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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
KENYATTA WILLIAMS, :
:
Appellant : No. 1091 EDA 2014
Appeal from the PCRA Order March 25, 2014,
Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County,
Criminal Division at No. CP-51-CR-1004231-1991
BEFORE: DONOHUE, MUNDY and MUSMANNO, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY DONOHUE, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 04, 2015
Kenyatta Williams (“Williams”) appeals from the order of court
dismissing his second petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief
Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546 (“PCRA”). We affirm.
The PCRA court summarized the relevant factual and procedural
histories as follows:
On August 21, 1992, [Williams] was found
guilty by a jury … of [f]irst [d]egree [murder],
[r]obbery, [a]ggravated [a]ssault [], [c]riminal
[c]onspiracy, and [p]ossessing [i]nstruments of
[c]rime. He was sentenced to life without the
possibility of parole. [Williams] appealed, and the
Superior Court affirmed the judgment of sentence on
August 26, 1994. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
denied his petition for allowance of appeal on
January 18, 1995.
On December 24, 1996, [Williams] filed a pro
se PCRA petition. Counsel was appointed, and a “no
merit” letter pursuant to Finley/Tuner [sic] was
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filed. After review, the [PCRA court] dismissed his
first PCRA petition. [Williams] filed an appeal to the
Superior Court, but his appeal was dismissed on
February 17, 1999 for failure to file a brief.
On May 21, 2012, [Williams] filed the instant
PCRA petition, his second. After conducting an
extensive and exhaustive review of these filings, the
record and applicable case law, this Court found that
[Williams’] petition for post[-]conviction collateral
relief was untimely filed. Therefore, this Court did
not have jurisdiction to consider [Williams’] PCRA
petition and it was dismissed.
PCRA Court Opinion, 4/28/14, at 1-2 (footnote omitted).
This appeal follows, in which Williams presents two issues for our
review, alleging ineffective assistance of trial and PCRA counsel. Williams’
Brief at 21, 34.1 Before we can consider these claims, we first must
determine whether the underlying PCRA petition was timely filed. It is well
established that “[t]he PCRA’s timeliness requirements are jurisdictional in
nature, and a court may not address the merits of the issues raised if the
PCRA petition was not timely filed.” Commonwealth v. Copenhefer, 941
A.2d 646, 648-49 (Pa. 2007). The PCRA provides in relevant part as
follows:
(1) Any petition under this subchapter, including a
second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within
one year of the date the judgment becomes final,
unless the petition alleges and the petitioner proves
that:
1
Contrary to our Rules of Appellate Procedure, Williams, who is represented
by counsel in this appeal, has failed to include a statement of questions
involved in his appellate brief. See Pa.R.A.P. 2111(a).
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(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the
result of interference by government officials with
the presentation of the claim in violation of the
Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the
Constitution or laws of the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were
unknown to the petitioner and could not have been
ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that
was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United
States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after
the time period provided in this section and has been
held by that court to apply retroactively.
(2) Any petition invoking an exception provided in
paragraph (1) shall be filed within 60 days of the
date the claim could have been presented.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b).
Williams’ judgment of sentence became final on or about April 18,
1995, which marked the end of the period in which he had to seek review by
the United States Supreme Court. See Commonwealth v. Dehart, 730
A.2d 991, 993 (Pa. Super 1999) (holding that judgment became final when
period for filing petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court lapsed). To be considered timely, therefore, Williams had to file any
PCRA petitions on or before April 18, 1996, unless he could establish an
exception contained in § 9545(b)(1).
Before us now are Williams’ second PCRA petition, filed May 18, 2012,
and the four amendments thereto that he filed between August 23, 2012
and February 1, 2014. These filings are blatantly untimely, and so Williams
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was required to establish one of the exceptions to the time bar for the PCRA
court to consider the claims raised therein.
In his second PCRA petition, Williams made numerous allegations of
ineffective assistance of counsel. He acknowledged the untimeliness of his
petition but attempted to establish the § 9545(b)(1)(iii) exception based
upon the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Martinez v. Ryan, __
U.S. __, 132 S.Ct. 1309 (2012). This Court has previously decided that the
United States Supreme Court’s decision in Martinez affects federal habeas
corpus law only and has no impact on how we interpret and apply the
PCRA’s time-bar. Commonwealth v. Saunders, 60 A.3d 162, 165 (Pa.
Super. 2013) (“While Martinez represents a significant development in
federal habeas corpus law, it is of no moment with respect to the way
Pennsylvania courts apply the plain language of the time bar set forth in
section 9545(b)(1) of the PCRA.”). Accordingly, reliance on Martinez will
not establish an exception to the PCRA’s time-bar.
