo, set to run
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concurrently with his federal sentence. This state sentence was imposed in July
2008.
Castillo appealed his state sentence to the Florida Third District Court of
Appeal and raised his speedy trial claim in a pro se memorandum in that direct
appeal. The Court of Appeal affirmed per curiam, without explanation, Castillo’s
probation revocation and sentence. Castillo moved for rehearing, but the Court of
Appeal denied the motion. He did not seek discretionary review in the Florida
Supreme Court.
Castillo filed a motion for postconviction relief in Florida state court in
December 2009 under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, alleging that his
speedy trial rights were violated because the State of Florida waited three years to
try him for violating his probation. The state court denied this motion in a
summary order without an evidentiary hearing, and Castillo did not appeal this
decision. He filed a second Rule 3.850 motion in June 2010 on the speedy trial
issue. The state court again denied Castillo’s motion in a summary order, and
Castillo did not appeal this second decision.
Castillo filed the § 2254 petition now before us in May 2011, again alleging
that his speedy trial rights were violated by the three-year delay between his arrest
and his state probation-revocation hearing. The magistrate judge concluded that
Castillo had failed to exhaust his claim because he did not appeal the denial of the
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Rule 3.850 motions, and this failure to exhaust created a procedural default. 1 The
district court adopted the magistrate judge’s findings and denied Castillo’s § 2254
petition.
II.
We review de novo a district court’s denial of a § 2254 habeas petition.
Sims v. Singletary, 155 F.3d 1297, 1304 (11th Cir. 1998). We review its factual
findings in a habeas proceeding for clear error. Id. We may affirm the denial of a
habeas petition on any ground supported by the record. Trotter v. Sec’y, Dep’t of
Corr., 535 F.3d 1286, 1291 (11th Cir. 2008).
Exhaustion presents a mixed question of law and fact, so we review de novo
the district court’s conclusion that a claim is unexhausted. Fox v. Kelso, 911 F.2d
563, 568 (11th Cir. 1990). Before seeking federal habeas relief, a state prisoner
must exhaust his claims in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). To exhaust a
claim in state court, a petitioner “must fairly present every issue raised in his
federal petition to the state’s highest court, either on direct appeal or on collateral
review.” Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d 1144, 1156 (11th Cir. 2010); see also Mason v.
1
The magistrate judge also evaluated the merits of Castillo’s speedy trial claim, finding that: his
speedy trial claim under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191 raised only state-law
principles not cognizable in a federal habeas claim; his speedy trial right under the Sixth
Amendment did not attach to a probation-revocation hearing; and he failed to demonstrate
unreasonable delay in connection with his due process–based speedy trial claim because much of
the state delay resulted from Castillo’s simultaneous federal criminal trial. The magistrate judge
concluded that the state courts’ rejection of Castillo’s speedy trial claim did not conflict with
clearly established federal law and was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.
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Allen, 605 F.3d 1114, 1119 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (“Exhaustion requires
that state prisoners must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any
constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State’s established
appellate review process.” (quotation omitted)).
The district court found that Castillo had not exhausted his speedy trial claim
in state court, and treated the claim as procedurally defaulted in denying the § 2254
petition. However, Castillo appears to have exhausted his speedy trial claim on
direct appeal. If Castillo properly exhausted his speedy trial claim on direct
appeal, the fact that he raised it again in two later-filed Rule 3.850 postconviction
motions that he did not appeal does not render the claim unexhausted. See Cone v.
Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 467, 129 S. Ct. 1769, 1781 (2009) (“A claim is procedurally
barred when it has not been fairly presented to the state courts for their initial
consideration—not when the claim has been presented more than once.”); see also
Kennedy v. State, 547 So. 2d 912, 913 (Fla. 1989) (per curiam) (noting that claims
that “had been raised or could have been raised on direct appeal” may not be
relitigated in Rule 3.850 postconviction-relief proceedings in Florida).
Neither does the fact that Castillo did not seek Florida Supreme Court
review of his claim render it unexhausted. In O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S.
838, 119 S. Ct. 1728 (1999), the U.S. Supreme Court held that in order to satisfy
the exhaustion requirement, a state prisoner must present his claim to a state
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supreme court in a “petition[] for discretionary review when that review is part of
the ordinary appellate review procedure in the State.” Id. at 847, 119 S. Ct. at
1733. However, that exhaustion rule “turns on an inquiry into what procedures are
‘available’ under state law.” Id., 119 S. Ct. at 1734. Castillo directly appealed his
state sentence to the Florida Third District Court of Appeal. He raised his speedy
trial claim in that direct appeal, giving notice of it to the Court of Appeal. The
Court of Appeal affirmed his conviction per curiam without explanation, in effect
deeming that claim meritless. Castillo then moved for rehearing, which the Court
of Appeal denied.
Though Castillo did not seek discretionary review in the Florida Supreme
Court, he did not need to in this case because such review was not “available” to
him under Florida law. See O’Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 847, 119 S. Ct. at 1734. The
Florida Supreme Court has ruled that it “does not have jurisdiction to review per
curiam decisions of the district courts of appeal that merely affirm.” Persaud v.
State, 838 So. 2d 529, 531–32 (Fla. 2003) (per curiam). Because the Court of
Appeal affirmed Castillo’s case per curiam without explanation, the Florida
Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to hear any discretionary appeal he might have
made, rendering his claim exhausted.
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III.
Even though the district court improperly denied Castillo’s claim on
procedural grounds, the dismissal must be upheld on the merits. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(b)(2) (“An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the
merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies
available in the courts of the State.”). Castillo has not shown that the state court’s
decision on the merits was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of
clearly established federal law.
Under § 2254(d), a federal court may only grant habeas relief on claims that
were adjudicated in state court on the merits if the state court’s adjudication
resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application
of, clearly established Supreme Court holdings. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). A state
court’s decision is contrary to established Supreme Court precedent if it arrives at a
conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law or
decides a case differently than the Supreme Court has on materially
indistinguishable facts. Borden v. Allen, 646 F.3d 785, 817 (11th Cir. 2011). “An
unreasonable application of federal law is not simply an erroneous or incorrect
application; it must be objectively unreasonable.” Smith v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr.,
572 F.3d 1327, 1333 (11th Cir. 2009).
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We review de novo the district court’s decision as to whether a state court
acted contrary to or unreasonably applied clearly established federal law in
postconviction proceedings. Reed v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 593 F.3d 1217,
1239 (11th Cir. 2010). However, we defer to a state court’s merits determination
in a habeas case. See id. (“The question under AEDPA is not whether a federal
court believes the state court’s determination was incorrect but whether that
determination was unreasonable—a substantially higher threshold.” (quotation
omitted)). The state court does not need to expressly identify the relevant Supreme
Court precedent or perfectly state the applicable rule of law, or provide a “detailed
opinion covering each aspect of the petitioner’s argument” to merit deference.
Smith, 572 F.3d at 1333; see also Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 98–100, 131
S. Ct. 770, 784–85 (2011) (noting that a summary ruling without reasoning is
entitled to AEDPA deference).
Castillo offers three legal bases in support of his claim that his speedy trial
rights were violated: Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191, the Sixth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and the Due Process Clause of the U.S.
Constitution. Castillo’s claim based on Rule 3.191 is not cognizable on federal
habeas review because it involves only state procedural rules and not errors of
federal constitutional dimension. See Davis v. Wainwright, 547 F.2d 261, 264 (5th
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Cir. 1977).2 Florida’s speedy trial rule also does not apply to a probation
revocation hearing such as Castillo’s, because a probation revocation proceeding is
a sentencing function as opposed to a trial. Gonzalez v. State, 447 So. 2d 381, 382
(Fla. 3d DCA 1984) (per curiam).
The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy . . . trial.” U.S. Const. Amend. VI.
However, probation-revocation hearings are not criminal prosecutions protected by
the Sixth Amendment, and thus defendants such as Castillo are not constitutionally
guaranteed a speedy hearing. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 781–82, 93
S. Ct. 1756, 1759 (1973); United States v. Taylor, 931 F.2d 842, 848 (11th Cir.
1991) (per curiam).
The Supreme Court instructs that the Due Process Clause protects the liberty
interests of individuals such as Castillo in a probation hearing, because probation-
revocation proceedings may result in a loss of liberty. Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 781, 93
S. Ct. at 1759. To satisfy due process, a person facing a probation revocation must
receive a preliminary hearing at the time of his arrest to determine whether there is
probable cause to support a parole violation, and a “somewhat more
comprehensive hearing prior to the making of the final revocation decision.” Id. at
2
In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), we adopted as binding
precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down before October 1, 1981. Id. at
1209.
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781–82, 93 S. Ct. at 1759. The revocation hearing must occur “within a reasonable
time after the [individual] is taken into custody.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471, 488, 92 S. Ct. 2593, 2603–04 (1972).
In order to show that the state court’s rejection of his due process–based
speedy trial claim was an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law, Castillo
would have to show that no “fairminded jurist[]” could disagree that the state court
unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent. See White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct.
1697, 1705–06 (2014). Castillo is not able to show this because the Supreme
Court has never explained what due process requirements must be satisfied with
respect to the timing of a probation-revocation hearing. All the Supreme Court has
said is that the hearing must be tendered “within a reasonable time” after the
individual is taken into custody. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 488, 92 S. Ct. at 2603–04.
Though the Supreme Court has yet to articulate a rule for deciding when
such a delay violates an individual’s due process rights, it has provided a
framework for evaluating whether a speedy trial violation occurred under the Sixth
Amendment. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 2192
(1972). Factors we may consider include (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason
for the delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of his right, and (4) prejudice to the
defendant. Id. Our court has assumed without deciding that this test might be a
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workable framework for addressing due process challenges to delays in probation-
revocation hearings. See Taylor, 931 F.2d at 848.
Even employing this test to evaluate Castillo’s speedy trial claim, he has
failed to demonstrate an unreasonable application of clearly established federal
law. At least three of the factors potentially weigh against him: First, there is some
justification for the delay because Castillo faced a federal prosecution, jury trial,
and appeal in the time between his arrest and his state probation-revocation
hearing. He was in federal, not state, custody during the pendency of the federal
proceedings. Second, Castillo did not assert his right to a speedy trial at any point
during the three-year period—he raised the issue for the first time during the
appeal of his state probation decision. Third, Castillo cannot show prejudice from
this delay because he failed to identify any potential witnesses or items of evidence
that were lost as a result of the delay. See United States v. Clark, 83 F.3d 1350,
1354 (11th Cir. 1996) (per curiam). We conclude that the Florida state court’s
denial of Castillo’s speedy trial claim was not an unreasonable application of
governing Supreme Court precedent.
For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s denial of Castillo’s § 2254
petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
AFFIRMED.
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