In his first and second amendments, Williams argued that the United
States Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama, __ U.S. __, 132
S.Ct. 2455 (2012), created a newly-recognized constitutional right, thereby
establishing an exception to the PCRA’s time-bar. There is no merit to this
claim. As we have succinctly summarized, “[i]n Miller, the Supreme Court
of the United States recognized a constitutional right for juveniles under the
age of eighteen, holding that ‘mandatory life without parole for those under
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the age of [eighteen] at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition against ‘cruel and unusual punishments.’”
Commonwealth v. Cintora, 69 A.3d 759, 764 (Pa. Super. 2013).
However, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has held that the holding of
Miller does not apply retroactively. Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 81
A.3d 1, 7 (Pa. 2013). Furthermore, even if Miller could be applied
retroactively, Williams would not be entitled to relief. Williams had already
turned eighteen at the time he committed the crimes underlying his
sentence. Supplemental Addendum to PCRA Petition, 8/24/12, at 3. This
Court has conclusively established that Miller does not create a newly
recognized constitutional right in individuals that were over the age of
eighteen at the time they committed their offenses. Cintora, 69 A.3d at
764.
Next, Williams raised claims of ineffective assistance of counsel,
unlawful detainment, and the trial court’s lack of jurisdiction over him
because of an illegal arrest. With regard to the ineffectiveness claims,
Williams acknowledged that such claims “[are] not considered to be fall [sic]
within any of the three exceptions to the time bar.” Third Supplemental
Addendum to Petition for Post Conviction Relief, 8/28/13, at 2 n.2. To the
extent that Williams attempted, again, to raise Martinez as the exception to
the time bar for these claims, his attempt fails for the reasons discussed
above. William does not attempt to establish a time bar exception for the
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remaining claims. “The PCRA squarely places upon the petitioner the burden
of proving an untimely petition fits within one of the three exceptions.”
Commonwealth v. Jones, 591, 54 A.3d 14, 17 (Pa. 2012). Because
Williams failed in this regard, the PCRA court could not entertain these
claims.
In his last amendment, Williams alleged two bases for relief: that the
trial court lacked jurisdiction over him due to a defective criminal complaint
and that he was unlawfully incarcerated because the trial court did not
reduce his judgment of sentence to writing. Fourth Supplemental Addendum
to Petition for Habeas Corpus Relief and Post Conviction Relief, 2/10/14, at
3-7.
As noted by the PCRA court, the first of these claims is cognizable
under the PCRA. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(viii) (providing that a claim
that a proceeding occurred before a tribunal without jurisdiction must be
raised under the PCRA). Williams’ claim is that the because the criminal
complaint does not bear the seal of any issuing authority, the trial lacked
subject matter jurisdiction over his proceedings. Fourth Supplemental
Addendum to Petition for Habeas Corpus Relief and Post Conviction Relief,
2/10/14, at 3-4. At no point in making this claim, however, does Williams
allege or establish an exception to the time bar.
Williams also alleged that he was unlawfully detained because he was
incarcerated without a “[w]ritten [j]udgment of [s]entence [o]rder.” Id. at
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7. We agree with the PCRA court that this claim is not cognizable under the
PCRA. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2).2 Therefore, it was proper for the
2
This statute provides that to be entitled to relief under the PCRA, a
petitioner must establish
that the conviction or sentence resulted from one or
more of the following:
(i) A violation of the Constitution of this
Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the
United States which, in the circumstances of the
particular case, so undermined the truth-determining
process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or
innocence could have taken place.
(ii) Ineffective assistance of counsel which, in the
circumstances of the particular case, so undermined
the truth-determining process that no reliable
adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken
place.
(iii) A plea of guilty unlawfully induced where the
circumstances make it likely that the inducement
caused the petitioner to plead guilty and the
petitioner is innocent.
(iv) The improper obstruction by government officials
of the petitioner's right of appeal where a
meritorious appealable issue existed and was
properly preserved in the trial court.
(v) Deleted.
(vi) The unavailability at the time of trial of
exculpatory evidence that has subsequently become
available and would have changed the outcome of
the trial if it had been introduced.
(vii) The imposition of a sentence greater than the
lawful maximum.
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PCRA court to treat this as a habeas corpus claim. See Commonwealth v.
West, 938 A.2d 1034, 1044 (Pa. 2007) (holding claim that does not
implicate truth determining process or implicate the legality of the sentence
imposed falls outside of the PCRA and is properly addressed as petition for
writ of habeas corpus.).
As this is not a PCRA claim, it is not subject to the PCRA’s jurisdictional
time bar. However, Williams does not challenge the PCRA court’s denial of
this claim on appeal. See Williams’ Brief at 21-43. As such, it is not before
us to review.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/4/2015
(viii) A proceeding in a tribunal without jurisdiction.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2).
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